

ANNE O. CARY

Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy

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Q: This is an interview with Anne O. Cary on behalf of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and I am Charles Stuart Kennedy. Anne, let's start at the beginning. When and where were you born?

CARY: I was born in Washington, DC September, 1952. My father at that time worked for the Civil Aeronautics Board, but had been with various government agencies working on different aspects of aviation.

Q: What was your mother's background?

CARY: She was from the mid West, Chicago originally. She graduated from Stanford in 1946 and was working as a researcher at the Library of Congress when she met my father. She was one of a group of five women from Stanford who shared a suite at the Fairfax Hotel on Mass Ave. and worked for the government. Of the five, every one married someone involved in government.

Q: This was war time wasn't it?

CARY: Just after the war, 1947.

Q: This was one of the great genetic pools that was created in Washington and from which many of the next generation who have done well in Washington came from.

CARY: It was amazing how those five people met people and married off. Virtually all stayed in government to some extent.

Q: What was your father's background?

CARY: He was from Boston and was an aeronautical engineer. He had been a pilot with American Airlines, with Alaska Star when Alaska was still a territory, and worked for the Department of the Navy during the war. He was, however, aviation from the very beginning. After his initial stint in Washington, during and after World War II he went to private industry for a while but then came back to government and was with the FAA as administrator for international affairs.

Q: What was your family name?

CARY: Cary. I have kept my maiden name.

Q: Tell me a little bit about your early schooling.

CARY: We moved fairly frequently. When Dad left government originally we moved to New Jersey and he was with Curtiss Wright, which was an avionics manufacturer. I went to Catholic school, St. Luke's in Ho-Ho-Kus, New Jersey.

Q: With good nuns.

CARY: Good nuns with 50 kids in the class.

Q: But, no patent leather shoes?

CARY: No, but horrible green uniforms. It was a small town of about 2,000 white Protestants and Catholics.

Q: You then went to Catholic high school?

CARY: No, we then moved to New York, to Manhasset, when I was going into sixth grade, and there was no room in the Catholic school so I went to public school. This was 1963 and Manhasset was a well-to-do community on the north shore of Long Island. The courts ordered desegregation implemented at the very beginning of school year. There were demonstrations and federal marshals and TV cameras everywhere. It was a unique experience for me, as much because of the contrast with the town we had moved from, where everybody was ethnically the same as for the high profile stuff.

Q: You were getting really two things, both the desegregation which essentially meant African Americans coming into your school, but also you were a Catholic girl in a public school. We try to capture some social history while we are at this thing. Can you talk a bit about what you observed?

CARY: When you were in Catholic school there was a myth about what went on in public school. They supposedly were horrible kids and could do all sorts of things, were wild, would go up to the strip malls, went steady, etc. Of course, there really was no difference between the two. But there was very little interaction between the two groups and even at church you could tell who went to the public school and who went to the Catholic school. There was a distinction.

Manhasset also had a fairly large Jewish community. Yom Kippur, which I had never heard of before, was a school holiday. I started to learn about Jewish culture and Judaism in Manhasset.

Q: How did the integration go there?

CARY: Without a problem. The adults made such a big deal about it. Everybody was nervous. I remember the teacher saying, "Don't get out of your chair because somebody will come and sit in it and then you will have to stand for the rest of the day." After the cameras went away and the marshals, there were no problems, they just put in a couple of extra desks and kids came in and sat down. There was a difference in what the kids had learned. In math for example, the kids from the Valley school had not had the same type of "new" math which our school, Munsey Park had begun teaching. Same thing with the English program. I don't remember any incidents at the junior high level.

Q: Where did you go to high school?

CARY: We moved back to the Washington area, to Bethesda, Md. in 1965 and I went to Thomas Pyle for 8th and 9th grades and then to Walt Whitman High School. There you had a certain number of diplomats' kids so it was racially mixed, but again socially, economically everybody was from about the same level. In my graduating class we had 850 students and I think 8 were African Americans.

Q: Being in Bethesda, which is sort of the heart of the Washington establishment, were you getting any feel for the Foreign Service at the time?

CARY: I had one good friend whose family had been with AID. She moved in during 9th grade and had just come from Addis Ababa. She told great stories about how exotic Ethiopia was, tales of the wild man of Addis and armies of ants coming through the kitchen. They were just amazing. Her stories and positive experience were some of the reasons we ended up in Addis later on. There were lots of other kids with Foreign Service background as well. Alan Toon, Malcolm Toon's son, Mandy Kilham, Ed Kilham's daughter, Dave Meadows, John Meadows son and Tom Day, Pete Day's son were all friends.

I was always aware of the Foreign Service though because my uncle was in the Foreign Service. My aunt and uncle with their six kids would stay with us part of the time they were on home leave. They spent most of their time either in Moscow or Berlin.

Q: Where did you go to college?

CARY: I went to the University of Wisconsin at Madison.

Q: What sent you off that way?

CARY: That is where I got in. I had originally said I wanted to do psychology. Before I get into that, A little digression about my first overseas experience. I always wanted to go overseas, so I used my babysitting money when I was 16, the summer of Woodstock...I had friends who went to Woodstock but I went to Europe.

Q: Woodstock being a rock festival par excellence. This is where your generation went off and did its thing and you went the other way.

CARY: Right, I went to spend the summer in Europe. I flew the Davis Charter, which I think was \$200 round trip, and stayed with family friends in London. Raymond Prosser had been the British Air Attaché^{1/2} in Washington and most of the money I earned was babysitting for the two children who had accompanied them to the US. They had just moved back and lived right outside London. I spent a week with them. It was the week of Wimbledon and Prince Charles' investiture as Prince of Wales and left me feeling very Anglophile and in awe of everyday houses that were older than the United States.

I then boarded the boat-train for Germany, ever fearful that I wouldn't get on the right train car (marked Frankfurt). I managed to find it and took the military night train from Frankfurt into Berlin where I stayed with my Aunt Anne and Uncle David. Berlin was then still an occupied city, and the US was one of the occupiers. Life was pretty good for the American diplomats. The housing was spectacular. I got to see a lot, - my first opera, Checkpoint Charlie, the Pergamon museum in East Berlin. My 15 year-old cousin and I went off and made some trips around Europe, including Paris. We headed to Prague...coinciding with the first anniversary of Prague Spring, when the Soviets clamped down on the Czechs in 1968. My cousin Peter had a diplomatic passport and even though we had valid visas and were going to visit the US Ambassador, Mac Toon, we were not allowed to continue on to Prague. The police took us off the train somewhere in Czechoslovakia in the early morning and put us on a bus full of tourists and sent us into Nuremberg and just dropped us there. It was never really explained. We had to call the Toons and tell them we couldn't make it.

Q: Malcolm Toon was the ambassador in Prague at that time.

CARY: Right. His son Alan had been in school with me. It was my first real experience with a communist regime and it was not at all pleasant. I was 16 and my cousin was 15 and it was totally ridiculous. They may have known who we were, but I don't think so. They just yanked us off the train. We were the only ones.

Q: But that is the sort of thing at the age of 16 you really tuck away and turn into a real adventure.

CARY: Yes. Plus that meant we were on our own for a week because my aunt and uncle were in Spain. So, we went back to Berlin and were in the house for a week before an adult came back.

But it was interesting traveling in Europe at that point because I don't know now if I would let two 16 year olds wander through Europe. But there were very few problems. We didn't have any sense that anybody was going to harm us.

Q: I was a consular officer at that time and it really was easy to hitchhike around.

CARY: It didn't phase my aunt or uncle or my parents that here we were wandering around. We had somebody to touch base with everywhere if we needed them. We stayed in the cheaper hostels.

Q: Well, it was a great period. Well, then you went to the University of Wisconsin. Let me get the dates here. You were at the University of Wisconsin from when to when?

CARY: From 1970-73. I went there thinking that I wanted to study psychology, they had a great department. I went to one class and decided it was not for me. I took an international economics course which I thought was wonderful and I decided to major in that.

September 1970 was in the midst of a radical period for students. I arrived on campus right after the army math research center bombing.

Q: Wisconsin has always had a progressive thing.

CARY: It was very radical.

Q: Were you burning flags and bras and this sort of thing?

CARY: Not flags but we certainly went out and demonstrated against the Vietnam War. The bombing had been specifically aimed at the army math research center which was doing research for the Department of Defense.

Q: This was probably almost the worse episode of the protests. Some people were killed.

CARY: Yes, a man was killed. They did eventually catch those responsible. Those who did it had called in a warning but no one knew the man was there. The bomb blew out virtually every window within a half mile radius which was most of the campus buildings as well as the hospital's. The university didn't have the money to fix them all and it was well into the winter which is very cold in Madison, before they were all replaced. So, everybody was aware of the blast for a long time afterwards.

It was a very radical campus. In the Economics department much of the focus was around the land tenure center. It did a lot of work down in Chile.

Q: What was the land tenure?

CARY: Wisconsin was a land grant college so they had a heavy emphasis on agriculture and land use. The land tenure center looked at ownership patterns overseas and production techniques. Some major projects were in Chile and the students worked with the peasants, finding some inherent inequality in the system. So, you had that sort of radicalization...we are going to change the world, the world is unfair, things have to be made better. You had people going and living in Chile, particularly, but Mexico and a couple of other countries as well, who would come back and say, yes, the world is miserable and we have to change it. This was the time when people believed they could change the world and were going to change the world which was morally the only thing one could do. The means to change did not preclude the use of violence...

Q: Did you have the feeling that almost the students, and the more radical students, were patently in charge of the campus at the time? Part of the mix of any good university, in normal times at least, is that you have a rather mature, older professorial group that will say, "Okay," and you have young striving students full of ideas and you put the two together and there is a certain mix from which everybody benefits. It sounds like the balance was a little off at that time.

CARY: Yes, it was. In fact, Wisconsin had a limited number of out-of-state students and after the bombing there was a real call to decrease this number because they felt it was the out-of-state students who were the radicals causing these problems. Actually the people who did the bombing were from Wisconsin. Eighty percent of the school was from Wisconsin. At that point the school was trying to decide where to go. The Board of Trustees wanted to go one way, the President another way. There was a lot of discussion about changing the grading system - pass/fail was introduced. The curriculum was scrutinized to see whether or not it was "relevant".

I can remember that the president of one of the big ten universities had made the statement, "when the revolution comes." He had clearly bought into it, that yes, the revolution was coming and things were going to be changed. It was when students first began getting involved in tenure decisions, saying so-and-so had been denied tenure because they are teaching radical philosophy and approaches. You would have demonstrations. There were also "teach-ins". I remember one attempt during a course entitled, European History, 1840-1870, taught by a professor named George Mossey, who also taught at Hebrew University and had very strong views. This was a large lecture class of 500 or so students. One day somebody marched into the room and announced they were going to do a teach-in on Vietnam. Mossey stood there and said, "No you are not, I am covering this whatever part of history it was, in my class, and you just get out of here." But, most of the faculty at that time didn't try that. Some shared the more radical views and I assumed that others didn't really care.

Q: One did have the feeling a little bit that the lunatics were in charge of the asylum in a way. Maybe that is unfair, but it allowed those who were interested in power...young people having a wonderful time, but it must have been disruptive to others who were trying to get an education and had paid for it.

CARY: It seemed like such a social thing. It was the right-on radical thing to do. You had your little bandanna and when you went to demonstrations you were careful you didn't have anything on your head like a barrette because when you are hit by a billy club your head will bleed more. You had to have the right kind of work boots and blue jeans. And, it really was a party for the vast majority of people. We briefly talked about fundamentalism, Islamic fundamentalism. In a lot of ways you see the same thing in the universities in Morocco. It is socially a thing to do, it is not that most people are really committed. Certainly there were some people who were really committed and have continued with that life today, but for most people that was just what you did, the "in" thing to do.

Q: You started when, in 1970?

CARY: Yes, 1970.

Q: So, you weren't there for the Cambodian demonstrations and that sort of thing?

CARY: No, though in high school, Walt Whitman was a very politically aware place. I went and made sandwiches for the Poor People's Campaign and went down to the Mall and distributed them. I spent a week on an exchange at Cardoza High School. I worked on Gene McCarthy's campaign.

Q: For somebody who is reading this later on this was the elitist left. They do all the socially correct liberal agenda.

CARY: Exactly.

Q: How did your parents feel about all this?

CARY: They were very supportive most of the time. My mother opposed the Vietnam War fairly early on, but mostly because she thought it was stupid. I remember being back home for some demonstration, a march on Washington, and some friends had come from various places and were staying at our house and the debate between my parents was whether or not we could go because there was a threat of violence. When it came down that it was really more that they didn't want me to do it, I did it. Had it been safety...I wasn't really concerned, but no kid ever thinks anything is going to happen. It was the march against death, a Vietnam protest. I remember wearing a placard with some soldier's name who had died in Vietnam. You marched passed the White House and yelled the name and then marched up to the Capitol and put the card in a coffin. The most impressive thing about it was I think what people see with the Wall, the Vietnam Memorial, was just the number of people who died.

Q: I might add just for a sociological note, while you were doing this, at least for part of the time, I was US consul general in Saigon. Then you went to Ireland?

CARY: Yes, I went to Ireland to do basically a junior year abroad. It was not a program so I had to drop out of Wisconsin and apply to Trinity. This was just at the start of the trouble in Northern Ireland and there were a lot of bombings in Dublin, specifically. To me it was a real contrast to what had been going on with the protests in Wisconsin, the real thing. People who were really involved didn't talk about it and didn't say anything about it. There were one or two people that eventually I got to know who were involved with either the IRA or the UDA, because Trinity was majority Protestant.

Q: UDA being Ulster Defense Association.

CARY: Yes, and it was a radical Protestant group. There was one guy I talked to who was a Protestant from Northern Ireland, from Belfast, and he had been walking with a friend, another Protestant, through a Catholic area, and his friend was shot dead. He then went straight to the UDA. They trained him and gave him the name and picture of somebody and he went out and killed that person.

At one point I was pulled in by the police to support someone's alibi, to state that the person had actually been at a rehearsal. I was involved with a theatrical group called the Trinity Players. The police thought somebody had been involved with a terrorist act and were trying to corroborate whether or not he was where he said he was.

Q: Did you find yourself as an American, Catholic, and I assume you are of Irish extraction, emotionally sucked into this?

CARY: Not at all. I was horrified by it. It really showed what it is when you are playing for keeps. I can remember hearing bombs going off and knowing people who were injured. It was just a horrible thing. I was very disgusted to come back to the United States and see slogans, "Up the IRA," and at Irish pubs see people passing the hat for support of the IRA. You know both sides are murderers and this is not the way you are going to solve the problem.

Q: Also, I would think when you came back to Wisconsin you would feel that these were a bunch of kids playing around with ideas.

CARY: Absolutely. You could see how much of it really was social. How very few people really were serious about changing things. As we got closer to graduation the most important thing became finding a job for most people and social matters weren't as important. There had been a federal tax on phone bills and that was earmarked to defray some of the costs in Vietnam. So, every time the phone bill came, my roommates and I didn't pay the federal tax, writing a note that this was a protest against the war, etc. The phone was in my name and eventually I did get a bill for the \$19.20, but by that time Vietnam had been more or less resolved so I went ahead and paid the bill.

Q: I noticed that as soon as college students stopped being drafted, the protests went way down and one wondered if the commitment was still there, particularly after Vietnam fell in 1975 and thousands of boat people came out and you didn't see the same students rallying to help or do anything.

CARY: In fact, it was interesting how it worked out because my mother got involved through her community teaching English to Cambodians. She didn't believe in the war in Vietnam but she wasn't going to do anything, but she was the one who was out teaching this family how to cope with living in America as opposed to the radical students, even me (I was out of the country at the time).

Q: Well, you graduated when?

CARY: I graduated December, 1973.

Q: What was your major?

CARY: It was international economics. I put together my own major because I didn't want to go to graduate school, I wanted to work. So I was able to put together a program which gave me enough credits so I could apply for a job. Creditwise it was equivalent to a masters in terms of economics courses. So of course my first job was as a waitress at the Holiday Inn. I earned more money there than with my first professional job which was as an economist with the Civil Aeronautics Board. I had taken the Foreign Service exam in December, 1973.

Q: Wisconsin kicks a lot of people into the Foreign Service, particularly as labor attachés. A strong labor movement came out of Wisconsin. A good friend of ours, Larry Eagleburger came out of Wisconsin. Was there a thrust for the Foreign Service or were people sort of turned off. I am wondering about your generation, how did they feel about the Foreign Service?

CARY: The international aspect had an appeal at that time. You were going to be out doing something to save the world. A number of people did believe it was better to be in a system than fighting against it. You had people going into professions, law or medicine or social work or people going into do-good organizations. Business was not a consideration for most. Most of my friends who were more on the moderate side and were fairly serious in their academic studies thought that it was great that I could get a job. Most of them couldn't.

Q: What did you do at the CAB and how did you get into that?

CARY: I had worked in the summers at the CAB library so I knew it. They had an opening for an international economist so I applied. I was on the civil service registry where you go in for an interview and because I had worked there during the summers they knew who I was. I got the job, a GS-5, I think.

Q: A little lower than waitressing.

CARY: Absolutely, I made a lot more money waitressing than I did at the CAB. I did Canada Air Taxis and the Caribbean. At the point Freddy Laker was working on...

Q: Freddy Laker was a British entrepreneur with resorts and airlines for the masses.

CARY: Yes, and it was just after the price hikes, the gasoline price hikes. The CAB was still regulating fares and a lot of what I did was just calculating whether or not a fare made sense on a certain route with certain planes. It was very interesting to see what we were trying to prove. The general philosophy was to limit the number of foreign carriers flying in to the US and to expand the number of points accessible to US carriers overseas. State was the lead negotiator for aviation negotiations. When a country requested a new route we would consult with the US carriers, Pan Am for the most part at the time.

Q: Did you find yourself, at least from the lower level, watching the yen and the yang where we want to keep those foreign airlines out of our airports but at the same time we want to get our good American airlines into those European places?

CARY: Yes. It was very interesting to see because most of these Caribbean countries fell under old treaties that had been signed with a colonial power. So a lot of them were really the UK. The UK still had interests. It was clear that the CAB in this case was there to promote US carriers' interest. When the CAB was abolished, one of the issues was what is a US carrier anymore, you can't really tell, and even at that point they had proliferated, so TWA was also a major international carrier, and then you had the other domestic ones just starting to operate internationally.

Q: How long were you doing that?

CARY: Briefly. I did it for about six months. I started in January, 1974 and I went to State in June.

Q: You had taken the Foreign Service exam?

CARY: I had taken the Foreign Service exam in December. It was during the brief stint when you took a specialty exam (political, economic, admin, consular). I took it in economics. There was also an English and general knowledge portion (cocktail party conversation) as well as the functional area.

Q: Did you take the oral exam?

CARY: Yes, I took it in February.

Q: February what?

CARY: 1974.

Q: Can we talk a little bit about the oral exam? I am always curious how these change.

CARY: It was in Arlington. There were three examiners, a woman and two men. They gave the written biographies of each one. Then we sat around...I remember there were ashtrays and I smoked at that point. It was a very casual, comfortable type of situation. They would ask questions. I remember one was if I were the commercial attaché^{1/2} in Germany what I would recommend to a US company who wanted to put in car washes. Would that be a good investment? I said I really didn't know and they asked how I would go about finding out whether it would be a good idea or not. Well, I said something about seeing who was washing cars, were they washing the cars because they wanted to wash the car or because they wanted the car to be clean?

Another one of the questions was was there any US policy that I could not defend? They did ask why I went to Wisconsin and did I have radical tendencies and what did I believe? I did say that I found the bombing of the dikes in North Vietnam to be a policy that I personally could not defend. I could say that the US government position is that it was justifiable. I had no problem with that. But if somebody asked me personally I would give them my personal feelings. That didn't seem to bother them at all.

Q: In the summer of 1974-75, I was one of the panelists that used to give that exam and we would look at the background of the person. If you did come from Wisconsin we would say, well, let's find out a little bit about how they feel. We had people who were in the SDS, which is a radical thing, but it was all right, there was no problem, people go through stages. But we wanted to know if they could defend their position and were articulate and could think on their feet.

CARY: I also had the feeling that they pushed you so at some point you said, "I don't know." And, if you didn't say, "I don't know," then you didn't pass. If you just bluffed and it was obvious that you were bluffing, then you didn't make it. You could bluff to a certain extent but then you had better know when to quit.

Q: I felt it was quite a good exam because I felt we were looking at the person, rather than now when it is very impersonal.

CARY: You also wrote an autobiography. The whole thing took less than an hour. They then sent me out and called me back a couple of minutes later and said, "Congratulations, go down and get fingerprinted." They actually did offer me a place in the March class, but I couldn't leave the CAB that quickly. When they did my security interview my application had "Urgent" stamped on it. It was just about the time when they had to bring in more women and I am convinced they didn't have very many female economists.

Q: Well, I am sure they wanted more women, but also being an economist and having been overseas and made these connections, made you a prime candidate.

CARY: I think it was a good thing to move rapidly. It is something as I saw when my husband entered the Foreign Service. They wait so long before offering a position. Most people have to make other decisions in the time it took State to process an applicant. So, I thought the speed that they can move when they want to was a good thing. For somebody who was just getting started it worked very well. It was rapid enough. They pushed through everything very quickly. It was clear that their numbers had to be improved.

Q: I was on the board about that time and we were looking for more women and minorities. So, you started when?

CARY: In June, 1974.

Q: Can you describe and characterize a bit about your A100 course?

CARY: Yes. We were the 113th class.

Q: I was class 1.

CARY: Oh, really?

Q: I mean they started other numbering later on, but I think you were of that continual.

CARY: There were 40 or so FSOs. I was the youngest. In fact at that point it was the 50th anniversary of the Rogers Act and I was the youngest FSO. So, I was in State Magazine as the youngest FSO.

Q: The Rogers Act being the act which created the Foreign Service in 1924.

CARY: There were about eight women. One had been in before but had been forced to resign when she got married and had been reinstated, a consular officer. One was a former playboy bunny, she had done that while in school to make money. There were some ex-Peace Corps volunteers. It was a fairly diverse group, an older group with more and more people over 30 because the age limit had been dropped. We had a couple of people in their forties. Most people were not married. The A-100 class lasted for a six week period.

One of the things I remember most was a lecture about social entertaining. We were told you should always serve dinner with parsley so that people can hid things they don't like under it.

I can remember going out to Harper's Ferry.

Q: It was sort of a retreat wasn't it?

CARY: Right.

Q: A sort of bonding process where you had all day and long night sessions and really get to know people.

CARY: I remember playing poker. Gib Lanpher was one of the counselors. And Ed Stumpf was my counselor at that point. People were trying to figure out where they would be going and what was going on. The award for the worst first post went to Sally Barr who went to Mogadishu.

Q: I think with justification. That or Bangladesh would qualify anyone for that honor.

CARY: It was an interesting group and one sort of keeps track of people in later years.

Q: Now, you were the generation coming out of the Vietnam protest. Vietnam was falling at that point, things were not going well. What was the attitude towards the government, what the individual officer should do, the ethics, etc.?

CARY: It was a good thing that Vietnamization was the policy of the day. This meant that the number of FSOs being sent to Vietnam was way down and the Department wasn't forcing people to go. A number of people would not have accepted such an assignment. That was clear. I don't know if it is true or not but I believe one whole class went to Vietnam once.

Q: Oh, yes. At a certain point it was just part of the process of recruiting. You got these young people and that was where they went for their first tour.

CARY: So, that wasn't happening, but had it been happening there were a number, I am sure, who would not have gone. Because they weren't forcing anyone into a Vietnam assignment, nobody felt they had a moral dilemma.

Q: How would you characterize people feeling about their careers and whether Anne Cary, is this a real career or what?

CARY: People came in with the idea of trying it out and seeing whether it worked. It might be good and it might not be good. Very few people, I think, (except for those coming in as a second career, more or less,) were certain this was really what they wanted to do. My attitude was I will do this as long as it is fun but will stop as soon as it stops being fun and will do something else.

Q: At the beginning were you picking up any sexist vibes? This is the time when the culture is beginning to change as far as women in the Foreign Service and all this, but it was still pretty early on.

CARY: There was definitely an attitude. Because I was so young I don't think it bothered me as much as it would had I been older. But, I was so much younger than everybody else around that when people condescended, I interpreted it to mean, "Of course, I'm the new person on the block," and that was fine with me.

Q: You would go for the coffee or something?

CARY: Right, I will fix your coffee. I can remember a Christian Science Monitor journalist walking into the office and looking at me and saying, "I like my coffee with two sugars." So, I got up and got the coffee and went and sat down. He realized when I sat down at the table that I wasn't a secretary. It was also a time when secretaries had a lot of problems with female officers because it is a difficult situation. A lot of these were the old time Foreign Service secretaries, many who had college degrees and just simply weren't given the opportunity to become officers, and here comes this young kid who is an officer telling me, how to do this job I've been doing for 20 years. There was a lot of tension. Most of the men I found to be pretty paternalistic which didn't bother me much. And people were "Oh, oh! You can do that. Isn't that amazing." But, because there weren't that many females around, people would remember me and to me that was an advantage. It was, "Oh, yes, it is the girl." And it was "the girl," as nobody would call me a woman at that point. And there was a big thing about using "Ms." It took a long time for the Department to use "Ms".

The attitude towards women was not as negative as I think it got later on when people started believing that the gender was more important than talent, saying, "It is a woman, that is why. They had to have her do that." There was no sense that women were being given preferential treatment at that point. Women officers, particularly in political or economic work were still enough of a rarity and still having to prove that they could hold their own in the Foreign Service. So, the sense was a little strange.

I think in the workplace it could become uncomfortable because people really didn't know how to deal with a woman, especially for a lot of the older men. If you were overseas and the control officer and invited to go out to dinner, it was all of a sudden awkward. It put men in a situation where they really didn't know what they were supposed to do, what the ground rules were. Sometimes I think people were making passes because they weren't sure whether they were supposed to or not. That part of the etiquette had not been decided yet, how you deal with a colleague outside the office or even inside the office. There were people who were really used to dealing with women in a certain way and would continue to do that in a work situation.

Q: I was part of this and it was difficult. I think all of us were going through a learning process. In a way the paternalism thing could be helpful because as a more senior officer there were a couple of younger women who I kind of took under my wing, as I think many of us did, and really pushed. It was kind of fun to watch them being ambassadors. I have been to a number of ceremonies. But in a way it was discrimination of a reverse sort, but there was a paternalism behind it which isn't a bad thing. I think at a certain point senior officers should take younger people under their wing and push. I think it was easier for many of us to do it with women than with men.

CARY: I did think the age thing did make a difference, because older women really resented it more. Many of them were bringing in something from a second career and felt that they were being treated in a condescending way. There was one case where there was a male supervisor, two women and another man in an office. The supervisor basically condescended to everybody. He would say, "Now you write a memo and say TO: so-and-so, and put these points in it and do this and that and the other thing." I looked and saw that he treated everybody that way, even the minister-counselor, because that was his approach to things. But the other woman really took it as pure condescension and denigration of her ability.

There was no effort to tell people how to deal with these problems. That one particularly came out very badly as it degenerated into a fight over a leave slip. An easy way to get back at people is to deny leave or to take unauthorized leave.

Q: We are talking about a time when the unwritten corridor rules were being setup. Did you find yourself able to tap into a women's network? Or was the generational thing between the older women who had clawed their way up the hard way and you who had come in with perhaps the skids greased just a little bit to get more women in, or at least that was the perception, were you able to find women role models?

CARY: There simply were not very many senior women at the time. My first job was in the Ops Center and Regina Eltz was there. But senior women were single and they were not a role model for me because I didn't want to be single all of my life. To me there was a difference because they had given up everything for their career and I was not going to give up everything for that career. It was partly seeing women, not just officers but secretaries as well, who had lived for their jobs and were left at the end with not even a place to live. Later on there was more variation, but early on there were just not very many senior women in a position to go out of their way to make an effort for other women.

Q: Your first assignment was to the Ops Center?

CARY: Yes.

Q: From when to when?

CARY: From July, 1974-May 1975. So I was in the Ops Center for the fall of Vietnam.

Q: In the first place, an assignment to the Ops Center, as I have done these interviews, I have found the Ops Center is often the key to many people's successful career and is usually something you earn after you have been out and around. To take a brand new A100 person and throw them into it is rather unusual.

CARY: Yes, it was and normally they wouldn't do it. It was usually a second or third posting. I ended up there because I wanted to stay in Washington and because the person who had the job was a guy who resigned suddenly. His letter of resignation quoted John Denver "he was born in the summer of his 32nd year". He just quit to go off to find, you know...

Q: John Denver was a singer and song writer. How would you characterize him?

CARY: As a hippy.

Q: Okay.

CARY: So, this guy just decided the Foreign Service was too confining for him and left. So, they needed somebody right away. I always thought it was because I beat Gib Lamfer in poker and he thought maybe I could do it. Chuck Redman was the other person in my class who went there. They had two opening. It was a very interesting time. The people who were there at the same time, Maurice Elam was the director, Roland Kuchel was the deputy. The other AWO (assistant watch officer) were Wes Egan, Jock Covey, Joanne Artz, John Wolf . It was a very interesting group. You worked on teams and would switch jobs. You would be an editor for a while, you would be what was called an AWO, the person who takes the incoming immediate cables and reads through them very quickly to see if there is any action that has to be done or whether you have to alert somebody. My view was that basically you were baby sitting the world. You were there so if something went wrong you called the right person. It gave a great overview of how the Department worked, how the decisions were made, how the information was passed, how much was really done over telephones. We had hostage situations, and hijackings. I was there when "Eagle Pull" went through.

Q: That was the evacuation of Cambodia.

CARY: Right. And when Ambassador Davies was killed.

Q: Yes, in Cyprus

CARY: We had this open line and you heard what happened.

Q: Could you talk a bit about what happened and your reaction?

CARY: You realized that you really could die. His secretary was also hit at the time. I had been in the Ops Center about nine or ten months. Cyprus had been evacuated three times during that period. The embassy had destroyed all of their communications because they kept having anti-American demonstrations. This last time a car went through into USIS. There was an open lattice work between the vault and where the main embassy was. They were sending everybody into the vault and the ambassador was one of the last people to go. There was stray fire going through...it just showed that there was no security...I mean I don't think anyone knew they were shooting the ambassador, his secretary was also hit. But George Twohie was the DDO (Deputy Director of Operations) at that point and the ambassador had been his best man. To have to go on and do your job in that circumstance...

Q: Were you listening...?

CARY: Through an open line they were saying..."They are shooting, we are getting everybody out." And then somebody came on saying the ambassador and his secretary have been shot. You just hear this. That was standard procedure whenever you have a crisis situation, you would establish an open line with the embassy because in some cases once you lost your line you couldn't get back in. We had the kidnapping of Barbara Hutchison in Santo Domingo.

Q: The USIA officer.

CARY: There was a consular agent somewhere in South America and he was killed. It was my first experience with US citizen services. The airport roof collapsed in Tehran and the wire services kept reporting that a US citizen was dead. We called the embassy, and here I was an O-8, there is nothing lower than an O-8, and actually got the DCM out of bed and told him that somebody has to be able to tell us whether or not this person is dead now. We finally could confirm yes. The wife called back to the Ops Center. You're supposed to tell her, "The consular officer is trying to reach you." but you have the woman on the phone and have been talking with her every 20 minutes. You can't just sort of say, "Oh, the consular duty officer"....you are telling her, you might as well say, "I'm sorry, yes, it is confirmed and somebody will be in touch with you about arrangements." That was the first time I ever had to tell somebody someone was dead. It made me decide I never really wanted to do consular work. It was pretty awful.

Q: This was doing the Kissinger period. Did you get a feel about how he and some of his deputies operated?

CARY: Oh, yes, indeed. Larry Eagleburger was his special assistant at that point. Dave Gompert and Jerry Bremer were in the front office. Kissinger used the Operations Center a lot. He would patch calls through. Or we would deliver things to his house. We would send him the international soccer scores, he kept track of German soccer. But, if there was a NODIS that had to go...

Q: "NODIS" means no distribution other than the Secretary or some other principal.

CARY: We would take envelopes out to the house if he had to do things. He didn't treat his staff very well. He really had a fairly high disregard for other people's time and yet people who worked for him felt a very strong loyalty to him, that he really was a genius. People who were doing the Mid-East shuttle at that point believed he was just amazing. We would patch calls through because you couldn't call from Cairo to Israel. We would patch the call through the Ops Center and you stayed on a patched call.

Q: Was it a practice that you monitored a patched call?

CARY: Pretty much, and a lot of them were taped. We were still taping up to a point, there was a beep. We logged everything so we were supposed to be aware of what was going on and then people would tell us to do something. They would have a conversation and then say, "Okay, Op Center, would you call so-and-so, so-and-so and so-and-so."

Q: Well, it made sense. These are not private conversations, they are working conversations on government time and money.

CARY: Exactly. The big issue was that so much classified was discussed on the phone. And, if you really wanted to know what was going on it was all over the phone. People just didn't wait to send a cable when something really happened.

That was another thing about being a woman. I can remember answering a NOIWON which was the intelligence community alert and the scrambler phone could not pick up my voice because it was too high. A technician got on the phone and said, "I am sorry, Ma'am, I realize you are the duty officer, but could you please put a male on the phone? Because the upper ranges don't get scrambled." The military standard was limited. That has been changed since, but that was an issue.

Q: Well, it is true. I have found on radio links that a female voice doesn't come through as well in announcing as a male voice does, particularly those males who speak lower.

CARY: Right.

Q: What was the Ops Center doing then re Cambodia and Vietnam?

CARY: There was a military representative who had an office in the Ops Center, actually a couple of them and a DOD guy. They would keep a big chart where the North Vietnamese troops were and where the South Vietnamese troops were.

It was very clear towards the end when we still had Americans in Cambodia, that the shelling could reach the embassy, there was no question about it. The ambassador, at that time John Gunther Dean, wanted out. There was no doubt about that. He felt we were putting people at danger. There was a vote in Congress about additional assistance and basically people were told to stay until that vote was done and as soon as it was over, we pulled out of Cambodia.

And then Graham Martin in Saigon just would not come out when he should have.

Q: Wasn't there a feeling in the Ops Center of "Come on fellow, do something." CARY: Absolutely, it was so clear that the decisions being made at post were delaying and really threatening the situation. He kept saying, "When we pull out there will be no hope for the Vietnamese." But you had to for the Americans and he waited too long.

Q: Were you aware of other people talking on the line saying they could do nothing until the ambassador says such and such?

CARY: Yes, people at post wanted out too, they thought he was waiting too long too. And at that point working in S/S-S (another part of the secretariat) were Lionel Rosenblatt and Craig Johnston who had both served in Vietnam and they went back and got out friends.

So, there was a lot of discussion at the time as to what was morally right and the fact that by delaying, all of these people who had been promised a way out, well it was clear we were not going to be able to help them. That was just not acceptable to an awful lot of people.

Q: So many had had Vietnam experience so this wasn't a distant unknown land. How did the Ops Center work during the days that led up to Vietnam's fall and then the evacuation?

CARY: They set up a task force in the task force area which is adjacent to the Ops Center, so you could bring in people who were just concentrating on that. Again there would be an open line. I can remember Larry Eagleburger being in the Ops Center eating spring rolls when the evacuation started. Then, I went off shift. But, I was there when the order went out to bring in the choppers. It was just time, it was so late. People were sad, there were people who were crying.

Q: Was there any feeling of maybe too much is left to the ambassador? Were you getting calls from the NSC?

CARY: I don't remember NSC on that, but I do remember concerning the Mayaguez incident.

Q: Could you talk a bit about the Mayaguez incident?

CARY: Yes. That was an American ship that was seized off the coast of Cambodia. It was interesting because when the original message came across everybody sort of looked at it. American vessels were getting seized all over the world at the time.

Q: Like tuna boats, etc.

CARY: Right. They are usually fishing vessels. This was a cargo vessel. We looked at the report and finally decided to run it as a late item for the Secretary's summary which goes to the White House. A Secretary's Morning Summary was three pages and no more. It really briefed the most important events that day, usually taken from cable reporting from all over the world. To run a late item you did it as a single sheet at the very front so it captured attention. I have always wondered if that had not been run as a late item, whether or not we would have sent in the marines to try to free them. There was a helicopter crash in which, if I remember, 19 marines were killed. It was a decision made at the White House to send the marines and it was one of those you wondered whether it was really justified. The intent seemed to be to show the world that we were not going to put up with such things. As I say, American ships are seized all the time and usually nothing happens, we don't go in shooting.

Q: Well, there was very much a macho type thing with the Ford Administration kind of new and wanting to show it was tough, I think. How about hostage situations? Were there any?

CARY: There were a couple of hijackings during that time. But dealing with them was a pretty standard procedure. You had your check list and you just made your alerts. The S/CCT, terrorism people, Lou Fields was the coordinator at the time. He would come and set up shop right in the Ops Center, talking and making contact with whatever government it was at the time. That was the no negotiation policy.

Q: Was there any debate about the no negotiation policy?

CARY: Yes, particularly when you wondered if some of the demands were not too onerous. Then there is always the drawing the line as to what is negotiation. Dialogue was the whole idea, but dialogue was not negotiation.

Q: It was one of the big ethical things. In interviewing Tony Gillespie, who was involved in some of these down in Mexico, as a general services officer, saying that the Nixon/Kissinger combination was very tough, but it wasn't practical. It was sort of domestic political posturing but wasn't really dealing with the situation on the ground.

CARY: No. And you thought when people were killed whether it was worth it, whether it was really the right thing or not.

Q: Again you were in this wonderful position of being a very young, very new officer. Did you hear or get involved in any clashes among the great personalities in State Department or overseas?

CARY: Moynihan. We used to get Moynihan cables. He was ambassador to India at the time. You often got angry ambassador cables from all over the world and there were some real characters. They were normally restricted channels, usually going to the Secretary. The ambassador would basically be saying that he didn't agree with this policy, or this is really stupid, or whatever. Well, Moynihan used to send in his angry ambassador cables as Limited Official Use with a broad distribution so everybody could read them. We would then have to reclassify them and pull back all the extra copies. He was always pointing out the error of a policy that we were doing with India. You could always count on him for one or two well-written angry ambassador messages.

Kissinger so dominated what was going on. There were debates that went on on ethics and things. I remember going to talk to Larry Eagleburger about our policy in Cambodia. He had time for me to come in and say that I thought it was a mistake to be holding the people hostage, the American FSOs hostage in the embassy, and that they should be allowed to leave. I really didn't think it was right to hold people hostage to the US budgetary process. He said, "Yes." He listened and came back with the explanation of what happened and the fact that their trigger points...if they had actually shelled the embassy they would have pulled people out. But, he was very open and always willing to discuss matters.

Q: This must have been quite a heady time and you probably were never as close to what the State Department was doing again.

CARY: Right. From there I was staff assistant for the Under Secretary for Economic Affairs, Chuck Robinson, from 1975-76.

Q: What did that job entail?

CARY: It was more or less a gofer. Staff assistants are generally junior officers who go through the morning traffic, the cables, and all the paperwork for somebody. You sort it in order of importance, the issues they are following, what they might want to see, whoever their appointments are that day. If there was something in the newspapers or some specific item of interest you would point it out to them. This was not only for the principal but there were five or six special assistants in the office and everyone was following something. So, you made sure that everybody saw things. There is just so much paper that comes into the office, you make sure they see things they are interested in that they might not otherwise see. I sat in all the meetings that the Under Secretary had and was given a few special projects to work on myself.

Q: This was the end of the Ford Administration. Tell me a bit about Charles Robinson? What was his background?

CARY: He from business. He had been in international mining, Marcona Corporation. This was an interesting subject because at this point Marcona had been expropriated and the US government was trying to get their money back. but because Mr. Robinson had been involved he couldn't see anything about it. So, partly what would I was doing was making certain he wasn't brought into any of the discussion.

Q: Who had expropriated it?

CARY: Peru. They had just taken over all the mines and the equipment as well. Chuck Robinson really had not much to do with government directly. He came from California to take the job. So, he was a Washington outsider.

Q: How long had he been in there by the time you arrived?

CARY: He had just arrived.

Q: So you came about the same time.

CARY: He was putting together his office at that point.

Q: I think it is always interesting to see how somebody who is brought into a very responsible position from outside the government operates while learning the business. What was your impression about how he both learned about how the government operated and how he worked within the government?

CARY: The structure for coordinating economic policy is the beginning ground and there were multiple agencies involved. Some of the issues that he was dealing with at the time were the North/South dialogue, the Russian wheat deal, and the whole issue of the UN money. The prevailing political view was that the US should not be playing such a major role and the UN was bad, but how could we use certain things in the UN to carry on our goals. At the same time the bureaucracy at State was such...you had Tom Enders as the assistant secretary. Traditionally there has been tension between the assistant secretary and the under secretary.

Q: And Tom Enders was a very confrontational and domineering person.

CARY: Right. The physical differences between the two men were also striking. Chuck Robinson was small and slight and Tom Enders is extremely tall.

Q: Tom Enders is around 6'8", or something like that.

CARY: You could see that Chuck Robinson was well aware of the tensions and how to work around them, what niches to take and what niches not to take. He was not a confrontational person at all.

William Simon was Secretary of the Treasury and John Dunlop, another short guy, was Secretary of Labor. There was a weekly meeting which was supposed to be at the Secretary level but was at the Under Secretary level, to discuss all the economic input. Robinson was the one to attend that meeting. At this point in international economic policy, Treasury was more or less running it. You would get people from the State Department trying to get State's position. They would come in and make their pitch as to how Robinson was to present their issues in the State Department's favor. There was a lot of that, just bureaucratic infighting between Treasury, Commerce, USTR and State.

Q: You were obviously sort of the fly on the wall, not actually part of it. How did you feel State handled itself? Was there the feeling of confrontation, that State had a different agenda than Treasury?

CARY: Yes. But, there was also the feeling that Treasury would win. People were very careful to sound out people to find out how much maneuverability there was going to be on adopting a particular position. On one or two issues it would go to the President and he would not necessarily follow Treasury's advice, particularly if it had a great foreign policy implication.

Q: Of course, Kissinger was Secretary of State, and preeminent within the Cabinet when it really got down to the nitty gritty. Kissinger had the last say with Nixon.

CARY: But on foreign policy. Kissinger regularly avoided economic issues. We would have a decision paper that Mr. Robinson had sent up and you would go ask Kissinger's staff assistants where it was and it would be at the bottom of the pile at which time you would take it out and put it at the top of the pile again. Jerry Bremer, Kissinger's special assistant, said he just picks them up and puts them down and deals with other things. Some of these things were, oh, circular 175s, which was authority to negotiate, and you really had to have them signed. Frequently what would happen you would wait for Kissinger to travel and the acting Secretary would sign them and that was how they got signed. Once or twice I can remember saying, "He has to sign these things, we have a negotiating team out there and without the authority they can't conclude the agreement. We basically have the agreement." I think Kissinger had made the decision that he wasn't going to mess with Treasury on hard monetary issues. But there were some things, like the Soviet wheat deal, where State firmly said this was an issue we want to pursue as it is going to be good for the American farmer and for policy.

Q: Were there any issues, from your position, that you particularly found interesting?

CARY: Yes, the North/South dialogue.

Q: What was State's policy on this?

CARY: That we should be doing more. By not doing more it was impeding our ability to get anything done in any forum. Every issue came back to the South criticizing the US and other industrialized countries. Not much was getting done. India and Yugoslavia were a major spokesman for the non-aligned, saying we can not talk about anything in an international forum because it is unfair. We need more resources. So, the idea was to find a way to more or less settle that issue. To show that we were willing to do some things, but they had to do more. So a Conference for International Economic Cooperation was one of these talk forums that was set up...UNCTAD (United Nations Trade and Development) also had one of their major conferences.

So there was a lot of focus spent on trying to more or less satisfy the South to be able to get on with the other issues that the United States wanted to accomplish. There were true believers, but it was more or less let's shut these people up so we can get other things done.

Q: What about the Soviet Union's role at this particular time in this? It was technically a developed country but one could question it, but it was considered part of the North.

CARY: They were not really involved. They said they had their own programs, a lot of which was technical assistance. Many of the poorer countries were very happy with the Soviets and the Chinese who would send a lot of people to work in their country and do major infrastructural projects, and provide a lot of scholarships for technical study. So, they more or less said, "We are doing it." And the poorer countries more or less agreed.

Q: So other pressure was on Western Europe and the United States?

CARY: Right.

Q: How about Japan?

CARY: To a lesser extent. Japan was really just starting to get involved and give some money to the international arena, but even at this time, Japan was not yet a major consideration. They would give money, not very much, and that was all.

Q: As a staff assistant you are running around between the political bureaus, how did you find the various political bureaus and the Under Secretary for Economics? I mean, were they reflecting the Secretary of State's feelings of "Oh, God, I wish these things would go away?"

CARY: It depended on which bureau. Africa, obviously cared a lot. The European bureau, too, because the Europeans were very much seized with this issue as well. So you would get response from them. The others, I can't remember anything about them. It was not a major political issue for them.

Q: Were there any other issues that you particularly noted?

CARY: Well, there was a lot of controversy over the Soviet grain deal, whether it was a good or bad thing. Should we be trading with the Soviets? It was all very, very quiet until it happened. Deane Hinton at that point was working in the office, he had been PNGed out of Zaire and was parked in Robinson's office, and he was working on the grain deal. I had the applications of the team that was going on to Moscow on my desk with their Russian visas and Helmut Sonnenfeldt, who at that point was Counselor of the Department, and very involved in anything to do with Soviet affairs, came in and just yelled at me saying anybody could come up to my desk (they were upside down on my desk), see that these were applications for Russian visas, and realize that obviously something was going on. I should be much more careful about this type of information.

It was an interesting deal because we had gone in with different interests and different goals than the ones we came out with and selling it to both Congress and the rest of the Administration when it was not a complete deal was an interesting thing. It was one, again, that Enders totally opposed.

Q: Was it a domestic political issue of helping the farmers but also one of not letting the Soviets off the hook and make them suffer for having such an inefficient system?

CARY: That is exactly it. It was a disastrous year for the Soviet harvest. We would look at satellite pictures of the grain field and do estimates of what the harvest was going to be and how much they needed to buy, because the year before they had come in and bought at a very low price and driven up the price for the rest of the world. So people wanted to be sure that that didn't happen again. That was one of our main concerns. We wanted to make sure we controlled their purchases and that they, indeed, were paying a fair price for what they were doing. But the real hard liners felt that by giving them grain at a reasonable price we were allowing them to use money that they would have used to buy grain and then have more to spend on their military program. The hard line argument was that feeding a soldier was just as bad as giving him bullets or shoe laces or anything else. That was what the controversy was. There were a lot of people who had the mind set that any trade with the Soviets is a bad thing because it allowed them to get it cheaper than if they had to get it themselves.

Q: What were your boss and his staff pushing?

CARY: For a specific amount of grain agreed in advance. It was a ten year agreement. What we were looking for was a minimum commitment over a ten year period and consultations for any purchases that had to go above that. This is more or less similar to the PL 480 program in that you have a usual marketing requirement and each country we give assistance to have to continue to buy what they normally would so that donated grain or cheaper grain doesn't displace existing markets.

Q: As you mentioned, there had been the feeling that the Soviets had pulled a fast one on us prior. They had a real problem but had gotten a very good deal and this was sort of one of these never again things.

CARY: Yes. It was interesting because they renegotiated the grain agreement at the end of the ten years, because it worked for both sides. That was the interesting part of trying to sell it, the fact that it worked for the Soviets as well as ourselves, people thought of it as a negative and not a positive. You tried to explain that in a trade agreement both sides have to come out better than when going in or it doesn't work. But people really didn't see things that way.

Q: You had less than a year there. Did you come out with any feelings about how the upper ranks of the State Department work?

CARY: Yes, I did. I decided it wasn't worth it to be in the upper ranks. You worked extraordinarily long hours...a 16 hour day was not at all unusual. You spent a lot of time just doing things that were more or less unproductive. A lot of it was ceremonial. You have to meet with the visiting so-and-so whether you want to or not. You have to go to all these meetings. I must say there were very few meetings that gave me the impression of coming out with any reasonable results, or any result. It was just "Yes, we checked off, we had a meeting." Never that any decisions had been made in the meeting. Eventually something was decided. There was a great deal of frustration because rarely was the principal able to achieve what they wanted to do. That is something that both Chuck Robinson and Bob Ingersoll, who was Deputy Secretary and out of the business world too, couldn't understand. If you are a CEO, you get it your way. When you are an under secretary, you don't get it your way. You don't have that ability to say that this is how it is going to be. So, my impression was that after all the effort you put into it, and it is a lot of effort, the return was rather minimal.

Q: So, you didn't get a thirst for that?

CARY: No. In fact it had exactly the opposite effect. That the best thing to do was to take jobs that you enjoyed and wanted to do rather than shoot for the top. However, there were a lot of people at that point, the other staff assistants and special assistants, who really did want it, who felt that that was enough, you did at least leave a thumb print on policy.

Q: I was never put into a high pressure job like that but my gut feeling was that I also avoided it because that didn't interest me. I think that anybody in later years looking at how careers develop, often it is the difference between this desire to get even to the assistant level but up among the very hard charging people working these long hours, that they get a psyche satisfaction. Others would take a look at it, like you and me, and say, "Thanks, no thanks. I would rather have something I really enjoy doing and getting more satisfaction out of."

So, we are now at 1976. Where did you go, what did you do?

CARY: I went to Brussels and to the US Mission to the European Community. Deane Hinton had been named ambassador and I had always been interested in the European Community as a concept. So, when he was named, I asked if I could go. After some haggling Personnel created a rotational position at my level. USEC is a unique mission with only economic and political sections, no admin or consular sections. I got an opportunity to work in both. I did three months in the consular section in the Embassy at because junior officers were required to do some consular work. I left for Brussels in July, 1976.

Q: You were there from when to when?

CARY: From July, 1976 to August 1978, two years.

Q: You saw Deane Hinton both in the Under Secretary's Office and in Brussels. He became later a Career Ambassador and was a trouble shooter all over the place and one of the stars of the Foreign Service of this era. How did he operate and what was your impression of him?

CARY: He is a very direct person and you either liked him or you didn't. He was very smart. Smart, rather than intelligent. He had very good sense of what was going on and could size up the situation quickly. He did not put up with any nonsense. If he said something he didn't spend an awful lot of time explaining it or expounding it. He said it and if somebody asked why he said it, he would present his arguments. He was very much a rough type of a personality. He wore cowboy boots and smoked cigars and would put his feet up on the desk and drop ashes all over the place. He would yell at people in front of other people, which I don't think is a good management approach. But he would apologize as well, publicly if he had made a mistake.

He took my small cubbyhole of an office when he came into Robinson's office but in USEC he had a beautiful suite and a gorgeous house. He dealt well with the Europeans. We have an adversarial relationship in dealing with the Commission

Q: This is the European Commission which was still in its formative years, would you say?

CARY: Well, this was during what most would call Eurosclerosis. The Commission was not doing anything, not managing to move things forward. The European economies were all stagnant. Whereas the United States traditionally has been a great advocate of European integration, most Europeans were not. You would see efforts to do things in the European Commission that were undercut by other member states. We used it minimally, but it was the trade negotiating entity for negotiating the Tokyo Rounds. So trade issues were the main concern that we had. They had just started the idea of political cooperation but there was no reason for us to deal with the Europeans on any political issues through the Commission.

Q: Essentially the political side was taken care of by the various embassies and the issues were basically trade.

CARY: Yes, trade. We had automobiles, chilled chickens, and brandy wars. Bob Strauss was Special Trade Representative at that point and he would come through very frequently to discuss various issues with the Europeans almost always of a negative nature. I remember once he had just come back from negotiating a car agreement, a restrictive agreement, with the Japanese and the Europeans had wanted to get one and couldn't. He more or less rubbed their noses in it publicly. The Europeans at that point were feeling very much that they were second class and with Japan building up they felt maybe they would be third class in the future. They were trying to do things, Stevie D'Avignon, Belgian Commissioner for Industry, was one of the closest collaborators who we worked with on a regular basis.

Then you got involved with the German Commissioner, and his mistresses and it was really just a different world.

Q: What type of work were you doing?

CARY: As a rotational officer I spent six months in the economic section and six months in political. So in the political section I did an in depth report on the European Court of Justice, which is a separate branch of the European Community sitting in Luxembourg. It was more or less an academic exercise. However, the court is important as it has been, as the Supreme Court has moved US policy further along than perhaps any other entity.

Q: In other words we were looking at the European Court as saying if we have a problem here we are going to take it up to the highest law of the Community and we being a legalistic country feel we could do something.

CARY: Yes, there is very little you can do if you are not a member state to bring a case before the court. The Court was used very effectively to make progress on the social front. Workers' rights, in which the court set the policy that has to be followed in all the member states and at that point there were nine members.

Q: What was our interests with workers' rights?

CARY: We thought the Europeans went too far. The Europeans had legislated more vacation, maternity leave, paid leave, etc. Also there was the question of the ability to have more say in management which was one of the things they were talking about then, the workers' council idea which would allow the workers to have somebody on the board. It took the European Community a long time to do anything, so you usually had the ability to put some input into it.

Q: Why would we care?

CARY: Because American workers would say that the European workers had such and such and since they are our main competitors you can't say we would be at a disadvantage if we did that.

Q: We always had this dual policy of wanting them to do well for our own security, to mainly keep the Germans and French from going to war, and that this was very nice but we are going to price ourselves out of the markets.

CARY: The workers' situation was one small part, the real issue was the trade, their regulations kept us out of markets and it was a time when people were just beginning to get in. So, agricultural products were a major issue for us because they were not covered under the GATT. They had to deal with agriculture on a case by case basis and most of our great issues were access for US products. That really was what we spent most of our time on. Cranberries and blueberries were an issue. Cranberries and blueberries are not grown in Europe but they grow arielle and myrtilles which are little berries, one red and one blue, so the Europeans argued indeed they did have cranberries and blueberries because these are red and blue berries that grow on bushes. So they would put a tariff on imports. We kept arguing that they were not the same and finally won so today cranberries and blueberries can go into the European market duty free.

Q: As I recall it, soybeans were not a European product until all of a sudden they started using it as a way to use up surplus land or something.

CARY: A lot of people will say that we really caused the problem because we cut off the sale to Europe in the '60s ...it is used as soymeal for animals. Europe started growing soybeans and paying farmers a subsidy and introduced the variable levy based on the community price vs world price. It was a major market displacement for US soybean growers. Later the EC started exporting. The US and Brazil were the real soybean exporters of the world and we took real exception and have been fighting on soybeans ever since.

Q: What was the mood of the mission towards the various big nations?

CARY: The French were a pain in the neck. The French Mission was in the same building that we were and there was remarkably little interaction. With the Brits we always had a very good relationship. This was again when the Commission was dominated by the French language which has changed over time as more and more people prefer to speak English than French. But in 1977 you had the Brits, with whom we traditionally had good relations. The Italians were a joke as were the Germans. Their philosophies seemed to be to name politicians who were in trouble or a liability at home to the EC. So their commissioners were always people who for one reason or other were not wanted in Bonn or Rome. Consequently, they were not as powerful. Again at this period the Germans were really being rather soft, not trying to make a ruckus or flex their muscles in any respect. They would always hid behind the French. You knew that the French position was not always disadvantageous to the Germans but they always blamed unfavorable Community action on the French.

Q: The Germans as well as the Brits have a highly subsidized agricultural side.

CARY: There was no majority voting at all. Everything was done by consensus. The French were more than happy to stand up and say no. It didn't bother them in the least.

Q: I would think Deane Hinton would have problems dealing with a French technocrat.

CARY: He did all right with the French. Each country had both an embassy and a mission to the Commission. The Commission was run politically like the UN. You balance exactly by grade who is doing what and have to have the same number of people at the director level and that sort of thing down to the staff. Every document had to be translated into all official language...one third of the EC budget was for translation of documents. This was ridiculous because really there were two working languages, English and French. The Italians tended to prefer French, the Germans, English. I can remember a dinner party for most of the Commission and some of the people from NATO...that was the other thing, in Brussels you had three US ambassadors, NATO, Bilateral Mission to Belgium and USEC, so it was an interesting way of relating one thing to the other...I remember going to a black tie dinner party for most of the Commission when Mrs. Hinton stood up and said, as they were passing out the cigars, "Ladies shall we go." I wasn't sure what to do, I was there working, not as a spouse, so I stayed with the men, which was perfectly fine. Hinton offered me a cigar, which I turned down, but I did take the brandy. That was really the last time I can remember a dinner with the ladies formally withdrawing to a separate room.

A quirky thing about language was when the mission hosted the premier of "Star War". We invited all of the Commission and needed a subtitled version. The question of what language for the subtitles arose. But we ended up with the French subtitle version. The Europeans really didn't appreciate the movie, and seemed bewildered when the Americans responded with cheers, and laughter.

Q: How about the Netherlands and Belgium in this melange?

CARY: The Belgians were very good, as a matter of fact. They tended to send their best people to the Commission so they had a more important role than their size would indicate. Clearly they felt that their future really was in making the European Community work and you could see that in the people. There was not the huge negative feeling towards the Commission. The fact that the Commission was in Brussels hiked the prices up tremendously for apartments, parking, food. It was also interesting because the language differences between French and Flemish were very strong. There were riots and whatnot. The Commission helped put things in English. Rather than have everything put into two languages, it was a lot easier to use English, because if they used French they would have to put it in Flemish too. Putting things in English was a much better way.

Q: What about the Netherlands?

CARY: The Dutch sent very competent people. I can't remember any major problem that we had with the Dutch. They were for more open markets.

Q: Were you getting the feeling that the British were really in this thing yet?

CARY: No, they, again, seemed still to be of two minds. They had only been in six years or something and Community membership remained a political hot point. A lot of the Brits who were seconded to the Commission never went back. The Commission paid very well with lots of benefits, better than they could get working for the British government. So, you didn't have the back and forth between the top levels of government and Brussels that you need for it to work well. It has started now. But back then you had people who were just there. The people from the Mission were real diplomats and would go in and out, like any other posting.

The journalists were another part of the equation. The local "Economist" staff, the British weekly, were the best if you wanted to know what was going on in the EC. It was one of two relied upon sources, the other was a little pink sheet that came out every day which everybody read religiously and that told you what the issues were of the day and who was doing what.

Q: You left there in 1978. What was your feeling whither the US to the European Community and whither the European Community?

CARY: I am a Europeanist. I felt it was the only way to go. Protectionism among member states was striking, but you could see that people were beginning to realize that that it couldn't continue. Unemployment was a problem and you can't continue to be protectionist when you can see clearly that you can get some more jobs if you allow some more trade.

I didn't see that political integration was going to happen. The monetary union, yes, because you can't have a totally integrated economic community without monetary unity. But political unity, no, the European interests were conflicting. There were NATO and non-NATO interests, special relationships with Russia, with the Arabs, and the developing world.

Q: Did you ever get the feeling that your Mission was looked upon with a certain amount of suspicion back in the Department or Washington?

CARY: No, because I think what we were doing was so clearly in the US interest. On the political side there simply wasn't much. A group from Congress maintained loose contact with a group from the European Parliament. The European Parliament was going to have direct elections the whole time I was there and never had them. So, that part was not a threat to anybody. The Mission and USTR worked very well together and Commerce as well. Treasury just regularly dismissed the European Community until recently...The relationship between the OECD and the European Community was an interesting one. There were a lot of things we were doing within the OECD to try to work with the Europeans at the time.

Q: Then you left there in 1978. Where did you go?

CARY: I went to Port-au-Prince, Haiti.

Q: Boy, what a switch! Talk about going from one type of economy to another. You were in Haiti from when and when and what did you do?

CARY: I was economic/commercial officer from 1978-80. I got off the plane and I just had never seen anything at all like this. The poverty was just incredible. A ramshackled city with animals all over the place. I was pretty appalled at how poor people could be. US economic interests at that time focused on Haiti as an off-shore zone, industrial zone. All baseballs used in the major leagues are sown in Haiti. There were a number of electronic companies, Motorola, GE, GTE plants there, apparel companies, stuffed animals, etc. So, economically US investment was not very much in real terms, but light industry mostly fueled by US companies was the only sector of the economy that was growing.

Q: Was this a policy of just doing something economically for Haiti?

CARY: It was really more of a basket case problem. The boat people more or less started while we were there. Jean-Claude Duvalier, "baby doc," was the leader and he wasn't as stupid he looked, but he was not intelligent. He was 28 or so at the time, really incompetent and had no real interest in doing anything other than party. His mother was still alive and was plain evil, having people killed and being extremely greedy. He really wasn't that way, he just, I think, wanted to get out.

Q: First let's talk a little bit about the embassy. Who was our ambassador then?

CARY: The ambassador was William Jones, an African American who is still in the State Department, but at that point was a political appointee. He had been a lawyer in California. He spoke some French but didn't speak Creole at all and he was the only one who could have contact with the President, Duvalier. That made sense except for age and language ability. There were other people in the mission who were more natural interlocutors for Baby Doc but contacts with Duvalier were limited to the Ambassador.

Q: This was William Jones saying this?

CARY: Yes. It certainly is not unusual for the ambassador to say he is the one who is going to have contact with the head of state. We probably could have had better information...not that better information mattered that much...but there were other people in the mission who could have had more casual and insightful access to Duvalier.

Q: ...looking at it at the time and maybe later, this was a man first time there, a little unsure of himself who wanted to make sure that no fancy Foreign Service type was going to take credit or something like that?

CARY: Well, I wouldn't say take any credit, but it was clearly his mission and he was the one who...he did meet regularly with Duvalier sipping bourbon or scotch, but they would sit and talk in French. Duvalier, for example, was much more comfortable in Creole. The educated class were very comfortable in expressing themselves in French. But most Haitians didn't really speak French, or wouldn't admit they didn't speak French and so you would have conversations and come out very aware that the person had no idea what you had just said. Now, Duvalier's French was better than that, but in terms of letting down your hair and saying what you really think, if you wanted to do that you did it in Creole.

Q: When you were there you spoke French?

CARY: Yes.

Q: How well did you speak Creole?

CARY: Not very well.

Q: Is there a considerable difference?

CARY: It is a much simpler grammar. There is Spanish thrown into it. If you understand English and French, it is pretty easy to understand Creole. If you understand just French, it is not so easy, because the grammar is much more English...subject, verb. There are only three tenses...yesterday, today and tomorrow. So sophisticated thoughts are expressed in French. If you are going to talk about anything on economics, you do it in French. But, if you are talking about what is going on or voodoo...people really did believe in voodoo, in zombies. Educated people with Ph.D.s believed in zombies. The Creole mythology is just great and there is some beautiful literature that comes out of it. A lot of my friends spoke Creole, so they could translate for me or tell me what someone was saying if I didn't understand.

Q: What type of things were you doing?

CARY: We mostly worked with US business that was coming in, trying to make sure they got appointments, getting needed infrastructure. We also helped set up the Haitian American Chamber of Commerce. I spent a lot of time setting that up with links back to the International Chamber of Commerce here in Washington. There had been no formal association, people just sort of got together at clubs or hotels. There was a casino industry as well which was sort of interesting. They would bring people down on junkets and you would never see them unless they had a problem with health or something like that. Tourism was beginning to develop. Club Med and Holiday Inn had places.

Just about that time AIDS was being discovered.

Q: Acquired Immune Deficiency, a deathly illness which usually comes through sexual contact which, of course, tourism in a place like that was vulnerable.

CARY: Exactly. The original AIDS warnings was about contact with homosexuals and Haitians because Haitians were the first other high risk group that turned up.

Q: Was there a lot of promiscuity within the Haitian society?

CARY: Well, there was a fair amount. Because it was such a poor country, there was also tourism prostitution, both male and female, and it was a fairly well known place for homosexuals to vacation. Also in Haitian peasant society, monogamy is not necessarily the rule. It was not unusual, because the land is divided into such small parcels, you would have a system called "placage" where a man with six different parcels of land would place a different women to work each of the different parcels. The man would make the rounds while the women were actually doing the work. So, it was a pretty fluid system in terms of sexual contacts. And there was all the rum and the dancing.

Q: How about this divide between the sort of Africans and the mixed Creole people. This goes back to the Napoleonic times and even before. I did a book on the American consul and I think the constitution got involved in helping the Creoles against the Black revolt there after the country was freed. How did you find that?

CARY: It was very clear, the differences. Coffee was historically the main cash crop and it is an export crop. The coffee industry is virtually controlled by white and Creole families and they were important in terms of the plantations and the whole coffee industry. They were seen very clearly as the people who were the elite. It was very much a skin color thing. In Creole there is something like 14 different words to describe your skin tone, so you know exactly where somebody was. And that was where Duvalier had an awful lot of appeal, because he was very dark, Papa Doc. They keep saying that Papa Doc was elected in a free election and we supported him in the beginning. But part of his appeal was he was black as the majority of Haitians are, very dark. His wife was dark too, and Jean-Claude is dark. So, when Jean-Claude married Michelle Bennett who was from one of the elite families, her skin tone is lighter than mine, there was a lot of controversy about it, feeling again it was a way of saying white is better, light is better.

Q: Just the other day I read in the paper that Aristide, who is quite dark, married an American Haitian woman who is quite light and apparently there is lots of unhappiness. It is so easy to get absorbed into the upper class, because these are usually the people diplomats deal with anyway, but you are not sounding out the country very well if you get too isolated. Was this a problem?

CARY: People were aware of it and it certainly was a problem. It was a problem more for the support staff because being with the American embassy they were automatically put into the elite. The elite were very wealthy, they thought nothing of flying to Miami on a whim for a shopping trip. They lived in huge houses and gave elaborate parties and weekend gatherings. Everybody was more or less included in it. It put a number of people in a situation they had not been in before - living beyond their means. I think people were aware of that. There was a lot of effort to make sure that we did get out and see the other parts of Haiti, not just plantations. I remember flying in a private plane up to the Plantation Dauphin which was a sizeable sisal plantation. I was fed lovely meals, and given the VIP tour.

As a counterpoint, by this time I had met my husband-to-be, who worked for CARE and I would travel with him to all the villages, seeing the missionaries and food distribution. People in the political section also made an effort to get out. There was a DATT, Defense Attaché, who had a plane and we could travel around that way. Most of the embassy tended to socialize with very well-to-do people, but the poverty was so pervasive that you couldn't not deal with it and not see it. There were a lot of international organizations that were working there and we were in contact with them as well.

I remember African Swine Fever, which is a virulent disease that has a very high mortality rate for pigs. Frequently, a pig was a Haitian peasant's form of savings. A pig was worth \$50-60 which could be a year's earnings. If somebody died, the family would sell the pig in order to be able to bury them. This cost a lot because of the belief in zombies. A body had to be well buried, with cement over the grave to make sure it couldn't be exhumed and turned into a zombie. So, when African Swine Fever was identified in Haiti there was a huge issue over what do you do with these infected animals. The econ counselor at that time, Bob Richmond, would go out into the bush and take samples of dead pigs in an attempt to confirm the fever and send them up to Atlanta for analysis. I must say that was one part of the job I didn't really want to do.

There was a very large AID mission there and Larry Harrison was the AID director. He subsequently wrote a book more or less about the cultural implications of poverty saying there are certain cultures where the elite don't work and are non-productive. Such cultures tend not to have succeeded because as soon as you get enough to live you stop working. There was a lot of controversy about it, but Haiti was one of the places that he was citing as part of this problem.

The other issue about Haiti was because it was in the Americas Republic Bureau, it really doesn't belong there. It is French speaking and makes much more sense to put it into the African Bureau because the issues and the approaches are much closer to what you will find in Africa than you find in Latin America. And, we were almost totally ignored by the Bureau, nobody had any interest in coming down.

Q: Did the Dominican Republic play any part?

CARY: The border was closed pretty regularly between the Dominican Republic and Haiti. One of the big issues was cane cutters, Haitian cane cutters. The Dominicans would come over and engage Haitians as cane cutters by the thousands, and ship them over to cut cane. It became a human rights issue as to whether or not these people were really doing it of their own choice or whether somebody else was getting paid off and the cutters were essentially slave labor.

The other really sad issue was the boat people. There was no economy; the US was going through a recession; the price of coffee fell. US off-shore plants in Haiti were closed as investments were being pulled back. It was a country of no hope. People would sell everything they could and buy passage on one of these incredibly rickety boats. The Tontons Macoutes, who were still running around at that point, would take the money and then turn the refugees in. The refugees were sent back and had no money, no land and no tools. Some people made it to the US, I hate to think how many didn't. Those boats were... I would take one to one of the little islands just off the mainland, you could still see the mainland, and you wondered whether you were going to make it back. It was just really sad. The agreement on interdiction was made by the US with Duvalier and was something I never agreed with. Stopping the refugees on the high seas and turning them back would be piracy in any other definitions.

Q: You left there in 1980. Whither Haiti as far as you are concerned?

CARY: Haiti is the one place I have been that I did not think had any hope. Nobody puts anything into that country unless you can get it out on a plane. There is just no investment. There was a minister of commerce that I got to know pretty well and he was well educated and had been teaching in the United States. I thought he would be different, but he was on the take just like everybody else. I talked to him about it and he said this was the one chance he had. He would be minister for maybe six months and he had to get everything he possibly could for his family in that six months. Until that mentality changes and people see that there is a long term future in Haiti, I just don't see it getting better.

Q: How pervasive was corruption?

CARY: It was pervasive but not bloodsucking. If you were a businessman and wanted to meet Duvalier, for \$5000 you could meet Duvalier and probably get whatever it is that you need him to sign. But, you could also meet him by chance and get the same result. So, it was affordable corruption for those well-healed. For a peasant, even 100 gourd (\$20) was too high a price for the right stamp. Towards the end of my tour drugs became a part of the picture and changed the corruption situation. Haiti is strategically located for small private planes to refuel on their way to Columbia. There was an increase in the number of Lear jets coming in with drugs, having gone down to Columbia. This appeared to tie in with Baby Doc's marriage with Michelle; the Bennett family has been implicated in drugs.

Q: Baby Doc's wife.

CARY: After that we started getting Lear jets coming through and we had a couple of crashes. One was just disgusting. It was coming from the United States. The plane crashed outside the airport and the family came down and could care less about their son who had been the pilot. The important thing was the jewels or money that he was taking down to Colombia to bring drugs back. It was disgusting to see how eager they were to have access to the plane, while not seeming to care about their son's remains. As the drug culture moved in the corruption got worse. We were leaving just about that time so it was only by stories later I learned how much things had changed.

Q: How, at that time did you treat people who were going to have to deal with a corrupt society? We are under pretty strict controls.

CARY: Well, some of them were really corrupt themselves. We had one instance, it was so sleazy. You really had to make judgment calls. These were Americans trying to convince the Haitians that they should open a toxic waste dump to accept US waste. The proposal was to pay a million dollars and later put a golf course over it. The proponents were from New Jersey and the ties to organized crime were pretty clear. Yet, this was an investment, and they were willing to put some money into the community as well. They kept saying they had golf courses in New Jersey that have toxic waste under them. The question was do we, the US government representatives encourage this type of investment or not encourage it. Do we actually go to the Haitians and say they would be out of their minds to do this, which is what we did eventually. Actually one of the people was killed in mysterious circumstances and the project didn't go any further. But, they were spreading money around like nothing. So, you have that part as well. People were looking to do things that you couldn't do in the United States because of the proximity. It is close enough by plane.

For other people, the Corrupt Practices Act was very clear and you were very clear to people what they could or not do as Americans and most people were relatively sophisticated. One of the things that an organized chamber of commerce can do is provide a meeting place where people can ask others questions like "How do you get things cleared through customs?" We had one US company making Christmas tree ornaments (a 0 tariff item) and sending them back to the US. US customs kept classifying them as pin cushions (about 7% tariff). That obviously was somebody looking for a payoff, on the US side. So, you would get the stories from the business community. They were pretty up-front that if you want your container out in 24 hours you had to make some arrangement. The basis for most of the business investment in Haiti was a fast turn around. All the materials were shipped down from the United States, assembled in Haiti, and entered back with tax only on valued added which would be low because the wage was \$1.60 a day. And this was for skilled labor. The quality of the electronic stuff was the same as what they were doing in Taiwan and Japan. So, it was a big deal. But, if you couldn't get your container out and turned around quickly, you lost a lot. So people were constantly working accommodations with people.

Q: When did you get married?

CARY: My husband-to-be, John, went off with CARE to work with the Afghan refugees in February 1980 and I went to Paris in September.

Q: You were in Paris from when to when?

CARY: From 1980-83.

Q: And what was your job?

CARY: I was trade policy officer in the econ section, it was called general economic policy. My portfolios were strategic trade (keep electronic and computer communications equipment away from the Soviets and the other proscribed destinations). This was a problem because the French did not take the same approach even though they were members of COCOM and should not be shipping things, but the French shipped things. So we had an awful lot of back and forth with them on that. I also did French relations with Eastern Europe. Again, this was an area where the French had a lot of trade with Eastern Europe and we didn't. We just wanted to keep tabs on what they were doing and what types of agreements they were signing because we felt some aspects of the exchanges were not in our best interests. On technical assistance the French were providing information that was not kosher.

Q: During this 1980-83 period, who were your ambassadors?

CARY: Art Hartman was ambassador when I arrived. He was a delightful person to work with. And then Evan Galbraith.

Q: You might talk a little bit about Hartman and then about Galbraith.

CARY: Hartman was just as professional as you could be. He was a delight to work for. It was a huge mission but you felt that he knew who you were and cared. I didn't have very many opportunities to work with him directly. Once or twice I would go down and fill in in the front office for a staff assistant. He had a very, very busy schedule with lots of meetings. The residence was just gorgeous. Everybody was sad to see him leave, but he went on to Moscow.

He was replaced by Evan Galbraith who was an investment banker and a very different sort of a person. He was very pleasant but gave the impression he saw it as an we vs them situation, and he meant the Foreign Service not the French as the them, the Foreign Service were not necessarily his friends. There were a couple of issues such as the Soviet gas pipeline with the embargo imposed following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Q: This was very early in the Reagan Administration which came from the right wing of the Republican Party and the Soviets had invaded Afghanistan and was a very confrontational time with the Soviet Union.

CARY: One of the major policy decisions by the US was to deny all equipment that would go to the Soviet natural gas pipeline that was being built, a huge 2 meter pipeline. A certain amount of the equipment was US or US licensed. Some US companies took big hits on that. The French would not honor the US requirement not to sell US licensed equipment. We had some GE turbines that were manufactured in France under US license. It became a big issue with the French. I can remember Bob Gelbard was in the Treasury office at the Embassy. He was sent to the port because as soon as the GE turbines were loaded they were informed that that would break the embargo because the French were going to ship them on to the Soviets. There was an awful lot of back and forth about how to deal with the French on this issue. Galbraith was very critical publicly about the French actions, which in most people's opinion is rarely the way to get results from the French, to criticize them publicly. He, against advice, did it on French television. There was a feeling that his manner of dealing with the French was very, now you would say "in your face." Well, he wasn't quite that aggressive but there was no question that he was publicly criticizing his hosts and the French got all indigent and woofy about it. There was a feeling in the embassy that he did not listen to advisers very much, and had he the situation would have turned out better.

Q: Who was the economic minister at the time?

CARY: Mike Ely at the time and he was just great to work with.

Q: Yes, I interviewed him. Did you have much dealing with French officialdom?

CARY: Yes. They were not very warm. In fact, I remember one lunch I was dealing with a counterpart, a one on one lunch, and it was one of my days when French was just not coming at all and was struggling and finally at the end of the meal, he lets me know he spent eight years in India as a child growing up. I said, "You let me struggle with my French. You could have at least switched to English once or twice." He said, "Oh, but I speak with an Indian accent." So, it was better for me to struggle with my French than for him to switch into English because he didn't like his accent in English.

They were very bright people. At that time one of my friends was going to ENA, the Ecole Nationale d'Administration, {every year one Foreign Service officer spends a year at ENA and then works at the embassy} . In 1980-81 it was Dean Curran and I got to know a lot of French who were going to ENA. They were just bright, bright people, and yet just not very personable.

Jean Claude Paye was the director of the economic bureau at the Quai d'Orsay. I would go with Mike Ely for most of his calls, particularly on this tech transfer problems that we had. Paye was just a brilliant person but he would lie through his teeth. He had no problem at all. He must have known that we knew he was lying. But he was just as cool as he could be. I found that there was a big difference between French diplomats in Paris and French diplomats outside of Paris. I found they tended to be a lot easier to deal with outside of Paris. It was very compartmentalized. You did your business and left, there was very little chit chat.

Q: But, this is also the atmosphere of the office too? So, it was not directed towards you as much as this is the way it's done?

CARY: Well, at that point my husband, we got married in France, was working for a French company and it is exactly like that. Nobody knew anybody's first name. We were invited to a couple of people's houses but most people in the office had never been to anybody else's house. It is a much more formal and distant way of doing things. I always think of their kids - they put them in play clothes that have to be dried cleaned! You just have to wonder about it.

Q: Was the pipeline thing resolved at all?

CARY: Well, the French went ahead and broke the law. Dresser and GE were fined and lost contracts. Afterwards, one of the things I spent a lot of time on was the fact that the French wanted to sell telecom switching technology to the Soviets and we said absolutely no way. I learned a lot about switching, more than I thought I ever would about technology and digital switches and how much information could be sent. Again this was one of those instances where the French would say one thing and do another.

Q: Was it business at any cost or in your face?

CARY: Business at any cost. This was French technology, it was good and they disagreed with our...this was also the time when Richard Perle was involved in a lot of these negotiations as well. Richard Perle was Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Technology. This was the sonabouy story where DOD took the little chips out of a Speak and Spell, a kid's toy, and said the Soviet's could use these for sophisticated military applications.

Q: Richard Perle was the par excellence, called the dark prince because he came out of the very extreme anti-Soviet side. He was an assistant to Scoop Jackson who had been a senator from Washington and there was no accommodation, he took no prisoners.

CARY: Right. He really was "don't sell them the shoelaces." The French felt very much that we had gone overboard with the technology issue. I can remember making a demarche requesting the French not to sell spare parts for C-130s to Libya. In a very unkind way, my contact at the Directory for External Economic Relations said, "If you let the Libyans get the plane how do you expect us to keep them from getting spare parts?" We had a lot of differences with the French about what they could sell and to whom. They thought we were ridiculous about this. But, they also, in my opinion, went ahead and sold things deliberately that they knew really were of strategic use and they didn't care. Money was more important, the deal was more important.

Q: Iran and Iraq were at war part of this time, did selling to them come up?

CARY: Yes, but I didn't get too much involved in that one because it was munitions and we had the military side on that. But, yes, we had definite differences. The relationship between the French government and US government was one of very hard feelings. We were more interested in what French intelligence was up to than we were in Soviet intelligence in terms of what was going on at the time.

Q: We were concerned about French intelligence trying to get at the equivalence of trade secrets?

CARY: Yes. There was no question about it, it was going on. That was an issue. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the question in the US came up as to whether the CIA should be doing more economic espionage. I kept thinking back at how negatively we reacted to the French using their intelligence purely for commercial reasons.

Q: Well this sort of longterm alliance with the French has not been an easy one has it? It seems to be a special relationship with the accent on the negative side.

CARY: Yes, very much so. The French, I always feel, have a complex. They really do believe they are superior to virtually anybody else but they just can't find the proof and it drives them nuts because they really do believe that everything has to fall into A, B, and C.

Q: I have always thought about these magnificent schools that you are talking about, the ENA and others, which were mostly set up during the Napoleonic time, and France has been diminished in power ever since Napoleon. I am not sure if there is a one, two, three relationship or not.

CARY: It was also interesting, the role of the private persona and the public persona. When we were there Giscard had lost the election, which the embassy did not call at all and everybody said, "We didn't call it because everybody spent all their time in Paris. Anybody who had gotten outside of Paris would have known that the country was ready for a change." There was mud on everybody's face on that one.

But there was never a word in the newspaper or in the media about how many of the female ministers Mitterrand had appointed were supposed to be former mistresses. That was all just understood and had nothing to do with anything else. People's personal lives were people's personal lives and had no role any place else.

France hosted the G-7 economic summit in 1982. President Reagan came. This was at Versailles. As a control officer I got to know my way around Versailles and the back rooms of Versailles. It was really pretty amazing. I was just astonished about Reagan and the way his staff protected him. He was late for a meeting with Mitterrand, he was sleeping and nobody would wake him up. I thought, "How could you do that?" But they did. And, nobody was going to apologize, he needed his sleep. He came two days early so he wouldn't have jet lag.

Q: Mitterrand was the longest term serving president, and just recently died. We didn't call the election of Mitterrand, but was this going to make things worse for the embassy?

CARY: It was not what we wanted. Mitterrand's stance on a number of political issues was directly opposed to where the US wanted to go. In the months after Mitterrand was elected, people just fled with money, baskets full of money and gold left the country. Among the upper class of France there was this feeling that under Mitterrand things were just not going to work out and they had to get their money out. And politically, he was not interested in making any accommodation whatsoever to the US point of view.

Q: In dealing with the French was there much informal mingling afterwards?

CARY: No. You got to know friends other ways. The people we saw socially were generally formed through non work contacts. Friends who we knew living there, some old Peace Corps people who had married French people and now were living in Paris. There was a group like that that we got to know. Or French diplomats that we had known in other posts and were then posted back to Paris, you would see them socially. A friend of my father readily included me into the family gatherings things like a traditional epiphany dinner, where the person who finds the almond in the cake is crowned. It was very nice to be included in such things and it gave an idea how people live at home which many people at the embassy didn't see, I think.

Q: Looking at the French social structure, one always hears of the importance of the intellectual class, the intellectuals. In no other country can I think of where somebody calls himself an intellectual and gets away with it, certainly not in the American sense. Did you find that the intellectual class, or whatever you want to call it, was important?

CARY: Ah! Amazingly so. We got to know some people from a couple of the think tanks...this was when a couple of the French graduate schools were starting to get into management.

Q: Like the Harvard Business School.

CARY: Right.

Q: Well this was the American challenge wasn't it?

CARY: Yes, "Le Défi Americain" by Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber. At dinner parties you were always talking about ideas and concepts and there was real debate, it was give and take, with people thinking, which is an exciting thing to do. People weren't just economist, only being able to talk about the economy. They could talk about the opera, some kind of butterfly, or whatever. The intellectual was a much more rounded individual. People were clearly identified as intellectuals and comfortable being called that.

I would say there was more excitement about intellectual activity and food. I have never seen people feel so strongly about food. I mean, the Belgians care about food, but they care about quantity. It has to be good but there has to be lots of it. The French didn't care so much about quantity but it had to be exquisite and just right. You would spend time talking about ideas but always spent time about the food, this meal and the next meal and the last meal.

Q: Was there intermingling between the industrial or business class and the intellectual class?

CARY: No, not much. We made a couple of trips with congressional people when we were trying to see the GE jet engine, a quieter engine. We went out to SNECMA, which is a French government company. In all major industry at that point there was significant government control. So at the top levels you might have engineers, economists and administrators a mixture from the grandes écoles and other universities. Further down the line class lines were pretty rigid. If you didn't go to college you were limited. At the work site you just did your job. Husband John was sent out to Syria to work for a French construction company that was building an oil pipeline. He described very little mixing on the site between "management" and workers. They ate meals together, but that was it.

Q: This intellectual give and take and sort of making your points in a way is somewhat alien to us. At least our skills aren't as honed as the French who have been doing this all of the time. Did you find that this was a problem?

CARY: The problem I found was that you could not be an individual. I could not turn around and say, "Yes, I think US policy on this, that and the other thing, was wrong" in the course of the conversation and then go back and say, "But this is US policy." People didn't buy that. You weren't allowed to concede one thing and then go back to the original statement. We can generally draw a line between this is my job and I am presenting the US point of view. And we did have some dumb things to present.

Q: And early Reagan was a very difficult time for a lot of us. He was going through a long learning curve, let's say.

CARY: Right. I can remember presenting demarches where you just sort of put them down and then talked about something else, obviously totally undercutting the demarche, but you had to deliver it. There were difficult times when you were trying to develop relationships with people, and yet you were sort of stuck because you couldn't cross the line. To cross the line from being a bureaucrat and a diplomat you crossed the line of friendship. After using the familiar form "tu" you can't go back to vousvoyer. And, yet, we do it all of the time. It doesn't work with the French and I had a hard time with that. So, I ended up not talking to people I worked with other than the official line.

Q: Was Galbraith still there when you left?

CARY: Yes.

Q: Because he left and had been asked to leave the embassy.

CARY: Yes. We also at that time had some terrorist incidents. One of the military attaché's was murdered. There was a bomb put under the commercial counselor's car and two French bomb experts were killed trying to detonate it. The Chargé, Chris Chapman, was shot at at about 30 feet but missed. This was all within less than 6 months. So we were down on hands and knees looking under the car for bombs every morning, and we got...this was so typical...the French would let us get regular plates but wouldn't give us the regular macaron, the little sticker that said you paid your tax, so you got stopped all the time. It finally took action at the highest levels to get the French Treasury to agree to issue to us the little stickers so we could have regular plates and not be stopped all the time.

Q: The idea of having regular plates being so you wouldn't have conspicuous diplomat plates.

CARY: Yes, and the diplomatic plates all started with a specific number for each embassy - I think the US was 6 CD, so there was no question who were the Americans.

Q: Who was bombing and who was shooting?

CARY: Arabs. They never found anybody. But the person who shot at Chris Chapman was dark and appeared to be of Arab extraction. At the time there was a lot going on. There was a Jewish delicatessen that was machine gunned one Sunday morning. There was a lot of anti-Israel and anti-US activity. One poor guy, an American who lived in the Netherlands, inadvertently parked his car near the Israeli embassy and the French police blew it up. The degree of terrorism, that was one of the issues that we had a lot of problems with the French on. There was a strong belief at the time that the French had cut a deal with a number of terrorist groups... basically you leave the French alone and we will leave you alone. Not only were the Iranians living there but everybody from all over. It was felt that a lot of people's lives were at risk because France let the terrorists live there. That did change later, but there was a lot of bitterness.

Q: Well, you had really two governments. You had the Reagan administration and you Mitterrand government, both of which moved up and eventually came to coincide but again one was coming from the right and one was coming from the left and as always happens the early times of the administration and the later times of the administration, really they both come towards the center.

CARY: Right. It was funny, had it been any place but Paris, they would have sent the dependents out. But you couldn't do that. You couldn't say you were sending people out of Paris because of the high level of danger, that just doesn't work.

Yes, it was an interesting time.

Q: You left there when and where did you go?

CARY: I left in 1983 and went out to Stanford for a year of university training.

Q: Did your husband working for a French firm cause any problem from the Foreign Service side?

CARY: He did not take a diplomatic passport because his company had been nationalized and rather than go through the whole thing of requesting a waiver, it was just easier...he at that point was actually working under his Irish citizenship because American citizens couldn't work. But, as his grandfather had been born in Ireland, he had an Irish passport and as an EC citizen he had a right to work in France. He did not get diplomatic status feeling that would just make the issue easier.

Q: Today in March 7, 1996. Anne, so we are off to Stanford, is that right?

CARY: Yes.

Q: From when to when?

CARY: From September 1983-June 1984. I was pregnant with my first child. It is a marvelous program there. I know they are cutting way back and are trying to change it, but university training is a great sabbatical and refreshed my contact with Americans and the America outside of official Washington. It's a year that the Department of State sends an officer, a mid-level officer, to further study something. I did economics, but it could have been a particular region or management.

Q: Was the economics course linked to the business school there at all?

CARY: I was at the Food and Research Institute which has the unique capacity of granting a masters degree in one year, so it was very attractive to a lot of people, a lot of FSOs. I would say one or two a year opted for that program. It had a very strong emphasis on development economics and finance. But, I decided that I wanted to take my intermediate macro micro economics in the business school because it tied in much better with what was practical. Stanford's normal economic progression was very theoretical and very heavy on the mathematics with more interest on looking at the relationship between numbers rather than the relationship between what happens in the real world. The business school had a much more concrete focus which I actually did find suited my purposes much better.

Q: I think it is sometimes difficult to find something that fits, particularly in the field of economics where you can get off on the theoretical basis and some of these professors have earned great plaudits for this, but when you get down to it, unless you are going to be teaching the same thing to somebody else, it is not going to do much for you.

CARY: Yes, most of the group were going on to the World Bank or academia. Virtually everybody else in the program was going on for a Ph.D. and were looking for the more theoretical grounding. But, it was interesting. There was the linear programming approach to development and how you change each input and what that will affect in terms of production. Simple things, how much fertilizer can you keep adding and get a positive result and at what point does it start to become negative. It gave me an opportunity to get started working with computers and see how important they were. If you are really doing economic analysis of anything, they were the way to go.

Q: Well, computers were still a very new thing.

CARY: Well, I would say it was at that point that they really started to become an indispensable part of the normal office. It was just beginning to be recognized as something that offered something. Now, the State Department did a miserable job, and still is doing as far as I am concerned, of training people to use them and to feel comfortable with them and understand how they can really make our product better. And if you compared our product, our analysis, with what comes out of CIA, which after all in most instances is using information they get directly from State reporting or open source reporting...they just package it better, use graphs. They have taken the computer, as the military has, and used it to present things very, very well. Later on it was made very clear to me how far behind State was in making presentations to Congress. I mean, if you just hand somebody a typed script, you know it is not going to get read. If you gave them something with colored charts and lots of white space, they will show it around and something will happen with it.

But Stanford offered all of its students computer time. I can remember after our son was born, he was born during winter break and I had to start the second quarter when he was ten days old. My husband would knock on the classroom door when it was time to feed the baby. Every female graduate student asked me how I worked out my timing, especially on the quarter system. I wouldn't recommend it to anybody.

Q: Well, what was happening vis-a-vis your next assignment? Were they looking at that and saying, "Wait a minute?"

CARY: We were also waiting because John had taken the Foreign Service exam in June, 1982 and had been offered a position but we didn't want to take it then. So, we were going to be looking for a tandem assignment. I got promoted.

Q: To what grade?

CARY: From a 3 to a 2. So at that point, my official assignment which had been linked to university training was a 3 and I was uninterested in it, we were going to be looking for a tandem which had to be overseas. What would be available wasn't quite clear because the jobs that are opened to the entering class are not advertised and are filled in a different way. They are not filled by open bidding. And this is something that really held true, even when we became a tandem couple, the system did work for us. I know for a lot of people they felt it hadn't worked. You do have to make the decision who's career is going to be more important and in the early stages there is no question, it is the junior officer. So that was something that worked out. We were going through this uncertainty. I wasn't sure I was going to be able to finish the last quarter because of the baby. But, personnel was very good and said, "That's fine, we will break your assignment because you are not sure and we will just leave you, if you don't mind, just floating until we can see what is going to work out." That worked for us very, very well. I did finish on time.

Q: Well, on this course, was there a concentration on food economics?

CARY: No, more on development and finance. And there was a great theoretical course a guy named Pan Youtopolous, who is fairly well known in this field taught on really theoretical development and still somewhat of a holdover from the '60s and '70s...

Q: Rostow and the takeoff thing.

CARY: It wasn't just this critical path of education and capital and relaxing some of your controls. That there were other factors involved and whether they were social factors, whether it worked best when you didn't have a dictatorship...most people felt it worked best when you had a dictatorship and you could do what you wanted to do.

Q: We were in Korea with a dictatorship which seemed to work very well. I have to admit a prejudice and am only raising it because I thought it might be interesting if you talked about this and that is you can get these theoretical things going about economics and all, whereas I would think that the social factors, cultural factors, are so important. Do people work or don't they work and all. And it has so little to do with numbers. It seems like such a futile exercise to play around with this.

CARY: But you have to, that is the other thing, as an economist you have to look for things that you can quantify. Part of the program was looking at the evaluation of development projects using the World Bank criteria and then comparing it with the AID criteria, for example, because there was a practical bent. You would take a situation where you built a road in the middle of Africa, a farm to market road, and figured out what the benefit of that was. Frequently what happened was they overbuilt the road. You built a road on which two trucks can pass. Most of these places didn't need them. Although they opened up new markets they also brought changes. The maintenance was supposed to be done by the people...this was the period when, okay we will come in and build this road and you will then maintain it. Well, they couldn't maintain the roads. They had no previous experience with using asphalt. It had been a pounded dirt road and every rainy season they had to go and pound the ruts out, that they could have managed. But there was a tendency to overbuild, spend more money doing things because you would run the analysis out for five years and say, well, in five years we are going to have trucks so we want to do it now because it is cheaper to do that. Try to evaluate then what happens when you have opened a new area, who comes and who goes. Because a lot of times what really happened was people left, didn't stay. They could get to the big city and stay there.

But it was an interesting time, people were trying to figure out...it was also about the time the liberation theory was becoming more prominent. We had in the class a large number of foreign students, including a number from China. This was the time when China was just concentrating on saying, we want our people taught, we want them to go to the best universities, we want them to have the best education. I think all the Chinese students worked for the government or were being paid by the Chinese government and were going to go back to work for the government. There was no question of them going some place else like the World Bank, which some of the other nationalities did.

We had students from Nicaragua. This was at the time of the mining of the harbors.

Q: Oh, yes, when we were trying to overthrow the Sandinista government in a not very covert fashion at all. The CIA was doing all sorts of things including something that clearly was against international law since a state of war didn't exist, mining Nicaragua's harbors.

CARY: And because I was the State Department person, people expected me to be able to explain this away. The Nicaraguans were saying, "We have a system that is finally working after this horrible corrupt system that lasted for ever and ever. We are finally giving something back to the people. Why are the Americans trying to prevent this from continuing?" We also invaded Grenada at the time. There was just incomprehension by the foreign students about what the US was doing at that particular time.

Q: And we had a very confrontational administration under Ronald Reagan in the early years, particularly in dealing with Central America. It was head to head. This was one place we were not going to allow a communist takeover. And, to be fair, the Sandinista's were not nice little people either. They were trying to overthrow the regime in El Salvador and were, you might say, surrogates to the Cubans. So, it wasn't as black and white as one might think. But, I am sure in the student context it was.

CARY: It was. The feeling that the students kept expressing was, "But you {the US} are so big. The US reaction is totally out of proportion. It does not meet the situation. Why do people think we are so dangerous to the United States that it is worth it to the United States to weigh in so heavily?"

Q: It honed your diplomatic skills.

CARY: Yes.

Q: How did your husband find this?

CARY: He loved it. He had basically this nine months where he knew he had a job waiting for him, but he wasn't working. Stanford let him take courses that he wanted. He spent most of his time with the baby, so he had special time too of being a father.

One of the most interesting things about the difference between academia and diplomatic service was clear when I took a course on technology and society. The topic I chose was the transfer of technology through international conferences. This grew out of my concerns with the Richard Perle concept of trying to restrict papers being presented at academic conferences on the grounds that the information would allow somebody, some foreign national, to obtain sensitive information. DOD actually pulled back a number of papers that had been funded in part or in whole by the Department of Defense or other US government agency before they could be presented at conferences where East bloc nationals were present. I thought it worth considering if transfer of knowledge at international conferences really happens. To me it was an interesting contrast between academia and the Foreign Service, the way you go about answering a question. When I presented it to the professor...my proposal was I would call and interview people in the area who had won Nobel prizes and who are always asked to attend conferences and find out at what point in their career they benefited from a transfer of knowledge by attending conferences that they wouldn't have learned elsewhere. The professor said, "You know, nobody ever does that. This is an area where you have huge personal resources to go and talk to people and it would never occur to most students to go and actually talk." I went over to Lockheed and Bell Laboratories, people in the Hewlett Packard and other software industries, RAND, etc. Everybody was totally receptive. They all had people available who were willing to talk and make the information available with no difficulty at all. The conclusion was there is nothing said in conference papers that is going to take anybody the next step forward. What you do have to worry about though, is the personal contact because it can lead to the formation of partnerships. That is where the early collaboration goes on. So, if you are really intent on stopping the flow of information that is useful, you will have to stop those early personal contacts because that is where people really do share.

Q: Did this get sent to Richard Perle?

CARY: Yes, it did. It didn't draw any response.

Q: It is interesting though. I have found in our oral history program people will come and want to look at transcripts and I will say, "Great. By the way that person just lives down the street from here and you can call him up." But, there is a great reluctance on the part of academics to talk to someone, they would much rather read a document, and these interviews become document. I can understand if the individual is very introspective and shy and perhaps it is a matter where a document is the way it has been stated, while at an interview maybe what is taken down is incorrect. I don't know exactly what it is. But in the Foreign Service if you want to find out something you go ask somebody and then analyze it thereafter.

CARY: It is just an interesting difference. Journalists do the same thing, go to the person rather than what they have written.

Q: You left in June 1984. What happened then?

CARY: We went back to Washington. My husband was sworn in as a political officer. Harry Kopp, whom I had worked with before offered me a job for basically six months looking at the debt financing crisis in Latin America. He was supposed to become a deputy assistant secretary in the ARA and he didn't become one because the slot that was supposed to become vacant didn't. Harry was named senior advisor. He had been DCM in Brasilia I think. He was an economist and was looking at this debt financing issue which was a real burden for Latin America and there was no clear way to solve it. The international banks and others were looking for innovative solutions. Some of the trade programs that had come up like the Caribbean Basin Initiative and different ways to improve access and always a proposed free trade area was always discussed, but never got very far. But as it turned out I didn't work there very long because we worked out our next assignment to Ethiopia where John was going to be the junior political officer and I was going to be the econ/political officer. And they gave us Amharic, so we took the Amharic together at FSI.

Q: On the debt crisis, just to get a little feel for it because you are the new person on the block. What had caused this debt crisis in the early '80s in Latin America?

CARY: Basically overborrowing not just from the institutions, the World Bank...but because there had been a boom everybody was willing to lend them money including the private banks. When the bust, which was really more of a slowdown came, they couldn't pay, they couldn't pay their debt servicing even and there was a lot of rescheduling going on. The banks more or less felt that the world governments were also responsible because they had encouraged people to go in and invest and now funds were just drying up and people were losing their investments. There were a lot of proposals of selling bonds, in fact, there were the Brady Bonds where you could buy official discounted debt and there was a secondary market where you could buy discounted third world debt. The countries would be able to buy their debt back rather than have somebody else hold it and do something else with it. So, very cheaply they could retire these debts. But, it lasted about six years, and there was no new investment going in which was the other problem.

Q: Although you just had a short period there, how did you find the State Department's response, particularly in the economic field, to the debt crisis? This must have been something that was coming. If you are an economist you must be able to see early on that there is a problem.

CARY: I felt the State Department was not very well set up to deal with this as an issue and the angle used to approach it tended to be more "We have to do something because there are political implications," rather than "Latin America has the potential to be our largest trading partner, should be our largest trading partner, and we need to make sure that it can happen." It was very much, "We have to help specific countries and not necessarily the other countries." Or you would look at the US investment, what banks could not go down.

Q: Chase Manhattan.

CARY: Right, and Chase at that time started to pull out worldwide a lot of its operations. But there had been this boom and everything was good. People were overextended, loan officers would write multimillion dollar loans on nothing. It was really sloppy. And then someone was left to pick up the pieces. State economic officers tend not to have a very rigorous financial analysis credentials...there are exceptions, but they stand out as people who really understand the financial aspects. The tendency has been to just leave that to Treasury.

Q: Did you find that our confrontation with the Sandinistas in Nicaragua seemed to be paramount?

CARY: No, it was Cuba. US obsession with Cuba struck me as way out of proportion with what was going on. .

Q: It is interesting this Cuban thing here. What was your impression during this short time when you were looking at this thing, in the corridors, about a long, 25 year old embargo of Cuban things?

CARY: I was surprised. Latin American hands tended to not see this as such a bad thing. It really made sense because Cuba really was a bad place. Castro was bad and wasn't doing his country any good and this would help bring about change. Even at that point people were saying he was getting older and...

Q: Ten years later we are still talking about strengthening the embargo.

CARY: And then the other thing about the Sandinistas and all that...we were sending out truth squads around to different countries asking for their support with just silly charts showing captured weapons which had flowed in from Cuba or the East bloc. There were a number of countries that did support the Sandinistas, particularly those with socialist governments. We kept trying to discourage them. There was an awful lot of money and effort that was channeled into that type of effort than to solving the debt crisis.

Q: Did you get any impression about the power of the major banks?

CARY: Not so much the major banks as I think our interests were pretty close on that one, but companies and how strong their ties might be to a certain country. In Europe US companies aren't usually involved so heavily with a country that they would lobby the assistant secretary or the Secretary about the political situation. That wasn't the case in Latin America. I found that individual companies had very, very major roles to play in looking at US policy towards Latin America and I had not seen that in Europe.

Q: How did you find Amharic?

CARY: Interesting, I liked it. It is a different script, a Semitic language, which I had no background in. I was pleased at how easy it was to read, because unlike Hebrew where they drop off the vowels, the vowels were there. There is a different form of each consonant depending on which vowel it is with, but it is pretty regular. It is a rich language, it has a lot in it. Because of the Marxist they had to create all of these new words, like "comrade," because "friend" didn't quite mean the same. So, for Ethiopians there were all these new words that kept coming out. "Chairman" was another one.

I found the proverbs another source of richness. I can remember thinking I was never going to understand a culture where the "fox doesn't need a raincoat to dig a hole." Then you get to Ethiopia and find that the soil is the black cotton soil and is extremely difficult to till when dry. You can't dig a hole unless it is raining. It was my first sort of real language experience at FSI. Back even in those days they were talking about having child care available, but they didn't.

In the class there was John, myself, and three military people who were learning to be interrogators. One of them was very interesting, she was a Rastafarian, she was white and from North Dakota but a Rastafarian. She thought you could only talk to Haile Selassie in Amharic. The FSI professor kept saying, no, he speaks French. But no. She was really learning Amharic because she wanted to be able to speak to Haile Selassie.

Q: Will you explain what type of religion Rastafarian is?

CARY: It is a mystical religion coming out of the Caribbean with heavy emphasis on marijuana and other mind-altering drugs. Haile Selassie before he became emperor was Prince Ras Tafari. The rastas decided that he was really a god and worshipped him. The religion has a continuing influence, particularly in music, in the Caribbean and among some Black Americans, although lesser now, but at that point it was very popular.

Q: This was where some of the young people were going.

CARY: It is funny because their whole idea was absolutely contrary to anything Haile Selassie believed in.

Q: You were in Addis from when to when?

CARY: February 1985- June 1989.

Q: This was a very crucial period

CARY: Yes. While we were studying Amharic the news journalists came out with video footage of the famine in Ethiopia. The outpouring in response to these pictures of starving kids was just tremendous. They raised more money than I think had ever been raised for a foreign disaster. It was complicated by the fact that the Mengistu government was Marxist and leaned very much towards the North Korean model, absolutely antagonistic towards the United States, towards the West. The Ethiopians, themselves, are very insular in a way. They don't believe the outside world should have much to do with what they are doing. But it was so clear that they could not handle the extent of the famine which was caused by drought and the 15 year old civil war.

A further complication for the US government existed. The person I was replacing was a CIA employee who had been caught red handed paying off one of the rebel groups, captured and held by the Ethiopians and tortured. Vernon Walters had to fly in and get him out. The Ethiopian government threw out almost everybody in the mission and restricted the US mission in Ethiopia to 18 people including the marine guards.

Q: Before you went out there was the whole idea of having a mission there up to question?

CARY: We had a permanent Chargé^{1/2}, there was no Ambassador, and had not been one for three or four years, I think. The idea always was that we would be thrown out or asked to leave because the regime was so disagreeable. The reason for continuing a mission there was the Horn of Africa was very, very important. Ethiopia then included Eritrea and the access to the Gulf and the ability to keep ships from going in or out was absolutely imperative. There had also been an important installation at Kagnaw station.

Q: This was a communications center, but that had been gone hadn't it?

CARY: Yes, that closed in the 70's, but the Ethiopians held technicians for three or four years a spies. When Mengistu broke with the US the government sent a diplomatic note giving 24 hours for almost everybody to get out. They allowed a small number to continue. So it was a very, very lean mission. When we arrived we were told to keep a bag packed. We expected to leave at any time.

Q: Going there with a little baby, did they still have the Swedish hospital or something?

CARY: No, actually the Russian hospital was the best one, but we didn't allow anybody to be really treated for anything. If anything happened you went to Kenya. We had a nurse with a good medical unit there. In fact, when other people in the diplomatic community were injured they would come to us first. There were no medicines, this was an austere regime. You couldn't import anything, everything that was imported was a luxury and that included medical supplies. Casualties from the war going on with the Eritreans were everywhere, you should have seen these kids. It was Civil War style medicine. They didn't have enough antibiotics or equipment to treat things. So, if you basically had anything they amputated. People were very, very leery about having their kids go off in the army because you just didn't know what was going to happen. The Ethiopian government would sneak through the streets and pick up any male who looked old enough to be inducted. Boys regularly would disappear and their families wouldn't know what happened. Of course this was a regime that picked up people anyway and took them out and you just had no idea what was going to happen to them.

There was a curfew which was strictly enforced...I thought this was great because you had to be off the streets by midnight which meant if you had a baby sitter you had to take her home, so all parties broke up around 10:30. Everybody really appreciated that.

Q: I know, I lived with a curfew in Korea, delightful.

CARY: It was also the first time I had been in a country where we didn't have good relations, where the newspapers said nothing, so you really had to use the diplomatic circuit to get information. That was the only way you could find out what was going on.

Q: Who was the Chargé there?

CARY: It was David Korn when we arrived and he was an interesting person to work for, extremely intelligent. He writes beautifully. He didn't get out and yet he wrote the best analysis. He listened. We would go out and he would listen. His wife, Roberta was the PAO. She had been deputy assistant secretary for human rights when they got married and then went out to post. She decided...the USIS program had been shut down when everything else had been shut down...that it was really time to do something. She spent an awful lot of time out meeting people, going to the universities and making cultural contacts. She got out quite a lot. Joe O'Neill was the DCM and Joe hustled more than any third secretary you have ever seen. He knew everybody and had no problem talking with the third secretary at the Italian embassy and no trouble talking with an ambassador. So, David would take in all this information, asking good questions and then write these wonderful analysis. It sort of made me think of Gary Trudeau. I have often wondered how he does it because he is not there. He draws these things and captures just exactly something. He did some strips about Ethiopia at the time and it was amazing how accurate it was.

Q: At this point what was the government of Ethiopia?

CARY: The government of Ethiopia was Mengistu and a politburo, the gang of five who were his closest advisors and were really thugs. We are talking murderers.

Q: We are talking about a time when they had cabinet meetings where they shot each other and these were the ones who survived.

CARY: Right. Originally when they overthrew Haile Selassie the government was a collective group called the Derg. Mengistu was a colonel. There is a story, apparently true, that he came on a military exchange program to the US in the late '50s and while in the South he was insulted. Because of the racial incident his experience in the United States was a negative one he never forgot. That contributed to where he came out. But, he was a ruthless person and indeed when it looked like it wasn't really clear who was going to control things there was a shoot out at one of the cabinet meetings and he basically killed his opposition. I mean he was firing as well as other people. When we were there it wasn't nearly as bad as it had been earlier when thousands of people were killed in the streets. It was real terror. You had no way of knowing if it was going to happen to you. It had nothing to do with what you had done. It wasn't, "Oh, I had been doing this so I am at risk." Everybody was at risk. Every single person could be picked up and pulled off by the goons and beaten or held or whatever.

The rest of the royal family was also in prison at that time. They were virtually all female, the government having made sure they had killed off all the males there were. Haile Selassie's son was in London where he had been on medical leave when it all happened, but he is kind of off in his head.

But, it was a strictly Marxist government with a politburo. They wore little comrade suits. Traditional Ethiopian dress is very attractive. It is usually a white gauze fabric with very fine embroidery in a strip and sort of jodhpur type pants with more or less a cape, a real attractive thing. Then they came out with these sort of Mao suits, - we all called them comrade suits. They were sort of shiny blue and very ugly. If you were a bureaucrat you had to wear either that or on occasion you could wear traditional, but you couldn't wear Western clothes. It was a real attempt by Mengistu to split the society from its traditional roots. The Coptic Church, particularly in Ethiopia, amongst the Amhara was very, very important. This is a Christian religion which dates before Christianity in France, about the 4th century. They kept trying to break that link with the Church and they finally decided they couldn't break that link so appointed the abuna, the patriarch, and more or less made him toe the line to do what they wanted. But people would still go to church on a regular basis.

There were also very strict social conventions. If you were in mourning you wore black. During the time we were there virtually everybody was in black almost all of the time. There was a lot of death.

Q: From war and brutality.

CARY: And from the famine.

Q: Did the embassy have any real contact with the government?

CARY: In a very limited way. I can remember trying to get my first appointments with the ministry of trade and ministry of external affairs, and I waited and waited and waited. I couldn't get in to see anybody. It seemed my first couple of calls there was a pattern. I would finally get an appointment, usually with the vice minister, that was the level with whom I was dealing, and they would be very lovely and pleasant people and then they would defect the next week. So, I was beginning to think that the only people who were going to see me were those who were going to defect and were not going to do me any good. How was I ever going to know what is going on. But eventually I did start to know different people.

There was a very limited business community that had continued, so I got to know those. There was the international aid community and also the ECA, the Economic Commission for Africa, the UN's body for Africa, was located in Addis. So, even though you had this very strange situation you still had about 70 diplomatic missions in Addis at the time.

Q: How did you see the role of the Soviets at that point?

CARY: They were the chief advisors, they were ubiquitous, they were funding the arms. Without their money, just nothing would have happened. It was interesting because the Chinese were there and the Chinese were our allies in Ethiopia. Some of our best information would come from them. The Chinese ambassador was very friendly. They would have great Chinese dinners and invite everybody, virtually the whole diplomatic corps. They really played an important role. The Chinese kept arguing that their form of development was much more appropriate for Ethiopia than the North Korean model. Mengistu kept wanting to do large scale communal farms, steel plants, etc. and it just didn't make any sense. Here Ethiopia is an agrarian society in Africa with some of the greatest potential. It had great coffee, had been a grain exporter in the past, a lot of possibilities if they were well done. But Mengistu would come up with these collective villages which just went totally against the grain of any Ethiopian. They would fly us all out to see these things. We would go off in these Polish helicopters and visit. It was interesting because I could speak Amharic and talk and ask questions of the people. You always had a minder in Ethiopia to make sure you didn't go anywhere you shouldn't, but when they took the diplomatic groups out everyone didn't have a minder. So you could go and ask people and they would say, "Well, you know, yeah, it is clean and they paint the walls and all that, but the tractors don't run or this, that or other thing."

Q: Were the Soviets pushing Mengistu to go in for steel mills or something? The Soviets were beginning to move into that downward spiral that...

CARY: No. The Soviets kept saying they weren't going to give them all this industrial stuff, it was mostly military material they really wanted. The Soviets had totally switched from massive industrial development to much more agrarian small scale. So Mengistu would fly off to see his great friend in North Korea...

Q: Kim Il Sung.

CARY: Right. ...to put some pressure on. So, you would talk to the Russians. They bemoaned Mengistu's wrong-headed development approach.

But it was a very odd...most Ethiopians hated the government and would go out of their way to let you know that they thought it was miserable even though they were at risk by doing so. Everybody you visited, everybody who came to see you would get a visit by security. "Why did you go see the Americans?" John asked to be able to do consular work part time because he said nobody would talk to the political officer, but everybody will talk to a consular officer because that was their only hope. Except for the really top politburo members, everybody was sending their kids, not just their college age kids out, but their seven and eight year olds to get them out of Ethiopia. So, everybody wanted to talk to the consular officer and would tell him anything he was interested in. It was an excellent source of information and you could see just how deep the dissent really ran.

Q: Let's talk first about the famine and then about the civil war. With the famine, here is something an economic officer could really sharpen their teeth on because stuff was coming from outside and you were trying to find out what was happening. How did you deal with this?

CARY: It actually worked very well. We were restricted on staff...with the famine they increased the number of permanent Americans to five. So, AID had five slots to run the second largest aid program in the world and did it wonderfully. They brought in TDY people as well because there was just a lot of logistics. This was a country where moving things around was extremely difficult. There were no trucks, no roads. And people were visibly dying. Actually the UN appointed a coordinator who was very, very good. When it came to overall donor coordination it was imperative that the coordinator have access to the government. The government had to come up with certain things and certain information.

The emergency was really for me, a way to get out into the countryside to see everything. I just attached myself to an AID trip and...US policy at this point was to do only emergency. We would not do anything that was considered development. We would only feed the people. So, we did get out. I got an opportunity to travel around an awful lot at that time and see how bad it was and it really was...

Q: Was this a government induced famine?

CARY: No, it was drought for the most part. Certainly the ability to move food from one area to another was impeded by the civil war, but the real problem was drought. And then with the famine, livestock died, and with that hard soil you really needed oxen or a tractor to work it. If the oxen died...and the traditional way of plowing was with a two oxen plow. By necessity ILCA, an international research center based in Addis, developed a one oxen plow so they could at least get something planted.

The topography of Ethiopia is just one grand canyon after another. Large-scale food distribution was very difficult. The cheapest means is trucks, and there weren't any trucks. So all of the donors contributed money, this included the Chinese and the Russians, and they bought a fleet of more than 200 trucks. The UN coordinated the movements. Once that was in place it worked pretty well.

Q: If you have grand canyon after grand canyon how do you get the trucks around?

CARY: Long convoys were part of the solution. But many areas were not readily accessible by road. The old warhorse of a transport plane, the C-130 was used extensively in conjunction with helicopters. The US and the British sent in a lot...the British were great and sent a steady supply of aircraft and crews. They said they used them as training missions. They would load them up and come down to about 30 feet above the designated drop zones which would be on hill tops. The cargo doors opened and the crew would push out the pallets loaded with food. They would drop and then the Polish helicopters would come in and take those to even more remote places. The idea was as much as possible to keep people where they were.

Q: Oh yes. So often they all move to one place and there is no way to sustain them except emergency aid from then on.

CARY: Right. There was an awful lot of effort to get the food out there and it really was very, very difficult logistically. There was a lot of cooperation among nations who normally didn't work much together. Poland was still on the negative list. I can remember flying to one model communal village that the Ethiopian government was showcasing. I had the North Korean on one side the Vietnamese on the other.

Q: Both of whom we don't recognize.

CARY: Right. But that was just the nature of the operation, you always found yourself in different situations.

Q: Was their within the diplomatic community sort of a bureaucratic infrastructure built up with everybody working on this because you had the British, Americans, Chinese, Polish and North Vietnamese, etc.?

CARY: Yes, and it was pretty much the UN structure that pulled it together. There were always some problems, but there was agreement that we can't have everybody going off and doing their own thing, we have to decide what the priorities are. For example, the US didn't have any development priorities and most everybody else believed it was critical to do long range development. At the same time the Ethiopian government imposed a resettlement policy, forcibly moving people from part of the worse eroded areas saying that these places will no longer sustain life. So, they moved people en mass and built new settlements in different areas. Some went from highlands to lowlands and people who had never been exposed to any of the lowland diseases got sick and some died. So, there was a lot of that going on. This was forced resettlement. People didn't want to leave and it was a very controversial project. The diplomatic community was taken out to visit the resettlement sits. The Ethiopian government wanted us to see that it really wasn't so bad; that people had crops to bring in now which they didn't have in their homeland. Indeed 15 years before USAID had proposed exactly the same thing. Of course, it shouldn't be done forcibly, but the Ethiopian government's point was these people won't leave any other way. And people did leave the camps. There was early talk about people being shot trying to leave. What we could verify was that after some time with the policy, some people left the camps and walked back to Tigray or Welo or wherever they came from and were neither assisted nor hindered by the authorities.

There were some pretty awful incidents at feeding camps. Again we would fly out to see these things. Most of these trips were under the auspices of a non-profitable organization. If they were doing something, we could get an extra seat on their airplane. There were a lot of congressional visits at this point. It seemed as if everybody wanted to have their picture taken holding a starving Ethiopian kid so we had an awful lot of CODELS and staffdels...but then we couldn't have anybody too high level because it was such a miserable government. I must say Bob Dornan came out and I was his control officer.

Q: He was an extreme right wing California Representative who made an abortive run for President this last time which faded rather early. What was he interested in?

CARY: He had actually been in Nigeria during the Ibo crisis and had done air drops and was interested in the process. In the feeding camps there were just thousands of kids and he loved being surrounded by them. He would clap his hands or shout a phrase and the kids would repeat it. Very much the politician. I think he did genuinely like the kids but he was a very strange person who always seemed to be focused on something else. He kept talking about Nigeria and I would say well, this wasn't Nigeria. I assume what happened was he went back after having had the Ethiopian experience and talked about Ethiopia. The odd thing to me was he shared a room with his aide at the Hilton. Now, congressmen when they travel get a fair amount of money, but he watched his pennies and was very careful that way.

Q: Did you have a lot of press there?

CARY: The press people got thrown out on a regular basis. Blaine Hardin was covering the famine and he got thrown out. If you wrote something negative about Mengistu then they wouldn't give you a visa to come back in or they threw you out. They escorted you to the airport and said goodbye. But there were a lot of people who would come in periodically and then a lot of people who came in to do stories. We had the "We Are the World" performers who would come in who had done this huge concert to raise money and produced a record. Many of the artists did come to see what was happening. Bob Geldof was the one who organized it and he came through regularly. Because it was a circus in a lot of respects, the question always was, is the food getting to the people or is it getting diverted. And for the most part, because this was something we were very concerned with, it was getting to the people. The losses that occurred were due to storage difficulties. And then the war, there was a train that went up to one of the ports and every once in a while the rebels would blow up the tracks so nothing could move for a while while they had to rebuild the bridges. And then there were just times when you simply could not go into an area. Mickey Leland, the congressman, was supposed to come, he came frequently.

Q: A congressman from Texas.

CARY: Right. He was supposed to come at epiphany, which is a big Coptic holiday and we were going to go to the rock churches in Lalibela which had been closed because they were under rebel control. But the government basically could guarantee daylight access to the churches, if you came in and out by 2:00. Everybody was all excited because none of us had had the opportunity to visit the churches. And then, Leland canceled his trip and we couldn't get permission to get in any other way, plus we couldn't afford the plane. The reason he gave for the cancellation was because his wife was expecting twins. And we all said, "He has known for months that his wife was expecting twins. Why did he cancel three weeks before the scheduled trip?" Of course, he was eventually killed in a plane crash in Ethiopia.

Q: He was killed in an airplane with somebody from AID, was it?

CARY: My successor and my husband's successor were on that plane. It made you think.

One hand you had this Marxist regime and on the other you had the Ethiopian Airlines which had more or less been run by TWA for years and years and still followed the TWA rules and regulations. They had a great relationship with EX-IM Bank, they turned a profit. And Mengistu didn't touch the airline's management. Every once in a while he would take one of their planes, they had 767s, and go off and do something, but he didn't go out too often just in case he got overthrown. Ethiopian Airlines bought 2 Boeings while we were there, making Ethiopia one of the most important US markets in Africa. It was just a very interesting contrast.

Q: While you were there I take it, particularly with the famine and all, that the idea of maybe just pulling completely out had slipped into abeyance?

CARY: Yes. It was clear that there was a real mission for the US to play. The change in the Russian position by cutting back on weapons sales was another good thing. Somalia which was starting to turn back to the United States. So, there was an interest in staying. We had a change in the Chargé at the time and Jim Cheek, who had been a Latin American hand. Jim was one of the people that Jesse Helms said never, never, never, you are out...

Q: It was sort of to hide him away from Latin America wasn't it?

CARY: Yes. He had been DCM in Nepal and then came to Ethiopia. He felt that no money had been spent on the mission for ten years, because everybody was afraid it was going to be closed down, but he reasoned that we have people here and we need to spend money, we need to build things up. We needed temporary lodging to put people. Because we couldn't get permission from the Ethiopian government to build, we brought in prefab houses and put them on the compound, which is absolutely a lovely compound. Jim was one of the best people from whom to learn how to deal with an adversarial relationship both with the Ethiopians and with Washington. He understood that the mission couldn't ask the US Government for anything positive for Ethiopia because Ethiopia is bad, but we still had an interest and we needed to be present and we needed to have some ability to say that we were guiding the way things were happening in terms of development and human rights. I mean, the foreign minister had defected at that point. It was looking more and more like this was a sinking ship and it really was only a question of time. So Jim played a very deft game with Washington, always being sure that everything was presented in terms of US interests, not that we have to do this for Ethiopia. It was very much the human rights concern.

An embassy employee was beaten up during a congressional visit. While the congressman was having dinner with some government officials, the goons took out one of our chief political FSNs and beat him up. The synapses were starting to slow down, the strains, the government really couldn't manage the situation. The war was going badly. The rebels were gaining more and more control. There was a flow of people coming in and out of Sudan. Then we had the Dinkas. Talk about John Gerang...these are Sudanese Christians, who are all about 7 foot tall at least and very thin. They would show up at the embassy and come in and have talks. Well, you know, you can't hide talks with Dinkas because they are so obvious who they are, except John Gerang, who is a real short guy.

Q: Who is John Gerang?

CARY: He is the leader of the southern Sudanese liberation movement seeking independence from the Muslim north. The US was having problems with the Sudan at this point. They would close borders so refugees couldn't move. Ethiopia was both a refugee generating and receiving country. You had Sudanese and some Somalians because of the drought there, so keeping track of the refugee situation was a very dynamic situation. There was the sense that things were changing...the Russians and the whole relationship between the US and the Soviet Union was changing. So, there was a reason to maintain a presence and indeed increase it if possible.

Q: Could you explain what the origins were of the war and how you viewed it during this period?

CARY: Historically there has always been tension between the Eritreans and the rest of Ethiopia. Eritrea was a separate state under the Italians from about 1890 through the Second World War. At the end of the Second World War the UN made it a protectorate of Ethiopia. In 1956 or so Haile Selassie incorporated it as part of Ethiopia proper, claiming historically the borders extended that far. This directly contradicted the UN mandate. He had no right to do that and the Eritreans just simply didn't accept it. So basically from 1956-57 the Eritreans had been fighting a movement of resistance and never gave up. So Mengistu was fighting the same war that Haile Selassie did. It escalated. No one was supplying weapons to the Eritreans or the Ethiopians under Haile Selassie. Well, I guess we were doing some. That was one of our contentious issues with the Ethiopian government. They had paid for F5s pre-DERG and we didn't deliver them because it was after the coup. The Mengistu government kept saying we owed them the money for the F5s and we refused to pay them back. Then the Soviets started providing tanks and planes and missiles and heavy artillery which the Ethiopians hadn't had before. And the Eritreans and then the Tigreans, another province, also got into the act and war continued. So, it was really guerilla warfare with the Eritreans and Tigreans becoming more and more sophisticated in battles and you just got to the point where Ethiopia could not sustain it any longer and that was what brought down Mengistu, it wasn't anything else.

Q: While you were there what was the general feeling at the embassy about the military situation?

CARY: Actually it was followed very closely in terms of what was going on and what was lost, the ordinance, and we were aware that the Russians were not going to maintain the level of supply, in fact, were cutting way back. Mengistu would periodically fly up to Moscow and plead for more materiel. And the Russians just simply weren't coming up with it. Another interesting part of the equation was the territorial integrity aspect. In Africa a whole issue revolved around the accepted the 1960 borders. Eritrea was part of Ethiopia and that really was what the discussion was about. Historical Eritrea had been separate...Eritrea and Tigre, the now country of Eritrea, has all the sea coast. Ethiopia no longer has any sea coast. Well, historically that is a bad idea to cut somebody off. But the argument was if we agree in a change in the boundaries of Ethiopia, what is that going to do with the rest of Africa.

Q: That has always been a great dilemma. Biafra was a great challenge at one point. Was this debated within the embassy?

CARY: Absolutely, should Eritrea be a separate country and how do we get around it? A lot thought it should. Then there were others who thought that the unit works as an economic unit as well and should be maintained. Eritrea is where an awful lot of the environmental derogation has happened. It is going to be very difficult for Eritrea to sustain itself.

It had been self sufficient under the Italians. A digression. There was a special relationship with the Italians. Of course Italy had controlled Eritrea for 80 years and the infrastructure there was very Italian. There were lots of vineyards and fruit trees, and it was more industrialized than any other part of Ethiopia.

So, you are talking about splitting a country where historically you have got antagonistic ties...3,000 years of tribal distinctions, there are 200 dialects in Ethiopia...

Q: And basically Ethiopia is still run by Amharas, were they?

CARY: Right.

Q: And the gallas, were they...?

CARY: Galla is a pejorative term that means slave. The Eritreans, the Tigreans and the Amhara were all fairly sophisticated groups. You knew which of the foreign service nationals were which group and people were very distrustful of each other in the midst of all this. If you were a Tigrean you didn't trust anybody unless he was another Tigrean and if you were an Amhara you felt everybody was out to get you. And then you had all the people in the south that basically all three of those groups looked down on. These were the slave population. That was one of Mengistu's issues. He felt he was treated as a gala, as a slave.

Q: In a way, unlike Nigeria, the US was not particularly called upon to make this, whether the country was split or not, an issue because by being somewhat removed we could finesse this one. Just stay to one side and say maybe theoretically we have the policy of such and such but it doesn't amount to anything.

CARY: Right. Our only real interest was strategic because of the Horn of Africa. It kept coming back time and time again. That is what we care about, we want to be sure that whoever controls the straits is on our side. Because, if you block that off you have to go all the way around.

Q: This is tape 4, side 1 with Anne Cary. You were talking about the emotional side of the famine.

CARY: There were a lot of people who had never given money to a foreign cause and because of the photographs of the starving children coming out of Ethiopia gave something and felt personally that we should be doing something else. The US walked a line of what is development and what is emergency assistance. US policy was only to provide emergency assistance. But is supplying clean water emergency assistance or is it development? Education is development, but basic health education is emergency assistance.

Q: Were you at all looking beyond and saying, "Okay, after this regime falls, what will be next?" On the economic side that is what you are supposed to do.

CARY: Right. I think it is a viable country. Again, you have lost so many of your educated people that the question is will they come back. The regime and the situation forced people out during the civil war. If you could get out you got out.

Q: Here at the Foreign Service Institute we are about four blocks from a major Ethiopian settlement, more or less. They have been quite a contribution to the economy of the Washington, DC area.

CARY: But, it has more resources than most countries in Africa. Because of the high plateau it has the ability to raise livestock without a problem with the tse-tse fly. So, Ethiopia could supply all of Africa with its meat. It has got good potential with grain. Pioneer Seed was in there doing an awful lot of interesting things. It has possibilities with good management to be a grain exporter. So, it can feed its people and be a very viable economy, but can't do it without its trained people coming back and contributing. It has been three years now since Mengistu left and the civil war ended and Meles came in, and there are still some of these tensions. People still haven't gone back. You talk to Ethiopians and they say it is not quite right yet, although they still haven't given the impression that they are here permanently, although a lot of them now have kids who I can't see could possibly go back.

Our commercial specialist immigrated to the United States and took advantage of the special visa program. She was Tigrean and had five kids. When her oldest, a boy, turned 12, he was tall. She was so afraid that he was going to be picked up and impressed into the army. She also was harassed because she worked for the embassy. So, she is here with the five kids. She would go back and maybe one or two of the kids would. But there has to be the development, the possibilities. There is a lot of money going in now. But, it still takes a certain amount of time.

Q: You left in 1987. What was the situation when you left?

CARY: It has rained, so that was good. There were people still trying to get out, doing everything they could to get their kids out. The people who stayed were the ones who felt strongly this was their country and they had to stay there. But they also felt there is no hope for my child, so they would send out their kids. A lot of other development was going on. A lot of other countries...Sweden had a fairly major development program. The World Bank had a large development program that was going on. Roads were going in. I had been out traveling with Brown and Root people, a big engineering firm, who were building another bridge over the Blue Nile and putting a road from the coffee producing region into the grain producing region. It was very interesting to see how that worked. There was hope but Mengistu had to go and you thought he was going to go.

The other interesting aspect that I want to mention is the Falashas, the black Jews of Ethiopia. That was a situation which made me wonder why on earth the US was involved in getting black Jews out of Ethiopia to Israel. The Beta Israel (house of Israel) better known as Falasha, traditionally has been a very poor group of people who were potters, tanners, certain positions that statuswise an Amhara would not hold. Falasha claimed to be descendants of the Lost Tribe of Israel. The international Jewish groups, a lot of money coming straight from the United States, were basically paying off Mengistu to get people out for a long time. They smuggled them out through Sudan, this became another of our irritants with Sudan. The Sudanese authorities knew it was going on but when it became public that Jews were going out through Sudan to Israel they made a...

Q: Of course, Sudan is a fundamentalist Islamic country and was Israel's sworn enemy.

CARY: Right. There was an awful lot of money paid to Mengistu to get the Beta Israel Jews out.

Q: Were you at the embassy involved in this at all?

CARY: Yes, in an indirect way. Many of the contributors were Americans. People coming through and being involved with the AJDC (American Joint Jewish Distribution Committee). They had projects, which now are not needed because everybody has gone. Yes, the US was certainly aware of what was going on and we did what we could to make sure people got out.

Q: On the strategic thing. By the time you were there it was becoming more and more obvious that the Soviet Union was changing, was trying to get the hell out of Afghanistan, was going through the Gorbachev reform and all this. One of the major aspects was lessening the tension around the world. Was the control of the Red Sea still as much a problem as it was before?

CARY: Well, it wasn't necessarily just the Russians or the Soviets controlling it, it was the fact that there still is an awful lot of shipping through it. It became less a political issue and more a "if we can't ship through there, it has an economic cost," and we didn't want to have that happen. The arguments of having physical control of the seas become much less important as technology means you can bridge them.

Q: You left there in 1987. Maybe we should stop at this point and pick it up next time with your departure for India. You were there from when to when?

CARY: From 1987-89.

Q: Today is March 21, 1996. Okay Anne, we are off to India. It is always interesting how tandem assignments work. How did it work out at this point?

CARY: This is exactly why we ended up in India. John Craig, who I had worked with in Haiti and who knew both of us, felt we should be in NEA, because he was in NEA and thought the Near East Asian Bureau was a great place. He contacted us very early on in the bidding process and said, "We have two jobs in India." Mine was going to be basically econ/commercial/trade policy officer and for John it was the staff assistant position to Ambassador John Gunther Dean. It sounded interesting. People said fascinating things about India, so we bid on it and were assigned. We had bid on a couple of other countries. There were two jobs in Barbados which also sounded interesting. I had specifically called to see if there would have been a conflict because John would have been political officer and I would have been econ and head of section. First they said no but then called back and said, yes, we couldn't do this. There were a number of possible jobs...you just go down the list...the bidding tool is useful because they do it by post so you just go down and look for two jobs in the same post. We were always able to identify four or five reasonable positions. India was a reasonable chance for me to go to a large econ section with a lot of issues. John was less thrilled about being staff assistant, but it was supposed to be for only one year after which he was to go into the political section.

Q: You went out to India in 1987. As you saw it and what you got from the embassy, what was happening in India internally and vis-a-vis the United States?

CARY: Relationships between the US and India are strained. A lot has to do with the non-proliferation situation. India has exploded a nuclear device and would not sign the non-proliferation treaty. Because of this we were very careful about what we would sell them in terms of technology transfer. They had a well established relationship with the Soviets and were receiving a lot of, particularly military and aviation equipment from them. The tension between India and Pakistan was such that the United States wanted to balance things off and made sure there wasn't the possibility for another war. Also, India was a leader of the non-aligned countries and almost as a given would say no to anything the US proposed in international forums. Rajiv Gandhi was prime minister. They were just in the first steps of economic liberalization which was of major concern to the US. Companies would just look at this 900 million people market and salivate saying, "If I only sold one whatever to each Indian, I would make it." And the Indian market was very, very closed. We were working to open up the Indian market, to liberalize it. There was an ongoing joint economic commission that didn't do much but would push a bit on liberalization each time it met. There were a number of issues that had political overtones, Union Carbide's involvement in the Bhopal disaster, for one.

Q: This was where a couple of thousand people died from the emissions of a chemical plant.

CARY: The litigation continued during my time there.

Also, Delhi was a huge mission and had agencies represented that I didn't even know had people overseas like the Library of Congress. There were a lot of DEA, Drug Enforcement Agency, people. The Afghan war was also going on. There was a lot going on. Then you also have the immigration issues, the brain drain and a lot of high tech exchanges going on.

Q: Would you explain the brain drain.

CARY: Indian schools produced large numbers of very well educated graduates with no jobs whatsoever in India. There is a large number who seek to immigrate to the United States. There is resentment that the US is taking the best from India; there is resentment that the United States gains from India's spending scarce money to educate her people and then India obtains no benefit from it. Of course, on the other side, there are no jobs for these people and it is a very frustrating situation for them.

Q: What was your impression of John Gunther Dean as an ambassador. He is one of the imperial ambassadors and had been around a good bit. People talked about him as difficult but effective as an ambassador. I was wondering with the Indians, he doesn't sound like the type that would work very well.

CARY: He left under duress from India while we were there. It was a very difficult situation. This was his fifth ambassadorial post. He had sort of done everything and been everywhere and his lack of contact with the Department and regular communication became a problem. He basically make his own policy in many instances. Reagan nominated a replacement as a recess appointment, a person named John Hubbard, president emeritus of USC, who had been a "Scholars for Reagan" fund raiser. John Dean just did not believe that this was going to happen. They could not possibly replace him and he really did not accept it when it did happen. It was a very sad end of a career.

Q: He was of German birth, rather you might say Germanic and a very serious hard charging individual. It would strike me that this would not be a very good mix with the Indians, but one never knows about these things. What was your impression?

CARY: He had some very good relations with key people in the Indian government. He had a formal manner which I think appealed to some of the elite. He wore white shirts with French cuffs and a jacket through the hot season. In India from mid-March until October, nobody wears a tie. Everybody is in bush jackets. Most of the Indian government offices were not air conditioned. Dean was meticulous about his personal appearance and damn the weather.

I saw him on a number of instances with the Indian government bringing up mostly trade issues that were really of key interest to us. A big irritant was India's quota on the number of American films which could come in.

Q: The Indian film industry is the largest in the world isn't it?

CARY: Yes.

Q: It always seems to be the same movie, but...

CARY: Yes, after four hours of singing and dancing in wet saris.

So, Ambassador Dean could be very effective on certain issues when he chose to be. But, as I said, at that point he was just not being involved necessarily on all the issues and if he didn't like the instructions, he didn't necessarily follow them. This made it very difficult for the people on his staff. If the ambassador doesn't make the point it is very hard at a lower level for the point to carry any conviction whatsoever.

The ceremonial part, which is a big part of an Ambassador's job, went well because the Indians were very much into ceremony, as was John Gunther Dean. When we were going to post, somebody partly in geste told me to take my white gloves, because the Ambassador insisted on them in the receiving line. I took them but never used them. However, it was just a level below that in terms of being absolutely appropriate. He had very strong feelings about the importance of family. People whom he believed didn't respect family had a harder time. We were okay because we were married and had these two kids who were the same age as his grandkids. So, we did get to see him because John was his staff assistant. In fact, we saw him a lot. We were frequently invited to the residence where everything was served with white gloves.

But, during that time, it was very difficult because there was a real gulf between him and the Department. When you lead a mission saying we are going to do it my way, the rest be damned, it is hard on the staff, hard on the DCM as well.

Q: Did you see any conflict from your perspective or maybe from chats with people in other ones, with our embassy at Islamabad?

CARY: No. This again was an odd time because Arnie Raphel was killed at that time.

Q: He was our ambassador and blown up in an airplane with Zia, the President of Pakistan, an assassination.

CARY: And a number of other people. They never did quite figure out what really happened. And also because of all the US arms being channeled to the Afghan rebels, there was a special ambassador for Afghanistan which was covered out of Washington. So, you more or less had two ambassadors dealing with the same issue because for Pakistan at the time, the Afghan war was the biggest issue. There was a great divide...people would go over to Islamabad and say this is wonderful, it is so different from India. Muslim society is so much easier.

Q: There are Muslim societies and Muslim societies. But, as so often happens between these two embassies the main issue was not Kashmir or something of that nature?

CARY: No. Kashmir closed just as we were leaving. In fact, various parts of India were closed. Darjeeling was closed because of guerrilla fighting much of the time. You couldn't go into the Punjab because of internal problems. There were an awful lot of Indian internal problems at that point. A lot of terrorists, a lot of killing of each other, intercommunal violence. It was probably the most violent place I have ever lived. Every spark could strike something. There were just so many people. You stop to change a tire and all of a sudden you have 200 people and somebody shoves somebody else and you have a fight. It was much in contrast to the image of Gandhi's India, India had nothing to do with non-violence.

Q: Your responsibility was trade. I would think that this would be a very difficult job. One, the Indian is bureaucratic. Two, the Indian is just plain difficult to deal with in the business sense, for us. We are trying to break into something where the international politics aren't in our favor. They would prefer to have somebody else as their main customer. Could you tell me how you went about your work?

CARY: We had a lot of really difficult trade issues. The people I dealt with on a regular basis, particularly, Anwal Hoda, who headed their GATT section and is actually in the GATT secretariat now, was just superb. He had been doing GATT issues for 20 years. He had written a book on it. He knew the issues cold and if you just walked in, he was going to get you. He would quote sections of the agreement verbatim or of previous panel reports. His expertise meant he could say, 'don't you remember five years ago when we had this same dispute?'

We had a lot of ongoing trade disputes. Almonds was a big one issue, concerning the tariff for almonds. We finally did negotiate it successfully with the Indians. I found the Indian International Service, which is staffed on the basis of a highly competitive exam, had excellent people. So the working relationship was very good. I found they were just as sharp as they could be, did their homework, knew their issues and they knew what your position was going to be. Now, they didn't change their position, so negotiating was very frustrating. You would move one inch and then go back and debate it again when we thought we were ready to move on.

We negotiated a Science and Technology agreement. Intellectual property rights were a main concern for us both because there is an awful lot of piracy of US films and US music in India and we were trying to get the Indians to change the law. On the patent side we had major battles. India didn't provide product patent protection. For US pharmaceutical companies this was the main issue. In the GATT rounds, improving intellectual property was a key US goal and we were very far apart. That was really a lot of the nuts and bolts that I was working on.

You could see where the Indian position had come from, straight from the economic socialism of the planned economy. The state should be able to get some benefit, the individual shouldn't get all the money from an invention. Something that was good for mankind should be spread out. So, they allowed that if something was good, then anybody could make it. Overlaid on this system was an incredibly extensive and corrupt license system where they figured out if they needed ten thousand teaspoons they would give licenses to people to manufacture ten thousand teaspoons. So there was no competition and quality was absolutely miserable. But, they felt the Western system was not equitable and left people out, so they refused to provide the same kind of intellectual property protection that we thought was important, except in computers. The Indians excel in computer software. Indians hold many copyrights. They provide copyright protection for 50 years as opposed to the 17 of a patent. So, you could see things changed when their interests were at stake.

The other interesting thing about working with the Indians Services, both civil service and the international side, was they were very thinly staffed on many issues. The ambassador, the DCM, head of the econ section and I all had Hoda as a contact, because he was the person who made the decisions. The minister merely would confirm them. So in essence, the Indians did with one person what we did with 4.

Q: The politicians were pretty much politicians and that was what they did.

CARY: Right, and they really didn't get involved with these decisions at all. The Permanent Secretary made the decisions. So that was the person we had to deal with. In one way you might say that probably we were overstaffed if we had so many people dealing with one contact. It also worked on the foreign affairs side. There were two people basically on the America desk.

Q: You mentioned intellectual and patent rights. What weapons did we have to deal with them and what was the outcome of some of these issues?

CARY: Super 301, which is a US trade law saying that if countries don't provide adequate protection for intellectual property rights or use unfair trade practices, they can be cited and the US can take retaliatory action against them. And India was cited. We spent so much time going back and forth working with the Special Trade Representative's Office at USTR in terms of what unfair trading practice India should be cited for because there were lots of things to choose from. We were all absolutely shocked at the end. USTR cited India for unfair trade practices for the insurance industry, which had been nationalized some years earlier. We were surprised because none of the insurance companies had ever said they wanted back in the market. Under the terms of the Trade Act specific dates were set for when they must make progress hold talks. The Indians said they were not going to talk about this although they eventually did sit down and talk. There was a lot of posturing. It was watchlisted for intellectual property rights. As is often the case when the US acts under mandated fiat you get these laws passed which would restrict your action so somebody comes up with a way to maneuver around it. The watchlist was a maneuver to avoid citing a country, because once you have actually cited a nation then the incentive to negotiate is gone. You retaliate, they retaliate back and it is a trade war. So, what you want to do is keep the pressure on to keep things improving. India was one of 20 countries that were watchlisted the first year the trade law went into effect in 1988. There was an awful lot of back and forth with the desk, with USTR, who really was the office calling the shots on who was going to be listed. They were out on a regular basis negotiating various things.

Then, on the other side we had technology transfers because Reagan had signed an agreement with Rajiv that we were going to transfer technology. A sensitive issue was the super computer. The Indians really wanted to buy a Cray.

Q: The Cray being at that time the top of the line computer with tremendous capacity.

CARY: The Defense Department said over our dead bodies. But, we had the Presidential agreement to work it out. So, we negotiated with the Indian government, with Cray, and among the various concerned US agencies. We had members from the Defense Department and State and other interested agencies on how to put in safeguards so the Indians couldn't use it for any nuclear stuff. The Indians were also testing a long range missile. They weren't successful while I was there. They kept trying but it didn't quite work out. Their argument for being able to buy the Cray stemmed from the fact that they had already been successful in developing their own technology and US efforts to prevent missile and nuclear research were futile. "Listen, we know how to do this. We want it for weather patterns because the monsoon is the single most important element in the economy and weather patterns are so complex that you need a supercomputer to be able to work them out."

At the same time they were working on parallel processing to create a supercomputer. The concept was to put together enough computers, hooking them up together rather than the more complex way the Cray supercomputer worked and being able to do the same type of calculations with the same speed, which is what they needed.

There was an Indian project working on that and they were having some success. In the end, we finally did sign an agreement to sell them a Cray with safeguards on the Cray which nobody was really happy with but it allowed them to get the Cray. Cray was not at all happy about it because they had an ongoing involvement in something that they didn't feel they should be involved- basically limiting the runs of the program so they could be monitored in a way which made it tedious and traceable to do the type of calculations needed for nuclear development. The agreement was a compromise about how you deal with technology transfer when politics has said we will do this now, how do we do it to keep our security risks well covered. In India at this time there were lots and lots of Russians everywhere doing everything. The Soviet Union was becoming less and less of a threat and a lot of our personnel were involved in watching Soviets than they were dealing with the Indians. A lot of people thought that the Indian trading relationship with the Soviet Union benefitted India. The Indians got all of this good military stuff for selling the Soviets lousy consumer products.

Q: Looking at the Soviet Union and looking at what you are saying about India, I would have thought that the Indian would be basically a more sophisticated country in trading practices than the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union wouldn't have much to offer outside of military hardware.

CARY: Well, military hardware was what the Indians wanted. And they gave them a production line for the MiG fighter jet. That was important to the Indians just to have this type of thing. So they would sell them their pretty miserable consumer goods.

They sent people to the Soviet Union to study for a while and then brought them back and would work on projects. What was happening was the technology in India was advancing so rapidly. They were doing so much and the government was helping it. They were doing everything they could to bring these people in. The econ section got involved when Microsoft wanted to bring over about 50 Indian software engineers for a 3-5 year period. Of course, most of them were in their early "20s and there was the problem of whether or not they would return to India. We said, "Why don't you just do what a lot of other software companies were doing - establishing companies in India and working through direct satellite hookups? You would have these engineers who were being paid very well by Indian standards who would be working on all problems for the US and would just go back and forth in instantaneous communication." But Microsoft didn't believe that would work. They had to come and learn the Microsoft philosophy and could only do that by living and working in the US at headquarters. Microsoft really wasn't used to "no". I think they got 35 visas out of 50, which is really very good. The Microsoft lawyers kept saying, "We know they will come back." We replied that they couldn't know that and couldn't guarantee it. It was raised at higher levels because obviously Microsoft was a very important US company and they didn't understand why the US government wasn't trying to help them. It became a fairly sensitive issue. We had to work with the consular section and, of course, you can not tell a consular officer what to do and to whom to issue a visa, nor was anybody inclined to do that. We all had a lot of respect for how they were making their decisions.

Q: Here the Indians were building up an army on Soviet equipment, and, of course, the Gulf War hadn't yet happened which was to happen a couple of years later, but certainly with Syria vs Israel and all, Soviet military equipment just didn't seem to be as good as American equipment. Did you get a feeling that the Indians realized the difference in equipment?

CARY: Oh, absolutely, they wanted very much to buy US, but we just wouldn't sell them the level that they wanted.

Another issue which I was involved in, we called it "shake and bake," and it was a combined accelerator vibration testing system used for testing satellites. India was building its own satellites. The whole television system was done through satellite. They wanted to launch on US vehicles. They wanted to adequately test the satellites before spending a lot of money to send them up. We got into games about what percentage of the satellite were US parts or Soviet parts. We spent more than three years in negotiation on that. And whether we would sell them radiation hardened chips to put in their satellites. That was another proliferation concern. Congress was very much tuned to the concerns and every time you talk about a sale of high technology equipment to India they would turn around and say, "No, you can't." During the negotiations the US team went through some of the Indian facilities where they were building their satellites to see how they would control the chips to make sure they could account monthly for each and every chip and prove where everyone of these things were. It was ridiculous, our policy on so many things, because they could be used for nuclear testing. Anything that could possibly be used for nuclear testing was really sensitive, overly so, in my view. Specially as we had gone through three or four rounds on these radiation hardened microchips and the industry guy who was on the negotiating team said, "You know, we don't manufacture them separately anymore...all they have to do is buy them." I am sure the Indian knew this too, but to the Indians it was the principle that was important...You will sell these to us because we are a worthy ally.

Q: Was there ever a time after the negotiations that your Indian colleagues would join you in a drink and let their hair down and tell you what they really felt about the situation?

CARY: The business community certainly did that. But officials, no. Nobody would ever criticize their government. They had no problems. The civil service just did not get involved in talking politics or anything. There was just no advantage in that. When you got into the internal troubles and human rights, it became much more emotional. Criticism was just not possible for officials. The reply to US criticism was, "You don't understand what is going on."

Q: Did you get involved with the problem of child labor?

CARY: Yes.

Q: Will you talk about that?

CARY: The requirement to limit imports of goods was not yet part of US trade law, but we were very concerned about child labor and slavery because it is a major component in certain Indian industries...rug making is one of the major industries, but also mining. Child labor is just everywhere because the wage in India is a real problem. No one person earns enough money to support a family so everybody has to work including the kids and they do. It becomes a very emotionally charged issue. Parents say, "Well, we will starve if we send them to school. We can't afford to send them to school. Although school is free you have to have books, shoes, clothes." Most of India is hideously poor and people simply couldn't do that. I would visit mills...they had a few top of the line textile mills that are all automated, but most of the textiles industry in India is hand loomed.. Little kids, 7, 8, 9 years old sit at the loom and work it or knot the rugs. Some worked outside, but a lot of it was just very unhealthy. There was no education and no future for these children. People would say that we have enough educated people, we don't need any more, we can't give jobs to the ones we have. And what else do you do to keep people alive? I certainly don't believe child labor is the answer, but they really did believe there was no alternative. If you were smart that was good and they would try if they had a smart kid and sacrifice everything to get that kid to school and to keep him in school.

The other sensitive social issue was dowry. It was illegal to charge dowry, which is what the bride's family gives the groom. It is a huge amount, two or three years salary worth of presents. The bride, herself, will have her jewelry, which is hers and that doesn't go into the family. But 95 percent of the marriages are still arranged marriages and part of the negotiation is how much we are going to get...the set of dishes, clothes, stove, refrigerator, motorbike, television, etc. When the average Indian earns maybe \$50 a month, a pretty decent middle class wage...some kids may earn \$10 a month, which is possible. But the families would agree to this marriage with the payment of say \$1000. The couple would be married and if the bride's family didn't come up with what they had promised, or if indeed they did come up with what they promised but the groom's family decided they wanted more, it was not at all infrequent, the bride's life could be in danger. At least one woman a day was burned to death in what were called dowry deaths. Either the dowry hadn't been paid or more usually, they wanted more and the bride's family couldn't do anything about it. They couldn't afford it and it was just unacceptable for her to go back home. She was stuck. It was just a horrible situation.

Q: Did that come up in our relationship at all?

CARY: Yes, in the human rights report. Another issue that came up as was female infanticide.

Q: I would have thought under this system that some people would cut off the problem at the beginning, no girls or something.

CARY: Yes. They used amniocentesis, for example.

Q: This is a way of testing for the sex of a child.

CARY: A study was made and out of 8,000 abortions cases following amniocentesis, 7,999 were female fetuses. It was unquestionably used for sex selection. If you didn't have a son, you were nothing. Some families, because they couldn't afford the dowries, would kill their baby girls. There was an awareness that this wasn't acceptable. The Indian press which was very odd, very undisciplined, would report these things. They found it pretty awful. There was one case of suttee, which is a widow throwing herself on a funeral pyre of her husband, when we were there. It was very unusual though. A 19 year old girl. It had been illegal for years. The British had outlawed it and the Indian constitution doesn't allow it and it really hadn't been practiced for a long time. Now, granted, as a childless widow, her life was not worth a whole lot in a village. But, she indeed did commit suttee, suicide, and it raised a lot of attention. People would talk about whether this was a good thing or a bad thing. Whether she should be allowed to do it, more because it was such a miserable life for a childless widow. If you have sons you are okay and are going to be protected. But if you are childless there is nothing to protect you.

Q: As a female moving up to the higher ranks of a Foreign Service officer, what was your impression of the role of professional women in India at that time?

CARY: There were not very many, particularly at the higher ranks. This is ironic because India had been led by a female prime minister. There was a deputy secretary (relatively high rank) at the Foreign Office. I can't think of any women in trade ministry. There were a couple in commerce. Indian unmarried female foreign service officers couldn't live. I remember one woman in particular, who was the deputy secretary in the Foreign Office, and I asked her if she would go overseas and she said, "No, I can't really because I am not married and it is just unacceptable for a woman to live on her own. If I marry somebody in the foreign service, then that would work out and we could go and I could keep working." There was not a taboo about married women working, but she couldn't live alone. I thought that was an interesting thing. There were, certainly, some women who were out, but most not. Most of the women who worked were very poor women. They were hauling dirt in 115 degree weather in a sari. The poverty in India to me was much worse than Ethiopia. Although, you get to a certain level and how miserable is miserable, it is not a contest. But, there seemed to be an acceptance of it because, of course, with the Hindu philosophy, if you are an untouchable it is because that is what you deserved. So, there is no need for society to feel sorry for you because you have earned that position and you have to work to be better, to move up in the next reincarnation. It was very much a family orientated system where anything outside the family didn't matter. The rest of the world's troubles just really couldn't be your concern.

Now, to me, as a way of living, I found that very, very difficult. You understand that in a country with so many people where there isn't enough for everybody that the way people protect themselves is different. The common spaces were just filthy. People would spit, people would urinate in the corners and staircases. This in a government building. Then you would go into a lovely office, nicely appointed with carpets on the floor. It was a real land of contrasts.

Q: On the more frivolous side, but important to us, how did the clash between the movie moguls work out?

CARY: Well, Jack Valenti...

Q: Jack Valenti was the president, and has been for many, many years, of the American Movie Producers Association.

CARY: India imposed a quota of about 100 US films a year going into India. We felt that was just ridiculous. There shouldn't be any quota at all. The censors would eliminate an awful lot of what could go in because you could not show a kiss on the screen and no nudity. You could blow everybody to smithereens, that was okay, but no sex whatsoever was allowed. Certain films the director wouldn't allow any cuts so they weren't imported, but most producers or directors didn't care about what happened to a film in international, particularly "third-world" distribution. But, India had a strict quantitative limitation and we were able to get that increased and MPEA was happy. But, Jack Valenti was there every step of the way with letters and phone calls.

Q: Of course, you couldn't work reciprocity because nobody would cross the street to see an Indian movie.

CARY: That was our point. India can send as many films as it wants to the US. There are a few, obviously that have won best foreign film, but most of the 400 odd films are of limited or no interest to the US audience. I did go down to Bombay and call on the film studios, because the other movie issue was piracy. There was an awful lot of pirated copies of movies on video coming in and the Indian film makers didn't like this because it cut down on the people who went to see their films.

Q: We are talking about video tapes.

CARY: Yes. The other thing was pornography was coming in. I was surprised at the subterfuge that went on. The smugglers would put a regular movie for 15-20 minutes at the beginning of the tape and then put a pornographic film on after that with the idea that the censors were not going to sit there and really look through more than 20 minutes before they pass it.

Q: I would have thought there would be a thriving pornographic industry in India. They invented pornography in a way.

CARY: I can remember going with my mother to Khajuraho, which has erotic carvings all over the temple's walls. The guide went on at great length about them. But, again, their idea of pornography is just very different. Sex isn't necessarily pornographic, although kissing is. But, the other is all in a married sense.

Q: Where there any other issues you had to deal with? What was life like in the embassy? Big embassies often have their problems.

CARY: It worked very well as a matter of fact. There was a science section...the people I worked with most frequently were the military side, the intelligence, and the commercial section. This was a Foreign Service Commercial post as well and they had three people there. We worked very, very well together. It is not unusual to have a good relationship between the economic section and the commercial section, but we worked very, very well together. They were very good about inviting me to functions or making sure that I met with the business community. Sometimes the economic and commercial interests conflicted. With the technology side we were trying to restrict sales and the business community is trying to sell. The military side was also very cooperative.

Q: How did you find the Indian business community?

CARY: Extravagant. Here you had one of the contrasts of India with people lying on the streets begging and people literally dripping diamonds, emeralds and gold threaded saris stepping over them to go to parties. The business community had an awful lot of money and for certain things would spend it so lavishly. At the hotels we would be invited to just huge events, 5,000 people to a wedding. There was very conspicuous consumption, particularly of items which could not be legally imported. I remember being in on a wealthy business man's home where he was pushing Johnny Walker Black. I can remember somebody saying, "Oh, yes, somebody from one of the other embassies sold it to me." And, I thought, that is one of the reasons why we are closing down our commissary. We closed it to all non-Americans at that point.

New Delhi was really like Washington 20 years ago when no business people lived there. Most of the business community would come to lobby and commuted by Air India or the internal airlines. Because of the security problems throughout the country you were physically searched every time you got on an airplane. It was very thorough. The business community would make "air dashes" up and down the country.

Q: You left there when John Hubbard was ambassador.

CARY: Yes. He was the political appointee that gives the bad name to political appointees. He was in his mid-'70s and had been involved with educational exchanges in India, so his appointment did make some sense. But he had the title of ambassador and had no interest at all in being an ambassador. He really didn't believe there were some things that he had to do as ambassador. It was in contrast to John Gunther Dean who took the business seriously. He might not say what you wanted him to say, but he did go see the people and say it. Hubbard approach was just..."are you kidding, I'm not going to do this." He liked the social aspects of it. He had more girl friends come and stay at the residence, as well as his ex-wife with whom he had a good relationship. You had to ask, "Who is at the residence today?" And he was not confirmed. He was a recess appointment who was not confirmed. So, he left after less than a year when the Bush administration came in.

Q: And you left about that time too, didn't you?

CARY: Yes. We left in the summer of 1989.

Q: Where did you go?

CARY: To Washington. I took the European Community Affairs, deputy director, position. It was in EUR/RPE, which was European Community Affairs and OECD Affairs. Felix Bloch was the one who hired me, but before I showed up in the office he had been arrested.

Q: You might explain who Felix Bloch was?

CARY: Yes. Felix Bloch was a career Foreign Service officer who actually was not arrested, what I said was wrong, they never charged him, was dismissed for spying for the Soviet Union, for selling secrets. He had been the office director in RPE and DCM in Austria just before that. There was belief that he had for a long time been passing information to the Soviets. I learned about it on TV. I was supposed to report to the office the next Monday and I think it was Thursday on the news they showed footage, which turned out to be a simulation, of Felix passing information in Paris to a Soviet agent.

My security clearance, which hadn't been updated for 15 years, was updated along with everybody else's in the office immediately. All of the office's computer files were frozen until they went through it all. It was a very odd thing. I was told this, I wasn't there yet, security walked into the office and escorted Felix out of the building. He was not allowed to take anything out of the building. Then he was kept under surveillance for a long time. They never were able to bring charges against him. In the end he was denied his pension. I found it scary to think they could do that. He was never charged, he was never found guilty of anything, yet he lost his pension.

Q: You were doing this work from when to when?

CARY: From September 1989 to September 1991. It was a fascinating time. This was major change in the world. In summer 1989 Poland and Hungary were making some economic and political reforms and the West wanted to provide some assistance. For odd reasons in the Bureau our office got very much involved in this assistance to Eastern Europe because the Eastern European offices couldn't handle it. Between the OECD and the European Community we were trying to all get together to get assistance to help these two countries.

I can remember giving a briefing on Eastern Europe in early October, 1989 to some businessmen. The main points were - Poland and Hungary, we expected continuing reforms. Nothing in East Germany is going to change, nothing in Romania, but you might be looking in the other bloc countries for some small openings. Within six weeks it was history. The regimes had started to come down one after another. The Berlin Wall came down. Just all of Europe flipped. It was a lost opportunity because nobody stepped in with a new idea. There was no "Great, this is what we are going to do." The European Community was in the process of sort of taking back charge of themselves and saying...

Q: We were moving towards the so-called year of Europe.

CARY: Yes, that was in 1992. It was to be an economic union with all the barriers to trade coming down. There was to be one product standard. If you could sell it to one of the European countries you could sell it to all. Really a true internal market was supposed to happen. The US was very concerned with that. But on the political side the changes in Eastern Europe were so rapid. You would write a briefing paper and the next day you would have to revise it. The European Commission was really looking for a political role and felt that this was the impetus. You had 1992 coming on and this whole new world, and this was a European world and Europe was going to go back and take charge. It actually did a good job moving towards putting into place the political structure, until Yugoslavia blew the whole thing out of the water. But the changes were just so rapid that, in my opinion, the State Department and the whole US government just could not move quickly enough to manage the leadership role that we had had when post-war Europe was created. This was the end of post-war Europe and whereas there had been a clear idea of what the US role should be, now there was a lot of uncertainty. The 1992 issue had raised questions. Is Europe our friend? Are they our allies? Isn't a united Europe a threat to the United States. What should we do in reaction to that? There was not a clear sense of US leadership, nor did Europe want US leadership. Many were saying, "Hey, you guys, back off. This is our show and we are going to run it." It was a very exciting time. Lots and lots of changes. And it was very disappointing because I think we lost an opportunity.

Q: The Secretary of State was James Baker at that time. Did you get any feeling about his leadership?

CARY: Yes. He cared about Russia and he cared about Israel but not the rest of the world. Every time you would send up a memo saying such and such prime minister was coming, and wanted a meeting with the Secretary, the answer was no. He didn't like foreigners and didn't want to have anything to do with them. Traditionally when the Secretary goes up to the UN he has a lunch with all of the European Community leaders or foreign ministers. No, Baker didn't want to do that. He didn't want to do much. Bob Zoellick was his Counselor, a position which could be anything in the Department, and he more or less took over responsibility for Europe. He was a young guy, in his '30s at the time. Very bright. He was the one who was looking over what was happening in Europe and how we were going to deal with it, and assistance to Eastern Europe. There were good people on his staff and we worked closely with them.

The Under Secretary for Economic Affairs was Richard McCormack, the ex-Helms staffer who had been Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs, was just totally out of it. Zoellick was it. He was very sharp. But it was more of just keeping track of what was going on.

Q: It was pretty apparent to anybody looking at it from the outside that we didn't know what we wanted. I wasn't only that we didn't know where we were going, we weren't sure what we wanted.

CARY: Right. What do you do with NATO? The European Community was enlarging and the question is what do you do with the Eastern European countries. How do we integrate them into the economic and political organizations that exist? Should we get rid of NATO? Should we get rid of the OECD? And people talked about it. We wrote an awful lot of papers saying one way or the other. The decision was to open partnerships for the East European countries with conditionality, both economic and political conditionality, and that assistance would be furnished to these countries in exchange for moving on. But it wasn't to be a full partnership yet because everybody was very tentative about where these countries were going and how these organizations could absorb new members and whether it would work. NATO was the biggest issue. Do you take in the Eastern Europeans and then the Russians when the whole purpose of NATO was to protect militarily against eventual Soviet invasion? There were just a lot of issues that people kept going over intellectually and coming up with small steps, which is what they were.

The G-24, which is a group of Western countries that were channeling assistance to Eastern Europe. We brow beat the Japanese to join. They didn't care about Eastern Europe but we told them they had to. If Japan was going to be a major player in the world, they would have to be involved and come up with money. The Japanese idea was to just write a check. We said they couldn't just write a check, they had to do things to see that the money was properly spent. Who was to decide that the countries were meeting the political and economic criteria? This was one of those cases where the US budget problems were such that we didn't have the money. There was a lot of bitterness against Baker because he would not ask for any more money in the budget for State. And then the decision was made to open new embassies in every one of the former Soviet Union republics...15 new embassies. They were all to be staffed with no increase in the budget.

Q: I sort of had the feeling from the outside that Baker had a very tight circle around him and was mainly interested in preparing himself for running for President. This may be quite unfair.

CARY: I don't really believe that. James Baker is a very bright man and I don't think he ever really believed he could be President. He is a very cold human being. He just does not come across with warmth at all. He is enough of a strategist to understand that if you can't sell yourself to the American people, you can't win the Presidency. He was very concerned about what the US was doing. I believe the reason he didn't ask for any money was because he knew how difficult it was going to be to get it on the Hill. I think he could have gotten it on the Hill at that point. If ever you had a justification we had it and the Hill was giving money at that point. But, he believed that down the road that we really should be cutting the budget and shouldn't be doing these things.

His small circle of advisors...Zoellick, Margaret Tutwiler, Dennis Ross...had a lot of sense. It was a very tight group and Baker ignored the rest of the State Department. So, if you wanted to get something done you channeled it through one of his people. On European issues it was Zoellick. We would present our ideas and C staff would call us saying they would like to see a paper on this but not to put it through S/S. Don't put it through the bureaucratic process, don't worry about clearing it with anybody else. So, that is the way everything was done. It was "We know who we want to look to in the bureaucracy and we will do that." The whole formal arm was still coming up with policy papers and writing things that weren't read. You couldn't send up something called a split memo...a recommendation in which different bureaus disagreed, each giving pros and cons for the position they favored.

Q: This essentially takes the decision making ability away from the Secretary and it ends up homogenized.

CARY: Right. Nobody was agreeing on things so nothing was going up. Still, you had policy that had to be made, so the circle of advisers were reaching down into the bureaus to the people they trusted. I mean it was a fault of their own making, but it certainly was a fault.

Q: Partly since it was at a time when we needed very strong guidance. As you and your colleagues were debating NATO, everybody has their own fix. Mine is that obviously NATO was designed number one to keep the Soviet Union from attacking Western Europe, but to me the other one, almost as important, was in one way or another to keep the French and the Germans in the same bed together so that they wouldn't start looking over each other's shoulder and get into an arms race or anything like that. Too many wars that had involved the United States had started that way. Was that also one of the things that you thought about?

CARY: No. At this point the Germans and the French proposed a joint German-French military component of a European defense force. This was rejection of NATO, with its US imprint. It is a proposal which surfaces regularly.

Q: They have a brigade even, I think.

CARY: Right. And, of course, on top of all this was the Gulf War which made things more difficult and complicated because Europe could not achieve political agreement to act. In the European Bureau we were involved in what we called 'Operation Tin Cup.' We were asking the rest of the world for money to pay for our forces. If they didn't send any forces they had to kick in some money to pay for ours. It was a very bizarre exercise going back and forth with our allies trying to get money to pay for US troops.

Yugoslavia was the other main issue that the US really blundered...I remember sitting at a European Bureau staff meeting early on when the then-Yugoslav office director... and, of course, a series of Yugoslav office directors have resigned...was very emotional about what was going on in Yugoslavia, saying it was going to be a blood bath and we, the US, really had to do something, but nobody wanted to do anything. The question became "Who should do something?"

There were lots of possibilities, NATO, WEU, CSCE, UN. And for each one there was an excuse. The CSCE could do nothing. The CSCE had to have consensus and the Soviets were not about to agree. The Soviets felt so threatened by the idea of splitting up a country that they didn't want anybody doing anything.

Some Europeans advocated the WEU, the Western European Union, a more or less moribund military agreement, with a stronger treaty commitment than NATO. The WEU treaty requires that if one of the nations is attacked the other partners must come to its assistance. The NATO agreement that says nations shall consider and provide assistance if possible. So, the WEU might be the arm to do it.

The continual debate was whether NATO should be involved. The Germans felt very strongly they didn't want any German troops going in to do anything. German troops in Yugoslavia just raised too many ghosts. There was great European sensitivity to that.

Q: There was a lot of dissent that came out of that. Were their debates?

CARY: Oh yes.

Q: How did you see things at that time?

CARY: Actually, I do believe the Europeans have got to take the lead, that they have to take the main responsibility for dealing with Yugoslavia because it is in Europe. They have to deal with the mess. Our interests, particularly with the end of the Eastern bloc, are limited and are humanitarian in many respects. And it is the humanitarian picture that the American people responded to. Seeing scenes of people getting blown up in the market square triggered an outcry, somebody has to do something. To be cynical, I think the final decision to send in troops was pretty much a political one. We don't want to have any of these horrible pictures on the TV just before elections, so let's get something settled so it won't have any shock value any more or whatever.

I did believe that the Europeans should come up with an answer, that this is very much an European issue. How you deal with it determines whether or not there is a European Union.

Q: As you dealt with this, what was your impression? Did you feel that there really is such a thing as Europe or was it pretty much broken up into the various national interests?

CARY: There is much more of a European sense in the 1990s than there was in the late 1970s. People really do talk about Europe and think about Europe. Some of the emotional issues, the European Monetary Union...the idea of one currency...I mean this is such a silly issue now. The goals that they set for monetary union regarding government deficits, tax policies and what not, are very difficult to reach. They have put off again the deadline. But in fact, they are going to be able to do this. Jacques Delors, as president of the European Commission, was a very strong force. He did an awful lot to add to the sense of a united Europe, to say, we are going to move, we are going to push. They were working on the Maastricht Treaty, which was the completion of a true common market and political union. They moved to change the name to "Union" rather than "Community." It is a union, indivisible more or less, you can't pull out of it anymore. In fact, a lot of members have said that if you could, they would have thrown Greece out of it long ago. Many EC officials told me that was the biggest mistake they ever made, letting Greece into the European Community.

Q: How did you see some of the major people in your office and any problems, France, England and Germany being the three I can think of, although there may have been others like Italy or Spain?

CARY: Italy was very much on the rise at that point. It had the third largest GNP. It was before all the problems of corruption.

Q: Yes, the whole thing has now fallen apart.

CARY: For the longest time Italy's negotiating position appeared to be, "Don't hit me, I will fall down." But, by 1990 it had moved into a much more secure role and a much stronger role. People were talking about the miracle of Italy and how wonderful it is.

The French were again strong Europeanists. Whether it was the fact that Delors was EC president...many people felt he was going to be the next President of France. So everybody kept an eye on what he was doing. And how well Europe did, how well the Community did, was seen as a reflection on France because of Delors.

The Germans were coming out from hiding behind the French and were actually beginning to stand up and say, "Yes, we think this." For the longest time the Germans just hid behind the French. But they were now willing to make some clear statements that such and such was an interest of Germany and they were going to move in that direction. Amongst the Europeans they seemed to be more willing to discuss problems and to show divisions because there was a link that wasn't there before.

We had regular meetings with the EC on political cooperation. We would send assistant secretaries to Europe or the EC people would come to Washington and cover a whole range of issues, human rights, the Middle East, non-proliferation, where we felt US and Europe had similar interests and to make sure that people understood where we were coming from. So, there was a dialogue going on.

Earlier, the US demarches just went to the capitals, but now we had to include the Community in our discussions. What we found out is that if you made a demarche in the capitals and you left out one part of it to tailor it more precisely to the interest of that country, your contact would have already received the full text of the demarche over their own EC network, a classified network. The Italians would say, "Why did you leave out this part?" They really were coordinating exceptionally well on the political side. So, we couldn't tailor our approaches to countries the way we had in the past because everybody would notice the differences.

Q: Did you feel as you were dealing with the evolving and very important element the cold hand of American politics? I am thinking particularly the Conservatives, the new isolationist element like Jesse Helms. Was their unease in Congress?

CARY: We spent a lot of time writing testimony and answering questions on the single market, 1992. How the US was preparing to meet the challenge of the single market. Lee Hamilton always had more questions about what the US was doing to meet the challenge of the EC single market.

Q: He was the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee.

CARY: Congress began to micro manage. They put in legislation a requirement that FCS, Foreign Commercial Service and part of Commerce, send three officers to our mission to the EC. FCS didn't like to be told where they had to put their people. They were told they had to put a senior person and two officers, not just line staff. It was written into the appropriations bill. The mission, USEC really didn't want another bunch of people. All of a sudden Treasury decided they should have a slot at USEC since it looks like the EC was actually going to have some impact on the world financial situation.

Tom Niles was the ambassador and wanted to keep the size of the mission relatively restrained. He was willing to have it increase somewhat, but nobody really saw what FCS people who were supposed to be pushing American exports and helping American businesses sell more, were going to be doing talking with the Commission that wasn't really buying American products. But Congress was proving that they were protecting US interests from the single market threat.

Then there was NAFTA, North American Free Trade Area. It began with a free trade agreement between the US and Canada and then was expanded to include Mexico. The idea was that we should be doing what the Europeans were doing because their single market was larger than the US market. We needed to be vigilant and protect.

Q: You left there in 1991. How did you feel whither Europe and our trade relationship with the single market?

CARY: Whither Europe? I was very optimistic. They had problems but there was the commitment to go ahead and go on. Economically, Europe was doing very well. The big issue was German unification. I thought it clear that changing the East Marks for Deutsche Marks at a 1 for 1 was ruinous, but you looked at the projections of the Bundesbank of growth. East Germany had been the most dynamic of any of the Eastern European countries and so should be able to be absorbed into Germany. It looked as though German growth would take a hit for a bit but should pick up in the long run. As long as there is economic growth in Europe, Europe will do just fine. When there isn't they squabble. At that point things looked as if economically they would do all right. So I was rather optimistic that indeed the Maastricht Treaty would be approved and that they would move on. I probably felt the monetary union would be a reality and that they would make some changes on the taxes. I mean, the United States does not have a uniform tax code and that is perfectly fine.

On our trade relationship, again we are looking at the end of the GATT Uruguay Round. Many of the contentious issues were about agriculture. Compromise was being reached on cutting subsidies. The US farm bill, and the US's willingness to cut farm subsidies was key. Every time you mentioned subsidies to the Europeans they counter, "Yeah, look how much you subsidize. Give me a break." It looked very much as if the United States would honor it's commitment to end farm subsidies and that most of our issues, if they couldn't be resolved in GATT, and certain ones it was clear at that point were not going to be, that we probably would go to an OECD code rather than the GATT code. Our experience after the Tokyo Round had shown that the GATT codes had been a mistake. So, the way to do it was to come up with some investment codes that the vast majority of our partners would agree to.

Procurement was the other big issue. European markets subject to government procurement were closed to the US products. That could be dealt with a code. A continual sticking point has been that the Europeans never believed us when we said we can't make the states practice non-discrimination in state government procurement. Federal government fine, but the federal government cannot force the states to do it. I never met a European who believed that.

So the way to resolve trade issues exists because it was in the general interests of both sides. That is what you need to resolve anything.

Q: What was the feeling towards Russia? Was this going to be a potential market or anything at that time?

CARY: Yes. It's needs were so huge and the amount of money that was going to be available was just not adequate. That was a lot of concern. The nuclear bit was a big issue too. What are you going to do with the nuclear weapons that are in these other republics? We at least knew the Russians and who they were, but we didn't know the people in the republics. Many questions about really what was going to happen with Russia because the needs were just huge. Also what about Russian troops withdrawals and who would pay for that. Those were issues that were definitely up there along with Yugoslavia.

Q: Where did you go in 1991?

CARY: Georgetown University.

Q: You were in Georgetown for a year, 1991-92. What were you doing?

CARY: We were the Dean and Virginia Rusk Fellows, which is a marvelous program for tandem couples. Both John and I were there. We were at the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, which falls under the School of Foreign Service. The opportunity is for you to do whatever you wanted. We participated as kibitzers in a graduate level course that was more or less Foreign Service 101. It was interesting because about half of the students, were foreign.

I taught a course the second semester and was a member of the admissions committee for the graduate school. We were each a mentor to an undergraduate fellow. The Institute for the Study of Diplomacy has about seven fellows. There were two from State, us, one from USIS, one from CIA, one from India, one from Czechoslovakia. We met as a group in regular session with students and each fellow presented a seminar on something. I also ran a program open to graduate students and faculty in which we invited ambassadors to come and speak on current issues. The first one was the Yugoslav ambassador who said he didn't even have a country anymore.

Q: Then after that?

CARY: After that to Casablanca.

Q: You were in Casablanca from when to when?

CARY: From August, 1992 to July, 1995.

Q: What were you doing there?

CARY: I was the consul general.

Q: And your husband?

CARY: He was the political officer.

Q: Now, is this a problem or not?

CARY: The Director General had to approve an exception. They worked it out by having John report to the political counselor in Rabat, which was 70 miles away. The first year there was somebody else in the job and John was taking Arabic, so there was no problem. He put together his own Moroccan Arabic program. FSI was flexible on this. Normally he would have had to go to Tunis for their language program. But he was able to convince them that because our housing was already provided that it would be cheaper for him to stay in Morocco and learn Moroccan Arabic rather than Tunisian Arabic. He already had some North African Arabic from his Peace Corps days.

Q: I recall you getting ready to go there. For the record you were great with child at the time. Where did you have your baby?

CARY: Here at George Washington Hospital. Again the State Department was pretty good about it. Sometime in February or March I got a call from my predecessor, Tim Foster who asked, "Could you be here for July 4th?" I said, "No, I can't because I am going to have a baby at the end of May, but will be there as soon as I can after the DCM course." FSI and Personnel tried to be accommodating about timing. Because the DCM course is only offered 3 times a year I knew I was going to be nursing during the time of the DCM course. Special arrangements were needed because some of it took place off site. Most people were in one part of the off-site place and I had a little cottage with two rooms and brought our nanny. She would come and knock on the classroom door when it was time to feed the baby and everybody got used to it. James was six week old and was the youngest participant ever in the DCM course. For the courses at FSI, the director made her office available from the beginning so James could be with me. There really was no alternative for a six week old. And then I took three weeks of French and again...the ability of the system to respond officially is "No we can't do anything for you, I am sorry there isn't any space," but individually the instructors were willing to find space using various offices or classrooms not in use.

Q: You are talking about nursing?

CARY: Yes. The system does have to realize that more and more women are choosing to continue working and have their children. I had three children while working in the Foreign Service. I took six weeks off with James, which was my longest post-partum break. Its not an easily addressed problem. It is inconvenient to have to come up with a substitute for a period while somebody is having a child. And now that the Department is insisting that women return to the United States to give birth, it means mandating a gap of really at least three months because most airlines won't let you fly when you are more than eight months pregnant and most doctors don't want you to fly either. When State was giving medical clearance for women to have babies overseas you had more flexibility. When our daughter was born we were living in Ethiopia. I flew to Nairobi two weeks before she was due and we returned when she was four days old. They haven't quite worked it out, how to handle trips and all that when you are nursing. I got an e-mail in 1994 from a female FSO who asked, "Please share your experiences of how you managed to have your kids and keep working."

Q: Well, you went out to Casablanca. What was the situation there at that time? Did you go out with any kind of agenda?

CARY: Yes. It was downsizing. Budget restraints meant we had to cut and you always cut at a consulate before you cut an embassy. The question was what to cut? The consulate was very large, about 100 employees including US and FSN personnel. We had a lot of regional offices in Casablanca. There was the regional marine headquarters which had moved out of Beirut. Casa had a marine security guard detachment. There were a couple of different agencies including the intelligence group and Department of Commerce. We had the engineering security services. All was based in Casablanca because it had good international connections to the region. So, I went out knowing that I was supposed to lose about half my American staff.

Freck Vreeland was ambassador, he had just been named. He was really up front. He had been the deputy assistant secretary for NEA when John, my husband, was the Libya desk officer. When we went down the bid list and saw 2 jobs in Casablanca, we thought we really ought to look at it. John had visited it with Freck and said it was a nice place. So, we told Freck that we were bidding on the job. He was very up-front and said, "I have to tell you that I have already promised to support somebody else for the consul general position." It was somebody he had worked with in France some time before. That was fine with us. The bid went up to the final DCM committee and Freck continued to support the other candidate. I got the job and Freck called me. I always admired his no-messing-around way of doing things. He was very above board about the whole thing. And it turns out that the person he wanted ended up political counselor in Rabat.

So, through a whole chain of events due to opening new embassies in Eastern Europe, there were a lot of shifts going on at that point. But the decision was that Casablanca had to be downsized and I was going out to do that and to work out the different ways of going from over a 100 employee mission which was the size of a medium size embassy.

Q: And only 70 miles away from Rabat.

CARY: Right.

Q: I would think this would...

CARY: Yes, so the question is why do you have Casablanca when you have the embassy so close. It is because Casablanca is the financial, business, and except for the Palace, the political center. It was like a New York and a Washington analogy. Historically US interests in Morocco have centered on the Straits of Gibraltar. I would argue that that has changed since the days of airplanes. Now the Middle East peace process ...and economic potential... are of key interest. King Hassan has a minor role to play in the peace process. Moroccan Jews are the single largest ethnic group in Israel and what remains of the Moroccan Jewish community is based in Casablanca. The majority of the business community is in Casablanca. And, if the stability of the country is going to blow, it is most likely going to blow from Casablanca.

So, when I arrived it had more or less been decided to pull out the intelligence components. And then the marine security detachment was supposed to leave. We were losing the marine security guards because there are only so many worldwide and they had to go to the new embassies. So, that changed our communications because you can only receive up to a certain level without marines. We had our own communications system but some of the other stuff had to be cut. I learned more about what is required for this, that and other level of security. So, the marines left and the marine battalion command left, that was 9 plus the 6 security guards, and some other intelligence agencies. The engineering security service was supposed to leave but it turned out it was cheaper for them to stay than to move them some place else, so they stayed. We had to reconfigure the consulate. We also moved all consular operations to Casablanca. The embassy only issued diplomatic visas and Casablanca did all the rest.

By getting rid of so many American employees, we had to decrease the local staff through RIFs.

Q: A RIF being a reduction in force, basically firing people.

CARY: Right, firing people, including a 30 year veteran who was just the best GSO you would ever have, but I had to make the decision. We had two GSOs but could justify only one. The senior one was within a year of retirement and the other one had 15 years experience. If we RIFed the junior one then the next year we would be without anybody with institutional memory. And, the senior was eligible for an immediate annuity.

A lot of these hard decisions had to be made just on the basis of what was best for the US government, which wasn't necessarily best for the individuals. There was a lot of arguing about this ...we cut down communicators...what kind of support the embassy would come up with. The same with secretaries because PIT positions were frozen and we couldn't add certain kinds of people. So, how do you get the job done with much reduced resources and a very, very nervous staff because everybody was afraid they were going to lose their job. Rumors about closing the consulate were constant. Regularly, some of the US multinationals would call up and ask, "Are you closing the consulate?"

Q: What was the political situation like? We are talking now about Algeria which was undergoing a fundamentalist resurgence and certainly everybody was and continues to be very nervous about that.

CARY: Yes. In fact, the day we arrived in Morocco, was the day that they blew up the Air Swiss counter in Algiers and our ambassador decided to send out all dependents. Moroccans are just as quick to explain that Algeria and Morocco are absolutely nothing alike. There is no commonality whatsoever. According to Moroccans, Algerians are by tradition a violent people and current events are a result of very poor choices and limits that were put in post French period. They reflect that there were no choices for political parties. So the only route was fundamentalist. That could never happen in Morocco because there are opposition parties. There are multiple choices. The king is the commander of the faithful which precludes anybody else claiming to know anything about religion because he is a direct descendant of the Prophet. You heard this every place and they believe it. I will say that I finally came down to the point that they believe it. Fundamentalism, both in terms of the religious sense because Morocco is a very liberal Muslim society. Muslims can buy liquor, nobody really cares about it except during Ramadan when only non-Muslim can buy liquor. On the streets women are not at all veiled. You can see mini skirts and bikinis, etc. A lot of the Gulf Muslims come to Morocco to party because it is a much less repressive society. There is a lot of resentment about that among the Moroccans, particularly with the Kuwaitis and Saudis. Half the Saudi royal family have huge houses in Casablanca.

It is a place where things were going on. The king believes, in my opinion, that if you have economic growth you can be pretty oppressive politically and nobody is going to care and he is probably right. There were a couple different types of elections while we were there and we went as observers. It was quite interesting, the Moroccans really haven't got any idea what democracy really is about. Most Moroccans, intellectuals as well as the man in the street, don't want American democracy because they see it as a negative thing. They see it as a challenge to family. Try to explain to them a system that allows a Marion Barry to be re-elected mayor.

Q: Marion Barry being a mayor of Washington who was re-elected after a drug conviction and serving time in jail.

CARY: They simply did not believe that if you know somebody is a bad choice, that you should allow the people to vote him back in. The king would not let a bad guy be a candidate. For the legislative elections there was a list of people who were suspected of drug dealing. Roughly a third of the marijuana that is sold in Europe comes from Morocco, from the northern areas. The government decided to publish a list of people who couldn't run because they were believed to have drug ties. There was no proof offered, but in a kingdom you can do things like that.

Q: In a way you are talking about a working kingdom. I have heard that King Hassan sort of eats ambassadors for breakfast if they sort of disagree with him but he particularly likes political appointees, some of them are renown for saying, "Our king," when they mean the Moroccans' king. Did you see any of this?

CARY: Yes. He likes political ambassadors because he doesn't believe in having less than great access to the President. The king wants to get directly to the President and he has learned you don't do that with a career Foreign Service officer who can't pick up the phone and place a call to the President. With change of administration from Bush to Clinton it became quite an issue because there was a long delay in naming a new ambassador.

Q: We are talking about changing from the Bush administration to the Clinton administration which has been very slow in making appointments.

CARY: Freck Vreeland, who had been ambassador for less than a year really hoped that he was going to be able to stay on. He wasn't and he left abruptly. The vacancy dragged on and on and on. Nobody was named and there were all sorts of rumors about who it was going to be. The Moroccan newspapers kept saying that there must be some serious problem with our relationship and that is why we are not naming an ambassador. We kept saying no, that the processes for checking out people was extremely long. They finally named Mark Childs Ginsberg, who was the first Jew to be ambassador to Morocco. He had been a trade lawyer before and had many interests. He had worked at State for a while back in the Carter administration. He had been on the Hill and worked mostly with the Gore campaign, but with Clinton as well. His wife was a former Miss Arkansas, a stunning woman. They have two kids.

So, he finally arrived, almost a year after the last ambassador had left. He is a young guy, two older than I. He had to go through the whole process of learning the Moroccan way of doing things. The king makes all of the decisions, all of the decisions. People won't necessarily tell the king he has to make a decision if they don't think he wants to be told. Particularly on the military side we had some difficult times... on the aid side as well. We give aid to Morocco and they were contrary or untimely in their responses and compliance. Lack of response escalated the issue and it all had to be done at the highest level. You have to go in and say, "We need an answer to this." It can be a very, very frustrating issue.

Of chief concern to the Moroccans is the Western Sahara which they occupy and believe should be part of Morocco. There is a UN mandate to hold a referendum. We have US troops there along with other nationalities. This periodically has been a real thorn in US-Moroccan relations. For Moroccans, any time almost anything happens the focus is always, "Well, how does this effect the Western Sahara?" It is a very esoteric issue and one which we have spent more time on than you would think was worth it. Well, that became one of the ambassador's key issues...What should be US policy in western Sahara? And you had USUN involved of course. And the Polisario, who have done a very good job working with the Hill.

Q: Yes. It is an interesting thing. Here you have this desert movement sponsored by the Algerians really a socialist government against a very friendly kingdom to us, yet they have a lot of support in congress. It is field fighters versus an authoritarian king or something.

CARY: And that is exactly how it got put and the issues are not at all that clear. But we would have congressional staffers come out and they would all want to visit the Western Sahara. You have to fly down with the UN and it is always very touchy. We would not allow anybody above a certain level to go. The military attachés couldn't go. The economic officers from Casablanca would go down.

There was supposed to be a referendum in 1992, before we got there, but there still hasn't been one. It keeps getting put off and it will get put off...

Q: There is nothing to referend with.

CARY: Until the parties find a political solution there won't be a referendum. And there are ways to reach one particularly now with Algeria so concerned with other issues. It just can't depend on the reluctance of Polisario. I think its important to move before Polisario splits, leaving little splinter groups that are going to cause trouble no matter what. Most of Moroccans believe that the Western Sahara is theirs and it should be theirs. There is no real economic benefit to having it become a minuscule independent mini-state.

Q: How about your contacts as consul general with the elements of government? Did you have any problems with being an American and/or a woman?

CARY: I was the first female consul general in Morocco so everybody was curious. Here I arrived with a 3 month old baby and two other kids. The Moroccans reacted very, very well, very positively. I had a sense that they could relate to me as a daughter, a sister, or something, I had kids. I felt no sense that people thought I should be home taking care of our kids. Amongst the upper class nobody takes care of their own kids so it seemed perfectly reasonable to be out working. A number of women have taken over family businesses or are involved in the family business. So there is an acceptance, particularly for women my age.

There was a protocol issue. I arrived just as we were coming up to the 50th anniversary of Operation Torch, the allied landing in North Africa in 1942. We had a ship visit and then a major conference. Somebody in protocol in Rabat in the Moroccan government decided that a consul general should get agreement. We only seek agreements for ambassadors. So while the embassy wrestled with a stubborn Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I couldn't be received by the wali, the chief governor of the district. This meant I couldn't call on any of the officials that I needed to for the ceremonies. Well, we worked out something where the wali would receive me so we could go on with the ceremonial aspects but the picture in the paper and officially I wasn't received on protocol terms until Rabat decided. The governors are basically all run out of the Ministry of Interior, they are not elected officials. The Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Foreign Affairs didn't necessarily talk to each other, so you had to send everything to both. It was a real zoo.

But, there was a lot of ceremony. Moroccans are very big on ceremony. During initial calls I would be greeted by troops dressed in ceremonial dress with swords. No one told me what to do on these calls. I was unprepared for how often I would be asked to speak. I had no idea about photo opportunities, drinking tea and eating cookies and just the chit chat. The Consul General was expected to show up for certain things and not for other things. Everybody would know who you were. You would go some place and be greeted with, "We are so pleased to see you," and there I am in my blue jeans. I quickly learned you don't wear blue jeans unless you are really doing something outside.

And the business community...everybody wanted to meet the consul general. Everybody has a very, very positive attitude towards America. We are not France, and France is the dominant European power in Morocco. The common attitude was, "We don't know much about the United States, but we like it. We don't have any problems with you."

Q: Which really goes back to 1781 or something like that when the emperor of Morocco recognized the United States without knowing anything about it and it has kept up ever since.

CARY: Mohammed III was the first foreign leader to recognize the United States as a nation. Actually there was a good reason for it. Most of the barbary pirates operated out of Morocco. They had an agreement with the British that they wouldn't raid British ships, but as soon the US became independent, well, the pirates could raid American ships. So, by working out this agreement, this letter to George Washington we were protecting our ships and ability to carry out trade. Why was our first consulate in Tangier? Because the Straits of Gibraltar were exceedingly important at that point and if US shipping couldn't get by the Straits, the US wasn't going to survive as a country.

Q: Now, you mentioned Tangier, I assume Tangier was in your consular district?

CARY: No.

Q: Well, did you have problems with dissolute Americans? One always thinks of Morocco as a place where dissolute Americans are given money by their family to stay the hell away and they can lounge around and chase little boys and little girls or both.

CARY: Most of them were pretty rich though. In Marrakech there were an awful lot of "artsy" American expatriates, including a sizeable homosexual community. They would come up to Casablanca for normal citizen services, to get their passport renewed or because they had problems getting something out of the country.

Q: So, you weren't up against a drug culture of people causing problems?

CARY: No, most drug problems were mentally unbalanced people. We had some of that sort of thing. The Moroccans did not want to have Americans in their prisons and on more than one occasion looked the other way. It was astounding to me. You have the opposing interests. Here we are supposedly serious about our commitment against drugs and all that, but we don't want any Americans in Moroccan prisons.

Q: This has been a dichotomy that has always been going on.

CARY: Our biggest problem was American women who came and married Moroccans after knowing them for three days, when it was clear that what the Moroccan was looking for was a green card. The consul - and we had three during my tenure - would always try to convince the women that they should think about this for a long time. We gave them letters from women who wrote, "I was so wrong. He came and was met by his brother at the airport and I have never seen him since and now I am pregnant." You would explain that in Morocco men don't marry women considerably older than themselves. They were really very sad cases. Technically under Moroccan law, a woman couldn't leave without written permission of her husband. Now, this has more or less changed, but not really. We had a number of American women married to Moroccan men and who were seeking to get out of the country and take kids. Usually the woman could get out, but to take kids was not allowed, that was more difficult.

So, those were some of the sad consular cases we dealt with.

Q: Well, you left there in 1995 and what?

CARY: Retired.

Q: Before we end this interview, you mentioned you would like to talk about the gender issue, experience in the Foreign Service, etc.

CARY: Specifically, what happens when your foreign contact makes an unwelcomed advance. It changed the way that I did business. In Haiti a high level contact made a grab for me at a restaurant. I thought I had been giving out the wrong signals and had made a mistake, so I decided I would never have a one-on-one dinner with a male. Okay, that seemed to work. Then I stopped having most one-on-one lunches because on more than one occasion a male contact, a colleague in the foreign government, somebody with whom I had to repeatedly deal, would make a pass.

Q: For future readers, a pass is a mild sexual advance.

CARY: Yes. Some of them weren't so mild. And I felt partly it was the confusion because people really weren't so used to women in these roles and when you put a male and female in a role that they are used to, such as a lunch or something, they put it into a social context and there are certain men who believe such situations call for a pass. This happened enough that I decided I would avoid situations that would put us in a social context. I would meet in offices in a clearly work situation. I thought that would solve the problems. But in Ethiopia, while seven months pregnant, I went to call on the Tunisian ambassador about an OAU issue and he grabbed and kissed me. Now, how do I ever deal with this guy again without retching? I just found it very bizarre, the fact that such a thing would happen. It certainly happens with Americans but it is much easier to deal with because you know their cultural context and know what is going on, and there are indeed ways of dealing with this if it continues to happen. But, when this is somebody that you need to see on a continuing bases it poses problems. It was a learning process for me. You know, there are certain people you can't tell at all how they are going to react and somebody like the Tunisian ambassador, there is nothing you can do, except make sure it is always your office after that, which is what I did. Although the Tunisian ambassador shouldn't be coming to call on a first secretary.

Some of the others were American colleagues, people who were traveling on TDY, with very peculiar ideas about what a control officer really is. I would disabuse them very quickly that that wasn't why I were there. I had some great times as a control officer. But there were people who had different opinions. Because visitors did the Brussels-Paris circuit I could compare notes with female friends in a similar position in Paris serving as control officer for the same person. We would compare notes as to whether so-and-so had been obnoxious. It was amusing that it wasn't just a one time situation, but clearly there were people who thought that was the way it was supposed to happen in terms of female officers. As a supervisor I have never been required to attend anything on sexual harassment or what is considered to be sexual harassment, although I think the Department is starting to do that. The Department of Commerce required people to...

[change of tape side]

Q: This whole sexual harassment came to its forefront in the late '80s and early '90s and is still with us. It has always been there, but as far as being a legal thing. Once you start getting into the mold of making official complaints, it puts you into a different category and no matter how nice everybody tries to be about it, it is not good for one's mental attitude, I think and also not really very good careerwise, I would think.

CARY: Right. I had a secretary that was involved in an actual case involving the Department of Defense and she had to go back to testify. She testified that the accused grabbed everybody. This raised the question of why is it that some people could deal with unacceptable behavior and others couldn't. That was the focus of the investigation. But that puts the onus on the wrong person. It isn't for the person who is getting grabbed to deal with it, it is why do people think they can abuse their position. As a female supervisor of males you get into it too, thinking okay that is right, it can work both ways. To hear people talk about situations they have been in with a female boss was something I had just not thought about. Indeed the possibility is there and may be even more subtle and more difficult to deal with because at least when you are a woman everybody more or less doesn't blame you for it. But some people would look at a man claiming harassment and think, what is wrong with him.

Q: Yes. I think it is one of these things that we keep working on. Often it gets overly legalistic and gets into victimization. We are working on it. I would think though that often to get somewhere in business, our business or any other one, often the more informal setting of the lunch sort of takes you outside the office setting. Did you find this prohibiting or did you sort of work around it?

CARY: Actually, I learned, as you learned, that if it is at your house you are in much safer grounds. So that is what I would do. I found that it was the one on one lunch or small group...if you picked your group right you could get just as much information and perhaps more as people bounced ideas off one another. But when you were really looking to cultivate somebody as they were going to be a good source of information, again by being in a position both in India and in Morocco of having a cook, I invited them to the house. You also didn't have a problem with a bill. That was another thing. Men were always grabbing the bill when you had invited them to lunch. I would make arrangements of paying in advance so that no bill was ever presented at the table. I found entertaining in my own home made it a lot easier.

Q: Well, before we finish this off, not quite on the same subject, but it has been in the headlines recently about overseas congressional tours. Did you have any particular problems with congressional tours or even staff or Presidential ones?

CARY: Well, Presidential ones are a whole different...advance people should be shot for the most part.

Q: What is the problem with advance people?

CARY: They just come in and want to do everything. They want to make all of the decisions and frequently they are not in real contact with the principal, so when the principal comes he wants to change everything. We are talking Vice Presidential and Presidential trips, where it is usually a fairly low level person who comes out to do an advance, particularly if it is a lengthy advance, because the chief people are with the principal. The advance team runs around dictating, we are going to do this, we are going to do that, we are going to visit here, we are going to have photo opportunities, set it up. And then, after talking to the real person who is going to be making a decision everything changes. So, a lot of energy is expended pleasing somebody who really doesn't know what they are supposed to deliver.

On CODELS, like everybody, I have had very mixed experiences. Some of them are just wonderful opportunities that do so much. When you get Congress telling a government we can't do this, it is not going to fly, it just carries so much more weight than when we say it. It can really help the field do their job so much better to have somebody out who understands the issue, who gets a chance to work at them. In France, most CODELS weren't worth anything. They would cancel the appointments at the last minute which annoyed the French no end. The Senator or Congressman would show up and say he was going to do something else...shopping, go to the commissary, have dinner elsewhere. If people came and just wanted tourist services, that could be provided, but to pretend they are going to do something else, it was a real waste and damages US interests. Now, you didn't get many people in Ethiopia who weren't on business. In Morocco we had a lot of people coming in and out. The unofficial people were often just as bizarre. We had Jesse Jackson come through and make pronouncements on the Western Sahara.

Q: Jesse Jackson being a black politician who is sort of all over the place, but particularly seems to go to the third world for a cause, etc.

CARY: And then there are have staff delegations coming out to do a report. Again, they were very mixed. Some of them were real professionals who knew what they were doing and weren't too demanding. Others were so much more demanding than a Senator would ever be.

These visits also are a good opportunity for the Foreign Service, which I think does a miserable job of selling themselves on the Hill. The visits provide the chance to have contact and take advantage of that contact to really let people know what it is we do and how we do it. I think we should do a lot more in terms of publicizing the type of constituent service that we really do provide and are happy to provide to American citizens. To help them out and let them know what we are doing. The Foreign Service needs to do more public relations back on the Hill saying, "Yes, we helped your constituent so-and-so." A great example, my husband was duty officer in Morocco and got a call from the States. There had been a death in the family and one of the relatives was a jazz musician playing briefly Casablanca. Well, John was able after only two phone calls to find the guy and get the message to him. So, the guy flew home immediately, in time for the funeral. Now, just following up to the home state representative, telling how we have helped the constituent would do an awful lot more for us. At the least it would offset the impression caused by the negative letters. So much of consular service is constituent service. Helping American business is a good thing, and we are now going back and saying more. But 80 percent of what Congress does is taking care of constituents and we would do better if we told them.

Q: All right, why don't we stop at this point.

End of interview