

G. JONATHAN GREENWALD

Interviewed by Raymond Ewing

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[This interview was not edited by Mr. Greenwald.]

Q: Jon, good morning. It's a pleasure to be talking with you today. I wonder if you could start off by telling me a little bit about how you became interested in the Department of State and international relations of the United States.

GREENWALD: I'd be happy to, Ray. It probably began when I was ten or 12 years old and I happened to read as my first "serious" book and it happened to be William Shirer's Berlin Diary, and that got me interested in the wider world and beginning to think about what it might be like to live outside the United States. From that time on I was interested in foreign affairs. I was also interested strongly in academics, and when I was going through university, I was torn in two different directions: one, thinking that I would stay with history, particularly ancient history classics; the other, that I would like to get out into the foreign world that I had been reading about for a number of years. It was the time of the Vietnam War, and a very large number of people, friends, academic colleagues, were greatly concerned, as I was, about what was going on in the world. I felt there was a great deal of frustration in the academic world. People who were most concerned about foreign affairs but couldn't really affect it except by demonstration. Being the kind of person I am, my feeling was that if I wanted to affect something that I was concerned about, the best thing to do would be to get involved with it and get in it rather than affect it from the outside, that one could be an amateur historian and a professional foreign affairs person perhaps more easily than a professional historian and an amateur foreign affairs person. There was much more frustration perhaps in the former than the latter. That's a point that's always open to debate, and I continually come back to wonder about it, but I followed that line and eventually decided that I would leave the academic world and would go into foreign affairs or at least go into government affairs. So I went to law school. When I finished law school - and I had found during the course of my time at law school that I was most interested in international law courses - I did two things. I took the Foreign Service examination, the written examination and then the oral examination, and I also interviewed with the Office of the Legal Advisor of the State Department, which conducts a separate and independent personnel search. About the time I finished law school, I was fortunate enough to be told that I passed the Foreign Service exams and would be offered an appointment. I was also offered a position in the Legal Advisor's Office, actually told by the Legal Advisor's office that I would be the next person in line when they had an opening, that if I would wait a few months, there would be an opening. I wasn't quite sure which way to go. I didn't know very much about the State Department, so I sought advice, and one of the people I sought advice from who seemed to be most knowledgeable was a professor of mine named Abe Chayes, who had been the Legal Advisor in the State Department in the Kennedy years, 1961 to '63, and from whom I had taken an international law course. He told me that his strong advice would be to go into the Legal Advisor's office because, as he said, you don't know whether you will like the State Department, you don't know whether you will be suited for it. If it turns out you don't like it or it's not for you, you will have kept your hand in the profession. On the other hand, in those couple of years in the Legal Advisor's Office you will have a chance to have more interesting work, more responsible work than all but the luckiest Foreign Service Officers have in the first couple of years. You won't be passing out visas; you will be doing more senior things that young lawyers get to do in the State Department. And if it turns out you like it, you can always switch. That made sense to me, so I followed his advice, and the only part of it that turned out not to be quite as he said was the switching part. Having experienced the State Department for a couple of years and having experienced a position that came from the Legal Advisor's Office that involved service abroad for four years, I realized I really liked the Foreign Service more than I liked being a lawyer in the State Department. However, I discovered that the process of lateral transfer was really quite difficult and quite time consuming. So, as I told Professor Chayes since, I thought his advice was 50 percent good and 50 percent bad.

Q: Probably the 50 percent bad is maybe the part that he shouldn't have given you, because he probably really didn't know how easy it was to laterally transfer from the civil service from the Legal Advisor's Office to the Foreign Service.

GREENWALD: I think that's right.

Q: And that does change from period to period - how easy it is or how difficult. Well, let's back up just for a minute. You did your undergraduate work at Princeton.

GREENWALD: Yes, that's correct.

Q: And then your law school was at Harvard.

GREENWALD: Yes.

Q: You graduated from law school in 1968. Then did you immediately come into the Legal Advisor's Office of the State Department.

GREENWALD: No, there was a gap of about eight or nine months. At the time that I was told by the Legal Advisor's Office that they would like to have me and I decided I wanted to go to them, they were full and they said that they would let me know when there was an opening. So I took a position in the Department of the Air Force in the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force at the Pentagon. I was working for the General Counsel on what was called Special Projects, which involved actually two particular projects. One was to improve, reform and expand the Office of the Historian of the Air Force. A man named Townsend Hoopes was the Under Secretary of the Air Force at the time. He was quite concerned that the true and accurate history of the Vietnam War from within the Pentagon be written. He felt the Office of the Historian of the Air Force was not, as it was then set up, capable of doing that. So he set up a project which involved bringing in quite a large number of very good professors of history to review the whole program and make recommendations. I was sort of the executive secretary for that, which was good fun. The other main project was the effort to save the Bolling officers' boat. Actually there were two boats that used to travel every morning and every evening from Bolling Air Force Base across the Potomac to the Pentagon, one carrying officers and one carrying enlisted men. At a certain point in time the GAO and the Congress became concerned about the cost of this venture, and it became the job of the Assistant General Counsel for Special Projects, my boss, to save that boat. He pointed out to me that this was probably the subject in which the largest number of senior officers in the Air Force were most interested other than the war itself, because, of course, they were the ones who made use of this boat.

Q: And they made use of it because they lived at Bolling Air Force Base and worked at the Pentagon?

GREENWALD: Yes. We went through quite a number of permutations in trying to resolve the problem from declaring the boat a reserve vehicle for national mobilization in the event that an attack on Washington occurred and it was necessary to cross the river by boat rather than by car, and it also was suggested that it would be a secondary rescue craft for their craft that had crashed in the river while trying to land at National Airport. But we finally saved the boat by declaring it a floating conference room, which extended the workday for the Generals by 15 or 20 minutes at each end. The compromise was that we got rid of the enlisted men's boat. It was about that time that I decided that I wasn't really too happy with Pentagon politics, and the State Department offered me the position that was now open and I switched at that point.

Q: I wonder how long the officers' boat lasted after that.

GREENWALD: About 15 more years.

Q: Really?

GREENWALD: Yes.

Q: Because the subway, of course, by then - it was not there in 1968, but not too many years later there was a subway. Well, I guess it didn't come to Bolling or to Anacostia for a while later.

GREENWALD: It didn't have leather seats and offer the pleasures of the sea voyage, though, every day.

Q: I guess the Navy has airplanes. There's no reason that the Air Force shouldn't have an interest in a boat on occasion. So when you came into the Department, that was 1969 after the new year. What sort of thing did you do? Again you were in the Legal Advisor's Office.

GREENWALD: Yes, there's a certain circularity to my career that you'll appreciate. I remember the very first set of telegrams I read the first day when I came in and they had said, "You're security clearance is now set, and you're starting work. Read these telegrams and come up to speed." I was in the office of the Assistant Legal Advisor for U.N. Affairs. It was a set of telegrams about the forthcoming set of talks between Denktash and Clerides.

Q: On Cyprus.

GREENWALD: On Cyprus. And when I left the State Department at the end of September this past year, by coincidence or not, the last telegrams I recall seeing were about the forthcoming talks between Denktash and Clerides. But in 1969 I was in the Office of the Assistant Legal Advisor for U.N. Affairs. We were a small office of about four. Primarily our job was to service the International Organization Bureau and the mission in New York. The great opportunity I had almost immediately upon joining was to go to New York and spend three months at the 24th General Assembly at the U.N. That happened because the person who would normally have done that became sick, and they simply needed a fill-in. So it was unusual for somebody just starting to have that chance which was great fun. It gave me a tremendous opportunity to see what the United Nations was like and to work on the Third Committee and the Sixth Committee, the Third Committee being the social and basically human rights committee and the Sixth Committee being the legal committee for the U.N.

Q: So you were in New York for three months that fall participating fully as a member of the United States delegation. You were probably the only lawyer or the only person from the....?

GREENWALD: There is a permanent legal advisor in the mission in New York, an office with normally two people in it, which is part of USUN. That office is supplemented during the General Assembly normally by having one person come up from Washington from the Legal Advisor's Office, and I was that person that year. I worked for two bosses, two of the many ambassadors on the delegation, both of whom are quite remarkable women. One was Rita Hauser, who herself was an international law specialist lawyer, New York lawyer, and she had the appointment of being the U.S. representative to the Human Rights Committee. When the Third Committee dealt with human rights issues, the work was for Rita. The other ambassador was Shirley Temple Black, the famous child actress. She was, in fact, quite a serious, substantial public official who took her job very seriously and was always embarrassed, I think, when other ambassadors would come up to her and ask for autographs.

Q: Or tell her that they had seen her in the movies.

GREENWALD: That's right. The project I most remember was one involving Rita Hauser. It dealt with Vietnam. All during the war there was the tremendous problem of prisoners of war often whose identities weren't known and the conditions of their confinement weren't known. There was an effort made, ultimately successful by the Red Cross to ameliorate those conditions. We tried to come up with a project that year at the U.N. to take an initiative on the prisoner-of-war problem. I had been much influenced by another law professor at Harvard, Roger Fisher, who had written a book called something like Getting to Yes, getting the other fellow to say yes, raising an issue in a way in which you took account of his perceptions, his needs, and developed a series of questions which eventually could be answered yes and bring the two parties together. So I wrote a memo which proposed a course of action which would have led to a conference on prisoners of war, which was taken seriously. It was the subject of a number of meetings that were held first in New York and then back in Washington and nearly became an official proposal which the U.S. adopted. It didn't happen, and it was decided that it was a little too theatrical and wouldn't have worked, but I was excited by the possibility that it was, in fact, taken into account the way it was. It was an exciting introduction to work in the State Department and convinced me that, in fact, I would enjoy what I just started out doing. The other major project was one that taught me something about perceptions. Before I had gone to the General Assembly I was given a lecture by the people from our Diplomatic Security Office about the need to be vigilant and particularly to watch out for very pretty young ladies who would turn out to be Communists. Toward the end of the General Assembly, as the host delegation, we were in charge of arranging for our Third Committee party. Each committee with the General Assembly would have an end-of-Assembly party. Since our ambassador was Shirley Temple Black, who had very strong connections to the entertainment industry, we were able to arrange with CBS to have a CBS sound stage as the site for our party. Then we had to figure out how to sell tickets for it. That was my job. I was put in charge of the ticket selling, and I decided the best way to do it would be to get a pretty young member of each of the various caucuses to sell tickets for their caucus. The prettiest young lady in the Eastern European and Others Caucus was a blond woman from Cuba. I had never talked to her in the first couple of months, being well aware of the strictures that I was under from the Diplomatic Security Office. So I walked up to her one day after a meeting and said that I'd like her to sell tickets for the party and sell them to her colleagues in the Eastern European and Others Caucus. She looked rather shocked, but she took the tickets and said she would. Then the next day a mutual friend of ours, another delegate, came up to me and said, "You know, Maria has said to me that she's happy to sell the tickets but she wishes that you wouldn't ever talk to her again in the open like that, because she had been given a very strong lecture before she came to New York to watch out for young Americans who would make approaches to her." So I realized that we sometimes had some of the same perceptions of each other as we went about this diplomatic business. But we had a very good party in the end.

Q: The party worked out just fine, and it was well attended by the Eastern Europeans and Others?

GREENWALD: It was, and I remember it ended exactly as all of the parties that I used to have in law school with my roommate, who was a Cuban exile. It ended with the Cuban contingent entertaining the rest of us with "Guantanamera."

Q: Now this was in the context of the Human Rights Committee or the other - the party?

GREENWALD: The Third Committee that dealt with human rights, social issues.

Q: Human rights at that time - this is late '60s. What sort of things besides the Vietnam War did the Committee get involved with? The Human Rights Declaration, of course: things relating to that or...?

GREENWALD: Yes, there were a number of treaties which had already been drafted, a whole series of human rights treaties of one kind or another dealing with human rights covenants which deal with everything, political aspects of human rights and treaties dealing with child labor and women's rights and so forth. Most all of these treaties - in fact, I think at that time virtually none of the treaties had been signed or ratified by the United States. The interest for Rita Hauser was to try to find a treaty that would be ratifiable by the U.S. There was a strong feeling in the Congress and Senate, which of course is responsible for ratification, that it would be inappropriate for the United States to commit itself to international standards which could be judged by the International Court of Justice or judged politically by the United Nations. We had, therefore, not accepted these treaties. The treaty that she focused on and the American Society of International Law and a number of other groups focused on was the Genocide Treaty, which eventually the United States, I believe, has become a party to. We tried during that 1969 period to get support for the United States to announce that it would in fact sign and present to the Senate for ratification that treaty. It didn't happen at that time. That was one of the issues that we spent a good deal of time trying to work out.

Q: There was a new team in New York in '69 after the election of Nixon in '68, I suppose, but you were new too, so that probably didn't....

GREENWALD: New and too junior to worry about the currents that were moving that high up on the waters. The ambassador at the time was Charles Yost, who, of course, was one of the great classic American diplomats of the post-war period.

Q: Okay. So after the General Assembly ended in December, you came back to the Legal Advisor's Office. You stayed working for the Assistant Legal Advisor for international organization affairs or U.N. affairs?

GREENWALD: I did for about one year and again had an interesting opportunity to develop an initiative and carry it forward. In fact, it was not so much developing an initiative but carrying one forward. There was an organization dealing with international aspects of tourism, but it wasn't an international organization within the U.N. system. It had a lesser status. There was a project underway to convert it into a so-called world tourism organization which would become a part of the U.N. family of international organizations. The United States was ambivalent about whether this was a good idea or not. This was a project that the International Organization Bureau, IO, was working on. They turned to our office to provide legal assistance in analyzing the draft statutes. I got very much involved in it and made a number of suggestions for basically a different type of set-up statutes, which became the U.S. proposal for how this organization might be done. At the end there was a conference in Mexico City, a negotiation that lasted several weeks, in which we were able to carry our project forward and get everything we had sought in the statutes, and as a result the United States did in fact become a member of the World Tourism Organization. Years later I was happy to see the building of the World Tourism Organization in Madrid when I was working in Madrid. A few weeks ago I was less happy to be told that in the budget cuts that came down a couple of years ago, the International Organization Bureau had to make decisions about what organizations the United States could no longer afford to be a member of and that the World Tourism Organization didn't make that cut.

Q: So we withdrew?

GREENWALD: I think we apparently have withdrawn from it.

Q: Of course, the subject of tourism has also always been a little controversial in terms of how the United States government should organize itself to promote tourism from abroad. For a while there was an agency in the Department of Commerce that I think was headed by an Under Secretary or somebody of senior rank and had a number of offices abroad, and I'm not quite sure what's happened to that over the years either.

GREENWALD: I don't know. Those were the people that in fact we worked with. That was the other part of the U.S. government involved with that issue back in 1970. I simply don't know what's become of it. I haven't dealt with it since 1970. Bill Stibravy was the head of our delegation at the conference. He was later ambassador to UNIDO.

Q: And you were in Mexico City for the negotiations?

GREENWALD: Yes.

Q: Did you have any other conferences or negotiations you were involved with in this year in LUNA?

GREENWALD: That was it for LUNA, because I left that office shortly after we had the conference in Mexico City. It was the normal thing within the Office of the Legal Advisor to move particularly young lawyers from one office to another fairly frequently, every year or every two years. After about one year in the office dealing with U.N. affairs, I was moved to the office that dealt with Near Eastern affairs, Near Eastern and South Asian, which was called L/NEA.

Q: Let me interrupt for a second to ask whether it was fairly standard practice in that period for the Legal Advisor's Office to hire new attorneys immediately out of law school. You had not practiced at all, other than this short little work you did at the Pentagon, before coming into the State Department. Was that sort of normal?

GREENWALD: Yes, it was. They normally would take two, three, perhaps four people a year out of law school in a competitive fashion of interviews at some of the better law schools. They would also bring in a couple of people - I don't know the exact numbers but a couple of people - at middle ranks, and then they would also bring in a number of people at the rank of Assistant Legal Advisor or higher who had some type of political connection. So there were basically three different screens coming into the Legal Advisor's Office.

Q: And also generally a philosophy in career terms that lawyers, attorneys, did not work there indefinitely, did not necessarily make a career of it. They would come and then leave and possibly come back again.

GREENWALD: Well, there were two types generally. There were people who would come in for a couple of years and use it as a very nice mark on their resume. They were interested in international law, and it showed that they had worked in public international law. But they basically saw themselves as lawyers who were working at the State Department for a certain period of time. There were a number of others who felt themselves to be State Department officers that happened to be lawyers. Often those people would stay and make a career of it. They would become the people who were the backbone of the Legal Advisor's Office. They would usually be people who would rise to Assistant Legal Advisor or perhaps one of the several Deputy Legal Advisors. I don't know the percentages. I would guess that probably two-thirds of the people who would come into the office would see their future there as being limited to two or three or four years. Maybe one-third would feel that this was something they wanted to make a career of.

Q: And occasionally there would be a Foreign Service Officer who was a lawyer who would be assigned to the Legal Advisor's Office, but that was fairly unusual, I think.

GREENWALD: It was rare. It happened but it was rare and it still is rare. I think it was rare primarily because the Legal Advisor's Office was concerned to retain its independence. It wanted to keep control of its own personnel and make sure that it could pick the people it wanted to, and it realized there were a lot of Foreign Service Officers who had law degrees, and if it became a normal matter for people to be assigned during their Washington tour in the Legal Advisor's Office, the question would probably come up before long: well, why not make the Legal Advisor's Office part of the overall personnel system. So that kind of assignment is usually resisted by LSL.

Q: Well, let's come back to your transfer to the Assistant Legal Advisor for Near East and South Asia. That was in 1970, I guess.

GREENWALD: Yes.

Q: What sort of thing did you do there?

GREENWALD: Well, I was particularly interested in going into that office. In fact, it would have been my first choice when I started, because I had actually spent part of the summer of 1967 between my second and third years in law school playing foreign correspondent. This goes back to my original William Shirer interest. I had spent a lot of time doing newspaper work in college as a stringer for various newspapers and news outlets that wanted the news out of Princeton. I worked for not my hometown newspaper but in your hometown of Scranton, Pennsylvania, during one summer. When I had a job for the summer of 1967 working in a law office in London, I in fact doubled by trying to write foreign dispatches for the Scranton Times. That had been a very busy summer as I think back. The Six Days War had just happened, and a few months before that the colonels had taken power in Greece. I had wanted to go toward the end of the summer to Greece, because I still had my interest in classics. I thought that would be a nice combination of spending some time in Greece as a tourist and also writing a few articles about the political situation. Through a string of coincidences I met Robert Young, head of the agency radio, TV, news office in London that summer and told him what I wanted to do, and he said, "Well, Greece is interesting, but if you're really interested in writing news this summer, you'll have to go to the Middle East." So I thought that was fine, and I got in touch with the Scranton Times and said, "How would you like it if I went to the Middle East and tried to write some articles there for you." They liked that very much. They gave me a letter which was: "To whom it may concern, Mr. Greenwald is going to write articles for us as a member of the staff of the Scranton Times." I did go to Greece, and I spent about a week there, and I actually got an interview with one of the leaders of the Junta, Colonel Patakos, and wrote an article about that. But I made arrangements to go to the Middle East and worked out a couple of weeks where I would spend some time in Israel, some time in Lebanon, and some time in Jordan, and had a fascinating two weeks, wrote a lot of articles. On the one which the Scranton Times liked best, they used as a headline: "Local Boy Meets Arab Farmer Who Likes Scranton." On the West Bank I interviewed a farmer who was very pleasant, very hospitable to me, and he asked me where I come from, and I said I was writing for a newspaper in Pennsylvania. He said he had been in Pennsylvania, he had visited a relative, but couldn't remember the name of the city, but it was a very large and pleasant, friendly city. I said too quickly, "Could it have been Scranton?" and he said, "Well, it could have been." And so I wrote it as somebody who had been to Scranton and remembered how friendly and pleasant it was, and that, of course, was the most interesting thing to the newspaper, which was really much more interested in the local-boy-does-this angle than they were in my thoughts about foreign affairs. But I was so interested in the couple of weeks that I spent in the area at that time that when it came time during the following year, my last at Harvard Law School, to write my thesis, I, of course, picked international law. The subject that I picked, title, was "The Role of the Law and the Lawyer in the Problem of Jerusalem and the West Bank." I spent much of that year being quite concerned that the problem would be solved before I could write my paper, because, of course, that was the period when what became Security Council Resolution 242 was being negotiated. My professor was Melvin Katz, who had been at one time the principal administrator of the Marshall Plan. He had a good deal of experience in foreign affairs and kept assuring me that I really need not worry that the problem would be solved before I could get my words down on paper.

Q: He was right.

GREENWALD: Yes, indeed, he was right. In any event I did want to go into the Near Eastern office, because that gave me a chance to work on those issues that I had spent time on thinking about in law school and found so fascinating. It was a time when there was an effort made to develop a peace plan for the region. It was talked about as the Rogers Plan, which, of course, never got too far, but there were some very interesting meetings and interesting papers. For somebody who was as new to the business as I was, it was a very, very exciting period. I have to admit that where I had the most influence was certainly not on the Middle East but on a problem which at that time was thought of as essentially a Middle Eastern problem that had become global in a sense, which was narcotics. At that period Turkey was still within the ambient of the Near Eastern Bureau. Turkey was seen as the source of much if not most of the opium which became heroin and came into the United States. There was a great deal of pressure being put upon Turkey to make substantial changes to prevent this from continuing. It seemed to a number of us that if there was a way to multilateralize the problem, it would become easier for Turkey to do what we wanted it to do, because it would no longer be a matter of Turkey being singled out.

Q: By the United States?

GREENWALD: Exactly, or by the world community. And in fact the problem was a multilateral problem, because Turkey was by no means the only or even necessarily the principal place from which opium and heroin could come. So I developed an idea for what first we thought of as an independent treaty. In the end it became a protocol which amended the existing single convention - as it was called, single convention - of narcotic drugs. There was an effort to greatly expand the powers of the International Narcotics Control Board, which was the international organization existing in the U.N. system that was to monitor the growth of opium poppies and the extraction of opium from those poppies and movement of the opium in legal channels. The idea was to give the International Narcotics Control Board substantially more power to determine how much acreage could be planted and what could be done with the opium that was extracted and also power to impose some penalties on countries that had been unable to meet their obligations including the penalty of removing the acreage allotment. This was a rather new approach to narcotics control in the U.N. system at the time, so we had to work very hard to develop support. We wanted to have a conference call to negotiate this new protocol. We had to work through the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, which was a body of 24 states within the U.N. who were on the committee for limited periods of time. It was a rotating membership. Certain countries, large countries, were permanent members; others were rotated through. We'd have to get the Commission on Narcotic Drugs to recommend to the Economic and Social Council of the U.N. that a plenipotentiary conference be called, and this was a substantial project that lasted for about a year and a half. I drafted the basic document that became our protocol. Our office, the office of the Assistant Legal Advisor, had the lead within the Department for organizing support for the idea. We traveled very, very widely for that year and a half to get support. In fact, I almost ruined my subsequent career in Berlin before it was started, because the very first trip that we took to get support for the conference was to be a trip that would begin in Washington and go to Moscow and then go to Paris. From Paris there were another 20 or 22 stops. That was an around-the-world trip. Leading our delegation was David Popper. At that time he was Ambassador to Cyprus but had been one of the longstanding Deputy Assistant Secretaries in the International Organization Bureau and a great expert on the U.N. system. There were a couple of us who were to support him. It was my job at first to make the arrangements for the itinerary. I got one of those great fact books that you used to be able to get with all the airline flights in it, took it up to my office, and worked out how you could get from Moscow to Paris in time to make a meeting the next day. There was a flight through Berlin, so I made arrangements for us to fly through Berlin. Fortunately David Popper, who had experience also in the German problem, which at that point I knew nothing about, pointed out that we had no diplomatic relations with the German Democratic Republic. We didn't go to the German Democratic Republic, and the only way you can fly from Moscow to Berlin was to fly to the GDR's Berlin airport, and that I would have broken a policy of 25 years of non-recognition if we had pursued this particular itinerary. So we had to change that, but in fact that first itinerary, that first trip in which we tried to build support for our idea, went in six weeks from Moscow to Paris to Rome to Nicosia, had a stop-off there for Ambassador Popper, to Monaco, Mali, to Lomé, Togo, to Accra, to Lagos, back to Cyprus, then from Cyprus on to Beirut. From Beirut we went on to Kabul. From Kabul we drove through the Khyber Pass, to Peshawar, from Peshawar to Islamabad, from Islamabad to Delhi, from Delhi to Rangoon, from Rangoon to Bangkok, from Bangkok to Hong Kong, and ended up in Hawaii, where, of course, we had to brief the CINCPAC on what we were doing, and then spent two days relaxing in a beach house. There were several more trips like that, not quite as long but substantial trips, some of which I did, some of which my colleagues in the office did. In the end we were able to get the Commission on Narcotic Drugs to make its recommendation to ECOSOC. We were able to get ECOSOC to make its decision to convene the plenipotentiary conference. We were able more or less to get Turkey to support the project. In April 1972, the conference was held in Geneva. We were able to get the protocol docketed and eventually ratified, and it's in force and it's an important part of the international structure.

Q: It's rare that somebody can see the progress from an idea to drafting, to all this building support, to the actual conference and success, so I congratulate you for not only the result but for being involved for that long a time.

GREENWALD: It was very exciting. Of course, what was misleading to me was it gave me fully false ideas about what could be accomplished at other times in one's career, but it was very exciting.

Q: It's nice that you could do it at least once. Were you actually at the conference in Geneva then? You were still in the office at that time.

GREENWALD: Yes, yes, I was. It doesn't have a great deal to do with foreign affairs, but I can't help but point out that I got to the airport to fly to that conference riding in the back seat of Maureen Dean's Porsche. If you recall, Maureen Dean was the wife of John Dean, who later became famous in the Watergate scandal. At that time she was actually not married yet to John, but she was a very close friend of the lawyer from the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs as it was called them. He was part of our delegation, so the three of us drove out to the airport, two of us who were leaving for the conference and Maureen, who took us out there.

Q: That's worthy of a footnote. I'm not sure it is, as you say, in the context of foreign affairs. Watergate.

GREENWALD: It was a very interesting conference, because it was one that actually marked the culmination of a lot of work and produced a concrete result.

Q: It also, just in the context of U.S.-Turkey relations or Turkey's relations with Western European nations and the United States, eased the problem that had been building and, as you say, put it into a multilateral context, not just focused on Turkey. Okay, what other things did you do while you were in this office? This was the time you were involved a bit with the Rogers Plan. This was the period between '67 and the '73 war. It was also a time when Bangladesh achieved its independence. I don't know if there were other things like that that you were involved with a bit.

GREENWALD: Well, I had a chance to see a bit of them. I didn't work terribly closely on the Bangladesh problem, but I do remember sitting in a staff meeting of the Office of Pakistan Affairs. One of the senior experienced officers who had spent a lot of time in that area, a fellow named Craig Baxter, said, "In six months there will be an independent country in east Bengal," and at time everyone heard that with shock and horror, and it turned out he was right, almost to the day. It was one of the things that contributed to the growing respect I had for the quality of the people in the Foreign Service and contributed to making me feel this was something I really wanted to explore further.

Q: I served with Craig Baxter in Lahore from approximately '64 to '66. I think he served in Dhaka also before the period that you're talking about.

GREENWALD: We passed through Lahore in the summer of '71 as part of these consultation processes. It was just before the fighting broke out. One could see the troops in readiness in the Canton Mountain. It was a very tense period. In fact, Bhutto passed through the airport as we were preparing to get aboard our airplane. I remember seeing a crowd of reporters around him. But I didn't really work very much on Indian problems. In fact, the one Indian issue that I think I spent more time on than any other was the rather parochial one of whether or not the U.S. school could be maintained against pressure from the Indian government at the time to close down foreign schools.

Q: Were you involved with Cyprus at all other than visiting a couple times with Ambassador Popper, the head of your delegation?

GREENWALD: At various times people would say we have to spend a little bit more time trying to come up with new constitutional provisions and ideas and schemes, and there would be a bit of excitement, but it wasn't a period in which that was the most active issue. And so I read the telegram reports, and that was about it.

Q: When did you actually leave that office?

GREENWALD: I left it in the fall of 1972, because by that time I had already been accepted for the position in West Berlin, which normally was filled out of the Legal Advisor's Office, because everything in Berlin was legal-political or political-legal. There was always somebody in the Political Section of our mission in West Berlin who had a legal background, normally somebody who came out of L. I had been interested in that job almost from the time I had come into the Legal Advisor's Office. I applied for it, and I was told I would be put into it when it next became vacant, which would be early in 1973. In preparation for that, they had moved me into the office of the Assistant Legal Advisor for European Affairs so that I could get some experience with the issue. I had also been trying to learn German on my own. I had been taking early-morning German classes at the Foreign Service Institute for two years. I had asked for some substantial time at FSI to learn German full-time once the assignment was actually made, and FSI had said, "No, because you're doing it the wrong way. You've done it on your own in the early-morning class. We don't want people to think that the way they learn a language is to go to the early-morning class. You should attempt full-time, 24- or 48-week instruction. In the end they did let me take about five weeks of full-time German in December and then in January. But because I couldn't take the full course, as I had about four months in L/EUR working on the Washington side of particularly German legal issues. At that time the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin had just been negotiated. The final signature was in June of 1972, and the question was how it would be implemented. I knew that the work that I had been doing in Berlin for the time in my assignment that would be substantially on the implementation of the Quadripartite Agreement which had been negotiated. [end of tape]

Q: Okay, we were talking about preparation for your assignment to Berlin as the Legal Advisor at the U.S. mission in West Berlin. Why don't you say just a word again, Jon, about the Quadripartite Agreement, what it meant, and how you prepared yourself for that assignment.

GREENWALD: Well, of course, Berlin had been for most of the post-war period at least potentially the hottest spot in Europe, the place where it was most likely that the Cold War could become at least a very hot crisis and perhaps even a hot war. The Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin was negotiated throughout most of 1970 and 1971 into 1972 in order to find a way to remove Berlin from the center stage. It wasn't thought that it was possible to resolve the Berlin issue. The different positions were too strong, too starkly opposed, but there was a common interest in preventing Berlin from becoming continually irritant. That would make it impossible to make progress in any other area of the Cold War agenda of both sides. So there was an effort, ultimately successful, to negotiate a series of arrangements, on the one hand, between the four major wartime victors, the United States, the U.K., France and the Soviet Union, and on the other hand, between the two concerned German sides, the Bonn government (the Federal Republic, the FRG), and the East German government (the German Democratic Republic, the GDR). The object was to make practical improvements in the situation in and around Berlin and for particularly the residents of West Berlin while leaving both sides free to maintain that their fundamental view of the situation, their legal position and political position, had not been affected. That agreement had just been concluded by June of 1972. I knew that the major work that I would be involved with over the couple of years that I would be in West Berlin would be how that agreement was to be implemented. So I spent a fair amount of time in the fall of 1972 really trying to learn the very complicated negotiating history and agreement and complicated history of the Berlin question. The Berlin question had its own mystique, its own expertise that was known as Berlinery, and it was something like in some ways learning the mysteries of the atom or so it seemed, or, as others would put it, learning what the world is like once you go through the looking glass in Alice in Wonderland.

Q: What did the Quadripartite Agreement do with respect to the German Democratic Republic in the United States, if any?

GREENWALD: Well, one of the purposes, of course, from the Eastern point of view in reaching an agreement on Berlin was to establish the point that the German Democratic Republic was a legitimate, permanent part of the international scene, a government with which other governments should have normal diplomatic relations. Until the Quadripartite Agreement had been concluded, essentially there was no other government outside the area of direct Soviet influence which had diplomatic relations with the GDR. In fact, the Bonn government had a policy, the so-called Holstein Doctrine, under which it would break diplomatic relations with any country that established diplomatic relations with the GDR. Because of the power of German influence in Europe and the United States' position, basically no other country had recognized the GDR other than those countries with which the GDR was aligned in the Warsaw Pact or China, for example. Once the Quadripartite Agreement had been signed, that policy changed, the policy of the Bonn government, the policy of the United States government. Countries began to establish diplomatic relations as early as 1972 with the GDR, and it was clear that it was only a matter of time before the U.S., France and Britain would do it. All three of us wanted to learn more about what was happening on the other side of the Berlin Wall. One of the things I worked on while learning in general about the Quadripartite Agreement in Berlin in the fall of 1972 was the question of how we would establish diplomatic relations with the GDR: what steps were necessary formally, what steps one had to take to establish diplomatic relations with the country, what issues were hanging around, property issues, for example, what protections had to be sought to insure that in fact our legal and political position on the Berlin question as a whole and the German question as a whole were still maintained. It was felt strongly that the United States, Britain and France would have to move together, because our position in Berlin very much depended upon the mutual support we gave each other. We didn't want to do anything with regard to the GDR that would weaken that basic position on the question of Berlin and Germany as a whole. So we did a lot of work in preparation in the fall of 1972, and in fact I flew out to Berlin to start my assignment in West Berlin in January of 1973 via Paris. It had been decided that there would be a meeting in Paris of U.S., British, French and German experts specifically to discuss this question of what each of us had to do to make sure that we were working in lock step as we proceeded in our own ways toward establishing diplomatic relations. We had that meeting in the Quai d'Orsay. It lasted two days. I flew out to the meeting with Jim Sutherland, who was the head of the Office of German Affairs, and his Deputy for Berlin Issues, Nelson Ledsky. Joining us was Bob Prowitt, who was [inaudible] CSCD work in Bosnia and was the person who worked on that issue from the Embassy in Paris, met us at the airport and took part in the meetings for the Embassy in Paris. John Kornblum, who is now the Ambassador in Bonn, came from Bonn, where he was a junior political officer at the time, to take part with the Embassy in Bonn; and Dick Barkley flew in from the mission in West Berlin, where he was in what was called the Eastern Affairs Section, which was the part of the mission that watched the GDR and effected embassy exile. Dick, of course, years later was my Ambassador in East Berlin at the time that the wall actually fell. We had those two days of meetings. We worked out common principles that we would all follow as we each proceeded to start negotiations with the GDR, and then Nelson Ledsky and I continued on to Berlin. Nelson dropped me off there and spent a couple of days as desk officer and went back, and I stayed for four years.

Q: When negotiations with the GDR actually began, you were involved with those, or were they done somewhere else, because obviously West Berlin was probably not where they were done?

GREENWALD: No, they were done in East Berlin and in Washington, and the very first American to cross Checkpoint Charlie to be received by an East German official ironically enough was Nelson Ledsky, and a few months later he was asked to take on the start of that task. I say ironically because probably nobody was a fiercer defender of Berlin against the GDR than Nelson was. He became the first person to deal directly with the GDR. Then Joan Clark took over that negotiation. Joan - I forget what her position was back at the State Department.

Q: Well, I believe she was Executive Director of the Bureau of European Affairs, or possibly later, but I think she already was at that time.

GREENWALD: I think probably that's what she was at the time she began the negotiation, which would have made sense because so much of the negotiation was about very practical questions like where this is going to be and what kind of buildings we were going to have, what type of facilities we were going to have. I helped at those early meetings basically by just going and taking notes. Most of the work was done elsewhere. I do remember driving around East Berlin with Joan and her explaining to me that she had been there before. She had been in Berlin right after the war ended in 1945 and had actually gone into the ruined chancellery building, the first chancellery which within a year was torn down, and of course there was no trace of that left in 1973. We proceeded more slowly for various reasons than the British and the French. The British and the French Embassies were opened by the fall of 1973. It wasn't until sometime in 1974 that we actually got members who were working on the ground in East Berlin. But that was very much a secondary part of the work I was doing. I found it fascinating because the GDR itself was an unknown land, and the opportunities one had to spend some time over there talking to people were great, but most of the work I did was on the implementation of the Quadripartite Agreement. As I had anticipated, the Quadripartite Agreement was a marvelous compromise. It was built around two concepts. The phrases were actually there in the agreement that the Federal Republic of Germany could maintain and develop its ties to the Western sectors of Berlin notwithstanding the fact that those Western sectors of Berlin were not an integral part of the Federal Republic nor were they governed by it. Of course, the ambiguities were manifest at those two phrases. They were made even more so by the linguistic question, because the official languages for the Quadripartite Agreement were English, in which basically negotiation was conducted, French and Russian, and in all of those languages it is not difficult to use the word 'ties' that could be maintained and developed. In German there are two types of ties, and so as soon as the Quadripartite Agreement was translated into German, it turned out there were two versions of the Quadripartite Agreement. There was bindomen and then felbindomen. Bindomen are very intense ties, ties of the closest kind. Felbindomen are much, much looser, the sort of thing you have when you have a telephone connection which is broken by somebody hanging up the implement. And, of course, the East German version spoke about felbindomen which could be developed, and the West German version spoke about bindomen which could be developed.

Q: And neither of the German translations were official?

GREENWALD: No, neither were official, but they encapsulated the great difference, and so there was a constant feeling-out process in the early years. How far could the Quadripartite Agreement go? How far could it be stretched? How many concessions had to be in fact gotten? How narrowly would it be construed? This was struggled over on virtually every issue that came up, and at that point in time the Allied involvement in the daily running of the government, the daily life of Berlin, was still rather intense. It was still a city under occupation, still a city in which basically all significant government matters had to be vetted by the German authorities with the Allied authorities. The various committees of the Allied Kommandatura were the ultimate responsible authority for governmental action in West Berlin. I sat on the Legal Committee with a British and a French Legal Advisor and had a Civil Affairs Committee and another committee, a Public Safety Advisor who supervised the police, for example. Ultimately the ministers, the heads of our diplomatic missions, met with the Governor Mayor of the city on the highest issues. But the bureaucracy being what it is, of course, Berlin was not a world unto itself, but the ministers in Berlin were responsible to the ambassadors, the British, French and American ambassadors in Bonn, who were in charge of the missions in Berlin, not as ambassadors to the Federal Republic of Germany but in their residual role as High Commissioners for all of Germany. As a fairly practical point, what that meant was the ambassador was responsible for what happened in Berlin, but the missions in Berlin were not subordinate to the embassies; that is, the Political Section of the mission in West Berlin was not subordinate to the Political Section of the embassy in Bonn. We had an equal right to speak our minds, to say what we thought about a particular issue, to say it internally but also to say it back to Washington in telegrams. So there was a constant debate, normally a debate of very good spirit and mutual respect, between the missions and the embassies, but in the normal way of things, you see things often from where you sit, with a perspective of where you sit. There was a different Berlin perspective on many issues, and there was a Bonn perspective. There was often a feeling that the missions in Berlin were very particular, very rigid and very conservative in the way they viewed Berlin issues and a feeling from Berlin to Bonn was sometimes a bit cavalier about important political-legal points that might be given up because they were looking at what they thought of as a broader picture.

Q: Was there a counterpart Legal Advisor in the embassy in Bonn?

GREENWALD: There was. There was someone in the Political Section of the embassy in Bonn who came out of the Legal Advisor's Office also. His responsibility was twofold. There was a so-called Bonn Group within the structures in Bonn, which was a group which met quite often with representatives from the American and British and French embassies and the West German Foreign Ministry to deal with Berlin issues. The Bonn Group was that group of four that dealt with Berlin issues, and the issues that we had over in Berlin which were of some significance, not simply purely local, would be discussed in Bonn, but again with the Berlin missions having a right to express their views independently back to Washington as to what positions would be taken in the Bonn Group. It wasn't a hierarchical matter of the lesser mission referring it to the higher embassy. The Legal Advisor in the embassy in Bonn was the person who dealt with the legal aspects of those issues that were handled in the Bonn Group but who also dealt with the rather separate and often quite complicated legal issues that were involved between the United States and the Bonn government. They often, for example, dealt with military status of forces situation and reserved rights, which were fairly substantial, that the United States, Britain and France retained in 1955 at the time they would otherwise return full sovereignty to the government in Bonn. So there was a substantial area of work that the Legal Advisor in Bonn did which did not involve Berlin.

Q: I guess the other dimension that we need to also talk about is the quadripartite, the Soviet role, and how did that play out in Berlin as far as you were concerned and the mission was concerned.

GREENWALD: Well, one aspect of the Quadripartite Agreement was that it allowed the Soviet Union to establish a substantial presence in the Western sectors of Berlin for the first time. There had been always a certain Soviet presence in West Berlin. There were several remaining Quadripartite institutions. Most significantly there was Spandau Prison, which still had at that time one prisoner, Rudolf Hess, of those who had been sentenced to lengthy prison terms by the Nuremberg Tribunal. There was a Soviet war memorial which was maintained just over the demarcation line in West Berlin, almost next to the Reichstag building, and it was felt strongly by a lot of people in the Western governments that we should not allow the Soviet Union a presence in the Western sectors. It would become a Trojan horse if, in fact, they established a consulate in West Berlin. It was a major desire of the Soviets to have such a presence, and in the end one of the concessions that was made by the West in order to get other things that we wanted, particularly the substantial concessions from the Eastern side on free access along the autobahn routes to Berlin, we allowed the Soviets to establish a consulate and trade mission in West Berlin. One of the tasks we had in the mission was to keep looking at that operation and prevent it from becoming in effect the fourth occupying power of West Berlin. The Soviet position was, after all, the Eastern sector of Berlin had become a sovereign territory of the German Democratic Republic and the Soviet Union did not occupy it any longer. The Soviet part of Quadripartite responsibility, therefore, had to be exercised, could only be exercised, in West Berlin, and it was our constant effort to maintain a distinction that the Soviet Union was operating a consulate and trade mission in West Berlin in the normal way that any country would operate a consulate and trade mission. That was not part of its Quadripartite responsibility. Its Quadripartite responsibilities were only exercised with regard to Berlin as a whole. We had many dances around that particular - angel on the head of a pin.

Q: How in terms of representation did the Soviets or did we expect the Soviets to discharge their Quadripartite responsibility? Could they have somebody from their consulate attend four-power meetings, or how did that work?

GREENWALD: Well, of course, they were expected to fulfill their responsibilities at Spandau Prison, and they always did. We would have been in principle happy to see them return to the Allied Kommandatura, which was the body that had been set up in 1945 to handle Berlin matters. There were two issues. There was the Allied Control Commission, which in 1945 was established as a quadripartite body to deal with Germany as a whole, and then subsidiary to the Allied Control Commission was the Allied Kommandatura, which dealt with Berlin, which was a four-power city. The Soviets walked out of the Allied Kommandatura at the time of the Berlin blockade and never returned, but in the building in which we met, the Allied Kommandatura building, there were pictures of the early Soviet members of the Kommandatura on the wall. There was always room at the table if a Soviet had shown up at our Legal Committee meeting or our Public Affairs Committee meeting or our Civil Affairs Committee meeting. However, if they had done that, the issue then would have been are we dealing only with governmental affairs in West Berlin or are we dealing with governmental affairs in the whole city. We would have said that they had a right to be there only if once we stopped talking about this or that problem about the fire department in West Berlin, we would start talking about what was being done with the fire department in East Berlin. That, of course, the Soviets were never willing to do, so we would insist that they maintain their responsibility for seeing to it that the Quadripartite Agreement was carried out properly. If we felt the GDR was misbehaving on this or that issue, we would go to the Soviets and raise an issue with them. Part of the job of the mission in West Berlin was to deal with the Soviets on Quadripartite Agreement matters. We would never allow the embassy in East Berlin, once it was established in 1974, to deal with the GDR or to deal with the Soviet Union on a Berlin matter. If there was a Berlin matter, it had to be dealt with through the mission, through the Quadripartite Agreement mechanisms. In the early days of '73-'74, of course, when everything was new and nobody quite knew how it would work, there were constant efforts to test the waters on all sides, to make sure that the Soviets didn't intrude into Quadripartite issues in the Western sectors, to make sure that they kept up with the responsibilities for East Berlin and so forth, that there were no changes in the procedures by which members of the Allied forces entered East Berlin, that they weren't subject to controls by the GDR and so forth. If there was a shooting incident at Checkpoint Charlie, for example, we would complain not to the GDR but to the Soviets.

Q: When you say, "to the Soviets," how was that done?

GREENWALD: To the Soviet embassy in East Berlin, which in our view maintained the same type of residual responsibility for Berlin and Germany as a whole as our embassies in Bonn maintained. The ambassador was, in our view, operating as the residual high commissioner for Germany and, of course, could have his delegated people handle lesser issues.

Q: Was there any other Soviet counterpart to the three Western missions in West Berlin, which you were part of? Other than the Soviet embassy in East Berlin, there was no other Soviet counterpart to that, to the mission?

GREENWALD: No, the other element of Western activity in the GDR was the Potsdam military liaison missions. Under agreements that were made very shortly after the end of the war, the U.S., British and French military maintained missions in Potsdam on the undisputed, what became the undisputed, territory of the GDR, because it was outside of Berlin. Their task was to maintain liaison with the group of Soviet forces in Germany. In fact, of course, they did a substantial amount of Cold War information gathering, as did the Soviet liaison mission, which they had the right to establish in West Germany, kept outside of Frankfurt, a liaison to the Allied armies that were in Germany. But those kinds of issues when one or another of those liaison missions stuck their nose under the wrong tent or was prevented from traveling down this or that road, those were dealt with in normally military-to-military channels. If it became very serious, then it would be dealt with by the channel of the mission in West Berlin to the Soviet ambassador in East Berlin.

Q: You mentioned that one of our objectives in negotiating the Quadripartite Agreement was to assure access through the autobahn and, I guess, the railroads, trains, air. Why don't you talk a little bit about your involvement at the mission in West Berlin in this period on access issues.

GREENWALD: Sure. The Berlin access problem had been for more than two decades one of the constantly recurring sensitive crisis points, and that's because in the immediate post-war period the Allies arranged with the Soviets only limited rights of access to the Western sectors. As it turned out, we had a good agreement on air access, which worked throughout the entire post-war period. There were arguments on the margin about whether or not the agreement was that airplanes could fly no higher than 10,000 feet or whether they could fly higher than 10,000 feet, but basically the air corridors which were established in the immediate post-war period were maintained. The Soviets did not contest them. They allowed the Berlin air lift to keep the city alive during the blockade, because the Soviets never did interfere with the flights that were conducted, and they never interfered with the civil aviation lines that were established and allowed to run through those same corridors. There was no equivalent agreement for land transport either by road or by rail; and that meant that whenever there was a crisis or a desire to create a crisis, to create a bit of pressure upon the Western position, it was possible for the Soviets, acting often through GDR police or sometimes acting directly, to prevent traffic from moving, to slow down the trains for a long period of time, or commonly to see to it that every person who was attempting to drive on the autobahn from West Germany to West Berlin was thoroughly searched and had to sit in a traffic queue for 24 hours or 48 hours. All of this meant that it was impossible to plan normal travel to and from Berlin other than by air. One of the great achievements of the Quadripartite Agreement was a subagreement which was reached directly between German authorities for the smooth operation of land traffic, road traffic, between West Berlin and West Germany. One of our tasks was to see to it that that it worked as it was meant to work, and that meant, of course, that we were very careful to react if there was ever an instance where it appeared that traffic was being slowed down for perhaps a veterinary search or any number of reasons some of which might very well have been legitimate, but we were very sensitive to any delay in the traffic. It also meant that we had to be very vigilant about something which on the surface or on first blush might not have seemed like it should have been a problem for the West to be concerned with, but it was called exfiltration. Exfiltration meant an effort to smuggle people through the autobahn to West Berlin or to West Germany - East Germans. In the days shortly after the Berlin Wall was built, there were various exfiltration efforts which were given a romantic aura of heroic efforts to help people get out of a situation that they wanted to be out of. Probably most of those efforts were in fact heroic and selfless and well meant, but by the time I was in Berlin in 1973 and onwards, after the Quadripartite Agreement, most of the exfiltration that existed was basically commercial. This was an effort by people to make a lot of money smuggling people out through the autobahn system, and where we were particularly concerned was what involved American forces who would use their special protective status. Even before the Quadripartite Agreement was signed, there was to be no interference with members of the Allied forces traveling on the autobahn between West Berlin and West Germany. We were concerned about people misusing that status to smuggle East Germans into West Berlin or into West Germany for substantial amounts of money, because it was a deadly risk. The feeling was that, if it were to come to light that there was this kind of misuse of the rights of the Allied forces, it would be an open invitation to the Soviets to say that it was necessary to put an end to the right of Allied access to Berlin. So one of the tasks I had was to try to work with the German police and with the Allied military police to uncover instances of misuse of our rights and find ways to put an end to that kind of misuse. We had a number of cases where in fact there were American soldiers who were involved in it, or ex American soldiers who continued to live in the city, who maintained friendly ties with ex-colleagues and were involved in gangs. Sometimes the ultimately responsible people were real mafia-type criminals, and it was obviously a very difficult, sensitive thing, because you had to be sympathetic to the individual who wanted to pay money to these people to get the relative, for example, out of East Germany, but we had to recognize that there was a major risk to a very substantial Allied and German interest that was involved as well.

Q: Did some of the exfiltration cases that you were involved with also involve people from third countries who come into East Berlin or East Germany as a way to getting to freedom, getting to the West, but had come from somewhere else, or were they mostly East Germans, East Berliners?

GREENWALD: No, these were East Germans. They were themselves paying money, paying personal favors, or having relatives from the West pay substantial amounts of money. It wasn't the problem that became an issue some years later when we had Third World would-be immigrants who would fly from Pakistan, land at the airport, Schoenefeld Airport, the East Germany airport, cross over the West Berlin and ask for asylum, economic or political asylum. That was a different issue that came up ten to 15 years later. No, this was a particularly sensitive thing because, of course, these stories got into the newspaper at the time. They would be played by the rather tabloid Springer Press as Allies preventing Germans from obtaining freedom, and there were issues that had to be dealt with that could have gone to the heart of the Allied presence and ultimately the safety and security of West Berlin. There was another type of access issue that was more pleasant to deal with, and that was the effort to give meaning to the pledges that were in the Quadripartite Agreement to build out the normal infrastructure of transportation in the city. For example, everything to do with train traffic in and around Berlin was basically under GDR control, because in the immediate post-war period it was decided to give responsibility for train traffic to the Reichsvonn administration in East Berlin. The Reichsvonn administration was the inheritor of the old German government train system, which was called the Reichsvonn. We considered it to be simply a train administration. The Soviets and the GDR considered the Reichsvonn to be a constituent element of the Ministry of Transport of the GDR. The Reichsvonn controlled substantial pieces of territory in West Berlin, the train stations, the tracks, the area even contiguous to the tracks. Anything to do with the modernization of that infrastructure had to be negotiated with the Reichsvonn, whether it was a project to rebuild a train station or a project to expand a platform so that a suburban West Berlin station could take long-distance trains for the first time since the war. We were constantly vigilant in Berlin to efforts by the GDR, by the Soviets, to use the practical concessions that they would hold out as a way to get changes in the legal status of the city. For example, the issue would always arise, the negotiation would be conducted between local authorities. The Zinot, the city government of West Berlin, which would be under general instructions from the Allies but basically operated on its own, would negotiate with Reichsvonn officials and at some point they would have an agreement. But then the question would arise: How would that agreement be structured, who would sign it, what would be the signature block under the signature. Would it say 'Deputy Minister of Transport of the German Democratic Republic' or would it say 'Reichsvonn Direccione'. I remember once going to Hausbruch for some of the side readings around the NATO ministerial. That was in May of 1975 when the issue of expanding several of the suburban train stations was finally to be resolved. There were agreements that had been reached to allow for expansion of the stations so that they could receive long-distance trains for the first time since the war. What was left was this question of how the agreements were to be actually structured. I remember sitting across from the State Secretary in the German Foreign Ministry, Gunter Lombell, who at one point lost his temper and said, "We can lose Detente while you Allied experts in Berlin argue about what hat some Reichsvonn fellow is wearing." This was what I alluded to earlier in saying that there were always slight differences of perspective between Allied officials depending upon where they sat. The people in Berlin, both the Allied officials and the German city government officials, tended to be more conservative, more careful about these legal-political issues. The people in Bonn, both the Allied embassies and the German government, tended to be a little bit - cavalier is word that's prejudging the way they [inaudible] - but basically looking at a larger picture. At that time, of course, Willy Brandt was Chancellor and Egon Bahr was his Senior Advisor for Eastern Issues. The Brandt government was very strongly pushing this Ostpolitik, which basically had the philosophy that you could produce change in Eastern Europe, change in Berlin, best by coming closer to the East, by improving relations substantially with the Soviet Union, improving relations substantially with the GDR. Personally that's a position that I agree with, and I think their policy was an enormous success, but our professional point of view from Berlin at that time was to always say, "Don't forget what you can risk if you go too fast or too far." And so you have this essentially creative tension between people in West Berlin and the people in Bonn, both the Allies and Germans in Bonn.

Q: Partly as a result of that on the United States side, therefore, Washington, the State Department and other agencies in Washington, had to often get quite involved in some fairly detailed issues related to Berlin because of some of these differences, but also because, in addition to the Berlin aspect, the Ostpolitik, the Republic of German aspect, there was also, of course, our relationship with the Soviet Union and really our whole attitude toward Eastern Europe, and where Berlin was an extremely important part but only a part. Is that right, or did you find that you got a lot of support from Washington, or at times did you find that broader issues, so to speak, overrode some of your concerns?

GREENWALD: Well, you know, I went to law school, and while I wasn't an enthusiastic law student, I always appreciated the philosophy that the way you got closest to the truth was through the adversarial process. Representing positions as strongly as you could and then a constructive rubbing together of ideas, you'd end up seeing the issue a little bit better. So I never thought that strong arguments between the mission and the embassy or between the mission and the embassy in Washington was a lack of support. I thought that was actually quite good and useful, and for the most part it led to a rather good consensus position. Certainly there was an enormous pool of support back in Washington from the people who had themselves served in Berlin and served in Germany, support for the importance of the issues we were dealing with. But there were, of course, different perspectives, and I think it was clearest probably in the struggle over the question of new institutions in Berlin. I had mentioned that the Quadripartite Agreement provided that ties could be maintained and developed; whatever ties were, they could be built up, expanded. There was a real question, though, as to whether totally new ties could be established. This came to a head in about 1974 when the environment became an increasingly important part of politics in Germany as it did in the United States. The Green Party, the Green Movement, was beginning to develop, and as the United States did, the government in Bonn decided that it needed an environment agency; however, it decided to put the environment agency in Berlin. It never had an environment agency before. It was a totally new thing. Umweltbundesamt, the Federal Office of Environmental Affairs, was announced as destined for Berlin. The Interior Minister at the time was Hans Dietrich Genscher, and he pushed it particularly. Later, for years afterwards he was the Foreign Minister. The Soviets reacted very strongly and said this was a violation of the Quadripartite Agreement. You could maintain and develop ties, but you can't establish something that's totally new, because that goes against the principle that the Western sectors of Berlin are not a constituent part of nor are they governed by the Federal Republic of Germany. Other provisions of the Quadripartite Agreement provide that, notwithstanding the legal positions of both sides, those practices and procedures which are developed over the years shall be respected. That means that offices which were established by the German government with Western Allied approval between 1948 and 1972 - even if the Soviets did not like those offices which were established, those offices would be respected and continue to operate. They could grow, they could have more people, they could have offshoots, but not something totally new, not a new governmental body. There was a certain logic about the Soviet position. One could see where they were coming from politically in wanting to draw a line. So there was a new mini Berlin crisis with little threats of interference on the autobahn and rumblings about what would happen at the NE office with the big stores. Ultimately the issue went away with the Soviets accepting the presence of the Federal Environmental Office, and it was always presumed - I can't prove it and I don't know whether documents have come out since to prove it or not - but it was always assumed that there had been a commitment made by Henry Kissinger to the Soviets and accepted by the government in Bonn that the resolution of the problem would be that, yes, this one time you can establish this office but never again. You won't do it again. Washington, Paris and London won't let Bonn put a new office in West Berlin, and that was something which was a difficult issue, because there were certainly people in Berlin who felt that this was an edge of the wedge and the next time that the Soviets would insist on something that wasn't quite perhaps as legitimate, legitimate from their point of view. That kind of issue became one of substantial argument back and forth, but I don't think it was ever done in a way that anyone felt that there wasn't a basic position of support for the concept, the issues that Berlin stood for. With that broad consensus of how important Berlin was in and of itself and for the larger picture in Europe, one felt very comfortable and very proud working there.

Q: It was also an issue on occasion that did engage the Secretary of State? [end of tape]

Okay, this is the second session of a Foreign Affairs Oral History Interview with G. Jonathan Greenwald. It's the 24th of March, 1998. I'm Raymond Ewing, and this is being conducted at the National Foreign Affairs Training Center under the auspices of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training. Jon, we were talking last time about your assignment as Legal Advisor at the U.S. mission in Berlin in the 1970s. You mentioned the four-power control of the Spandau Prison, of the one prisoner, I guess still just one prisoner at the time that you were there, Rudolf Hess.

GREENWALD: Yes, it was a very macabre situation because you had a large, very large building which had been a prison in Berlin in the 19th century holding hundreds of prisoners, which was operated solely for one very old, at that time 80ish-year-old, man, including several dozen fully armed guards of any one of the four powers which was in control of the prison in a given month and a group of warders and prison guards who were civilians who were for the most part professional prison people. In the United States' case, we recruited a number of professional prison guards from the U.S. prison system, and all of these people and all of this organization was to take care of one man, who at that time, the time that I was there, was still reasonably physically fit and seemed to be reasonably mentally fit. I would see him about every second or every third month, because one of the jobs of the Legal Advisors was to supervise the operation of Spandau Prison. The prison was a Quadripartite organization. There were four warders, one from each of the four powers, but the next instance of authority over the prison was the Legal Advisors, and that meant the Legal Committee of the American, British and French Legal Advisors. I had mentioned, however, that, since the Soviets walked out of the Allied Kommandatura in 1948, there had been no Soviets in any other part of the Kommandatura. This, of course, created an anomaly since there was a higher Quadripartite body which was supposed to supervise the work of Spandau Prison, and there was no Soviet member. So in effect there was an ad hoc Soviet member merely for the purposes of supervising the prison, and that was a member of the Soviet embassy in East Berlin, who would come to events and affairs at the prison, primarily the changing-of-the-guard ceremonies. We never admitted him to our regular Legal Advisors meetings, because that would be regarded as a violation of practices and procedures in the operation of Berlin. The Soviets would have had to come back entirely into the Kommandatura or not at all. But the events at the prison that occurred around the changeovers, the lunches primarily the day of the change-over, were what passed for diplomatic events, Quadripartite diplomatic events. There was always over the lunch a discussion of whatever it was that was happening in and around Berlin at the time. It was always particularly painful for me to go on the inspection that was part of the Spandau routine. The commanding general, British, American, French or Soviet during the time of their respective authority for the prison, would one day in the three-month period inspect the prison. The Legal Advisors were expected to accompany him on his rounds. The major part of that event, of course, was to walk in and speak to the prisoner, and the commanding general would always ask him whether he had any complaints, whether his health was being looked after and so forth, and that was about the extent of the conversation. It was a very routine thing and did follow the procedure with almost no change. One had the chance to put other questions to Hess. I could never think of what to say to the man, knowing his history, knowing the history of the regime that he worked for loyally. One felt simply unable to think of normal things to say. Couldn't ask him about the weather or about football or any of those normal icebreakers. You could hardly expect after his 30-odd years of silence that he would respond to a question if you said it to him, asked him, "Why did you fly to England?" So it was always a matter of embarrassed silences, and one always wondered what this man had done and what he had seen and even how he had become what he was, but he was always a mystery to me and I never had a meaningful conversation with him, but I consider the experience in and about Spandau Prison one of the more macabre episodes in my time in Berlin, in fact my whole career.

Q: Did his family visit him? Were they allowed to pay visits?

GREENWALD: Yes, there were family visits. There was a routine schedule of family visits. His son and his wife could visit. They exchanged letters with him. For many years he had not written to them. He had chosen not to see them and not to write to them, but that period of self-imposed isolation had ended some years before my time in Berlin. One of the tasks that the Legal Advisors were supposed to exercise was to monitor his correspondence. I confess we did that in a very loose way. It was not something that we took terribly seriously, because clearly the man had the right to exchange his private notes with his family, and we felt that way.

Q: During the period that you were in Berlin, were preparations begun or had they already been arranged for his burial, for his funeral, for his death?

GREENWALD: One of the constant questions was what would happen to Spandau Prison and what would happen to the remains of Hess upon his death. In the first instance the Allies believed that it would be appropriate to avoid the entire issue by releasing Hess. The feeling was that he was an old, ill man who had not that much more time to live and certainly not any time to be active as a politician any longer. He was not a threat, and it would be better and more humanitarian simply to release him. There had always been a feeling that the Hess sentence, in fact, at Nuremberg, had been something of a compromise, that the Soviet judge had wished to impose the death sentence and the Allied judges had felt that Hess, since he had left Germany in 1941, had been out of the power structure in the years of the very worst crimes of the Nazi period. Therefore, he might have been more appropriately sentenced to a number of years in prison but not a life sentence. The feeling was that he could be, should be released. I always felt somewhat ambiguously about it. I could understand the Soviet belief that Hess was, in fact, truly a major war criminal and that he should be punished to the full severity of the sentence he was given at Nuremberg, but to me it always seemed the cruelest thing that could have been done to Hess would have been to release him, because as he lived in Spandau Prison, while it was in some ways a terribly isolated existence, he could always maintain the illusion or belief, delusion, that he was still a very important person and that his movement was still a very important movement. Why else would four major powers dance about him in such a remarkable fashion? If he had been released, he would have seen that time and history and Germany had passed him by. In many ways I think that would have been a crueler end to his life than the fact that he was able to continue to live in prison with four countries taking care of him as they did. As you say, there were considerable efforts to negotiate some type of agreed scenario. If he was to stay in prison for the rest of his life, what would happen when he died? Those negotiations, at least during the time I was there, never went very far. The Soviets, I think, suspected some tricks, and they really never wanted to reach very serious agreements. We always suspected that their hope was that somehow Spandau Prison would become a permanent Quadripartite entity, that even when there was no prisoner the Soviets would see it useful to maintain some substantial element of their presence in the Western sectors of Berlin, and that they therefore weren't interested in an orderly disposition of the prison. In fact, what happened when Hess died, when he committed suicide in fact, oddly enough just a few weeks after I returned to East Berlin in 1987, the British acted very quickly and unilaterally, on a basis of an understanding that they worked out with the two Western powers, to quickly raze the prison so that there was no further question of it being a structure that would be devoted to four-power purposes.

Q: It was in the British zone?

GREENWALD: It was in the British sector of Berlin.

Q: And his remains were given to his family?

GREENWALD: Yes. I don't recall exactly where they were buried, but it was simply a matter of turning them over to his family.

Q: The fear perhaps on the part of the Soviets or at various times was that he would be a martyr, his burial place would be a place where neo-Nazis could rally or something like that?

GREENWALD: Yes, it was, but, of course, they made him into more of a martyr than he would have been by keeping him in prison for so many years.

Q: Because it was the Soviets that resisted any idea of early release or parole?

GREENWALD: Yes.

Q: Okay. He was able to exercise in the courtyard, the garden of the prison regularly, I think.

GREENWALD: Oh, yes, he had a certain number of hours a day that he could go out and in fact more than I think he ever really wanted to. There was really very little constraint in the years of his old age. Had he wanted to spend more time in the garden, he could have and, in fact, he did have some garden projects, but he wasn't a gardener. I think there were some passages to that effect in Speer's memoirs.

Q: I recall in 1980 flying over West Berlin in a helicopter and having the crew point out Spandau Prison and Rudolf Hess, who was walking in the courtyard at that time. Okay, is there anything else about your time in West Berlin that we should cover, Jon, before we go on?

GREENWALD: Well, basically it was a peaceful period in the history of the city. The Quadripartite Agreement, as I had said earlier, was new when I came, and the question was whether it would succeed in normalizing the situation in the city and around the city. That it did was perhaps symbolized about a year after I was there by an end-of-year wrap-up of the political scene by the daily newspaper Tagesspiegel, which wrote that the most controversial element of the city's life for the past twelve months was the decision to introduce a new, radically different pleasure boat onto the Banzai in the shape of a whale and called Moby Dick. The paper editorialized that the fact that Berliners could become more excited about the appearance of Moby Dick on the Banzai than any other event during the year was an indication that in fact the Quadripartite Agreement was working rather well. In fact, that's the truth of it. It did work very well for the city.

Q: That's a good story and good example of the calm and tranquility that the Quadripartite Agreement brought. Let me ask one question that I meant to ask before, and you may have touched on this before, but who covered the costs of Spandau Prison and the other Quadripartite aspects? Was that borne by the United States and the others?

GREENWALD: No, the full cost of the occupation was borne by the government in Bonn. I believe that the GDR bore certain Soviet costs. How those were taken into account between the two in terms of the cost of stationing Soviet troops on East German territory, I don't fully know, but the total cost that the United States, that France and that Britain bore in the occupation of Berlin was paid for by the Bonn government in the Occupation Cost Budget. The amounts each year were negotiated between the three Allies and the German government, but it was always a very generous amount. In fact, I think it's fair to say that there was an element of fat, of luxury in the Berlin occupation that would not have existed if each national government had borne its own cost - fat in the sense of the types of equipment that were put into the various missions, the types of official vehicles that were purchased, the housing and so forth. One used to laugh that the French army would station at least one unit of new troops in Berlin each semester and that they would charge the Occupation Cost Budget everything from uniforms down to the equipment for the new troops.

Q: Which they would take with them.

GREENWALD: Yes. Whether that's true or not I don't know, but certainly the German government was very generous in its support of the occupation costs, and they felt certainly originally that the costs were a matter of legal obligation, as an obligation was established at the time of the return of sovereignty to the Bonn government, but more than that I'm sure that the Bonn government felt that this was in fact a debt of honor paid to the Allies who they knew were standing in Berlin for the freedom of Berliners and that this was an important national cause for the government in Bonn. So they paid those costs without it ever becoming a major political issue of the Bundesamt.

Q: And the costs that they covered, that were covered by the Federal Republic, the Bonn government, included the three Western missions, diplomatic missions.

GREENWALD: Yes. Other than salaries, basically the entire operation of all of the three Allies in Berlin was covered by Bonn.

Q: So you finished your assignment at the U.S. mission Berlin in 1977?

GREENWALD: Yes.

Q: And where did you from there?

GREENWALD: I had been trying to decide during the four years that I was in Berlin whether I wanted to return to the Legal Advisor's Office or wanted to transfer into the Foreign Service, and it became a very easy decision for me as I found that I liked working abroad even more than I liked working in the State Department. I felt that I wanted to have access to the broader life of the Foreign Service and the broader opportunities that were only available to people who were in the Foreign Service as opposed to those who were in the Civil Service in the State Department. So from about the second year of my four-year tour, I began to explore the possibilities of what was called lateral transfer, lateral entry. At that point I discovered the weakness in the advice that my old law professor, Abe Chayes, had given me. There simply were no openings at middle grades in the parts of the Foreign Service that interested me, primarily the political cone. At one point it was suggested to me that I learn something about economics and try the economic cone, because there were some openings there. I knew nothing about economics. I had taken Economics 101 and had barely passed it at college, and that was about the extent of it. I tried to bone up on it, read a few books, actually came back for an oral examination and was quite properly told that I'd need to bone up a great deal more. It was apparent by 1976, that is within the last year of my tour, that it wouldn't be possible to do a lateral entry at that point in time and that I would either have to go back into the Legal Advisor's Office or find some other way in which I could continue to work abroad. I was interested in that and looking about the possibilities when in fact they developed. They developed out of some work which I had done during the time I was in Berlin but which I did outside of Berlin, that is the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. This was a major part of the diplomatic chessboard in the early 1970s. As efforts were made to negotiate down the levels of tension of the Cold War, there was a number of important interests I had. The normalization of the Berlin situation was one that each side shared, but I think it was fair to say it was probably a more important consideration for the West, because the West was always vulnerable to pressure in Berlin and it was clearly in our interest to create a situation where we were less likely to have that particular sensitive point pressed. The Soviets were interested in a number of things but not least the establishment of the idea that the GDR, the German Democratic Republic, was a legitimate and permanent part of Europe. Out of these various elements was crafted a strategy of several stages of negotiation. One involved the Berlin Agreement. Another involved the recognition of the GDR by the Western states, by the Western Allies including the United States. A third involved a negotiation to reduce military forces. This was something that the United States was very strongly interested in, because we wanted to build down the Soviet advantage to spot us on the ground in Europe in conventional forces. So the negotiation that I got involved with from Berlin was known as the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). This was originally a Soviet idea which had been advanced in the years immediately after Stalin's death for some type of security conference in Europe. The presumption was that the Soviets' interest was to create a document which would proclaim security in Europe and that in turn would lead to a weakening of the Western military position, at the very least a lessening of the commitment of the U.S. forces on the ground. So the West had been for nearly 20 years quite suspicious of this idea, and when the Soviets returned to it in the late '60s and the early '70s as one of the elements that they wanted to put into play in this diplomatic chess game, there was still a great deal of suspicion. Ultimately it was agreed to hold such a conference. The feeling was that this was a concession to the Soviets, that it was something that was not in the Western interest, that we would get through it as quickly as possible and move on to other things. At least that was the basic view in Washington, I think it's fair to say. But we were committed to it, and that meant a delegation that would go through a major set of talks, first in Helsinki to set the parameters of the negotiation, then in Geneva to actually negotiate the documents, ultimately returning to Helsinki for a signature, the Soviet expectation being that the documents were extremely important and would be done at the Summit level and the Western concept being that it would be done as routinely and quickly as possible. Originally the work, the fielding of that delegation was done entirely out of Washington, but as the negotiation stretched out over a much longer time than originally had been envisaged, the call went out for volunteers to strengthen the delegation, to fill gaps, and I went twice from Berlin. I was made available by the mission for two long temporary tours of duty, one in the fall of 1974 when the negotiation in Geneva was plodding along and not making a great deal of progress, and one in the spring of 1975 when it was moving toward closure. I'll want to say a number of things about the CSCE process, but in terms of the question that was originally asked, because I was involved for some months with negotiation, I made good contacts with the people who were responsible for the ongoing process of CSCE, as it was called, after the Helsinki Final Act was signed in 1975. As they began to prepare for the follow-up to CSCE, particularly as they had to prepare for the next conference, the next new conference which was to be held in Belgrade, they asked me if I was interested in joining that delegation. I saw that as a way to continue doing Foreign Service as opposed to legal things, and I took that opportunity and then went to work for what was the preparatory unit for the Belgrade Conference and then to the Belgrade Conference itself.

Q: And you did that still as a Civil Service lawyer on detail, or were you able to convert to the Foreign Service?

GREENWALD: This gets into technicalities, but when you're assigned to something like what I did in Berlin for four years, that is a foreign posting, a Civil Service employee of the State Department, a so-called GS Officer is converted to a Foreign Service Reserve Officer, what is called an FSR. Those appointments last for the duration of the assignment or a maximum of five years. My FSR appointment would have ended after four years when I left Berlin had I not gone into another assignment which involved Foreign Service. So I knew by accepting the Belgrade position that I would be continuing as an FSR for the full five years of my original appointment. That begged the question of what would happen after five years, because normally it wasn't possible for one of those appointments to be extended. That would have carried me a year into the Belgrade Conference, and I waited to see what would happen.

Q: So the Belgrade Conference actually took place in 1979?

GREENWALD: No, counting the preparatory meeting, it ran from June of 1977 until March of 1978.

Q: So this was really not very long after the Helsinki Final Act of the CSCE was signed in the summer of 1975. What were the main issues? Were you based in Belgrade most of that time? What were you doing?

GREENWALD: I was living in Belgrade at the Hotel Moskva for just about that entire time. But let me go back a little bit to Geneva and to the negotiation of the Helsinki Final Act, because I think that was in retrospect one of the more important phases of what one can see as the building down of the Cold War. I had mentioned that the Western approach to the CSCE was one of considerable suspicion, particularly in Washington. That changed over time, and it changed rather dramatically. But it changed at a different pace in Western Europe and in the United States. One of the people in the Foreign Service that I most admired was George Vest. George Vest was at one point in his long career the senior negotiator, the head of the U.S. delegation for CSCE. He actually did, I believe, the negotiation that produced what was called the Blue Book, the book of rules and procedures that was negotiated originally in Helsinki in the winter of 1972 but became the guiding document for the much longer than two years that were spent in Geneva negotiating the actual Helsinki Final Act. I didn't work with George Vest on CSCE. I didn't really get to know him until after that, but he used to say to me that he always enjoyed working on CSCE in years after Helsinki and the reason was that there was a constant demonstration, a daily demonstration, of how wrong Henry Kissinger could be. And George didn't like Henry Kissinger very much. I think that had to do with his brief and unhappy period as the Department press coach when Kissinger was the Secretary of State, but what he meant in regard to CSCE is illustrated by the following story. About a year into the negotiation, which was already much longer than we had expected the negotiation to last, it was basically deadlocked. It was deadlocked over a number of points in which the Western Europeans were dug in and fighting very hard. For example, the language that was to be put into the Declaration of Principles - part of that language would speak about the inviolability of frontiers. This was a great interest of the Soviets. Basically they were interested in seeing a ratification of the new map of Europe that had occurred at the end of the Second World War. The Western Allies, particularly the Germans, were very interested in linking to the language about inviolability of frontiers, language about the possibility, however, that frontiers could be changed by peaceful consent, peaceful agreement, with the people of the states concerned. It couldn't be changed by force, but it could be changed by open, free, diplomatic agreement or by self-determination of peoples. This had obvious relevance to the question of German reunification. At a meeting of Allied Foreign Ministers discussing this subject, the Western Allies were insisting upon the meeting to hang tough, and at one point Kissinger simply lost his temper and said, "Oh, go ahead. Finish this negotiation. Sign this document. Hurry it up. Nobody's going to remember six months after it's signed a single word that's in it." And that, of course, is where Kissinger was wrong, because unlike so many high-sounding proclamations that come out of international meetings, the Helsinki Final Act did have a substantial ongoing life and developed a momentum of its own and contributed, I think, enormously to what we eventually saw come to culmination in Eastern Europe in 1989. But the process, the growth of CSCE, the development of the concept of one in which the West was on the defensive to one in which the West was very much on the offensive was fascinatingly evident to those of us who were privileged to be in the negotiation in 1974 and 1975. We could even see that, primarily driven by the Western Europeans, the document that was being negotiated was turning into quite a remarkable thing that in particular advanced human rights to a degree of prominence that it had never had in a major negotiation before. Secondly it provided for what we called a follow-up mechanism. It wasn't simply to be adopted and then to be signed and then to be self executed. It was assumed that there would be problems, there would be questions, there would be issues that would still have to be dealt with, and that there would have to be an ongoing series of meetings at which one would take very careful stock and account of where things had gone well and where things had not. All of this was only dimly perceived on the ground at Geneva and probably even less well perceived in the capitals. Here I don't mean only governments but by commentators, by observers, by journalists who were writing about what was going on in Europe at the time. I think the single most important telegram I ever had the opportunity to write came at the later stages of the negotiation in late May of 1975. At that time it had already been essentially decided there would be a Summit, there would be documents that would come out of Helsinki that were of sufficient importance that we would grant the Soviets their wish to Summit what was done. We were all pushing to wrap up all of the loose ends. It was really only about that time that CSCE was discovered or rediscovered in the American press. It had been a hidden negotiation for two years. There had been a fair amount of attention to it in Europe, but in the United States there had been preoccupation with a number of other things, not the least the end of the Vietnam War, the Watergate scandals and so forth, and no one really paid much attention. Suddenly it was realized that we were only a month or two away from a major Summit to which the President was committed to go and sign a document, and there was a lot of controversy about that document. There were a lot of people, particularly among ethnic American groups, who were concerned as always about another Yalta, that somehow what we were going to do in Helsinki in August of 1975 was ratify the division of Europe and Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe. So we as a delegation were asked to provide an analysis of how serious were the provisions for human rights, because we had said that the human rights element document was quite remarkable and that this was a major Western success getting human rights into the document. Well, what did we mean? I had the chance to write that telegram, and I tried to explain that human rights had always been a part of international affairs. There had been human rights agreements back well before the First World War in agreements to end war or to ban war and so forth, but they had always been absolutist. They had stated a principle that was pure and noble and said this is the way it should be and that was all there was to it. There was no further process for seeing that the pledges were carried out, and the human rights statements generally stood on their own by themselves. Here, I argued, for the first time we were embedding human rights in a major international endeavor that was about many things, and human rights was one element of it. We were in effect saying that human rights wasn't in a separate league; it was in the major league of international affairs in the 1970s, and we were saying that it wasn't an absolute. There was the absolute statement in the Declaration of Principles that included a statement on human rights and fundamental freedoms. What was really unique about the Helsinki Final Act was not that declaration; it was what was called Basket Three, the element of the agreement that dealt with human contacts. There human rights were not absolute at all. They weren't perfect. They were commitments to do better in providing opportunities for family unification, for example, to do better and recognize that we're not going to do perfectly. It's the real world. It's the world in which we know that states have various competing commitments and various competing interests. We weren't expecting that the Soviet Union was going to change its fundamental nature overnight. But we were providing for a process of gradual change, linking it to the major elements on the international chessboard, and providing for a follow-up mechanism giving us the opportunity to hold to account the Soviets or anybody else who had failed to meet a given commitment. So I argued that we had a different concept and possibly a much more realistic concept, working toward gradual progress in these human matters that are so important to people. This was a major achievement which was worth the signature of the President. The test of whether we had negotiated well, the test of whether the President was right to go to Helsinki would be how well we kept the Soviets and the others to the commitments that were in that document. That was up to us over the next years to maintain. Well, that was obviously not the only document to persuade the White House that, in fact, the President could go, but I think it was a useful telegram; and in terms of my own career, it was helpful, because that was what convinced Bud Sherer, who at that point was the head of our delegation - Jack Oresky was his deputy - that they wanted me to join them for the Belgrade meeting. I was trying to step out of the strictly legal work that I had started with and was trying to deal with basically the political analysis of what was being done at CSCE. So that was my opportunity.

I should mention one other aspect of CSCE which was not unimportant. It was such a long conference that those who participated in it developed a certain esprit de corps which cut across delegation lines and cut across ideological lines. Since there was a certain expertise involved in mastering the nuances of that rather lengthy document, those people tended to continue at CSCE for a long time, for a number of years certainly after the original Helsinki negotiation. I think it's not too much to say that the commitment, the esprit de corps that was built during those two years in Geneva contributed to a certain feeling within many, many foreign ministries that was very personal, that this was a special document, this was a special process that all of us who were part of it would work very hard to see that it worked over the years. In some rather intangible ways, this was important, not least because one of the events that was accentuated by the Helsinki process was the effort of Eastern European countries to create a little bit more maneuvering room vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Personal relationships that were created in Helsinki were part of this. I had a major role to play in one element of that esprit de corps. I mentioned Basket Three. There were four primary baskets in CSCE: Basket One, which was the Declaration of Principles dealing with the charter of the fundamental rules and procedures for international life, the inviolability of frontiers and so on and so forth; Basket Two, which was economics; Basket Three which was human contacts that I have spoken of; and Basket Four was follow-up, this mechanism for seeing to it that the document in fact was taken seriously. The fifth basket was the basketball. Now the working procedure at CSCE negotiations was to normally start off with a plenary, and after a short while in which each side would present its positions, you'd see where there was dispute, and the chairman would call for a coffee break, and those people most concerned about the point at issue would go off in a corner and try to work something out while the rest of us would go and have coffee. During one of those coffee breaks, I was in fact having coffee, sitting at the bar in the delegates' lounge, when the number two in the Finnish delegation came up to me, a great, burly fellow named Eshkol Riakofsky. He said, "You Americans are wonderful basketball players. You invented the game. You're the best in the world. We Finns, we've just begun to play, but a few of us in the delegation have started to shoot around, and we rent out a gymnasium at a local high school Monday evenings. Why don't we get a couple of people from your delegation together and come out next Monday and we'll play a game." That sounded like a fun thing to do, so I went around our delegation trying to find volunteers. I was able to get four others, so we had five and that was enough for a team. We drove out there on Monday evening, and as we walked in the gymnasium we immediately realized we had been snookered, because there were what seemed like hundreds of people sitting in the stands, all of them shouting in unison, "Souame, Souame," which is Finnish for "Finland, Finland." There were nine or ten Finns out on the court wearing uniforms, blue shirt with "Souame CSCE Geneve 1975" on it, and they were going through lay-up drill. We realized we were in trouble. There was a referee there too, a Russian from the Soviet delegation. He came up to me before the game and said, "A few of us from the Soviet delegation play a little basketball too. Maybe when this game's over, you'll agree that we can challenge you." So the game started and the Finns got the ball, and they went down and scored a basket, and one of the members of our team, a fellow named Peter Herenee, took the ball as it came out of the basket and started walking toward the center of the court. Then I realized we were really in trouble, because Peter was Hungarian-American, grew up in Europe, and of course in football and soccer after a goal you take the ball to the center to kick off again, and that's what Peter was doing. He didn't know too much about basketball, and that was sort of our team. We did alright for a little while. We had a very tall center, a fellow named Ted Wilkinson, and as long as he held out and we could pass the ball to him, we could stay competitive. Of course, he wore down particularly, and the final score was 46 to 29, if I remember correctly, for the Finns. When the game ended, the Soviet referee came up and said, "The Finns, they're not really very good, but do you mind if we challenge them next week instead of you guys?" But after the game was over, the Finns took us to a sauna and then we went off somewhere and drank a lot of beer. Word got about the conference center that this had been a fun thing and there was another one coming up the next Monday. The next Monday I was the referee for the game between the Finns and the Soviets, which the Soviets won easily. Then the Soviets took the teams and referees and interested spectators off to a restaurant in town where Lenin used to hang out when he was in his Geneva exile. They showed us where Lenin had carved his initials into a table and how he sat with his back to the wall near the only door that he could escape out of if the police came in. We drank a lot of beer and had a good time. The next week there was a game between the English-speaking delegations and the Nordic delegations, which is featured in my memory by the Norwegian ambassador shooting his set shot underhand from mid-court every time he touched the ball. We won that game, and then there was another. Every week after that for about two months there was another game, and each game was followed by a party that made a major contribution, I think, to the spirit of the whole negotiation. There's a coda to that as we were getting ready for the Belgrade negotiation. As I mentioned, I was working in the corps delegation. The Finns came over for a consultation shortly before the Belgrade preparatory meeting, and the head of their consultative team was Ambassador Yeonini, who had been their ambassador in Geneva. He had not played in those games. He was an older man. He would sit on the bench with his rolled-up umbrella next to him and coach them. We went up to the Secretary of State's office and had the consultations. I took notes for it, and as we were coming out of the Secretary of State's office, Yeonini leaned over to me and said, "Have you picked your delegation for Belgrade yet?" I said, "No, we're just in the early stages of it." He smiled and said, "We have - three fellows and two meters." Two meters tall.

Q: Ready to play basketball.

GREENWALD: Ready to play basketball, and we did in Belgrade also.

Q: That's a good story. Let me come back and maybe finish the pre-Helsinki Summit in the spring of '75. You said that things had really accelerated in comparison to your first time there the previous fall. You mentioned what Secretary Kissinger had said, I guess, at a NATO meeting, "Let's get on with it. I don't think this really is going to amount to anything." Well, obviously that was a factor in the change of mood, but there must have been others as well that allowed progress and a final conclusion to be reached in '75 when clearly that seemed out of sight late in '74.

GREENWALD: Well, I think there were continuing pressures to move that particular piece on the chessboard and get on to the next move. The Berlin Agreement had already been concluded, and it was working well. That was a good sign, encouragement to go forward. The negotiation on multiple mutual balanced force reductions in Europe, MBFR, the conventional arms negotiation, had not been going well. That was solved much more definitively than CSCE. There was a feeling that if this was to go forward - and the MBFR negotiation was one that the West was very interested in - if it was to go forward, there was a need to move this particular piece, to get it out of the way to accomplish what we had undertaken to accomplish. There was also a feeling that you really wouldn't be able to make progress in a number of other areas until you had gotten this piece done. It was clearly something that was desired, particularly by the Soviets, particularly by Brezhnev, who had a lot of personal prestige attached to it. That gave us a leverage. He wanted it done. He wanted the opportunity to have that Summit. It allowed us to negotiate more successfully for the provisions in the document, but it was something that you at some point had to bring to a closure as well. You would only get what you wanted in the negotiation if you were ready to come to an end game. You would only be able to move on to the other things that you wanted, like progress in MBFR, if you got to that end game in CSCE. So I think by the second year of the negotiation it was felt that both sides had to finally do their bargains, and those bargains were reached in the late spring of 1975. The decision was made to schedule the Summit the first of August. Once that was done, then, of course, the pressure became enormous to really wrap things up in those last two months, because it would have been much more difficult to call off the Summit than it would have been to simply continue the negotiations. Once you had set that date, you really had set yourself in a drop-dead period end game. And there were a number of mini-crises on all sorts of things. Malta produced a whole series of them by holding out for very specific concessions on the Mediterranean. CSCE proceeded by consensus. There wasn't any voting, so in principle and theory any participating state could block anything by saying this is a matter of interest and importance to it and, until it got what it wanted, it would not give consensus. In practice, of course, states felt constrained not to use this ultimate power except in the most extraordinary circumstances. The Maltese were unabashed at using it for the purposes that they had, which were to create a major Mediterranean component to the security structure that was being established. They upset 34 other member states, I think, without any difference between East and West, but they were very successful in negotiating right down to the wire of getting a great deal in the document. Less weighty but for a moment equally baffling was the crisis created by San Marino at almost the last moment. CSCE is unique in that it gives you the opportunity to work with representatives of countries which you would never have a chance to work with otherwise because they aren't in any other international entity - San Marino, Monaco, Lichtenstein. The San Marino delegate was a lovely lady who hardly said anything over two years, had always been cooperative but really had not played much of a role. Then in one of the last nights when there was a negotiation that really went on all night, everything seemed to have been wrapped up. She began to talk, and this was an informal meeting, so there weren't translators doing simultaneous translation in all of the official languages. She spoke Italian, and not too many people understood Italian, but Jack Maresca from our delegation knew it, so Jack was one of the first to pick up what she was saying, and she was saying that she was very sorry but as the document now stood it would be necessary for San Marino to block consensus, to refuse consensus to the signing of the Helsinki Final Act, and she was explaining why. It had something to do with the fact that under the constitutional provisions which had established San Marino in the 13th century, San Marino had two heads of state in power and neither could do anything without the other, and it was impossible for both to leave the country at the same time. Yet here was a document which was to be signed by the head of state. So once the crisis was recognized, there was a hurried negotiation and an understanding reached at another coffee break that it would be possible, at least in the case of San Marino, for the document to be signed at less than head-of-state or head-of-government level. In fact, if you look at the Helsinki Final Act, I think you'll see that we have 34 Presidents and Prime Ministers and one Foreign Minister who signed the document, and that was San Marino. But in the end the delegates stumbled out of the Geneva negotiation at daylight literally on the last day before the conference was to be removed to Helsinki. And they signed the document, and then the test was in fact whether we would proceed with the follow-up in the way that we had said we would, which was to take seriously the many, many commitments that were in there, particularly the commitments on the human aspects, amelioration of human contacts.

Q: That brings us to your re-engagement with CSCE in 1977 and '78. Why don't you talk a little bit more about what some of the issues were, how they were dealt with, I guess primarily in Belgrade.

GREENWALD: Well, if you recall, it really was only a very brief period of time after August of 1975 after the signing of the Helsinki Final Act before it was apparent that many people in Eastern Europe were taking this document very seriously. You had, perhaps most dramatically, the Charter 77 Group which was formed in Czechoslovakia, and you had Helsinki monitoring groups which sprung up even in the Soviet Union. You had very quickly a rather repressive response from the Soviets and their allies to these groups. The governments had proclaimed the Helsinki Final Act as a great success of a peace policy, a policy that had achieved the recognition of the realities of Eastern Europe, that is the realities in effect of the division of Eastern Europe. They had carried out their first commitment which was to publish this document in their countries. Noyas Deutschland was the official party organ that the GDR published and that Pravda published and Mabsabacha published, and it was widely distributed. So everyone in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union who were at all interested knew what was there, knew what their government had committed themselves to, including all of those statements about improving human rights situation, increasing human contacts East and West, increasing freedom of expression, and so forth. The fact that domestic groups, homegrown groups, chose to see whether or not these promises were going to be taken seriously put tremendous pressure on the governments in Eastern Europe, and the first response was to basically crack down. This in turn created a lot of skepticism in the United States about what in fact we had achieved, whether it was a good document or not, whether we had simply naively accepted a cynical set of promises which would be cynically not implemented, and what had we gotten and what had the Soviets gotten out of this particular agreement. One of the first reactions in the United States was the creation of a new body called the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, established by a law passed by the Congress. It was not quite a Congressional committee, because uniquely it had as its membership six members of the House of Representatives, six members of the Senate, and three appointees from the Administration, one from the State Department, one from the Defense Department and one from the Commerce Department. But the first reaction from the Ford Administration was to veto it. It is my understanding that that was the strong recommendation that Henry Kissinger made, that this was an intrusion upon the President's ability to carry out foreign affairs. We should not cooperate in this venture. I don't recall the exact reasons why the bill in the end was signed into law by the President. And the initial reaction on the part of the Kissinger State Department was that we would not cooperate with this body which was really not in his view a properly constituted, appropriate Constitutional entity. But the law required that a report be made every six months by the President to the CSCE Commission on the Implementation of the Helsinki Final Act. The first report was due in the fall of 1976, about a year after the Helsinki Final Act itself was signed. I was still in Berlin, but I was called back from Berlin for a month in Washington to write that report. We had to basically invent it. We had to decide what would be involved in it, what type of information would be in it, what the format would be, how we would get input from the field, and so forth. Over years it became a routine, bureaucratized procedure, but the first time around it was quite different. Of course, the introduction was sensitive, because that was where we would have to try to explain the philosophy, the strategy for what our approach to CSCE was. So I worked on that for a month and then went back to Berlin and finished out my tour over the last couple of months and came back end of February/beginning of March, to prepare actively for the Belgrade conference which was to start in June.

Q: June of '77?

GREENWALD: June of '77. Of course, what had happened in the meantime was the Administration had changed. CSCE had played a not insignificant role in the debates between President Ford and Jimmy Carter. You may remember the famous debate in which Ford got way out on a limb and sawed himself off by speaking about Poland's independence. That was in response to a question that related to the Helsinki Final Act, what was it we were doing signing this agreement that appears to recognize Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe in return for a series of promises to ameliorate the human situation that were being broken. The new Administration had criticized the Ford-Kissinger approach, had signaled that it would take a much tougher approach towards CSCE, and the question was what this would mean in practice. For the first couple of months it didn't mean very much. When I got back to Washington, Jack Maresca, who was still working on CSCE basically as the Deputy to Bud Sherer, who was expected to be the head of our delegation in Belgrade as he had been throughout much of the Geneva negotiation, said that he had immediately after the inauguration of the new President written a paper on CSCE policy. He had pushed it up to the seventh floor, and had gotten Secretary of State Vance to basically sign off on a continuation of existing policy. This was to proceed with all due speed and all due diligence to press the Soviets for implementation of the Helsinki Final Act. We recognized that this was a very long-term process and had to be done delicately; that our Allies, who in fact been the ones who had held out for serious human rights language and for serious follow-up language, were nervous that we would have to show delicacy in the way in which we pressed the Soviets, because there were many other issues at play. They were afraid that we would simply make a polemic out of a delicate process and, in the course of so doing, the process itself could be broken. Vance had accepted that basic strategy, which was essentially a continuation of the way we had dealt with CSCE in the latter part of the negotiation in Geneva in the year after the signing of the Helsinki Final Act. I remember the relief of the first couple of delegations that came from Europe to hold consultation in fact with us. The consultations were conducted in a normal way with their old familiar interlocutors on the other side of the table, and it seemed like the same team, the same principles guiding that team were at play. And that continued basically until June when it was time to depart for Belgrade. There was a struggle at that point over whether or not there would be members of the CSCE Commission on our delegation, and in fact there were several members of the delegation who came out of the CSCE Commission in its work for the Congressional people on that Commission.

Q: Members of the Commission or staff?

GREENWALD: Staff. And during the course of the June preparatory meeting on several occasions Congressional members of the Commission came out to see what we were doing: Dante Fascell, who was the Chairman; Senator Dole came out at various times. So there was increasing involvement of the Congressional side and increasing pressure to do more, be tougher, pound the table a bit more, but basically the process continued with Belgrade in June and July as it had pretty much through Geneva. There was a negotiation which was quite tough with the Soviets over what the rules of procedure for the actual conference would be. We had to negotiate a balance between what was called Review of Implementation, that is review of promises that had been made and to what extent they were being kept, with new business, because the Helsinki Final Act was not supposed to be simply a photograph of one time but it was supposed to be an ongoing process that would allow participants to deal with new issues, new problems, and come up with new approaches, modernize itself, reinvent itself each time it met. The Soviets were very interested in seeing to it that some substantial part of the Belgrade Conference dealt with new business. Our feeling was you had to make sure you dealt sufficiently with the old business if you were to be credible when you approached new business. So there was a very tough negotiation over how you divided up the time. Eventually a compromise was reached on what was called the Yellow Book of Belgrade, which laid out an agenda, schedule, literally how many meetings would be held for Review of Implementation and how many on new business, and so forth. We left the first week of August. The meeting might have continued much longer, but the translators demonstrated their power very wisely and effectively. They pointed out that August was a sacred holiday period and that they had signed on for seven weeks and seven weeks were up at the end of July and they were going to leave. Of course, without them we couldn't really conduct any official business, because we knew we needed to have simultaneous translation into all six languages. In the end we reached a compromise and they stayed an extra week and got the work done by the first week of August, and they had almost a full holiday. We had a document which we carried back and felt it was reasonably good and that in September we would continue at the conference pretty much as we had before with Bud Sherer the head of the delegation and basically the same team that had worked on CSCE for the last couple of years doing a little bit of Congressional side-play.

Q: Sherer had been ambassador to Czechoslovakia. Was he still at that time or had he finished that post?

GREENWALD: He was still in Prague in 1974-75 when I worked with him in Geneva, but he had finished that post by '77 and was back in Washington and was doing this for a time. In September - I don't remember the exact date, the conference itself, I think, began around the 30th of September - but it was in early September that we suddenly were told that there had been a major change. The Administration had held an important meeting on CSCE and that major decisions had been made. These included that there would be a new ambassador, a new head of delegation; and that would be Arthur Goldberg, the very distinguished former Justice of the Supreme Court, former Secretary of Labor under Kennedy, former Ambassador to the United Nations, and a very strong crusader for civil rights and human rights. The structure within the State Department that would deal with CSCE would be revised so that it would no longer be a matter in which the European Bureau had overwhelming control. The new Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs headed by Pat Derian would have a substantial input - of course, they were interested in pushing the human rights aspect of it as far and as hard as they could. There would be a new attitude adopted toward the CSCE Commission, which would now be regarded not with suspicion and not as an interloper or as a Constitutional questionable entity but as a full partner. They would have a substantial part in staffing of delegation. Their staff director, a fellow named Spencer Oliver, would be one of the deputy heads of delegation so that we would have Justice Goldberg as the head of delegation, Bud Sherer would be retained as deputy in order to provide some continuity and some advice to Justice Goldberg. Jack Maresca and Spencer Oliver would also be deputy heads of delegation. We would have roughly equal staffing between the State Department and the CSCE Commission for the rest of the delegation. This, of course, was a major sea change, and it involved an awful lot of effort on the part of everybody concerned to get used to it: policy aside, just to learn to work with new and different people who were coming from different foreign policy cultures. It also was very difficult for our allies, who thought they were dealing with one type of approach to CSCE and discovered almost overnight that we had changed, that we were going to have a much more aggressive and much more human-rights-oriented up-front approach which we expected them to follow. The issue was simplified, as so often happens, in the one key phrase, whether we would name names or not name names. The old style that we had anticipated following was one in which one would use a lot of circumlocutions, talk about cases but talk about cases without specifically saying Joe Smith was doing bad things or whatever, and it was felt that by naming names you're raising the temperature of the meeting by a substantial degree. Our allies were very nervous about that. Much of that nervousness in retrospect, I will say, was foolish and silly, but it was a very real factor. It was very difficult to persuade them that in fact we were serious about this, we were going to do it, and we spent a lot of time in the fall of 1977 simply trying to persuade our allies that we were serious about this but not destructive. We weren't trying to destroy the process. We were doing what it was felt was necessary to make the process credible and therefore lasting in the United States. If we weren't tougher, if we weren't more specific about human rights cases and violations, we would not have any support for maintaining this process among those people who cared about foreign affairs in the United States, from the Congress, from the broader public. Therefore, to keep this process alive, this process which Europeans in particular felt had enormous long-term potential for becoming a mechanism by which Eastern Europeans would increasingly distance themselves from the Soviets, and the Soviets themselves might increasingly change their behavior to meet what would be recognized as the new standard European norms of behavior, that we would have to be, all of us, a great deal more rigid than existed on implementation than we had anticipated being. The Soviets, of course, were highly distressed by this approach. They felt that there was nothing they could do in terms of moving on to new business, that really all they could do in Belgrade was to find a way to end it as quickly as possible and to demonstrate that, as they saw it, the name calling could only be counterproductive. So you had a very difficult conference in which the Review of Implementation was conducted in an atmosphere of substantial incrimination, not all of it East-West or West-East but some of it West-West. Justice Goldberg had a tough time maintaining the facade or the semblance of allied unity, and in the end the task was to negotiate with the Soviets on a plausible ending to the negotiation that would keep the process alive. There were real questions about whether the Soviets wanted the process kept alive any more. They could see that whatever they thought they might have gained in the legitimacy of the divisions of Eastern Europe and Western Europe was overbalanced by the difficulties they bought for themselves on the human rights front, the difficulties they bought for themselves internally with their own people and the difficulties they had bought for themselves with the U.S. and Western Europe. There was real thought that they perhaps would like to see the Belgrade meeting be the last meeting. So it was felt that we had actually accomplished something when in March of 1978 we completed the tough Review of Implementation and had gotten the Soviets to agree that the process would continue. There would be another meeting in Madrid in two years' time; there would be a series of experts' meetings on various subjects that would be held between 1978 and 1980. It was a very difficult period, and it was not the kind of exciting, joint esprit de corps that Geneva had had.

Q: You kept playing basketball though?

GREENWALD: We kept playing basketball, and I think there was still enough of the links between delegations that helped to ameliorate some of the rougher moments. But this was a tough meeting. It really raised the question of whether or not an aggressive human rights policy could in fact be maintained consistent with other aspects of what really had been going on in East-West relations. In the end we found that the process was more durable than many had feared. One could be up-front about the human rights side of it and that it did not mean that the Soviets would walk away from the process or walk away from other aspects of East-West relations. It maintained, I think, a certain credibility with their own people and a certain credibility with the people in Eastern Europe who were looking for support in their efforts to hold their own governments' feet to the fire about the promises they had made. So in that sense Belgrade was a success, but I think it was a success that had failed to be recognized, looking back at it from a number of years. When we left Belgrade, a lot of us left feeling that there had been a promise that we were again meeting in 1980 but we might well not be and that it was very much open to question whether this policy could be maintained without creating fundamental splits for the allies and fundamental splits in East-West relations.

Q: What happened to you then after Belgrade?

GREENWALD: Well, during the Belgrade meeting, the fifth year of my FSR appointment ran out, and I resumed inquiries about whether it was possible to do a lateral transfer or not. It wasn't possible still at that point. There were a couple of things that were suggested to me. One was that I go to work for Ben Read, who at that time was the Under Secretary for Management, who was undertaking a lot of work which led to the 1980 Revised Foreign Service Act. I turned that down because I felt that I'd be basically doing legal work and, once I went back to the Department in that capacity, that would be the end of it. There would no longer be a problem that the system had to deal with. There were a number of people who were trying to be helpful to the Department that could usefully serve in the broader Foreign Service and were trying to find a way to make it possible, and that if I took that job, then that might seem to be the end of it. So I turned it down and I gambled, and it turned out that I was allowed to keep my Foreign Service Reserve commission for a couple more years. I don't recall the exact commission and how it allowed it to be done, but....

Q: Extend it beyond the five-year....

GREENWALD: There was some way to do it, and that was done, but I went back basically without any clear job. I didn't want to back into the Legal Advisor's Office for obvious reasons. I was just hoping that something would show up. I briefly worked in the Office of European Affairs, which was essentially the NATO office RPM. That was also the office which harbored this small ongoing CSCE unit, and there were a number of tasks that were basically left to clean up from the Belgrade meeting. There was the report of the meeting, the conference report, the delegation report that is, and there were these expert meetings that I mentioned, a session on peaceful settlement of disputes that was held at Montreaux that I went to, and a few things of that sort, but it was all stop-gap. After about six months of that, it turned out that there was an opening in the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs for the person who did their Europe work. I was recommended for that. Pat Derian accepted me, I think with some justifiable reluctance and reserve, because I was looked at as one of those who had been supporters of the old school. I owe her a lot for her willingness to tolerate me in her camp. I think it worked out reasonably well. The same types of struggles that had occurred during Belgrade were still going on in many ways, questions about the degree of influence that the CSCE Commission would have on policy, questions about the tone of our overall approach. I spent that year and a half with Pat trying to shuttle between camps and be a reasonably good representative of both, trying to find common ground, which was challenging, not always successful, sometime useful. But it basically worked out, and I think over time all of us recognized that there was more to the up-front Goldberg/Derian/Carter approach than us staid traditionalists had been willing to admit at the beginning. You could do more. A, you had to do more to remain credible domestically; and B, you could do more, you could push the process a little harder and further without breaking it than we had feared.

Q: I guess the question then that I would raise is: Were the results, were the accomplishments with what was achieved commensurate with the effort thrust? Could you point to examples where raising names, pushing on particularly issues in the CSCE framework made a difference?

GREENWALD: Well, you could always come up with instances in which somebody was released from prison, somebody was allowed to emigrate to Israel, whatever. You could never prove that you had more of that because you had named names. There was always a school of thought that said quiet diplomacy would have gotten more faster, that if you pushed the Soviets' backs against the wall, they would be more stubborn than if you worked quietly in a back room. Those things are never really provable. You can state a view and you can't prove it. It was clear that at least a lot of people whose cases were given publicity eventually had their situations somewhat ameliorated. Whether it was as fast or as thorough as it would have been otherwise is unclear. One just doesn't know. What I think you can say, in the light of history in retrospect and also taking into account that there was a long Madrid follow-up conference, part of which I was involved with, and there was a long Vienna conference after that, which I wasn't involved with, is that the CSCE process gave substantial impetus to the whole civil society movement that developed in Eastern Europe and which came to fruition in 1989. It certainly wasn't the only factor. It might not even have been the major factor, but it played a role. It gave credence to people to be able to point to the commitments that their own governments had made and had publicized. The fact that the West was still talking about that agreement and still keeping it alive and that this treaty gave us something which was alive and still evolving and not something which was just part of the past made it also a living vehicle for people in Eastern Europe. I talked to a lot of people during my tour in Hungary and lot of people during my tour in the GDR who considered themselves dissidents. They felt that the Helsinki Final Act and the ongoing CSCE process was a decisive factor in what they were doing. So if there was a bargain, a grand bargain struck in the early '70s, formalistic even if not legalistic recognition of the status quo on the one hand, which the Soviets wanted, and the opening up of this Pandora's box of human rights on the other, which the West wanted, it's clear that the CSCE bargain was one which was extraordinarily one sided to the benefit of change or movement, of evolution and revolution in Eastern Europe. So it was extraordinarily important in that sense. I think George Vest's words are very accurate that those who saw this as just a pawn to move one time on the chessboard give the Soviets this confidence to move on to some other things that we're interested in were short-sighted, and that those who felt intuitively, instinctively as early as the Geneva negotiation that something extraordinary was being put together were right.

Q: Besides the CSCE Helsinki process work that you were doing in the new Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, did you get into a lot of other issues too, or was this the main thing that you worked on as the European person there?

GREENWALD: It was the primary thing. There were some other interesting aspects to it. The two things that most excited people about human rights in Europe were clearly Eastern Europe on the one hand, which was dealt with through CSCE, and Ireland, Northern Ireland. I had done very little on that, got a lot of letters and would try to answer the letters that came from Congressional offices with the standard language, but I didn't see it as a primary part of my job. But Pat Derian was getting a lot of pressure from Irish-American groups saying this is supposed to be a human rights bureau and you've got a Europe section and you're talking a lot about the Soviet Union, but why don't you talk about Northern Ireland? So she said to me once, "The next time you go to Europe for one of those meetings in NATO and you're talking about CSCE strategy, I want you to go to Ireland," and basically the reason was that she could say, "Well, we are looking into the Irish situation and don't ignore it." I did do that and went to Dublin and talked to people at the Foreign Ministry. I took a train up to Belfast and had one of the most fascinating 24 hours I've ever had in my life. It was horrifying in many ways. Belfast reminded me of my hometown of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, sort of that size and a lot of run-down industrial enterprises that had seen their best days, the coal mines that were closed, that sort of place. But there was a Berlin Wall right through the middle of it. There were British soldiers controlling the streets in black jackets, and there were sandbags up in front of my hotel. That was shocking, and then the fact that as an American you could talk to everybody. Americans were desired discussion partners by all sides of the issue, except for the out-of-bound terrorists, of course, we didn't try to contact. We talked to everybody else, spoke very good English.

Q: You could understand them.

GREENWALD: Yes, we could. It was just an extraordinary immersion into a problem that I didn't know much about, and I found it fascinating and horrifying at the same time. I remember doing my reading for it when I knew I was going. I did some immersion reading of the problem and reading about a meeting between Bernadette Devlin, who was one of the activists on the Catholic side, and Ian Paisley. Very soon after the troubles began, Bernadette Devlin called on Paisley and sat with a teacup in her hand and tried to explain to Paisley the injustices that she saw being done to the Catholics in Northern Ireland. Paisley supposedly responded, "All that you say may be true, but I would rather be British than just." To me this was shocking, because I had always thought of British injustice being more or less synonyms, and it was a whole different vocabulary that was being used by people who on the surface spoke the same language I did. The consulate did a tremendous job of putting a program together that just went from about 8:00 in the morning to 10:00 at night talking to people and came back and wrote a 60- or 70-page report to Pat, not that anything came of it but just thought I needed to put it all down. It was extraordinary, but it didn't have much follow-up in my career except to remind me that the depths of tribal passions are not just necessarily confined to central Africa. In some ways it was a preparation for things we've seen happen, after the Cold War, in the Balkans.

Q: I guess the other European non-CSCE human right issue of that period was Cyprus and perhaps conditions in Turkey. Did either of those topics engage you very much at that time?

GREENWALD: A bit. One of the projects at that time was to create the annual human rights reports. This was mandated by Congress and was in the very early stages when I got to the Human Rights Bureau. We had to invent the process by which embassies would do drafts, address certain questions, send material in that would be massaged within the Bureau and would be negotiated with other bureaus that had interest. Then the State Department could supply the product. All that became again substantially bureaucratized over the years, but it was new and time consuming and creative at the time I was there. And Turkey was one of the most difficult reports. We spent more time negotiating it with the embassy and with the Bureau than almost any other, because it raised all sorts of difficult issues. What standard do you apply, and do you say the glass is half full or half empty, how sharply critical are you about the part that's empty? It was difficult internal negotiation, but other than that I didn't get involved very actively in policies regarding Turkey, because with constraints of time I really had to concentrate on CSCE.

Q: Did you then, particularly toward the end of your time in that Bureau, begin to focus on the Madrid follow-on conference, which was in 1980 I believe?

GREENWALD: Yes, I did. I spent a fair amount of time also trying to come up with a few ideas and trying to find ways in which we could break out of the cycle of pure recrimination between East and West over human rights. The concept I tried to develop was one of human rights roundtables. We hoped that we could get experts together to talk in a reasonably coherent and dispassionate way about what they regarded as human rights, how they saw human rights, how they saw the evolution of their.... [end of Tape 2, Side B]

Q: Okay, this is the third tape with Jonathan Greenwald under the Foreign Affairs Oral History Program. I'm Raymond Ewing, and it's the 24th of March 1998. Jon, I think we were just talking as we finished the other tape about the idea of human rights roundtables under the CSCE process.

GREENWALD: Our hope was to find partners to talk with quietly, privately and constructively about human rights. As luck would have it, ironically the only partner we found was Romania. Of course, one should remember that in 1980 the Romanian reputation in the West was different than it was by the end of the Ceausescu regime. We all tended to overlook a lot of what Ceausescu did domestically, because we were entranced with his relative openness and relative independence in a number of foreign policy areas from the rest of the Warsaw Pact. In fact, they were the only Eastern European country to agree to try this concept with us, so we arranged to send a delegation to Bucharest in the middle of winter in 1980. The delegation included myself; Harry Gilmore, who was the Director of the Office of Eastern European Affairs at the time, Deputy Director, I think actually; and two very prominent private members, distinguished lawyers in each case, John Cary and Wildo Shell from New York, who joined us. We flew off to Bucharest and arrived in miserable weather in February with brown coal being burned furiously throughout the city to keep people warm. At the same time, of course, it didn't do very much for the quality of the air. The impression that we all had from that week was extreme depression from the winter weather and also from the difficulty in having a meaningful dialogue. We did have discussions about human rights and substantial talk about economic human rights versus political human rights, but I don't think any of us felt that we had really made a conceptual breakthrough in the way the issue of human rights would have to be dealt within the CSCE. We hoped that we had at least made a breakthrough in starting to use this new mechanism and that it might get a life of its own and develop into something. In fact, it turned out it was the only roundtable of its sort that was arranged. Before too much longer the Madrid meeting was upon us and we were all taken up with what became the substantial polemics of that meeting.

Q: This meeting in Bucharest was a bilateral meeting, U.S. and Romania?

GREENWALD: Yes.

Q: And was there anyone representing the CSCE Commission?

GREENWALD: Yes, I'm sorry. I forgot to add that there was also a member of the staff who came with this delegation.

Q: Well, why don't you talk some about Madrid, the role that you played, who was the head of the delegation, how that was structured, and what happened leading up to Madrid.

GREENWALD: We realized, of course, that the Madrid meeting would have to be one in which the same tough human rights policy would be followed that was followed in Belgrade. The Soviets knew that and our allies knew that. The question was whether or not anything more could be done than was done at Belgrade. In Belgrade we essentially agreed to disagree and to meet again. It was felt that if that was all that could be done in Madrid, we probably would have reached a dead-end in the process. There would have to be some way in which we kept the Soviets' interest alive and showed them that there was something that could be gained. That was of particular interest to our allies that they expressed to us again and again. In other words, we had to find some way to make the New Business side of the meeting more important than in Belgrade where it had been completely overshadowed by the Review of Implementation side. We weren't adverse to that as long as we had an opportunity to make the Review of Implementation effective. So that was an issue that hung over the preparations for the start of the Madrid meeting. We had a preparatory meeting scheduled in Madrid for July.

Q: July 1980?

GREENWALD: July 1980, which we expected to be quite short. Our strategy, our goal was to basically simply reconfirm the Yellow Book of Belgrade, which had been used for the Belgrade meeting. It had set the guidelines for the balance between the Review of Implementation, New Business, and so forth. There was a phrase, a Latin phrase, which was in the original Helsinki Final Act which provided that the rules and procedure for the follow-up meetings be the same as the rules and procedure for Helsinki negotiation, *mutatis mutandis*, that is, making only those changes which are necessary. We felt the Yellow Book of Belgrade had been the necessary changes made from the Helsinki negotiation, which was a negotiation that produced a substantial document, to the Review of Implementation follow-on conference stage. Since we had already had a review conference, follow-on conference, *mutatis mutandis* in this case would just mean confirm the Yellow Book. The Soviets, though, came in with a very different concept. They came in with a view that the Belgrade meeting had not worked, had not been successful, because of the nature of the procedures that we all agreed to, basically the balance between Review of Implementation and New Business. Therefore, in their view, it was necessary to have a different kind of Yellow Book. They proposed a substantial revision which would have very much loaded the conference toward New Business and provided very little opportunity for Review of Implementation. So we found ourselves locked in a deadlocked negotiation that continued and continued and continued. I said July; actually I was wrong. The preparatory meeting began the very beginning of September, and the conference itself was to begin in late October. Instead of having a preparatory meeting in a couple of days, which then allowed us to go back to Washington and complete the preparations for the conference, complete the formation of the delegation, for example, it turned out that we were deadlocked in Madrid. The negotiation continued in Madrid over the procedures. Now the delegation had not been fully formed by the time we had left for Madrid. There originally had been an expectation that Governor Scranton, former Governor Scranton of Pennsylvania, would be the head of the U.S. delegation. I looked forward to that very much, in part because Governor Scranton was an old family friend. I had come from that part of Pennsylvania. But it turned out that for health reasons he had to bow out. The expectation was that the head of delegation would be then Griffin Bell, who for the first part of the Carter Administration had been Attorney General, a very close colleague of President Carter. He was to have as the deputy head of delegation a Washington lawyer, Max Kampelman. Kampelman was known as a very strong supporter of human rights. He had been outspoken about human rights and the need to advocate strongly in international for a. He also was known to be extremely skeptical, critical, of the Soviet Union. He had standing as a hard-liner on the Cold War with those parts of the American public that were still highly skeptical about the whole CSCE process. So in effect he was the person who would lend credibility to the delegation that the delegation would be hard enough and firm enough on keeping the Soviets' feet to the fire over the promises they had made. As it turned out, Max went with us to Madrid for the preparatory meeting. Griffin Bell stayed back in Washington with the idea that he would come out only when the conference itself began. Max had as his deputy Warren Zimmerman, who was highly experienced in Eastern Europe, had served in Moscow, served in Yugoslavia, also had a lot of experience in Western Europe dealing with the allies. He was an extraordinary, able person. It turned out that the two of them were a marvelous team. Kampelman is a man of formidable intellect and character and personality. He has a great knack for divining what the other fellow needs and finding ways to make arrangements so that everybody has enough to move forward. He demonstrated that knack very quickly within the NATO caucus. He became within a remarkably short time the leader of a more or less united Western caucus beyond the simple point of being the U.S. delegate. Obviously the U.S. had a delegation that was going to have an extraordinarily important role in any Western caucus. Beyond that inherent authority he quickly acquired a natural authority which was quite remarkable, particularly the way he did it in such a short time without having had previously very much international background. Warren Zimmerman helped a great deal in that, of course. It meant that we were able to maintain a very good degree of unity in the face of what became a substantial Soviet effort to change the rules of the game in Madrid. It became very much a game of chicken with the Soviets more than just hinting that if it was not possible to reach agreement on a substantially changed set of rules and procedure, there was no point in having the meeting, and it would not be held. The West was insisting that we had to have a very clear ability to maintain the Review of Implementation if we were ever to get to talking about New Business. I forget the exact day which the conference was to begin. It was in early November, after the American election, and it had been deliberately set to begin then with the expectation that politics would be over. I think everyone who had set the date a couple of years earlier had just assumed in the normal way that, of course, the American President would be re-elected. That was just an assumption on the part of the Europeans. What they wanted to avoid was having the difficult conference, including the difficult Review of Implementation, being conducted at a time when American electoral politics was preeminent. And the answer was, well, we'll start the conference right after the election. Well, of course, what happened was that the President wasn't re-elected. Ronald Reagan won the election, and so Griffin Bell was immediately a lame duck head of delegation, and in many ways our whole delegation was a lame duck. But Griffin Bell led the delegation out to Madrid. We had a special airplane to fly a very, very large delegation which included a tremendous number of public members. We had had a few public members on our delegation in Belgrade, which had been an innovation Justice Goldberg had made. I think we had five. We had 35 for the Madrid conference. Someone came up with that number because there were 35 participating states and thought of it as appropriate. It was a very mixed bag. They didn't all come in November. The idea was that some of them would come at different stages so that we would always have a few public members present and able to take part in the meetings, give a speech or two. But a large number of public members came. A number of members of Congress came on that plane with Griffin Bell. Dozens of staff members for the delegation came. They arrived the day before the conference was to begin, and whoever went out to the airport had told them we weren't sure there was going to be a conference because we still had no agreement on a document, and the best thing they could do is go to their hotels, unpack, and wait and see whether there was a conference. Then we went back into the negotiating room. There was a clock on the wall, and we kept watching it and watching it, and it reached midnight, which meant that it was the day of the conference, and we didn't get anywhere and we continued negotiating and we in effect stopped the clock. I can well remember going off for a coffee break and talking with a few colleagues from other delegations. It looked like this was the end of the CSCE, that it would be impossible to reach agreement on the document that we were negotiating. Since there would be no document under which the conference would operate, there would be no conference and the process would simply collapse. We seriously thought this was what the Soviets had decided to do with it, and it was too painful and they were jettisoning it. But when we came back from the coffee break, we began to hear slightly different tones from the Soviets and some of their Eastern European allies. It began to look like there might be some possible common ground. In fact, after an all-night session, we finally produced a document and the conference was able to begin on the scheduled day. It was really in question right to the very end.

Q: We might note that, unlike many other international conferences, organizations, there was at that time virtually no secretariat. All of this preparation was essentially done by delegations, by experts like yourself that had been involved for a while and had an expertise and background.

GREENWALD: That's true. The CSCE prided itself - at least the West prided itself - in the fact that CSCE was not a permanent institutionalized entity. It was a floating conference. It wasn't a huge bureaucracy. It was up to the host state to provide sufficient secretarial assistance to xerox the papers and make sure there were translators and so forth, but there wasn't an ongoing element that kept it moving while the conferences weren't in session. This has all changed in recent years. I hardly recognize the current CSCE, which is a huge institutionalized organization now. But there was a method behind the madness in keeping it lean in the '70s and early '80s. It was felt that it would avoid the process becoming just another international organization which existed for its own sake with momentum for its own sake. It would allow us to keep the focus on the actual commitments that had been made in the 1975 Summit.

Q: Why don't you talk a little bit more, Jon, about the conference itself in Madrid including whether it was completed by the Carter Administration or went on beyond January and new people came out, and how did all that work?

GREENWALD: Well, it began in November, as all CSCE meetings began, with a series of statements by delegations. The 35 heads of delegation all made their first statements. That took the first week. In most cases there was a very senior person who came from capitals. For example, Hans Dietrich Genscher came from Bonn to deliver the Bonn government's statement. Foreign ministers from a number of other capitals came. That was basically the process of setting out positions the first week. And then there was an agreed period of Review of Implementation that we had fought so hard for, which would carry on throughout the rest of the November-December period till the Christmas break. The conference would resume early in 1981 with working groups which were entitled to get to look at new proposals. New proposals was the term that was used for [inaudible] business. But the compromise that had been reached was that it was always possible to return to Review of Implementation. [inaudible] working groups were dealing with new proposals for the future, we could say anything we wanted to say and [inaudible] we intended to keep the Review of Implementation going throughout the entire length of the conference, which is in fact what happened. The great question, of course, was what the new administration in Washington would do with the conference, who they would send and how they would treat it. It turned out that we were very fortunate because Max Kampelman had considerable standing with many of the Reagan people. He had demonstrated already that he would be tough in his negotiation with the Soviets. He demonstrated that not only in his writings and his speeches over a number of years since he had moved away from the left wing of the Democratic party, but he had demonstrated it on the ground in Madrid for several months. At the same time he had acquired a considerable respect for the purposes and the potential of CSCE, so he was a believer that this was a process that was more than just about name calling, this was a process that had substantial potential for effecting the evolution of the situation in Eastern Europe. So he went back to Washington and lobbied for a serious approach to CSCE. He ended up getting named the head of delegation as the continuity and as the number-one man instead of just the number-two man. This was the best possible solution for us because he had already won the respect of the whole conference, and it meant that we didn't miss very many beats in the transfer from the Carter team to the Reagan team. The conference was really overshadowed by Poland. All throughout that summer you had the remarkable events that occurred in Solidarity, you had in the fall threat after threat that there would be some drastic action taken by the Soviet Union. It didn't happen, but there was constant concern that it would and there was the question of what would happen to the CSCE, what would be the impact upon the CSCE. There was a great deal of talk within the Western delegations about the need for a very firm strategy. We obviously couldn't go on and do business as usual, and how could we deal with it if there was an invasion of some sort. We hoped that, expected in fact, that the Madrid meeting would follow the pattern of the Belgrade meeting in terms of time. As an example of how human beings quickly assume the patterns created, once they have experienced something, they expect to experience it again. The Belgrade meeting had reached a point around Easter when everybody thought they had gone as far as they could go and that would end. Our assumption was Madrid would be that way also. We would go through a couple of months primarily of Review of Implementation, and at a certain point everyone would recognize now we have to draw a line under that and put together enough of a package of new [inaudible] so that we could say that CSCE was also moving forward in new areas, not just continuing to go over the past. That this would be Easter, and if we missed Easter, then jump over to the summer, and we all knew about the importance of August and the August holiday, so that surely the conference would end at the latest in July. That was our expectation, upon which any number of actions were taken, not least a decision that the State Department would not authorize permanent transfer, even for the core delegation. Everybody would be on TDY. This meant that one of the early things we had to do in the preparatory meeting was find a home for the delegation. We located in a residential hotel called the Eurobuilding 2, which was on Castellana, one of the main avenues of Madrid. From my point of view there were two primary geographic advantages. One was that it was about a 10 minute walk down Castellana to the Puntasar, which was very helpful for our daily work. The other was that it was a ten-minute walk down Castellana to the other side of the street, which was Estadio Santiago Bernabeu (soccer stadium) where Real Madrid plays. I had my dream come true, I believe, within 10 minutes' walk of weekly days of the highest quality football (soccer) and saw, in fact, Real Madrid play and occasionally Atlético, which played at the stadium just about every week during that period. The State Department paid us per diem. We had a very good rate at the hotel, because we were committed to staying for many, many months, and the hotel was a residential hotel so you had kitchenettes and could make meals if you wanted to and didn't want to go out for dinner every night. So there were a fair number of us in those days before we got only actual expenses and we actually could keep per diem. We made down payments on houses and other similar large investments as a result of spending many months on TDY in Madrid. Another aspect of the life of the conference is the Spanish had effectively killed the basketball tradition by being too nice to us. They gave all of those who came to the preparatory meeting honorary membership passes to the Real Madrid Sports Club, which is a marvelous complex on the outskirts of town with just dozens of the finest clay tennis courts, swimming pool and the like. So instead of a basketball conference, we became a tennis conference.

Q: So the conference did eventually end?

GREENWALD: It did eventually end, though I wasn't there by the time it ended. The conference was quickly a deadlock when once it moved to new proposals. You had a lot of different ideas brought forward, but nobody wanted to go very far at that time, because the specter of Poland was moving over the conference. The Western side didn't want to give up the Review of Implementation prematurely and didn't want to adopt a lot of forward-looking new proposals when it was possible that there could be enormous backsliding in Eastern Europe momentarily. The Soviets weren't prepared to be very forthcoming on the things we wanted them to be forthcoming about including the human rights area. So we really didn't get very far, and we discovered that the Easter break, fire break, was not very important and rather quickly discovered that summer wasn't either, that the Soviets would have been prepared to continue throughout the summer. The translators made their point about their August holidays, and the only thing that was left to do was to agree that we were still deadlocked and we would continue and resume in the fall, and the conference then would have ended. CSCE was proud of the fact that it wasn't a conference like most conferences are in the world today, called for a certain number of days so that you went six days or 16 days or whatever to negotiate and you had to reach your end game because the calendar said so. There were occasionally people who would say, "Well, we should set an end date, because that's what worked in effect in Geneva. When we set a date for the Summit, we all buckled down and closed out the last details, and we should recognize that as the way to do it here." None of us would agree to do that, so it was always open ended with an end that would come only when there was agreement. So the decision was made to continue it in the fall of 1981. I was already committed to leave it, because about the time the Madrid conference was getting started, Harry Barnes, who was the Director General of the Foreign Service, told me that if I resubmitted my application for lateral entry, there was a narrow window and it would work, and it did work. Then the question was what would my next assignment be, and I was very interested in going to Eastern Europe. I bid on a number of positions in Eastern Europe, Budapest and Warsaw and Moscow, and I was assigned to Budapest, which involved a year of Hungarian language training. So I was scheduled to leave in the summer of 1981 and go into language training, and that's in fact what I did. I left with a certain amount of regret, because I had wanted to see the next stage of the process that I had spent a lot of time with through to whatever ending it would have, but I could see that we weren't likely to reach that conclusion for a long time. In fact, of course, a couple of months later, in the winter of 1981, martial law was declared in Poland and there was a crisis in the conference and there was a long, long adjournment. Then the Madrid meeting continued with a series of adjournments and a series of revivals until the summer of 1983. It lasted three full years. Max lasted it out and Warren did, but relatively few of the original delegation. About the time it ended I was already well into my assignment in Budapest.

Q: Okay, so that kind of brought to an end the rather lengthy chapter with several important benchmarks of your CSCE experience, or at least for the time being. You may have come back to it later on.

GREENWALD: Basically it did end it. I spent a little time with CSCE in 1986-87 when I had a sabbatical year and was at the Atlantic Council of United States basically writing on whatever issues were of interest to me. I wrote a long article on CSCE which was timed at the beginning of the Vienna conference. Oddly enough, I had a chance to go to the start of the Vienna conference. I was attending a meeting with the Atlantic Council of all of the NATO states, which was held every year somewhere in Europe, and that coincided with the start of the Vienna conference. I took a train down to Vienna, saw a lot of old friends still in the delegations there, and wrote my article, which was published eventually in the [Inaudible] Bulletin, German foreign affairs journal, where I tried to summarize my thoughts about what the process meant and where it was going. I think even though I was an optimist about this accordance, like everybody else I was surprised when three years later you can stand back and say this was really more powerful medicine than any of us had realized.

Q: Well, I think, certainly in retrospect it was a very important development on the way to what Europe is like today in the division, end of the Cold War, and so on. Let's go back. You went to Budapest as Political Counselor after a period of Hungarian language and area training. What was the situation when you got to Hungary? That was, what, the summer of '82?

GREENWALD: That's right, the summer of 1982. By that time Hungary had already clearly established itself as in many ways the most progressive of the Eastern European states. They had started their economic reforms in 1968 at the same time as the Czechs had begun their reforms. The Hungarians had kept a very tight control over their reforms, keeping them essentially economic and making sure that the political side didn't spin out of control as happened in Prague. Whereas the Prague spring ended in the Soviet invasion in a crackdown in Czechoslovakia, you had in Hungary a situation of gradual liberalization which had reached by 1982 a substantial change from what had existed in the years after the 1956 failed revolution.

Q: What about on the political side?

GREENWALD: Well, you had a quality of life which, I think, allowed basically for people to say and do what they wanted as long as they didn't question the fundamentals of the Communist system and the fundamental of the relationship to the Soviet Union. That allowed for considerable areas of freedom, certainly in intellectual life, cultural life, in day-to-day existence, and also in many political areas, and in regard to political areas, policies dealing with the lives of people. You weren't only thinking about whether or not Hungary was a member of the Warsaw Pact who was committed to following that policy in the United Nations. If you consider political to be how do you approach the question of deciding about where the new subway line is to be built or whether there is an environmental problem in Balaton, or any of a hundred or a thousand different issues, there was free room for expression. Of course, one of the jobs of the Political Counselor was to look into the situation and ask himself where was it likely to go. What is it likely to mean in the larger picture. Are these many areas of freedom, economic, political and cultural, likely to coalesce at some point into something which changes the shape of Hungary's relationship to the Soviets and Eastern Europe. I think everyone in Hungary basically was agreed and there was a consensus, which was one of the striking things about the country. There was a consensus on a couple of points. One was that 1956 should never happen again, that it was a horrible tragedy for the country. Kadar said this quite frankly; he said call it revolution or call it counter-revolution but what it clearly was was a national tragedy and must never happen again. Those who wanted a lot of change, those who wanted a little change, those who wanted no change agreed on that. The rules of the game were set by the memory that what happened in '56 would lead to operating the way that would reach that kind of crisis. The other basic consensus, I think, was a little more surprising, and that was that everyone in the country wanted to take the Baich Oot. A fairly major street in Hungary is called the Baich Oot. Baich in Hungarian means Vienna; oot is street. What that meant was everyone wanted to find a way to be like Austria. Whether you were a Communist or not a Communist, that meant neutral, independent, substantially more tied to the West than it was at the present time.

Q: Prosperous?

GREENWALD: Prosperous, of course. There was a joke told by all sorts of people. It was a true story that during one of the ugly events of immediate imposition of Communist rule, in fact, in the Second World War was a show trial of a number of prominent Hungarians including Cardinal Mindszenty, who was imprisoned as a result of that trial in 1948. But another of the people being tried was Esterházy of the great noble family, the Esterházy family. He was accused among other things of having smuggled money abroad. He was on the stand at this show trial, and he was asked how he pled and he said, "Innocent," and the prosecutor said, "How can you say that? We have all of these documents that show that you put money into this bank in Vienna." He said, "Yes, I only sent money to Austria. I didn't send it abroad." There was an enormous nostalgia, which was more than just a nostalgia. It was a yearning with a clear political content to it for reestablishment of the old ties of the Austrian Hungarian empire. Even in the time that I was in Hungary, 1982 to 1984, it was true that Hungarian ministers and Austrian ministers had regular telephone contact with each other. They would pick up the phone and talk about many different problems and issues. There was a perceptible growing back together of many of the old contacts. The Hungarians built the autobahn to the border and completed it years before the Austrians completed it. It was more important to them that that autobahn link from Budapest to Vienna be reestablished. It was fascinating to work in the country. You could see so many things happening that seemed positive and seemed potentially very important if you tend to believe, as I do, being a fairly conservative person in terms of personal character, that evolutionary reform is preferable to revolutionary reform, because it's a much safer reform. It's much more likely to get from A to B to C to D and not fall off a precipice. Hungary was a very positive experience, because you could see evidence around you that in fact there was evolutionary reform, there was change. It wasn't certain that it would get where it wanted to go. That was very true. I remember one instance. There was a major dispute that grew up in Hungary, which in some ways is still alive, over the building of a huge dam on the Danube River. The Czechs have a name and the Slovaks have a different name for it, but it's a dam built where the Danube bends. The Hungarian and Czechoslovak governments agreed to jointly build that dam. The environmental group of Hungary was horrified that it could do terrible damage to the river and to the wetlands, the ecosystem. The Academy of Sciences produced a report that was highly critical of it. All this is very remarkable in Eastern Europe to have that happening where a government makes a major decision as a new sign of friendship between Hungarian and Czechoslovak people, this great project, a sign of prosperity, and then large numbers of people including people in the establishment like the Academy of Sciences start saying no, this is wrong, this is bad, you can't do it, you shouldn't do it. Students began to hold demonstrations, sit-ins at the university, all those sorts of things you used to see in the United States. Of course, the Czechoslovak government was furious. You can't allow this, you've got to stop it, you've got to carry on your obligations. The government temporized. It didn't build its part of the dam. It kept trying to find ways around the problem. March 15 is a Hungarian national holiday that involves the revolt against the Austrians in 1848. For years it was not celebrated, particularly after '56, because it was felt it was too dangerous to allow this kind of public expression of feelings. There was background also that it brought on the '56 revolution and there were events around the 15th of March that stirred up the population, and the government was afraid of the same thing happening. But by the time we were there in the '80s, it was again commonly observed. I was told by an old Hungarian that in the '60s and early '70s they used to go out to the embassy and walk around the streets, and kind of see how many people were wearing little badges of Hungarian colors on that day, and thought that was a political sign. By 1982, '83, '84, everybody was doing it. Ceremonies were participated in by the government party leaders, but there were also lot of little private things that were done that had more potential dissident lean to it. There were places where wreaths were laid and so forth. I came upon one of those on March 15, 1984, and I walked along with some of the students who were participating in that. After it was over, I got in a conversation with a young girl. I went off to a coffee shop with her, and we continued the conversation, and she began to tell me about what she was doing at the university and how active she was in the environment movement and various other movements and what had been happening to her. The dean of students had called her in and had a couple of heart-to-heart talks and said, "You're pushing this too far, and we might have to suspend you." She was very obviously out on the edge of just going beyond that point where you were allowed to exercise dissident views in Hungary. I was very impressed by that meeting. I came back from it wondering what was going to happen with this. Was Hungary going to evolve enough so that it would have room for somebody like that girl or would she end up in a couple of years going over to outright dissidents and emigrating? Would she be lost in the country here? Would she go with the outright opposition? It was very much an open question which way things would go, and clearly Hungary wasn't a fully independent actor in that drama. It could be affected by what went on around it, particularly with what went on in the Soviet Union. It was during the time that I was in Budapest that Brezhnev died. [end of Tape 3, Side A]

Q: This is a continuation of a Foreign Affairs Oral History Interview with G. Jonathan Greenwald. It's the 21st of April, so it's about four weeks after our last session, Jon, and I think right when we concluded the other day you had just recalled that Brezhnev had just died while you were in Budapest as Political Counselor. You were there from 1981 to '84. I believe that the death of Brezhnev was about '83. Does that sound right to you?

GREENWALD: Good heavens, I should know better. It was in the fall, I believe, of '82. I thought it was '82. I'm not entirely sure. I'll have to look that up. [November 10, 1982]

Q: Well, that's an important detail obviously to him and to what followed. But why don't you talk about the impact of that and his successor on Hungary and, of course, U.S. interests as seen from the embassy in Budapest.

GREENWALD: A small footnote correction: I was actually in Budapest from July of 1982 until July of 1984. I spent 1981-82 learning Hungarian at the Foreign Service Institute. When I arrived in Budapest in the summer of 1982, Brezhnev, of course, had long been ill, and his demise was expected but always the day after tomorrow rather than tomorrow. Of course, it was a period of very poor East-West relations generally, because you had the serious dispute over middle-range rockets, the effort to negotiate some type of solution to the middle-range rocket problem that had been started with the stationing of SS20s by the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe. It appeared to be breaking down, and we appeared to be getting into a new relative ice age in relations. The Soviet Union was in what was already, I think, being called a period of stagnation. In the last years under Brezhnev very little seemed to be moving. Brezhnev himself had no physical energy to set in motion any new currents, and there was great interest in what would happen after his death. The death occurred, as it happened, unexpectedly. He died, I believe, of a heart attack. There was substantial pomp and circumstance surrounding it, a huge funeral that I recall watching on television in Budapest, but great excitement, hardly hidden excitement, in Hungary among Hungarians that a real change was going to happen. The new man was Andropov, who had a reputation in the West as a hard-liner, which is natural because he was the head of KGB for many years. But Hungarians who felt they knew him very well believed there were more possibilities there. And the State Department, the U.S. government, the West in general was very interesting in learning more about Andropov, because obviously as the leader of the Soviet Union his influence would be enormous. They were particularly interested in Hungarian views because (a) the Hungarians were generally the most relatively candid in giving their comment about whatever was happening within Eastern Europe or within the Soviet Union, but they had (b) a very special connection to Andropov. He had been the Soviet ambassador in Budapest during the crucial year of 1956. He had been the ambassador as a young, up-and-coming member of the International Department of the Central Committee all during that period when Hungary was in ferment, the ferment that led to the revolution. He played a crucial role in the crushing of the revolution in November of 1956. He played a crucial role in the beginning of the reconstruction and the selection of Yanosh Kadar as the new Hungarian leader and the first year or so of the reconstruction in 1957 before he went back to his career within the Central Committee International Department. But there were many, many Hungarians who had very strong personal recollections of it, a number who had maintained contact over the years. Those were usually relatively difficult for us to talk to, because they were still at the very top levels of the Hungarian party and whatever they said would be at least carefully guarded. But there were a great many Hungarians who had dealt with him during the period in which he was ambassador who were no longer within the upper circles of the Hungarian party, either because they had retired or because they had been on the losing side of the revolution and had been out of power, out of influence for 25 years in between. But these people had dealt with Andropov. They knew something of his personality, they knew something of his predilections, and they were quite willing to talk. So we had a wonderful opportunity at the embassy to file reports about the personality, the character of the man, which were eagerly received in Washington. In particular, we did two very long telegrams based largely on interviews I conducted, also interviews that Ambassador Bergold at a different level conducted. But the people who were now dissidents, people who had been on the losing side of the revolution, those who were perhaps most willing to talk candidly were generally people who were my contacts. I was supposed to be in touch with the dissident community, people like the man who had been the press spokesman for the Nagy government during those brief days in October-November 1956. He had dealt with Andropov extensively. There was the man who had been the Prime Minister of Hungary for a brief period between 1953 and 1956 after the initial fall of the Rikosi hard-line government. There were efforts to establish during the Khrushchev period a slightly more reformist Hungarian government, a man who had been the Prime Minister for a brief period but had long since become a dissident of Hungary, a somewhat protected dissident. He spoke his mind rather freely but stayed out of jail, as most Hungarian dissidents did, but was a good source of information, political gossip and more than just gossip. He was willing to speak quite openly about his views of Andropov as a person and what he might mean as a Soviet leader. Generally these were very nuanced views. They were not views of somebody who was a hard-liner, a person one couldn't do business with. They gave an impression of somebody who was highly intelligent and very much open to discussion, ruthless if need be, as was obvious in some of his actions, but a person who was likely to give new impulses to the Soviet Union, the kind of impulses that Brezhnev had been unable to give. The Hungarians, being where they were within Eastern Europe in the spectrum of reform versus conservative within Eastern European political thought, hoped and believed and had reason to hope that Andropov would be sympathetic to their own type of reform, goulash Communism. They were quite optimistic that they would be given more leeway to develop their economic reforms and develop gradually their political reforms, which were behind the economic reforms but which were still, in Eastern European terms in the 1980s, significant. We reported all that. It was well received, and there was a great deal of readership for the kind of political reporting we were able to do during that brief period when Andropov was healthy enough to be active as the Soviet leader. But, of course, he very quickly became mortally ill, or what was a mortal illness perhaps at the time he came to power began to lay him low. After a very short time it was apparent that his period in power would be quite brief. The Hungarians were much less optimistic about what a Chernenko leadership would mean to them. It was in that period, that personally I heard for the first time the name Gorbachev, and the Hungarians were among those who began to speak of him as a person who was very much a proponent of Andropov and very much possibly a leader who would continue the stirrings of new directions that Andropov had begun. They were very disappointed when Chernenko was given the nod over Gorbachev in 1984 on the death of Andropov. But they were saying at the time that they thought that would be a brief interregnum and that Gorbachev was still the coming person. That the Soviet leadership had not quite been ready to trust full power to a very young and healthy person. They would want to wait and give him a few more years to prove himself while staying with the old tried and true Chernenko, whose health was obviously not good and who was thought to be only a brief stepping stone to the Gorbachev period. So it was a very exciting period to cover from the embassy in Budapest. I think the two years there were among the most intense and most enjoyable professionally that I had. They were certainly made more so by the delight of the Hungarian people that we had learned Hungarian and were able to move reasonably comfortably within the society and enjoy what was often called goulash Communism but in some ways was champagne Communism. It had a sparkle, a liveliness that really wasn't available anywhere else in Eastern Europe.

Q: How much of Hungarian Communism or economic-political life in Hungary changed during this period while you were there, or was it more an anticipation that there would be further changes as the Soviet leadership evolved further?

GREENWALD: There was already, of course, a considerable development of Hungarian reforms. The reforms were introduced in 1968. The period from 1956 to 1968, roughly speaking, was a period of consolidation. It was often a brutal period as the leadership reestablished firm control over a country that had been in outright revolution. But by 1968 the reform wing of the party, what some called the social democratic wing, the elements of the old Social Democratic Party that had been merged with the Communist Party after the Second World War, were again becoming dominant within Hungary. Kadar gave them considerable rein, and there was a dual development in 1968. You will remember that was a remarkable year in which there was ferment all around the world. There was great ferment in Eastern Europe, and in Czechoslovakia it turned into the Prague Spring. The Prague Spring quickly moved from economic reform to political reform, and it went beyond the point that the Soviet Union was willing to tolerate. There were close contacts in the early days of 1968 between the Czech leaders, Dubcek and Kadar. There was an effort to coordinate the reform movement because they saw that they needed each other, that each one was stronger because of the other. Kadar was a much more cautious leader than Dubcek, perhaps a stronger leader, one able to keep better control over his own political system. He quickly felt that it would be impossible for the Soviet Union in 1968 to tolerate major political reform at the same time as they were allowing major economic reform. He had cautioned Dubcek not to go as far as he went, but the Czechoslovaks went in their direction. The Hungarians very, very cautiously and determinedly kept their reforms on the economic path. By the early 1980s, though, it was, I think, no longer fair to say that Hungarian reforms were only economic. It had reached a point where they were beginning to experiment with more types of somewhat more democratic representation at less than national levels, at village levels, at county levels, and even within the party. They were beginning to try to find ways to extend some degree of political pluralism, because they recognized that you couldn't maintain a strictly economic reform. At some you would have to have decision making in general encouraged throughout the society if you were going to have an economic reform that wasn't simply directed from the top but was self sustaining. They were still very much in the early stages of exploring how to do that, and every time there was a hint of a new direction in Moscow, they paused and took stock. They had great hopes in some of the reform economists who were prominent in the Soviet Union in the early '80s. But the belief in Hungary was that Andropov would be willing to allow them to continue the experimentation which had begun on the political side, partly because he trusted the Kadar leadership, which he knew and which he had helped to put in power because he trusted them to do it in a gradual and safe way. They didn't have that same feeling of confidence in Chernenko, either in Chernenko's personality or in their connections to him. They believed there was great potential in Gorbachev, but they didn't know him that well, they didn't know him as well as they knew Andropov. So there was a definite feeling of disappointment and a momentary retrenchment when Andropov died in early 1984. But it was clear that the Hungarians felt they would have to go further with their reforms. They couldn't draw a line between economics and politics and build a fire wall. They realized they would have to have both, but they wanted to control it from the top.

Q: Did you ever have any problems in dealing with the dissident community? You mentioned that they were able to speak their mind. Was it ever difficult? Did you have to be sensitive to any restrictions either from the embassy or from the foreign ministry or elsewhere in the government?

GREENWALD: I always had the feeling in Hungary that the Hungarians basically considered that they were one large family that had had a horrible feud in 1956. As Kadar put it, whether you call it revolution or counter-revolution, it was a great tragedy and it must never happen again. There were understood rules within that large family of what could be done and what couldn't be done, and there were always efforts to push out the margins. The dissidents in Hungary were trying to push out those margins, but they understood what the rules of the game were. They understood that they had a situation that was far better than what any similar group had in Eastern Europe. At that time, oddly enough, most of the dissidents had their own personal connections to elements of the leadership. They were very often literally the sons and the daughters. One of the people I dealt with most often, for example, was a nephew of the man who was the deputy editor of the party newspaper. He thought very differently from his uncle, but there was literally a family connection. It was odd that after the system broke down in 1990, the people that came to power immediately were not these dissidents. They were people who had played no active role at all in politics, either in the leadership, in the government, or in the dissident movement. There were people who had basically been badly burned in 1956 and who ducked down low, who accepted the terms of the arrangements that had been made in the country, that you could do many things but you would have to stay out of politics, and they stayed out of politics. They were not contacts of the embassy. They were not people who wanted to be contacts of the embassy, and they weren't politically active in the early 1980s. It was only five and six and seven years later that they began to be active and came forward again. The people that we had dealt with as dissidents lost the first election. They basically won the second election. Many of them are in power right now. The only political prisoner case we had to deal with during the two years I was there was a matter of a young firebrand within the dissident movement who was co-editor of the leading Samizdat journal, Beszelo. He had been driving along in Budapest one day with copies of the journal in the front of his car. He was stopped by the police for, I think, just a normal traffic offense. The police asked him to open up his car, and he objected, probably because the Samizdat was there. He got into a scuffle with the police, and blows were exchanged, and he was carted off to jail and put into jail, charged with having attacked police. Who knows the truth of that, but he got some blows himself. There was concern in the West that there would be a political trial. This would lead to a crackdown on the Samizdat movement, on Beszelo. We were told quite bluntly and confidentially by the Hungarians that they had no wish to create a political martyr, there would be no political trial, a way would be found to release him. In fact, he was released, and Beszelo continued to be printed by the dissidents in a couple of thousand copies which were then passed around to five or ten times that readership in the country for a number of years until it was no longer necessary to do Samizdat. So our contacts with these people were quite open. I sometimes went to lunch in a good restaurant in Budapest with them. We would have them to our houses. The present Cultural Counselor was the person who was formally in charge of dealing with them, because it was thought it would be more politic, more diplomatic, to say that our contacts with them were cultural rather than political, but I would usually go over to his house whenever he had some of them over. The one bow to security was that he would always turn on his stereo fairly loud whenever we had conversations, but I really don't think that that greatly fooled anyone in the Hungarian Secret Service.

Q: You were able to see some of these underground publications on a regular basis? They were widely available?

GREENWALD: Sure. As soon as they produced, they came by and gave us a copy. We asked for a couple of copies, and we would send them back to Washington so that they could be read in the U.S. government.

Q: Were most of your contacts, your meetings, your discussions in Budapest, or were different things going on elsewhere, or is it such a centralized country that Budapest is all that really matters?

GREENWALD: It's a good question. Of course, Budapest wasn't all that really mattered, and we did try to cover the rest of the country, but we did it obviously less well than we would have liked. Budapest in Hungarian terms is this huge city. There's no American equivalent, because the population of Budapest is perhaps 20 percent of the population of the whole country, and it's certainly the intellectual capital of the country. So it wasn't as bad as it might have been in some countries to be located in Budapest and to have most of your contacts there. But we did try to travel. We were very small, and most of the time that I was in Budapest, I was the only political officer. We had a political section of one, and we had an economic section of one. Briefly we got a second person during the two years that I was there, but most of the time I was alone. So there was a limit to what we could do. But I tried to travel as often as possible. I tried to make friends with people, chance acquaintances, who lived outside of Budapest, and visit them in their homes and get to know a little bit about what was happening in the cities. But in terms of our regular contacts, they were people in Budapest.

Q: Harry Bergold, you mentioned, was the ambassador. Was he there throughout the two years that you were there?

GREENWALD: No, he was there the first year. He had been there for at least one, possibly two years before I got there, and he left in the summer of 1983. We had then a very interesting, very different kind of man, Nick Salgo, who came in as ambassador. Salgo was a political ambassador, political appointment, but he was a Hungarian American. He was born in Hungary. He grew up in Hungary in the 1930s as a young man who had graduated from university. He went to Switzerland just before the war to start his business career, and then when the war came, he wisely continued west and eventually got to the United States and made his fortune in real estate. He owned the Watergate complex here. He went back to Hungary as ambassador, and it was, of course, a remarkable experience for him, also a remarkable experience for the Hungarians. They had never had as an American ambassador somebody who knew the country quite so well and spoke native Hungarian. I remember very well an early experience. There was a courtesy call that Salgo was to make on the Minister - basically the Trade Minister of the Hungarian government, He was quite a liberal fellow, a person who basically from his job was interested in more contact with the West, switching the balance of Hungarian trade from more than 50 percent with Eastern Europe to more than 50 percent with Western Europe and the United States. When we were waiting for him in his outer office. When he came in, he came in furious. He was just upset. He had just come from a Central Committee meeting, and he just let his frustrations out and he said, "These people just don't understand. They don't understand that Hungary has to trade to live, that trade is essential for this country and it's good and vital." Salgo began to laugh, and he said, "Mr. Minister, it's a good thing that you didn't grow up in Hungary in the 1930s. You would have left just like I did." There's an important point, that Salgo wasn't one of those who left after 1945 because the Communists were bad guys who had ruined their wonderful Hungary. There were a lot of people that came to the West, came with that attitude. They came from the old Hungarian aristocracy, and for them everything that happened after 1945 was a black period. Salgo came from a Jewish commercial family, and he had mixed feelings about that old Hungary, pre-1945 Hungary, the Hungary which was controlled by the aristocrats and was strongly anti-Semitic, that believed that trade was sort of dirty business that wasn't really for gentlemen. In some ways, though, he was quite anti-Communist himself, in that sense a Reaganite. He had a feel for the commercial side of the goulash Communism that was rather impressive. We got along rather well with him, in fact, for that reason. In other ways he was a very difficult person, at least for the embassy, because he was a man who had ten new ideas every day. Two or three of them would be good. None of them would be wrapped in a normal, nice bureaucratic package, and the job for us was always to figure out which two or three were good ideas and which weren't. But he kept us on our toes, and he expected people to use Hungarian, to learn Hungarian, to use it. He never thought it was a hard language to learn, and said that. He learned it the easy way.

Q: He learned it in his earliest days.

GREENWALD: I got along with him quite well, because I used Hungarian, and he appreciated that. In some ways he was quite a lot of fun to work with. As I say, he was a challenge for the Hungarians. He felt that the only way to really learn the language is to learn it in the country, that FSI is good, it does a fine job of beginning to prepare its student to speak the language, but you really have to learn it in the country. So he worked very hard trying to get agreement that the second half of the language year for language students would be spent in Hungary. He recognized that he didn't want to do it in Budapest, because the embassy would grab the person and before long they'd be doing their regular job and wouldn't be learning. But he tried to get an arrangement that the students would spend a few months somewhere else in Hungary, living ideally in a home, getting instruction somewhere else, Pécs (Paich) perhaps or Szeged or whatever. After a great deal of effort and a lot of resistance from FSI, which I think felt slightly threatened, it was agreed to give the idea a trial. Unfortunately the place that was arranged to have people go to was Debrecen, east of country but very near a large Soviet air base, and the first person who was designated to be the guinea pig student was the air attaché. Before long the Hungarian security people caught on to that and said no, and that idea was scotched. I think later the idea was eventually put into play but unfortunately wasn't able to be done when he was there because of the nervousness, I would guess, of the security or the intelligence people on both sides.

Q: As a former dean of the School of Language Studies at FSI, I vaguely remember discussion of this, and I don't think it was only to protect and defend the total length of the FSI program, but there were some real problems on occasion, including suspicion that it would be used for information gathering, intelligence gathering. But most students would certainly be highly motivated and would use it very effectively with minimal supervision. We were always concerned that some were not, that they needed more direction in many cases. But I think, as I recall, we all agreed and certainly felt in principle that if you could learn in a language environment where you used it every day, that would certainly be better than doing it only for a few hours a day and then going home to an English language environment.

GREENWALD: The way in which I learned my Hungarian best and used it most was by developing my love for sports and particularly for Hungarian football. This was highly useful for learning the country and covering the country, because Hungary is a football-crazy country. You could begin a conversation with anyone in the country - I think you could have begun it with Kadar himself if you could have sat down with him, but I began it with other rather senior political people that way - by saying, "Why is Hungary no longer the most powerful national football team in Europe if not the world. Why isn't Hungarian football the best in the world as it was in the 1950s." Then you go on to, well, the society has changed and in what ways it changed, for the better or for the worse, and you could have wonderful conversations in every pub as well as in political circles like that. In fact, the last telegram I wrote - it wasn't a telegram because they wouldn't let me send it as a telegram, it was very long - was a telegram about Hungarian football. If it's this long, no, you have to send it as an airgram. It was the summation of my efforts to learn about Hungarian football but also of my efforts to learn about the psychology of the society, including just how far the reforms had gone and just how far they had not gone, and where the next stage would have to be if they were to be successful.

Q: Okay, well, maybe this is a good point to move on unless there's something else that you would want to say about your two years in Hungary.

GREENWALD: No, I think that probably touches the main elements.

Q: Where did you go from there then? You came back to Washington?

GREENWALD: I did. I spent two years in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research as the deputy office director of the Office of Political Military Affairs. That office dealt with conventional arms control issues, not nuclear - there was another office that covered that - and then what were called low-intensity conflicts, in particular that is all the wars and semi-wars that were going on around the world. One of the things we tried to do was to develop a weekly newsletter called the War Watch Weekly. It would give in a couple of pages analyses and news reports for the senior people in the Department and in the National Security Council based on all sources, intelligence, embassy reporting but also intelligence reporting on what was happening with, say, the Contras in Nicaragua, with the guerrilla war in El Salvador, with the Iran-Iraq War, with the fighting in Afghanistan, and so on and so forth, as well as items about changes in military doctrine, for example, in the Soviet Union and that kind of thing would be an occasional article. It was a new area for me. I had never worked in political military matters that directly and had never worked in so many geographical areas. I had spent my time in Europe, and this stretched me to a few others. Of course, the exposure to the intelligence community was new and different. Academic is the wrong word, but it was a rather passive job, because you felt somewhat removed from the day-to-day operational work in the State Department and from policy. You weren't supposed to deal with policy; you were only supposed to report the intelligence. So ultimately over the two years I found it a little frustrating. I enjoyed the tour, but I was happy to move on to more of what I thought of as the mainstream of the work within the State Department.

Q: You also weren't directly involved in any negotiations, conventional arms control or anything else? You were in effect supporting some ongoing negotiations but not directly involved.

GREENWALD: Yes, and, in fact, that wasn't a very lively time for conventional arms control negotiations. The so-called MBFR talks, the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction talks, which had begun in the early 1970s as part of that chess game trading pieces that I talked about a while ago when the Berlin agreement was being done and the CSCE negotiations were being started, were still piddling along making no progress. It was basically stalled. There were the beginnings of discussions for a new forum, a new format, which ultimately began to pay dividends in the late 1980s. But during those years from 1984 to 1986 that I was there, it was a frustrating negotiation.

Q: Okay, I'm not sure we need to spend much more time on the INR period unless there's something else. Where did you go from there, Jon?

GREENWALD: I had wanted to go back to Eastern Europe as quickly as possible. There wasn't anything that was opening up in 1986. One of my hopes, in fact, had been East Berlin, but the fellow who ran the political section there extended for a year. As I began to look for alternatives, I was offered a senior training opportunity, which I grabbed. It was a great chance, and it was a good way to wait another year until there were more possibilities in Eastern Europe. The choices I had for senior training - I was an O1 officer at that time, so senior training meant training in preparation for hopefully making it into the senior service - were either to go to the War College or one of several other possibilities where I would be more on my own. The one that attracted me was a year at the Atlantic Council. The Atlantic Council of the United States is in Washington and has had for many years a State Department as well as a couple of Army, Navy, Air Force senior fellows. It gives them a great deal of freedom to do research and writing on virtually anything they're interested in as well as a chance to participate in a lot of seminars and study projects that the Council runs. There were some wonderful senior people in charge of the Council at that time. George Signius was the day-to-day director of it. He had been the commanding general of the so-called USCOM in Berlin during the negotiation of the Quadripartite Agreement. I had not known him then, because he left just before I got to Berlin, and the meeting went after the Quadripartite Agreement was signed, but he was very interested in a lot of the things I was interested in. He had later been the head of ACDA, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and he gave good, active leadership on particularly European subjects including a program to start contacts with the Armatov Institute in the Soviet Union. Then General Goodpaster, who is one of the great men that I have had the privilege of being associated with, former aide to, close colleague, protégé of President Eisenhower, is one of the inspirations. I think if you've worked with him, you know what I mean. He is a very wise man, a man very open to new thinking and new ideas and not at all what one might have as a cliché of a military mind or a military man. So it was a very good year. I did a couple of op ed pieces, one on the 25th anniversary of the Hungarian revolution that the Los Angeles Times ran, a couple of longer journal articles, one that was printed actually by the German magazine, *Aussen Politik*, on the CSCE process. I also wrote on Soviet reforms and the interrelationship of the Soviet economic reforms which Gorbachev was just beginning to try to institute. Also on Soviet military strength and arms control negotiations that I did with Walt Slocombe, who was an old Princeton classmate - actually not a classmate, he was a year ahead of me at Princeton, but he was a classmate at Harvard Law School. He had the basic idea. We talked about it, and then I did most of the research and writing, and we shared the authorship in the *Washington Quarterly*, and a somewhat similar piece again on Soviet reforms that I did for the occasional papers series that the Atlantic Council puts out. So it was a good active period where I had a chance to do a lot of writing and talk to a lot of people that we wouldn't normally be able to talk to in the academic community and around Washington.

Q: That was the year '86-87, and then in 1987 you went again to Europe?

GREENWALD: I did. Again I wanted to go back to Eastern Europe. The first suggestion of the Department was that I go to Warsaw and spend a year learning Polish and then run the Political Section in Warsaw.

Q: Did you actually study Polish in Poland?

GREENWALD: No, it would have been at FSI, but I did spend the year 1987-88 learning Polish and then in 1988 was to go to Warsaw. I was excited by that and very much interested and wanted to do it, but after initially accepting it, I went back and asked for reconsideration because my wife, I think I may have mentioned, is a Berliner. Her mother had not been well, and for personal reasons it would have made a big difference for us to go to East Berlin, so I asked for that change of assignment. The State Department, the people in the European Bureau, were sympathetic to that and wanted to do it. They broke the assignment to Warsaw and were ready to make the assignment to East Berlin. At that point the security people in the Department stepped in and said they had an objection. The objection was twofold actually. One element of it was that I had had so many contacts in Hungary, a number of them had raised questions because some of those people, of course, were Hungarian intelligence officers and they thought that was perhaps not so good. That was dealt with rather easily. It was pointed out by a number of people that often the people that you have reason to have contact with and you get some of your best information from are people who have contacts with the intelligence services in Eastern Europe. Those people have a certain amount of protection, have a certain amount of self confidence. What they tell you has to be taken with some grains of salt and has to be assessed carefully, but that's true of anybody's information. You have to always ask why is this person saying this, what are his motives, what are the possible nuances that are there. That's not in that sense different from somebody who is an out-and-out dissident or somebody who works in government or somebody who works in the government and has connections to Hungarian intelligence. Those people whom they were speaking of were people who were in the Hungarian establishment and who were thought or known to have intelligence connections. That is, they were people who were foreign service officers in the Hungarian government or other types of officials but who were known to have friendly contacts with the intelligence services. That didn't mean that everything they said, 100 percent of what they said, was written out in advance for them as instructions by somebody, but you had to take into account what possible additional motives they might have other than just to speak the truth. So that was dealt with to, I think, everyone's satisfaction. The second part of the problem was that my wife was a Berliner. Like most Berliners, part of her family was in the West and part of it was in the East. Her mother's sister was living in East Berlin. Gobby's cousin, the daughter of that woman, was living in East Berlin. We didn't have close contacts with them. Gobby had not been able to have close contacts with them for most of the time after the wall went up, but the question was raised, is it proper for somebody who would be in a sensitive position in the U.S. embassy to have family connections that could have pressure put upon them. Is it fair to those people, is it fair to the government to go in that kind of situation. I really am very grateful to the people in the security services in the State Department, particularly the one individual who made the decision that they could trust us. If a situation developed that somebody was putting pressure on those members of Gobby's family or pressure on us, that we would be correct and proper enough to go immediately to the right people and tell them about it in the U.S. government. It wasn't an easy decision for them to make, because there had been lots of things that had caused embarrassment in the immediate preceding years, the incident at the embassy in Moscow, for example. It would have been easy for the security people to have said, "No, let's just not take the risk. Let's not assign him." Then I would have missed out on the assignment to East Berlin that led to the opening of the wall and all of the excitement and professional interest that that involved. In fact, I don't know where I would have been assigned, because all the other good assignments were gone too. So I really owe a great debt to that person who had the courage to take a gamble on us. As it turned out, there was, I think, no effort made on the part of the GDR services to put any pressure on that old sick woman or upon the daughter, whom we didn't have contact with or very little contact with. So there were no problems, but it took some courage on the part of the security services to make that decision.

Q: I would note at this point that you have published a book entitled Berlin Witness: An American Diplomat's Chronicle of East Germany's Revolution, published in 1993 by Penn State University. I was going to suggest that it would be hard not to cover some of the same things that are in the book, but I think anybody that is particularly interested in that period should look at the book and buy the book, of course, if possible, or look in a library. I think, since I haven't read the book, you need to kind of keep that in mind and certainly shouldn't hesitate to refer any potential user of this transcript to the book. In any event, your assignment was worked out. You went in the summer of 1987. You were there three years. This was a fascinating period, I guess. Did you realize that at the time you arrived, that it was going to be as dramatic as it turned out to be?

GREENWALD: No, I certainly didn't realize. I think one of the good reflections on human nature is there are rather few people who claim even today to have seen what was coming and to have said that they knew it all along. I knew it would be a fascinating experience. I expected it to be a period of great political ferment, because at least Glasnost was in full swing in the Soviet Union. Perestroika was already being started. It was clear that something major was happening. I expected to be observing a period of movement toward reform and perhaps the beginning of reform from above in the GDR. The general view was that there were certainly limits to what Gorbachev could allow in the way of reform in any part of Eastern Europe. Those limits were more restrictive in East Germany than anywhere else, because there was truth in the old saw about it being the most heavily armed and most dangerous border in the world. It was the point where the two great forces, East and West, came together and where there was simply more to be risked and more to be lost by reckless policy. We assumed there would be a more cautious approach to reform in East Germany than anywhere else. That said, I didn't accept when I went the idea that a number of people had that the East German Communist Party was simply a repressive organization with no internal combustion of its own. I talked to people who had served in East Berlin, like my colleague Wayne Merry, for example, who at that point was also the desk officer back in the European Bureau. He and others who had written about the country said that there is in the East air that is beginning to rise, there is reform potential, there are changes that will come. I felt my job was to look for those changes, but what I was looking for, to be honest, was change that would come from above, directed, guided, controlled and to some extent limited from above. It was a period when we arrived of considerable optimism, official optimism, in the GDR, because the long-sought visit of Erich Honecker, the leader of the GDR, to West Germany had been agreed upon. In September of 1987, just two months after I arrived in East Berlin, Honecker visited West Germany. For many Germans this was seen as a tantamount acknowledgment by the West German government that there going to be two states in Germany for a very long time. The GDR had made it as an accepted, permanent part of the international scene. At least the way in which the West German concept of unification would have to be carried out would be through a very long, protracted period of interaction with the GDR, not through isolation and hostility, which had been the original policy. For Honecker the visit to Bonn in September of 1987 was seen as the culmination of the effort to establish the legitimacy and the permanency of the GDR. There appeared to be no reason to believe that this was a wrong calculation. His own health seemed good. He was 75. He celebrated his 75th birthday just before going to Bonn. He seemed spry and without any particular problems. Much of the first year that we were there was a period that could be characterized by the title of an article that one of my academic friends wrote, an article whose title at least he still doesn't like to be reminded of. It was "The GDR at 40: The Problems of Success." There were lots of problems in the country, but they weren't mortal problems. No one thought so. No one who believed in the GDR within the leadership, no one who was GDR's enemy believed they were mortal. So we weren't looking for that kind of problem. We were looking for the kinds of problems that would lead to reform, to changes from the top, the kinds of changes that it was seen that Gorbachev was trying to institute in the Soviet Union. Another impression I had upon arriving in Berlin was how different the German-Allied relationship was. When I had been there in the 1970s, the Allies were still very much a major factor in every calculation about the Berlin issue. The Quadripartite Agreement had just been negotiated. It was still uncertain how well it would work, whether there would be a new Berlin crisis. By 1987 the Quadripartite Agreement had proven itself and worked very well. The idea of a new Berlin crisis was on nobody's mind. The Soviet Union clearly wasn't interested in provoking such a crisis. There had been a pattern of interrelationships worked out between the GDR and West Berlin and the Western Germans, which was quite enormous. I tried to write a long telegram about that in early summer of 1989. I did a fair amount of research. There were thousands of East Germans, for example, working in West Berlin on day projects, something that was unheard of, unthought of ten or 15 years ago. In all of this, the Allies were there as a safeguard, as an ultimate guarantor of stability, but were increasingly, one could feel, seen as not terribly relevant to the day-to-day operations in the city. The Zenot in West Berlin would keep the Allies informed more or less of what was going on, because that was expected, but there was no longer an operational necessity. They did things that they thought they needed to do. The government in Bonn did things that they thought they needed to do without feeling that they have to negotiate for acceptance from Washington and London or Paris. There was a certain feeling that the Allies were much less relevant than they had been and that German-German relations were beginning to drive the Berlin situation, to drive the inter-German relationship. One knew that that would have certain consequences, but what those consequences would be and when they would mature were things that were very, very difficult to make any prediction about. The timeline that certainly I thought of was still decades not months. Just one anecdote: I remember going home one afternoon in the early spring of 1989 and laughingly telling my wife about having overheard a conversation while I was shopping for a new stereo system at the stereo shop at the Tempelhof Air Base in West Berlin. I heard two young American military people chatting about what they were going to do when their tour ran out, and the one fellow said, "I really like it here in Berlin. I think I'd like to stay and catch on and maybe work here in this audio shop, but I here that they're going to give Berlin back to the Germans in another year or two, so there's no future in it." He had his rationale a little bit off, I think, but his timeline was a lot better than mine and just about everybody else's.

Q: I have two kinds of questions at this point, and I'm not sure which would be the most useful to pursue. First, we talked about the German-German relationship and maybe the lesser importance of the three Western Allies vis-à-vis Berlin at this particular time compared with the earlier period. My question is, well, what exactly, as far as the German Democratic Republic, was the U.S. role or interest in the period before things began to change. My second interest is when did you and others begin to see that change was likely to occur at an accelerated rate and what was it that got that started. So which way do you want to do, assuming that both of these are interesting?

GREENWALD: Well, I'll try to touch on them both. I'd start with the first, the importance of the GDR in the American scheme of things. It was minor. There was never any questions that the American interest in Berlin was primarily on the Western side of the city. That was where we had our commitment of honor and heart and belief. We yielded priority to Bonn in everything with regard to the GDR for all the obvious reasons. We tended to be a little bit suspicious from time to time that maybe the dream of German reunification would align the government in Bonn, whatever that government was, to the need to be cautious and careful and would cause them to make a concession on this or on that that they should not make. So when we thought of the GDR, it was more in terms of it maybe too much of a temptation for our good friends, our essential friends in Bonn, than anything else. We believed in the old ideological stereotypes and clichés even more than the West Germans believed in them, perhaps because we were further away. For us as a country and as played into us as a government to some extent, the GDR was always just the wall. For the people in Bonn it was Germany, and they had an easier time understanding that the people on the other side were people, Germans just like them, with mixes of good and bad and all sorts of nuances in between just like everybody else. We tended to see them in the stereotype of those few pictures that went around the world in 1961 of the folk jumping across the barbed wire or Peter Fechter, the one would-be escapee, bleeding to death in the no man's land. Oddly enough, I think, this played out in a different way after the wall went down. The Western Allies, not just the United States but France and Britain, had said dozens and dozens and dozens of times, at least at every opportunity to sign a NATO communiqué, that we supported the reunification of Germany. When it became a potential reality, there was a certain amount of skepticism and caution that immediately became apparent in Paris and London. Even Margaret Thatcher, as firm an anti-Communist as she was, clearly was a little bit concerned about a rush toward German reunification, what that would mean in Europe. There wasn't any doubt in the United States. We acted from the first day as if we believed - and we did believe - what we'd been saying for all those many years. Again I think it was because we were further away from the complexity of the situation. We were also further away from the horror of the Second World War, and it was easier for us to believe in our straightforward and simple beliefs, and so we supported Helmut Kohl and his efforts to move quickly toward unification. We won a lot of credit with Kohl, with the government in Bonn, because of that. But it was the other side of the coin of having a rather straightforward and simple view of the GDR, a side of the coin that would question the transfers 1987, 1988, 1989. In that period it meant treat these guys unlike all other Eastern Europeans, unlike all other Communist governments within the Warsaw Pact. Stay at arm's length, whereas there was a willingness and a desire for us to find ways to deal more effectively and come closer to even the ex-martial-law government in Warsaw, certainly the government in Budapest, certainly the government in Prague, even the government in Moscow. There was an ideological, I would say, unwillingness to do much with the GDR. We didn't like them. We had people running our policy in Washington who had grown up with all the memories and all of the experiences of the wall and the post-wall period. For them the German problem, the Berlin problem, was seen entirely from the West Berlin side and for whom the GDR was a nasty stereotype, the Doberman pinchers of the Warsaw Pact. So it was difficult to do those thing that you would normally try to do in Eastern Europe: build ties; build relationships; identify the people with whom you might be able to work better and try to establish connections and ties to them and solve problems; solve those existing bilateral problems we wanted to resolve so that we could move on to a better relationship. There was an effort from Roz Ridgway, who had been ambassador in East Berlin and then became Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, who developed a package concept trying to resolve several interrelated issues at the same time so that we could get a relatively clean slate and then move on. She never got very far, partly because there wasn't enough imagination on the East German side, and partly she got really nowhere because there wasn't a lot of imagination or will on the U.S. side. There was a feeling too people had - and I heard it expressed - that, well, if we move fast with the GDR, it will upset the people in Bonn, which may have been believed by the people who said it. I don't think it was ever true, because what I would hear people in Bonn say was, "We want you to move fast. You're going to make it easier for us to do the things we want to do." It was a frustrating period if what we were trying to do was advance bilateral relations. It was a fascinating period if what we were trying to do, which was certainly a big part of what we were trying to do, was to understand what was happening.

Q: But all of this, these attitudes in Washington, and the general framework of our political relationship for you as Political Counselor probably also meant that you were not encouraged to have the wide ranging contacts that you had in Budapest, for example.

GREENWALD: No, we were certainly encouraged. No one ever discouraged us from having contacts - well, one exception, one special exception but that wasn't particular to East Berlin. For years the AFL-CIO had a very strong policy against contact with Eastern European trade unionists. They argued that these weren't legitimate trade unionists but they were controlled from the top. They were part of the power system, and one shouldn't legitimize them by having contacts with them. There was one slight exception, and that was with regard to Hungary. I was actually able to make a contribution to establishing that connection, because there was a conference of labor reporting officers in Eastern Europe in Vienna in early 1983. The man who was the inspiration of this policy, a great old AFL-CIO veteran, Irving Brown, who had fought battles against Communist-dominated trade unions in Western Europe right after the Second World War, was there, and we debated this. He accepted the argument that, well, in Hungary things were a little bit different, and he said, "All right, as far as I'm concerned, you can talk to the second line trade unionists in Hungary as long as you make it just a cup of coffee and not in their headquarters." So I was able in Budapest to make as many contacts as I could as long as we didn't do it in a trade union building. But everywhere else in Eastern Europe, and certainly in East Berlin, U.S. diplomats weren't allowed to have dealings with trade union people. That actually meant something for the first time in 1989 when things began to bubble, including in East Germany. Part of the bubbling was workers having meetings in previously tame and suddenly no longer tame trade union halls and putting out resolutions and asking questions. It took a while before they were able to get the policy changed to go talk to those people. Other than that we were encouraged to talk to people, because people wanted to know what was happening. It was important to know how people reacted in East Germany to Gorbachev and all of that. It's just that you couldn't easily turn it into something operational in the sense of now let's resolve our claims problem, let's figure out a way to get most-favored-nation status to them, and let's figure out a way to make a package of items where tariffs might be reduced, let's come up with a package of exchanges. Those kinds of things that you would try to do in other parts of Eastern Europe were not very much encouraged.

Q: Who was the ambassador to the GDR when you got to East Berlin?

GREENWALD: The ambassador was Frank Meehan, who was one of the truly great area specialists and great people in the Foreign Service. He had served in Bonn, he had served in West Berlin, he had been ambassador in Warsaw, ambassador in Prague, I believe, too, ambassador in Vienna, and a delightful person who spoke very, very good German.

Q: Was he ambassador to Austria, or was he DCM?

GREENWALD: Maybe he was DCM, probably just DCM, but in any event a person with enormous experience in Eastern Europe. He had served as a younger officer in Moscow. He had dealt extensively over the years with a remarkable East German named Wolfgang Vogel, who was/is a lawyer, a lawyer who had played an enormous role in the exchange of spies and exchange of political prisoners, in resolving and facilitating all sorts of East-West arrangements over the years. Frank had dealt with him first, I believe, in the return of Francis Gary Powers, the U-2 pilot who was shot down in May of 1960 over the Soviet Union. Frank developed a very close personal relationship with Vogel, whom he came to respect. In fact, he was the godfather of one of Vogel's children. Over the years whenever there was a need to use Vogel's special services for something like the exchange that led to the release of Sharansky, the famous Soviet dissident, Frank would play a role. He would be brought in to deal with Vogel even if he was in some other capital or back in Washington. While he was in East Berlin, of course, Vogel became for him a wonderful source of information. I spoke earlier that people with intelligence can actually just sometimes want the best contacts. Vogel is a marvelous example of that. Obviously he had his intelligence contacts. I think it's still uncertain whether he had a rank in the GDR's security services. He had his personal connections to Honecker; he had his special political protection; and he was also a devoutly practicing Catholic, one of the reasons that Frank and he hit it off so well; a person of some real integrity; a person who when he said he wanted to see a more humane Communist system in the GDR, you could believe it. Things are always much more complex than black and white in dealing with Eastern Europe, were always more complex, and Vogel was a wonderful example of that. Frank was the ambassador when I got there and stayed until I believe it was December of 1988. The man who came after him, Dick Barkley, who had been a good friend of mine in West Berlin in the four years that I was there in the '70s, picked up that connection with Vogel. In fact, he had begun to pick it up some years earlier when he was in Bonn as the Political Counselor. In the earlier '80s he was used to do some of the things that Frank Meehan had done in dealing with Vogel. Roz Ridgway didn't speak German, and Vogel didn't speak English, so Dick was the first to establish that connection, and then for him the Vogel relationship continued during the time he was ambassador, which covered the period when the wall opened up and all of that period. Vogel was a wonderful contact, because he had his very, very good sources of knowledge. He had his own personal opinions that were strongly expressed. He was frustrated with Honecker but could see some of the things that Honecker was good at as well as what he was bad at. He had his strongly expressed disagreements with Mielke, the head of the Stasi, the secret service. He was a marvelous source of information, somebody one could talk to and learn a lot about what was happening within the country. That was the ambassador's contact. I dealt with a different level of people, mostly people and certainly people in the Foreign Ministry on normal Foreign Ministry business, but also a range of people in the many institutes that existed in East Berlin and in Potsdam, the Foreign Ministries Institute, the economic science policy center, and several others where you had a lot of people who were quite intelligent and quite knowledgeable, who had a certain amount of leeway because they weren't in the government. Obviously there were party members - were they reliable members of the SAD, the party - but who were interesting people who would say things which always had to be weighed against where they were coming from and what the particular axe they were grinding was, but who would tell you things. The burden that was there, perhaps partly because it was what we wanted to hear but partly because I'm sure it was true, was there are more would-be Gorbachevs or Gorbachev supporters in the GDR than you'd think. There are more than there are in the Soviet Union, and we know how to make it work once we're given the green light. There was a feeling that reform Communism, which was what Gorbachev was trying to create and make work, was something which could be done in the GDR much easier than in the Soviet Union, because Communism was a German idea, it was deformed in the Soviet Union, and Germans knew how to be reform Communists. They knew how to pick up the mantle of Rosa Luxembourge and make it work. That was the general thrust of so many of the comments. There was in it a certain amount of wishful thinking. There was in it a certain amount of national stereotyping, but there was a belief in it. In fact, something which sounds very odd today but is really quite true is that there was the period from the fall of Honecker, which was October 18th, 1989, to the opening of the wall, which was a few weeks later, in which there was an enormous enthusiasm, optimism, confidence among this wide group of people that I had been talking to for two years, that now their time had come, now they would have the chance to do the things that they believed needed to be done to make the system work in the GDR. They would pull out of the drawers the plans that had not been usable in the past, a belief that in the GDR, if anywhere, reform Communism could be made to work. Now that didn't fly. They didn't have much opportunity, much time to make it work, and it all looks in retrospect unrealistic, but that was the intellectual atmosphere that one sensed in 1987 and then increasingly experienced until it burst out in the fall of 1989. One of the themes of my reporting throughout those first couple of years was there was more here, at least in potential, that's about to burst forth than you think. It's going to become very interesting here. And when it becomes interesting in Germany, it will become historically important. I mention this in the introduction to my book, but if you'll let me repeat: In late 1988 just before Frank Meehan left, I tried to sum up the impressions I had that there was a lot that was there under the surface just waiting to burst forth. I wrote a long cable which concluded with some speculation in the last paragraph about what would happen when it does break forth, what would it mean that there was an East German Gorbachev. If the West Germans from the government to the people were as fascinated as they were with the Soviet Gorbachev, what would their reaction be to an East German Gorbachev? What would that mean for East German-West German relations and the kinds of things that the West Germans would like to do with the East Germans that we might be traditionally hesitant about them doing? We should start thinking about that. Frank sent the telegram, but he cut the last paragraph off. When he did, I scribbled on the top of the telegram as it had gone out, "Why did you cut this last paragraph?" He wrote me back a note and said, "Well, you've given them a lot to think about in this telegram, but you have to dose the SOBs back there carefully."

Q: He thought it was too much?

GREENWALD: Yes. But those of us in the embassy certainly felt that there was much more of a story here than people quite recognized. You always have a certain amount of that feeling in an embassy that they don't understand us back in Washington. It was a little stronger in East Berlin because of all of the layered history of the German problem and the feeling that in the ranking of the posts East Berlin, West Berlin and Bonn, East Berlin ranked way, way down, and we felt that there was a potential to be fulfilling some American interests there that wasn't quite yet being recognized. Having said all that, nobody at the embassy, and certainly not me, expected the impact to unfold the way it did in 1989. You asked when did one begin to feel that there was a whole new ball game about to be played. Traditionally the assigned date is when Hungary opened and snipped the barbed wire at the Hungarian-Austrian border, and that was at the very end of April of 1989. There was no immediate impact in East Berlin except for some estrangement between the two governments, Hungary and the GDR, but it was felt that this was something that would be worked out and was manageable. I remember the Hungarian DCM in East Berlin telling me, "Oh yes, they complain to us, but it will be worked out. There will be ways in which before you get to the border, the police will check was going into the border area and citizens of fellow Warsaw Pact states who don't have appropriate papers will be turned back, and nothing much will happen." That was the assumption, that there would be some way in which the effect would be limited and there wasn't any immediate major effect. In Hungary itself, though, a lot was happening, and in Poland a lot was happening, because you'd had the Polish election in which the non-Communists won and the Jaruzelski government accepted that. Preparations were being made in the spring and early summer of 1989 for the first non-Communist government in a Warsaw Pact country, and the Soviet Union was accepting that. In June of that year in Hungary there was the reburial of Imre Nagy, and the death of Kadar came symbolically almost at the same time. There was one evening on television an enormous demonstration in the central square in Hungary, hundreds of thousands of people marking the fact that there had been such a change in Hungary. The next night in that June there was a reception at the home of the Press and Cultural Counselor of our embassy for a glee club - I think it was the Yale glee club - and we were out in the garden because it was a lovely June evening. The head of the U.S. desk in the GDR Foreign Ministry came up to me. He was a fellow we had good, friendly relationships with. Besides the normal business, we chatted about football. He was always a very nice, intelligent fellow, and we liked his wife, who was a Polish-born woman. In fact, since then we've become quite good and close friends. We've kept up that friendship over the years. But he had always been very cautious in all of his comments to me, very prim and proper, buttoned down tight like all GDR diplomats and he came up to me in the garden and said, "Do you see what's happening in Poland and Hungary? Exactly the same thing is going to happen in the GDR in the next two or three years, because we have exactly the same problems." That shocked me, because I thought that if somebody who had always been that cautious became that uncautious, then maybe there really was much more of a crisis developing internally than I thought.

Q: When was this again?

GREENWALD: June of 1989, just at the beginning of the holiday season. Within a few days of that, Honecker fell ill. No one knew how serious it was, but he was taken off to the hospital for an emergency operation, and he dropped out of sight for a considerable period of time. Then the holiday season began and, if you recall, there were several developments. There were lots and lots of East Germans who even more than usual took holidays in Hungary that year. I think quite a few of them were using the opportunity to go across the border. There were others who went to Prague. The only country you could travel to, if you were an East German, without getting special permission, without getting a passport, or exit visa, was Czechoslovakia. You could travel to Czechoslovakia on the basis of your ID card. People began to go in large numbers to Prague and knock on the door of the West German embassy and camp out in the garden of the West German embassy by the thousands demanding the right to go to the West. As the summer went on, there was a growing sense that something was building up. There was no reaction from the government. Honecker was incommunicado. No one knew how ill he was. Nobody else was saying anything, doing anything. Something you knew was happening, but you didn't know how big it would be. I made an effort to write a major telegram. I'd have to check the exact date, but I think it was about the first of August. I put together the various indications of major things going on, particularly the numbers of people who were leaving the country, trying to leave the country, and the increasingly frustrated tone of conversations that we were having with people. "What do you think of the situation?" Frustration, pent-up frustration was bubbling out. I said in the telegram, "The last time that anything like this was seen in East Germany was in the summer of 1961, and that boil was lanced by the building of the Berlin Wall. No one thinks that anything as dramatic as that is in the wind, but something big is happening." Of course, that qualification was quickly overtaken by time, and it was proven to be even bigger than that, but that was an effort to alert people in Washington to what was going on. I think it did come as a warning that suddenly caused people to begin to look carefully, because it was summer in Washington and everyone was thinking about other things. They were thinking about Eastern Europe. They were thinking about the drama in Hungary and Poland and what Gorbachev was doing and not much about what was going on in Germany and what it would mean, what it could mean. Then, of course, the situation just continued to get worse throughout August. Honecker made one brief appearance to receive the first I think it was a megabyte chip, electronic computer chip. The GDR had made a major effort to get into the computer business in a big way. Honecker had traveled to Japan a few years earlier and had felt that he had seen the shape of the future in robotics and computers, and he wanted the GDR to be a leader in that, so he put a tremendous amount of resource effort into it, which was a sensible thing to do but probably, in terms of what was feasible, wasn't the best use of resources. But there was this moment of success when the megabyte chip was ready and he came out of the hospital to take part in it. You could see he was terribly pale and didn't look well. Then he went back in the hospital, which led to more speculation and there were rumors that began to develop that it was cancer and it was serious, and how quickly he would come back was unknown. There was full paralysis within the GDR government. The question that can never be answered but I think is worth raising is what would have happened if he had been healthy or if he had been so unhealthy that he was clearly not going to come back and they'd have to make a personnel change at the top earlier. There would have been action taken to deal with the situation. Whether it would have been successful or not, nobody can say, but one of the causes that led to the full crisis in the fall was simple inaction while the situation festered.

Q: One thing you haven't talked about yet, I don't think, except maybe indirectly is to what extent was the economic progress and development of the GDR, which was quite significant and substantial, certainly not compared with West Germany but compared with most of maybe all of the other Eastern German states: How significant was that in fostering some of these things that you have been talking about?

GREENWALD: Well, the general presumption when I went to East Berlin was that the GDR was doing well economically. It was listed as one of the ten most developed countries in the world, one of the ten highest producing industrial countries in the world, and it was thought to be in reasonably good shape. There was some evidence, and the evidence grew over the next couple of years, that the statistics weren't always entirely accurate and that the economy was not as well off as it was after the wall was opened or even before the wall was opened after Honecker fell, and the government began talking openly about its economic situation. It was clear that in fact the economy was in much worse shape than had been thought. [end of Tape 4, Side A]

Q: Okay, we're talking about the economic situation in East Germany.

GREENWALD: It was clear after the government began to deal more honestly with its situation in the fall of 1989 after Honecker had been deposed that the economy was in seriously deficient shape and that there was a great need for Western help, for West German support, to prevent something close to an economic collapse. The reason for the economy being quite so bad was the normal inefficiencies of the command structure, Communist command control structure, but partly because the government tried so hard to provide a standard of guaranteed lower middle class comfort for its people. It basically succeeded in that. It provided a very nice lower middle class standard of living. That meant an apartment, it usually meant a summer place, a little summer dacha or at least a scrapendachen, which is a very German institution, a plot of green sometimes within the city itself or on the fringe of the city where a worker could grow something and spend the weekend during the summer, a car, color television set, no fancy things, no luxuries, certainly not much foreign travel, but a guaranteed comfortable existence, which to Honecker and the people around him seemed like a wonderful achievement. You have to recognize where they came from. They came from a Germany, pre-war Germany, where the major influence on their lives was the Depression. It was a worker situation which was much, much worse, where you didn't have a job or you were on the dole, where you had very little state support. They felt they had created something quite remarkable. They had enormous difficulty understanding that, while that was a great achievement, if you compared it to what the Kaiser's Germany was or even what the Weimar Republic had lived with, it was irrelevant for most of their people, who were living for eight hours a day in whatever their job was and then for the rest of the day lived substantially in West Germany in their minds. They turned on their televisions and saw that life, which of course wasn't necessarily the real life of West Germany but was the somewhat idealized picture you get from television, and for whom mostly it couldn't be seen because they couldn't get there, they couldn't visit. It wasn't enough to say, "Well, you've got 1.3 television sets. You're an average family, and the average Pole may have only 0.8; and the Pole has to wait eight years for an apartment, and you've got your apartment." That didn't mean anything, because they were thinking about their real or their imagined cousin in Hamburg.

Q: Or in West Berlin.

GREENWALD: Or in West Berlin. The gap between the world that the old leadership was living in and the world that their people were living in had become enormous. They didn't understand each other. Leave out of the picture for the moment all of the presumptions about good-bad, Communist-capitalist, Stalinist-Democrat, whatever; you had a group of old men who for the most part had probably started off as idealists and had got that in their record. Honecker spent ten years in a Nazi prison. Of course, [inaudible], who was the President of the Volkskammer, escaped from a Nazi concentration camp and carried a fellow prisoner, a non-Communist prisoner, on his back out. But by this time, by 1989, they were 75 and 80 years old, they had been in power for 30-plus years, they had been living in Waldsiedlung, which was their own little compound north of Berlin. It wasn't a terribly luxurious place. People thought it was. The belief in the country was that they were living in great luxury, and as soon as the wall fell, one of the first things the crowd did was break into Waldsiedlung to see what this living was. It was sort of nice middle class German stuff, but it wasn't Ceausescu palaces. These people had been living in an isolated way for so long. The last GDR leader, it was said, whoever had a beer and knipe was Wilhelm Beek, who died in the early '60s. They were simply out of touch, and they were fossilized, and they were old and sick and couldn't move, couldn't adjust, and they saw Gorbachev talking about all of these new ideas. To them he was a young whippersnapper who didn't know what he was talking about and who was calling into question the icons that they had built up in their lives. When you look back on it, there was no way probably for Honecker to have made an adjustment, tactical change, that had caught the tide. I'm not sure that it wouldn't have been possible if he in one way or another disappeared from the scene even three months earlier. It would not have been possible for some of the younger people in the party to have caught that tide for a while.

Q: If there had been a German Gorbachev?

GREENWALD: Yes. The person who was talked about for that role was the head of the party in Dresden, Hans Muldrow, who clearly had good connections in the Soviet Union. He was liked by Gorbachev. He was exiled to Dresden. Not in the Politburo, only in the Central Committee, he was thought to be too liberal, too close to Gorbachev, and was kept very much at a distance by Honecker. If he had come to power in July of 1989, I think the next six months would have been very different. I don't mean that all of world history would have been very different, but the idea that it was possible to control change from above for a while at least, I think, is a real one. But it wasn't possible for Honecker and the people around him, and it was made worse by this physical incapacitation and what happened. One of the most interesting experiences I had was in the late summer of 1989. A fascinating book that came out. Actually two. In the GDR in the spring of 1989. One was written by Markus Wolf, who for many years was the head of foreign intelligence in the GDR. He had retired a couple of years earlier. Rumors were he had had a falling out with Mielke over policy. He came out with a book called *Troika* in the spring of 1989, and it was the story of three young men who grew up in Moscow in the 1930s, a true story. One was his brother, Konrad Wolf. The second was the son of an American, a professor named Fisher, Louis Fisher, who was actually a professor at Princeton of Russian history when I was there. He was a famous man who had chronicled the Russian Revolution, had been an intimate for a brief while of Lenin, and was a correspondent in Moscow in the '30s. The third, whose name I've forgotten, was the son of a prominent German Communist. Louis Fisher had broken with Stalin over the Hitler-Stalin Pact, packed up his family and went back to the United States. The Wolf family was living in Moscow, because their father was one of the leading German Jewish novelists and playwrights, and they took refuge in Moscow after Hitler came to power. The third family was broken up because Stalin purged the father when he purged a lot of Eastern European and German Communist leaders in the late '30s. So when the Hitler-Stalin Pact was signed and it was possible for a German Communist to go back to Germany, the mother took that young man back. The book is about those three men growing up in Moscow in the '30s in their teens and then coming together for a brief time in 1945 again in Berlin, Konrad in the uniform of the Red Army, Louis Fisher's son, George, in the uniform of the American Army, and the third boy in the tattered remnants of his Laufbahn uniform; and for a brief period they dreamed of the world that they grew up in being reestablished and friendship being reestablished in a new age, and then they're broken apart by the Cold War. Konrad Wolf became the best movie maker, director in the GDR, did a number of excellent movies; Louis Fisher's son is an American academic today; and the third boy eventually went off to West Germany and lived a normal life and left the GDR. Konrad Wolf had wanted to make a movie of that, but he had cancer and died. Markus had been a politician and spy master and all of that, and made a promise on his brother's deathbed to tell the story. He said, "Well I wasn't a director. I didn't know cinema, so I wrote a book." It was a fascinating book because not only was there this human side but in some ways Markus Wolf, an insider's insider, who spoke Russian as well as he spoke German, was writing about things which weren't written about in the GDR. Stalin's purges, what had been done to German Communists, some of the very things which were beginning to be written about in the Soviet Union, were being sat upon in Honecker's GDR, demonstrably as Honecker showed he would have nothing to do with the reforms in the Soviet Union. In fact, he had even banned a Soviet historical magazine called *Sputnik*, which had written stories about that period, as a demonstrative way of showing that he won't have that kind of Glasnost here. And suddenly here is Markus Wolf with this book, who then goes out on a speaking tour around the GDR giving readings from the book. It was a German custom to give readings from a book. My wife is doing it now with her book. We don't do this in the United States. In the U.S. when you would go on a book tour, you talk about the book and you go on a talk show, but in Germany you actually read a chapter or so and then they ask you questions. Of course, the interesting thing was they'd start asking questions of him like "What do you think of Gorbachev?" and he would begin to say things which nobody else in the GDR could say publicly. So we were fascinated by Markus Wolf and wanted to talk to him. I still have the letter that I wrote to Dick Barkley - well, what I mean is I have the answer to the letter I wrote for Dick Barkley asking him if we could come and see him. I got the letter back from Wolf saying that he just didn't think it was yet timely for him to be seen talking to the American embassy. The other fascinating book that suggested there were currents going on - there were two others. I'm sorry to make this even longer, but one was suggested to me by my friend in the Foreign Ministry who had shocked me by talking about the living problems. He put me onto a novel which had just come out which was about an East German diplomat, who was assigned someplace like Nicaragua and who has to come back to the GDR because his daughter committed suicide. The book is about him discovering what was wrong in a society that caused his daughter, an idealistic Communist, to commit suicide. He as an outsider was living abroad, he comes back with foreign eyes and in effect suddenly begins to see his own society. A lot of it was in code, a lot of it was carefully phrased, but it was a shocking book in its own way. It came out that summer. Then the third book was a book called *Da Afsta I*. It was reportage by a man named Randolph Shatza about the First Secretary of the party in a provincial town on the West German border about 20 miles from the West German-Bavarian border. Shatza had followed this man around for a couple of months and had been in all of his meetings, and what he wrote was a book on the day-to-day life of a First Secretary of the party. That was a fascinating book because it talked about things which weren't talked about: for example, the fact that a daughter of the Second Secretary of the party in that county had tried to escape across the border. Why did she do it, what do you do with her, how could this happen, how could one of our children do this, and lots of real-life governmental political decisions. For example, there was only so much money that was available to be spent at a factory which was very important to the economic life of that community, but it was spewing all sorts of environmentally poisonous stuff into the Vaira River. Should the money be used to build a facility that would purify the waste before it went into the Vaira River, or should it be spent for building another smelter to increase production? In the book it is shown that money was spent to increase production, and the First Secretary is saying, "Well, this was a tough decision, but we're in an economically difficult situation and we need to produce. Eventually we'll be able to do both, but we have to do this now." That book created something of a sensation, and again the author was going around the country giving readings from it. It was quickly sold out, and you couldn't get copies. You couldn't buy Markus Wolf's book at all. That was sold out in the first day, and they didn't print any more. I had a chance to meet the Minister of the Environment in the GDR in September 1989, and he was making a presentation about how everybody takes the environment into account in everything and it's high priority, just as high as it is in West Germany or your country. I said, "Well, what about this incident in this book?" Bud Zaltzimen had this real choice, and the decision was to build another polluting smelter. He was shocked, first of all, that I had read the book and, secondly, very embarrassed and upset. This was the kind of fact that the population was being armed with by a few greens, a few dissidents. Suddenly you had a book which was actually published in the GDR - a limited edition, but still it was published there - which was beginning to be talked about. So these were signs that things were beginning to change even in the GDR, that the iron hand of the past in the party, the Honecker group, was loosening, had to be loosening. So in late summer of 1989 I worked very hard to get permission to meet both the author of the *Da Afsta* book and *Da Afsta* himself, the party Secretary, who was presented as a decent man who wanted to do better and do well and was trying to make political decisions that were fair and all that. You had the impression that he was favorably portrayed, which you would have to do if you were writing a book about the First Secretary, but he was somebody who was a different generation than the Honecker people and who was perhaps an interesting political personality. So with the help again of this fellow from the Foreign Ministry whom, as I say, I had become friendly with, who I realized increasingly was worried about where things were going in his own country much more than he had let on for a couple of years, I got permission to go down to the town. Well, you didn't need permission to go. The GDR didn't have travel restrictions. You could go anywhere you wanted without making a prior request, unlike the Soviet Union or some other countries in Eastern Europe. But to get an appointment to meet the First Secretary, that obviously required permission.

Q: From, through the Foreign Ministry?

GREENWALD: Yes, if you were making an official appointment of any kind, you had to go to the Foreign Ministry. We got the permission and drove down there in late August. We had just been in Prague. We had taken a couple days off for a long weekend, and we had seen the West German embassy, seen the thousands of people in the garden, knew what was going on. The whole country was in a sense of state of growing tension. You could just feel it. A day or two before that we had been to a wedding in Kupwus southeast of Berlin, the wedding of a pastor who had become a friend. One of the people at the wedding reception was another pastor whom we had gotten to know. He was telling us how he had gotten a call that morning from Vienna. His own son had just crossed the border. Another pastor we spent some time with in the same late summer was Friedrich Shollemur, who was very much a politically active fellow. He was a very charismatic younger pastor who lived in Martin Luther's home, Wittenberg, and preached from the church in Wittenberg. When we talked with him, we met in Luther's rose garden where some of the bushes had been planted by Luther. He told us about what his little group, a dissident church group, was trying to do and their concerns, how desperate many people were and how his own family, his daughter, had said, "I know what it means to you, Father. I don't want to leave." But he had told her just the night before, "If you feel you have to, go." This was what was going on in thousands of East German families. This was the background as we went down to the town and had a conversation that lasted about three hours with the First Secretary. It was the author and it was the head of the government of the county, and there was always a parallel structure of the government and the party. The party was more important.

Q: Did the author live there?

GREENWALD: No, he lived not far from there. We visited him in his home when we went back to the area the next summer. But we met just outside of the town in a retreat house that was run by the party or the government. It was a fascinating conversation. So often what was most important was what the First Secretary didn't say, but he said it with his body, with his body language or his face, his grimace or his smile. Of course, when we went back a year later after everything had changed, we visited the party headquarters. He was no longer the party leader at the time. People there remember the visit and, of course, they laugh and say, "Well, naturally before when you were there, the Stasi were all over the building and put microphones everywhere," and we were sure that was the case. So you could see where he was being very cautious in what he said, but he was letting a lot out by the way he acted. It was the frankest conversation I had ever had in the GDR with anybody official. We were talking about some of the things I had spoken of a few minutes ago about the generation gap. Was it possible for Honecker to understand what was going on? Was it possible for the party to take the leap of faith forward and make real changes and trust its people? Why didn't the people trust the party? Nobody doubted in the conversation in the way it went that he recognized that the people didn't trust the party. He didn't say it, but you could see it from his reaction. The fact that you could have that kind of conversation, even as careful as he was not to say anything incriminating on the tape, was another sign of how far things had gone and how near some kind of precipice everything was. But the reaction that all of us feared was more likely than what really happened was a crackdown of some kind. Force had been shown to work in China just a few months earlier, and the GDR leadership had praised what happened in China. The power question was something that was always fundamental to an old-line party leader like Honecker, and it was a real expectation that if things got grim enough, the power ministries, the Stasi and the army, the police would be called out and all this ferment would be squashed. It could be bloody, it could be very nasty, but there wasn't any real sense that the system, the regime, was mortally threatened, at least mortally threatened with something they couldn't handle. The question was always would reason, would good sense, would compromise somehow find its way through so that the change of leadership in time and the new leadership would loosen up enough and make enough changes and get on the Gorbachev track fast enough so that you would have change controlled from the top. The idea that change could be controlled from the bottom and it would not lead to physical repression and disaster was something that frankly I never had until very, very far along. There was always this growing tension that was so thick you could cut it figuratively with a knife, with expectation that something very dramatic was about to happen and fear that it could easily become very, very, very bad.

Q: I'd be interested in maybe backing up just for a second, Jon, and talking a little bit more about the role of the Soviet Union. Gorbachev obviously was a very important figure in this period and in what happened. What about the role of the Soviet embassy? Were you getting a feeling that the Soviets were worried about what was happening in East Germany, were encouraging the use of a crackdown of force? What about the Soviet angle?

GREENWALD: Clearly the Soviets were extraordinarily important in the GDR. The traditional line was expressed at the time the Quadripartite Agreement was signed by the Soviet ambassador, a man name Nebrossimov, who is supposed to have said to our ambassador, Ken Rush, "All right, we have this agreement. Now we'll control our Germans, you control your Germans, and make sure it works." And there was no doubt that for a long time the Soviet embassy controlled the GDR, that Nebrossimov, who was ambassador there for many, many years, was a pro-consul. In fact, one of the books that came out in 1990 was a memoir by one of the early leaders of the GDR, a man named Herrstadt, who was purged in 1953 in the very dramatic events just before and after the June 17 workers' rebellion in East Berlin. Herrstadt was one of the people who was trying to lead a reform movement at the time, which was ultimately pushed aside by Walter Ulbricht, and he was exiled to nowhere within the country. He was an archivist for the rest of his life, didn't go to prison but had no more political future. He wrote a memoir of that period which only came out posthumously after 1989. He describes Politburo meetings in 1953. It wasn't the Soviet ambassador who was attending the Politburo meeting; it was the Political Counselor. He was more than a political counselor at an average embassy; he was a de facto, ex officio member of the Politburo at the time, and it was his word that ultimately people were looking to rather than Ulbricht. That had been changing over the years. There was no question that GDR leaders, certainly Honecker, had much more freedom than that, and it was demonstrated for all to see when Gorbachev came in and went off on a reform course that Honecker opposed, to the point where he was banning Soviet publications. His wife was saying at cocktail parties, "Who had ever thought the counter-revolution would come at us from the East?" But there was still enormous influence in the Soviet embassy, obviously information, sources that we could only dream of, of all kinds, I'm sure, overt, covert. They knew what was happening much more than we did, and to the extent we could talk to them, we tried to talk to them because we were interested in getting their take. I had good relations, my office, with the Russian Political Counselor, a man named Greneem. I would go to lunch with him about every month. We talked fairly openly. We talked more openly as we strolled the street and went back to our embassies. I remember very well in the summer of 1989 at one point when we had been talking about whether the GDR would ever have the nerve to make reforms. As we were strolling back he stopped and looked at me very hard and said, "Mr. Greenwald, do you really think that if they make those reforms, they could hold together?" That was clearly the question that was being asked in Moscow. I think they were emphasizing the need to do things, make changes. But I'm sure there was a caution, there was a feeling that maybe the regime was more brittle than we thought it was. Maybe it was as brittle as it proved to be. What they didn't do clearly was intervene the way a lot of East Germans hoped that would do, which was simply one day to call Honecker in and say, "Your time's up. It's time for you to go," basically what they did do in 1971 with Ulbricht. Ulbricht was in a somewhat similar situation. Ulbricht was opposed to the course that had been started. Willy Brandt was working very hard to establish a new relationship with the Soviet Union. The younger Brezhnev wanted that new relationship, wanted the sort of things that led to the Berlin Agreement and then CSCE and MBFR for his own reasons, and Ulbricht was suspicious of it all. At one point basically the Soviets said to Ulbricht, "It's time for you to retire." And there were a lot of East Germans who were hoping that would happen again and that Honecker would be told it was time to go and somebody, probably Modrow, would be tapped as the East German Gorbachev. I think there was caution in the analyses that were coming out of their embassy in East Berlin and undoubtedly from their think tanks and whatever else in Moscow. Gorbachev seems really to have believed in what he had said, that decisions in East Berlin were to be made in East Berlin just as decisions in Warsaw are to be made in Warsaw and we'll accept a non-Communist government. He was not willing to use the old stiff arm to make the change in East Berlin. But it was certainly clear that the Soviet embassy had a lot of knowledge about how much dissatisfaction there was in the country, how brittle things were, and the need to make some changes. I don't think they were out-and-out on the Gorbachev line; they were partly traditional, partly cautious. The DCM at the Soviet embassy was a man named Max Simichek, really a great German expert and spent his whole career on German matters both in Bonn and Berlin. He has written a book, which unfortunately hasn't been translated out of Russian, about that period. He clearly is a rather liberal person who was basically sympathetic to change, but I think they were cautious about how fast that change could be made without destabilizing the situation. We did have a lot of conversations and a lot of talk about that summer, and then as the revolution picked up speed, we continued those contacts.

Q: Again, I don't want you to feel like you need to give chapters from your book, but do you want to talk a little bit further about the embassy's role, your role as events of the fall of '89 went on?

GREENWALD: Sure. We had a very good Political Section, and unlike Budapest, where I was alone, I had several excellent officers helping me. One officer in particular had the task of following the church, a quite remarkable junior FSO who in many ways wasn't junior. His name is Imre Lipping. Imre was born on the very same day I was born, January 3, 1943, so you can see that as a junior officer in East Berlin he was 46 in that year. It was his second career. He was born in Estonia. His father was in the German army in the Second World War. They fled Estonia and went west as the tide of war shifted. His father was Estonian, but the Estonians were fighting against the Soviet Union because of the takeover of the Baltic states. He grew up in a refugee camp outside of Munich, came to the United States as a teenager, got a Ph.D. in medieval history, a specialist in medieval church history, joined the U.S. Army and became a colonel, retired after 20 years as a colonel, and joined the Foreign Service. After a brief consular tour in South Africa, he showed up in East Berlin as our junior Political Officer. He was obviously the ideal person to cover the church because he could talk about theological issues as well as the political issues, and was a wonderful person. He just did a terrific job in meeting everybody in and around the church movement. Of course, that was the part of the society which in September of 1989 began to coalesce as a political movement. It had been the closest thing to a political movement, to an alternative movement, all through the first several years that I was in East Berlin. But when nothing was being said anywhere else in society in that summer the crisis was happening, it was the church that began to speak out ever more publicly and groups within the church began to form the first incipient political parties. It was Imre's contacts with these people that let us know very quickly who was doing what, what was happening, who got the first copies of the manifestos that were coming out. I should say that it was the church and there was one other group in society that spoke out very quickly. The other group was rock-and-roll singers, rock musicians who, of course, were close to the kids, close to the young people. They were some of the first quasi-establishment artists who suddenly began to sign petitions and demonstrate.

Q: You had a political officer with a unique church background. Did you have one who had a rock music background?

GREENWALD: Well, we had two who were into that to some extent. One, Janice Winer, was actually a very good classical musician, and she joined the Foreign Service a little bit late after Princeton and Stanford Law School and then practicing law in California for a few years. She came in with her first assignment being East Berlin, but with a lot of music knowledge and a lot of good German and tremendous capacity to work. She is actually the German desk officer right now after having served a tour as human rights reporting officer in Ankara for three years. Then Heather Troutman, who was another Princeton graduate, who had good contacts to the rock scene and, in fact, had written a very good telegram about a movie that was made about one rock group that summer of 1989, picked up the story. One of the other political figures in whom there was a lot of interest was the party leader in Berlin, a man named Shebosky, who later became famous as the person who actually announced the opening of the wall at a press conference in November of 1989. Shebosky who gave out some emanations of reform and optimism. One of the indications we had Heather picked up from one of her rock singers who told her that she had been in Moscow that summer and she had bumped into Shebosky on the street. Shebosky had seen that this girl was wearing a Gorbachev button, which she could wear in Moscow but you'd probably get picked up if you were wearing it in East Berlin, and Shebosky pointed to the button and said, "Good girl, we need more like you." Just these little pieces of straw from which one would try to build bricks writing about what were the personalities of people in the Politburo and what were their real inclinations. What would they be like if they came to power? But as soon as those political movements began to form in September around people like Nan Sholimer, whom I had mentioned, we were in very quick, close contact with them and had very good sources of information to them and from them.

Q: You were dealing with a very fast-moving, very fluid, sometimes chaotic situation with very dramatic events occurring, whether it was in the West German embassy in Prague or on the border of Hungary and Austria as East Germans went across or ultimately then in November the Berlin Wall coming down. There was obviously enormous interest not only at the desk level in the State Department but at high levels all over the U.S. government but also in the American public, the press following it closely, television and so on. Therefore, you didn't necessarily have to report everything, because a lot of things were on front pages, so to speak, or on CNN. How did you deal with all that?

GREENWALD: Well, very little was reported in the American press until very late. There would be an occasional columnist, a reporter, who would come through, and we'd chat. They'd always come to the embassy and we would talk to them, but there was nobody stationed in Berlin. All the reporters were somewhere else. There was simply no American press presence in West Berlin or East Berlin, so you'd get an occasional story of somebody who'd come and write about what was going on. For the most part, well into the summer it was East German Communists stuck in the mud, nothing happening, last redoubt of old-style Communism. Don't look here for news, look to Warsaw, to Moscow, somewhere else. That changed, of course, in October but not until then. It took us a while to realize things had changed as much as they had. For example, the day after the wall had opened up, I remember calling up the operations center to tell them about what the Mayor of West Berlin, Momper, Willy Brandt and other West German politicians were saying at the wall that day. The guy in the operations center said, "Oh, yes, we're watching it on television." But it wasn't until quite late that that began to happen. The relationship with the press was a very good and mutual one, because when they did start to come in numbers, they came to us for comment, thoughts, and they also told us what they were hearing. We shared a lot of information. It was a good working relationship. But compared to the West German press, which was all over East Berlin, there was nothing much in the American press - really rather shocking, this lack of coverage for quite a while.

Q: The West German embassy was very active, informed, the Soviet embassy.

GREENWALD: Yes, and, of course, we kept in very close contact with them. They were informed, and they were very friendly. They were good professional and personal friends in many, many cases, and their sources were obviously far, far better than ours for the most part, but not always. There were some people that for various reasons they wouldn't talk to. One in particular I can think of is a remarkable old man, Jurgen Kujinsky, who died just last year at the age of 90-something after having written about 90 books. He was a legitimate scholar, world-renowned scholar who had written a multi-volume history of the German . . . [end of Tape 4, Side B]

Q: This is the continuation of a Foreign Affairs Oral History Interview with G. Jonathan Greenwald. It's the 28th of April 1998. I'm Raymond Ewing. This is being conducted at the National Foreign Affairs Training Center under the auspices of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training. Jon, I think when we finished a week or so ago, you were talking about one Jurgen Kujinsky, a scholar and person who, I guess, came to play a political role in the events of 1989 and thereabouts.

GREENWALD: Well, Kujinsky was an extraordinary man. He died only last year well into his 90s, by which time I think he had written roughly one book for each year of his life and within just a few months before his death, in fact, wrote a book which became a best seller in united Germany, one of his several autobiographical books. He was a person who wasn't very well received in West Germany for many years, because at the height of the Cold War he had been a leading polemicist from the East German point of view. As a result, he was somebody that our colleagues in the West German mission in East Berlin simply didn't see. As an example, there weren't too many but there were a few of the kinds of instances in which we had better access, broader access, or at least in specific instances better access, than even our West German colleagues. Kujinsky was a man who was at least an economic if not dissident at least would-be rebel. He tried very hard in his many years in East Germany to encourage a more intelligent approach to the economic policy in the regime, and he believed devoutly that at some point in the future the political liberties would be widened. He was a convinced, I'm sure to the day of his death, Communist, but he was one who believed at least considerably more in the ideals of Rosa Luxemburg than most of the leadership of the party did. In fact, in his own diary of the year 1989, which in some ways parallels the diary that I put together and published in that we both appear in the other's book, in my case my call on him and in his case his impressions of that call, at the very end of that book he talks about his conclusions of that year. He said that, in fact, he regarded what happened as basically positive even though it brought an end to the Communist regime in East Germany. He said he regarded it somewhat in the light of another tumultuous experience that he had which was the end of the Tizareich and the Weimar Republic. He said the Weimar Republic had great weaknesses, great problems, but it was fairly better than the Kaiser Reich which had proceeded it. There was counter-revolution involved in it. There was certainly counter-revolution when the Weimar Republic fell. He believed that there was an element of counter-revolution in the unification of Germany which had been directed from Bonn, but he believed that it was going to be a better Germany than the divided Germany that he had been living in for the last forty years. He believed it wasn't the end of German history and that, in fact, there would someday be a socialism which was more worthy of what he believed it should be. That was the kind of person whom one met quite often in outer party circles, more often than one might have expected - someone who had a certain position within the society, who was committed to it in its basic principles but who had a great deal of difference with the way it was implemented. One who believed that at least in that brief period in the fall of 1989 they would have a chance to make their own kind of European Communism work and work better than the Soviet-style Communism they had been living with for forty years. History wrote over them very quickly, but there was definitely a moment for I would say two months, October, November and into early December of 1989, when that was the dominant spirit one met when one talked to party people and people who were involved with the effort to establish the post-Honecker GDR government.

Q: Was there a widespread hope at that time among these circles that you're talking about that there would be a new form of a German Democratic Republic, and at what point did unification become a goal?

GREENWALD: This is a very interesting question and one that, of course, we were looking at at the time. We were looking constantly for any sign that this was a real question or a real issue in the fall of 1989, and ever since I've been asking myself what was there that we missed, was there something that we missed or did it simply come up very late and very, very suddenly. I tend strongly toward the latter view. I still remember vividly the largest demonstration in East Berlin just before the wall opened. It was the fourth of November, Saturday, just five days before the wall opened. It was in Alexanderplatz. There were anywhere from a half a million to a million, depending upon whose estimates you take, people crammed into Alexanderplatz in East Berlin carrying every imaginable sign and banner, all self made with certainly no central direction for those banners and those slogans that were on them. I walked around the square, walked around with Pierre Shostal, who was visiting and was at that time the Director of Central European Affairs in the European Bureau. We were looking, of course, for any sign that there was a unification theme. Everything was on those banners from "Party Leaders Are All Rascals - Arrest Them" to "Free Elections" to really anything you could think of with one exception: there was nothing about unification. The only sign I saw that had even the slightest hint of it was carried by a very old man, a hand-lettered placard, not a stick, that said something in German like "My name is Heinz Kuhn. My address is 16 Eisenletrestrasse, Panko (which is a district of Berlin), Berlin, Germany, The World," nothing else. As I said, it was kind of unorchestrated. It couldn't have been that somebody sent out word that said nobody could put something about one Germany or we are all brothers again, the Germans, or anything like that on these signs. It simply wasn't there, not that it might not have been in people's hearts but that there was a strong belief that there were certain things that simply couldn't be raised, were not raisable because there were red lines beyond which if you went you'd be back to the days of 1953 when Soviet tanks were rolling in East Berlin to put down a workers' revolt. I may have touched upon this last week, but I believe that even after the Berlin Wall had opened, there was still a period of some weeks in which that belief remained very strong and that, had Gorbachev so indicated that there was in fact still this red line, people would have pulled back and that there would have been a substantial waiting period before demands for German unification were put. As it turned out, the first demands, as you know, came from the crowds that were around the church in Leipzig that was holding every Monday large services that became then political demonstrations and spilled out in the street. Those demonstrations in September and October were very important in putting enormous pressure upon the Honecker government, pressure that finally led to its fall. But those demonstrations themselves had not touched on the unification theme until the second half of November, some weeks after the wall was opened, when a few people began to put up signs which raised that theme. Until then the motto of the crowd had been "We are the people," "Wizzen das folk," which meant in effect "We are the people of this republic, and the leaders should listen to us rather than the other way around." Remember the old line of Brecht, who said sarcastically about the party's response to the 1953 revolt that the people had failed the leadership and the leadership should elect themselves a new people. That "We are the People" chant slowly changed to "We are One People, Germans are One People." Once it was spoken, once it was brought out in public and there was no cough from Moscow, very quickly it became a crescendo. I really think that in September, October and into mid-November, it simply wasn't there, because people had internalized the belief that that would be too dangerous and that would bring down all of the hopes that the fall of 1989 seemed to be developing.

Q: I can remember studying German here at the Foreign Service Institute in 1958, and we talked some about the reunification of Germany, and it always seemed to me that it was kind of a language exercise. It was a way to use the language. It wasn't something that was realistic or achievable in my lifetime or career, but it did happen. I guess you've talked some about the very important role of Gorbachev and the Soviets and certainly the role of the East German people, the government of the Federal Republic. What about the role of the United States and the embassy in East Berlin in this period? Were we playing a leadership role, the embassy, or was it basically observing and trying to figure out what was going on?

GREENWALD: Well, as far as the United States goes, I think you have to distinguish two periods. You have the period throughout the whole history of the GDR in which the United States played a very secondary role for reasons I tried to explain last week. The United States wasn't interested in the GDR as the GDR, unlike our interest in Poland as Poland or Czechoslovakia as Czechoslovakia. We never accepted that there was something legitimate and permanent in East Berlin. If it proved to be permanent, we thought it wasn't for us to be first to say that, that it was really Bonn's call in how one dealt with East Germany. In fact, if anything, our concern was to be a bit of a caution or a bit of a brake upon Bonn, because we were always a little worried that at some point perhaps German romanticism would take hold and Bonn would become too entranced with reestablishing relationships with East Berlin, German-German relationships that might not take account of what we would see as tougher Cold War realities. So we were never a leader in developing ties to the GDR. At most it was a somewhat cautionary semi-brake upon the desire of the West German government to expand or accelerate its pace at ties. There was a certain almost commonality of viewpoint that haunted periods in the 1980s between Washington and Moscow in that, because you will recall that at the time of the dispute over the stationing of short-range or medium-range missiles in Europe with Washington putting missiles into Western Europe in response to the SS20s that the Soviet Union had put into Eastern Europe and into the western part of the Soviet Union, there was a German-German dialogue that developed that both Moscow and Washington regarded with a little bit of suspicion. This was in some ways, you might call it, Erich Honecker's finest moment, because he clearly was concerned that a serious escalation of the Cold War would put at risk the kinds of economic relationships that he had established with West Germany, that his regime had a life interest in seeing that things didn't get so bad. Bonn clearly felt that it didn't want to lose what it had achieved in German-German relations over the decade and a half of Ostpolitik, and the two came together to at least talk about ways to limit the slide into a tougher kind of Cold War. That created a certain distress in Moscow and at least a certain caution in Washington. So that was the nature, I think, of the U.S. view of the GDR. It stayed that way basically until after the wall had opened. Once the wall had opened up, a few weeks from that point at least, when unification suddenly sprang up and suddenly everyone realized that, as one said, the German question was again on the agenda of the world, on the agenda of Europe, then Washington did play a very important leadership role and played it in regard to our Western European allies. I think I mentioned or we touched on this last week, but we had all been saying that self-determination of the Germans was our goal, by which we meant, of course, eventually unification of Germany. This was one of the basic human rights and so on and so forth, that NATO was meant to protect and create conditions that would allow unification. None of the leaders who made these statements probably thought that this was any more realistic than perhaps you felt when you were going through language exercises at FSI. Suddenly we were all faced with the need to put up or shut up. At least in London and in Paris there was a hesitation to what the response should be. Mitterrand made a trip which was rather controversial, I think as far as Bonn went, to East Germany shortly after the wall opened, in which he at least seemed to be toying with the idea of giving support to the post-Krenz government. Krenz was the man who came in immediately after Honecker and tried to capture control of the reform process and maintain control but was swept aside shortly after the wall opened.

Q: Who made this trip?

GREENWALD: The trip was Francois Mitterrand's trip, the French President. The government then at this point was in the hands of Hans Modrow, who had been the hope of reform-minded East German party people before the events of the fall, the person who they believed could be a Gorbachev-like leader in East Germany. Modrow was the Prime Minister. There was no longer party control in December of 1989, and Mitterrand seemed to be toying with the idea of giving political support to Modrow. Margaret Thatcher also had her doubts. She called a conference of British historians and experts on Germany to consider what should the British answer to the German question be. At that point of hesitation in both London and Paris, the position Washington took was, well, we said it for forty years and we mean it. We support self determination, and we support the process which is being pushed by Helmut Kohl in Bonn. That sign of leadership within the Western alliance was decisive, I think, for making it clear that there would be a quick process toward unification. We could have put some brakes upon it, and we chose not to, for which we certainly gained a degree of appreciation from Helmut Kohl and from the government in Bonn. I suppose history is likely to be generally favorable toward that attitude. I say likely because there are all sorts of what-might-have-beens and could-have-beens, none of which would have involved a permanent division in Germany, but there is at least seriously raised in Germany today in both East and West the question of whether the Kohl policy of pushing for very quick unification and pushing everything aside to do it and to do it in a way which promised an ease of accomplishment, that has turned out not to be correct, was in fact the right policy and is today in East Germany. One saw another side of it in the election in Zaksnunhaus on Sunday a great deal of distress, and some of that is related to excessive expectations that were built up at the time, excessive expectations that the people in East Germany were all too willing to have built up but which were built up by the government in Bonn, and a lack of appreciation of the difficulties, so that a slower movement toward German unification has a certain after-the-fact rationale which seems in some ways quite strong. The real question, I guess, was whether it was possible to have a slower process. That's an impossible question to answer with any certainty. I think what was decisive, if I can guess what was in Kohl's mind - I certainly heard it expressed by West German diplomats in Bonn - was that the window is open and that window could be closed, unpredictably but at any time, basically by a change in Moscow policy, and that as long as the window was open, one had to go through it and take advantage of it, because the window could close quickly and perhaps there wasn't enough time to go slowly. That may be correct; it's just impossible to know.

Q: I've read the book by Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice on the diplomacy of the unification process, the negotiations involving the United States, United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union plus the two German states. I'd be interested in what you think of that book but also what role you and the embassy in East Berlin played in that process if any.

GREENWALD: Well, I confess I haven't read the book yet. I have to read it soon, because it will be useful for a course I'll be teaching next year, but I bought it and I bought it for the selfish goal of looking through the index to see how many footnotes to mine it had. After I counted those, I put the book aside, and I'll get to it soon.

Q: You could check the index too.

GREENWALD: The Two-Plus-Four Process, which is what the name of the negotiating process was, was a very carefully chosen title, of course, because there had been a whole series of four-power meetings on Germany which ultimately failed in the '40s and '50s, failed to produce a solution to the German question. There was talk, of course, in the fall of 1989 about having a four-power conference on Germany. I remember even before the dramatic events of October of 1989, just as the process of fermentation was becoming clearer in the summer, I was visited in Berlin by an academic friend, an American academic, who said, "Look what's going on here. There has to be a four-power conference to get a handle on this and prevent it from spinning out of control and becoming a danger to world peace." Well, it was clear that you couldn't have a four-power conference, you had to have something that gave the two German states a different kind of role at the table than they had ever had. I think there may have been one four-power conference just before that process broke down in the '50s where there were actually a couple of side tables at which German experts, West and East, had sat, but basically it had never been something that the Germans had a seat at. The world had changed, and certainly Bonn would demand a seat, rightfully so, at any four-power conference, so the name Two-Plus-Four, which I think was devised at a meeting in Canada - it might have been in very early 1990 - was meant to show not only that it was different from the four-power conferences of the '40s and '50s, that there were two German states, two were before the four. It wasn't the four plus two, it was the two plus four. It was the self determination of the German people expressed through their representatives in the two German states plus the four powers that had residual rights to Germany. That process began in earnest after the one free election that was held in the GDR, the election for the Volkskammer of the 18th of March. The embassy had a major political reporting role for the months leading up to that March election, to simply advise Washington on how it was going. There had been a very dramatic visit in December of 1989 of Secretary of State Baker to Berlin. He had given a speech in West Berlin about the new architecture, security architecture of Europe, and he had decided rather quickly on short notice that he would go to Potsdam to meet both some of the political leaders of the GDR and some of the unofficial church leaders and dissidents. He had met with Hans Modrow and had given an indication of American support for keeping stability in East Germany during what was a potential highly unstable period provided that Modrow kept his promise of free elections. One of the tasks we had was to monitor that movement toward elections and to indicate to Washington whether there was any backsliding. I recall, for example, at one point when there was a small fuss over some incident. I don't recall what the incident was. Secretary Baker telephoned Ambassador Barkley immediately and said, "Is Modrow still keeping to his word? Is he trying to get out of it?" There was, of course, great suspicion that there would be an effort by the Communist leadership to reestablish control. It was beyond the party's ability, and it may well have been beyond the desire of the new leaders of the party that had come in after the old Politburo had been thrown out in December of 1989, but it certainly wasn't within their power to do it. The Two-Plus-Four negotiations that began then after there had been a free election and the establishment of a non-Communist government under Hoto deMisiere in the early spring of 1990 was a process that floated about with negotiating sessions in Bonn and one time in Paris and one time in London, and in East Berlin. It was rather tightly controlled by principals from the capitals. In our case it was controlled from Washington. There was very little in the way of negotiation that was done by the embassy. We facilitated the meeting in East Berlin. We reported between meetings on what was being said by various people in East Berlin. Our access, of course, to the political leadership increased astronomically; that is, it was possible to talk to deMisiere at a moment's notice. It was possible for me to wander around the Foreign Ministry from floor to floor in a way that was undreamed of in the previous year. I recall one morning when the Deputy Foreign Minister, who was a former pastor and former dissident, invited me to a breakfast at seven o'clock in the morning in the Minister's private dining room to discuss whatever the issue of the moment was. I recall just thinking to myself as I went up to that meeting how fast indeed things had changed in that building. But our process was to facilitate and to report the intricacies of the events rather than to lead. Facilitation could sometimes take strange twists and turns. I remember a visit in I believe it was May of 1990, just about a month after the new deMisiere government had been sworn in, a visit of Bob Zoellick and Ray Seitz. Zoellick was the Senior Deputy to Baker who was charged with essentially carrying out the negotiation for him except for those sessions that Baker himself attended, and Seitz was the Assistant Secretary for European Affairs at that time. They decided that they particularly wanted to meet the Minister of Defense of the GDR, who was himself a very interesting figure. He was a pastor. His name was Eppelman. Eppelman had been one of the leading radical political pastors in the GDR for years. Before 1989 he had organized an arms control forum in East Berlin, which was looked upon askance by the authorities and was always the target of great interest by the Stasi, by the secret police. I discovered just how much so when some transcripts of various meeting were published in Stern Magazine, the West German equivalent of Life Magazine, a few years ago. I and other people from the embassy were featured prominently for our visits to him and our discussions with him. I discovered that my Stasi code name was Caesar. Another fellow at the embassy had a code name Rock Band. He told me the reason for that, and it was that he had always liked that rock band and he played its music on his stereo at home so much that obviously the people who listened in at his home decided to give him that name. Eppelman had become the Minister of Defense, which was a rather remarkable appointment because he was a pacifist and a pastor, but his job as Minister of Defense was basically to take whatever teeth it was believed the GDR army might still have out and to insure that it didn't become a threat to the process of negotiation and unification. Very quickly it was apparent that they had no desire to pose such a threat, and it became more a matter of negotiating the turnover of weapons and the disposition of stocks and bases and so on and so forth. But early in that process Zoellick and Seitz wanted to go out and meet Eppelman. Well, there was a problem; it was an old Berlinery problem. While the Soviets and the GDR had done a great deal over the decades to carry out their proposition that East Berlin was an integral part of the GDR and they so proclaimed, there were certain things they did or certain things which they did not do which still maintained their respect for the Quadripartite status of the entire city. Oddly enough, one of the things they did was never to put the Defense Ministry into East Berlin. One of the elements of the Quadripartite status of East Berlin was that it was a demilitarized city. The only military force in the city was the four-power force, American, British, French, Soviet troops. Well, there was actually a small contingent of GDR soldiers stationed in East Berlin and GDR soldiers that could be seen in East Berlin from time to time, but they never put the headquarters there, they never put the Defense Ministry there. So Eppelman was off in the woods 20 miles outside of Berlin in a compound near a small village. Zoellick asked, "Could we meet him in East Berlin?" We high priests of Berlinery said, "Gosh, you know, we've been maintaining the demilitarized status of the city for forty years through thick and thin, and at the last moment should we risk it? We ought to go out and see him in his headquarters." Zoellick and Seitz said that would be fine, work it out. We had rather tight parameters, because they had to make a flight from the West Berlin airport by a certain hour in the afternoon and they were tied up in the morning. Another aspect of Berlinery was that you couldn't go, shouldn't go from East Berlin into the GDR, because there were no controls between the East Berlin border and GDR proper. You should only go into GDR, true GDR, from West Berlin. So, for example, all of the time that I was in the embassy, if we wanted to take a visitor to Potsdam, we would have to take him from West Berlin rather than take him from East Berlin and drive out the normal way. This applied also to Zoellick and Seitz, so we made arrangements to meet them in West Berlin and drive from West Berlin into the GDR proper and go to the Defense Ministry. Because time was so short, we thought we would do a very clever thing. We asked the GDR police to provide an escort to meet us at the crossing point from West Berlin into the GDR and provide us a police escort on the autobahn so that we would be sure to get to the Ministry and back in time. Well, they met us. We had expected they would go rather fast on the autobahn like everybody else did, but you should know that while West German autobahns traditionally had no speed limit, East German autobahns were safer and more sensible. They had 100-kilometer-an-hour limits, approximately 62 miles an hour. One always, I always at least, felt a lot more comfortable on the East German autobahn than the West German autobahn.

Q: Probably there weren't as many cars either.

GREENWALD: There weren't as many cars as well. But the two police cars formed up, one in front of us, one behind us, a convoy, and we were the only cars on the autobahn that were going 100 kilometers an hour. Everybody else was passing us, but this was the new GDR with police that were determined to prove that they were indeed law abiding and they were not going to break the law, so we rumbled at 62 miles an hour down the autobahn being passed by everybody. At one point a policeman pulled us over and said, "Gosh, you know, we've never gone to the Defense Ministry, and we're lost." So to make the longer story a little bit shorter, after a while we eventually found our way to the Ministry. We drove in the front gate just as the Minister's car drove out the front gate, and we proceeded up the path to the steps of the building. The Minister's aide said, "Gosh, terribly sorry," but we were so late, he was late now for an appointment in East Berlin, and he had to leave for it. He gave his apologies. So we then got in the car and drove Zoellick and Seitz back to the airport.

Q: In West Berlin?

GREENWALD: In West Berlin, somewhat embarrassed and somewhat nervous for our careers. As we dropped them at the airport in West Berlin, I'll never forget the gratitude I felt when Zoellick said with a smile, "Be sure when you get to Washington to look me up. I'll take you on a nice drive around the Beltway."

Q: At the speed limit.

GREENWALD: So we facilitated as best we could.

Q: Let me skip ahead for just a minute. If you can remind me, when did you actually leave East Berlin?

GREENWALD: I left in December of 1990. It was connected with the question of what would happen to the embassy, what would happen to the U.S. diplomatic missions that were in Berlin. Throughout the summer and early fall of 1990, there was a great deal of discussion about how the American diplomatic presence would be organized and really how everyone's diplomatic presence in Berlin would be organized. The West German government had reaffirmed that at least formally the capital of the new Germany would be Berlin. There was considerable debate that was still to go on over the next few years as to whether or not the government would truly move, how much of the government would move, and particularly how fast it move. Of course, eight years after unification, it still hasn't moved, though it was supposed to be imminent. But it was clear that at least formally the capital would be in Berlin, and one expected that at some point the capital would actually be in Berlin. Before the unification of Germany, there were two types of diplomatic missions in Berlin. Of course, there were those in West Berlin which were evolutions of the original military missions that had been established after the collapse of the Third Reich in 1945. Some of those were military missions, and some of them were called consulates, depending on what the relationship was of the country to the anti-Hitler alliance in 1945. In East Berlin, of course, there were the embassies to the German Democratic Republic. The Bonn government gave all countries two options for being represented in Berlin after unification. One would be to have a consulate; another would be to have an office of the embassy to the Federal Republic of Germany, that is, an office of the embassy that was in Bonn. We and most countries chose the latter. It was really more a symbolic gesture than anything else. It was a statement of belief that in fact there would be someday an embassy in Berlin. So we had decided that we would merge our two existing diplomatic representations into the Berlin office of the embassy in Bonn, but how it would be done was a matter of considerable debate. The assumption had been that there would be for some time at least a substantial quasi-independence of the two elements, that there would still be a need for something in West Berlin to deal with all of the city-type questions and there would still be a need for something in East Berlin that would deal with the political process of merging East German institutions into West German institutions, that they would be both under the embassy in Bonn and formally linked together but there would still be two more or less separate entities with more or less separate purposes. We learned, in my case literally the day after unification and in the case of the ambassador, I think, the day of unification, of what the final disposition was going to be. It was somewhat different. It was a more rapid and absolute merger of the two than we had been led to expect. What that meant was that essentially by various formulae you had two Political Counselors, one in West Berlin and one in East Berlin; you had two consular officers, one in West Berlin, one in East Berlin; two Economic Section chiefs, one in West Berlin, one in East Berlin. One would be made the head of a joint section, and one would be redundant. There were various formulae for the way this was done, but for the most part the effort was to roll up the embassy in East Berlin and do away with it as quickly as possible. So I found myself on the morning after unification surprisingly with no work, with nothing to do on the grounds that I was the head of a Political Section who was scheduled to leave earliest anyway. I would have left on the normal rotation the following summer, and my colleague in West Berlin had another two years, I believe. So the question was what to do, where to go, and what way to leave. I left as soon as I could find a useful thing to leave to do, which was complicated in our case because personally my wife's mother in West Berlin had become older and more ill, less well, and no longer able to fend for herself in her own apartment. My wife had the task of bringing her to that conclusion, which was apparent to us but not immediately to her, and then to actually bring it about. She needed to stay in Berlin for a number of months, as it turned out for another half year basically. We couldn't go back to Washington that quickly, so I had found a temporary job in Frankfurt, which led in fact into my next assignment.

Q: What was the date of unification?

GREENWALD: The third of October.

Q: Of 1990?

GREENWALD: Of 1990, that's correct. We spent it, I should just say as a footnote, I thought, in an appropriate way. The second of October was, of course, a very dramatic day. That was the last day of the existence of the GDR, and there was to be a huge event at the Reichstag, which is on the old dividing line between East Berlin and West Berlin. All of the political leadership of both German states was to be there at midnight. There would be solemn speeches and fireworks and so forth. There had been huge crowds in East Berlin all of that day and that evening, and we had a farewell party at the embassy in which we celebrated with some bittersweetness both the achievements of the embassy and the fact that it was being disbanded. I felt particularly badly for our German national employees, East German employees. There were, of course, quite a number of them. All of them were to be fired, which I thought and still think was very unfair of the U.S. government. The reason was that, of course, the files, police files, the secret police files, on all of them had been made available to the West German government in the last months to the unification, to the walk-up to the unification, and they were then made available to the U.S., and all of them were seen to have had various degrees of cooperation with the East German secret police, which was absolutely unsurprising to anybody who knows anything about the way things happened in Eastern Europe. I have no doubt that that was exactly the case in Warsaw and Budapest, in Prague and Bucharest, everywhere in Eastern Europe. The different was in those places the files weren't made available. But the security people said, "You can't possibly hire to work in our new diplomatic post these people who are compromised." There were degrees of compromise. There were people who were out-and-out employees of the Stasi, and there were people who in order to keep their jobs occasionally would be interviewed and answer a few questions, and I think there should have been differentiation between them and they should have been treated the same way as the people in other Eastern European posts, but none of them were. They were all fired, so it was a particularly bittersweet evening to say goodbye to all of them, because they were obviously going to have a tough time. But around six or seven o'clock in the evening, Gobby, my wife, and I left our party and went off to a party which was held in what was called the House of Democracy, the building just off Unter den Linden. We attended the party there which for many of the people who had made the revolution, the leaders of Noyus Forum, of Democracy Now, the first, small, brave political parties which had been pushed aside in the interim. They were the losers of the free election in March of 1990, the one free election to the Volkskammer. That election, you will recall, was won by the Christian Democratic Union, SADU, which was the party of Chancellor Kohl. That party had always existed in the GDR version. It was a controlled version, but the GDR, unlike most of Eastern Europe, had maintained a number of technically non-Communist parties, block parties, which gave their support to the leadership of the Communist party. They were always loyal support, but there had always been an Eastern CDU just as there had been an Eastern version of the Free Democrats and a couple of other small block parties. The very top leadership of that Eastern CDU had been thrown out with the revolution in the fall of 1989, but to a considerable extent the party structure, the party organization, was retained and was used by the West German CDU to compete in the election of 1990. That plus the personality and the prestige of Kohl and his promise of a painless, quick unification that would produce, as he put it, a flowering landscape in East Germany with no losers had made for a successful election. The Social Democrats started from a disadvantage in that election. They had been ruthlessly expunged from the political landscape by the Communists after 1949, because the great fight on the left had been, for many years in German history, would the left be represented by the Communist party or by the Social Democrats. The Social Democrats were seen as the threat to the Communist party, so one of the decisive moments in East German history after the war was the forced unification of the Social Democrats and the Communists, which then became a complete domination within the new so-called Socialist Unity Party. When the revolution began in the fall of 1989, brave young pastors basically started the Social Democratic Party from scratch. They got a lot of help in the spring in the election from the West German party, but they were without an organizational base, which put them at a disadvantage. Then the loss could probably also be explained by one little anecdote. I recall meeting a couple of East German workers on a train who were talking just before the election about how they would vote. I asked them how they would vote, and they said basically, "Well, we're going to vote for the CDU, Kohl's party." I said, "Why? You're workers. You're people traditionally who would vote for the Social Democrats. You come from an area in Eastern Germany which before the war was a Social Democratic stronghold." One fellow said, "Well, because Kohl has the power and he has the money." They were practical people who said, "Let's tie our horse to the power in Bonn, not to the opposition in Bonn, but to the power in Bonn." Then it was still a very close election if you read the polls. In the morning of the election of March 18, the polls were showing a virtual dead heat. Basically, of course, both parties were speaking for unification, but CDU was saying, Kohl was saying do it tomorrow, and the Social Democrats were saying do it the day after tomorrow after we look at a lot of the i's that have to be dotted and t's that have to be crossed. Be careful. Move slowly. I personally am convinced that the reason for the landslide, maybe not for the victory of the Christian Democrats but for the landslide, that simply overwhelmed the Social Democrats and completely submerged the parties that had made the revolution like Noyus Forum, the Greens, and Democracy Now, which had an ever slower approach than the Social Democrats, was that it was a beautiful day that day. The weather was superb. It was like it is right now, the temperature in the 70s, sun shining, blue sky, which is very unusual for Eastern Germany in the middle of March, and I think with many, many people torn between their optimistic and their cautious sides, it was the kind of day that simply encouraged people to believe that they should take that jump into the unknown as fast as possible. Be that as it may, the parties that truly lost were the parties that had first gone out into the streets. To generalize, a lot of those people, certainly their leadership, were people who would not have been sorry to see the GDR last a lot longer, believed in a strongly socialist state, not a totally socialist state, not a unitary political state but one in which the political spectrum, while it covered a wide area, would be substantially more to the left than what one was used to in Bonn. These people met the third of October with a certain bittersweet reaction as well. They had won and they had lost, and we wanted to spend some time with them. In fact, I felt honored to be called up to the front of the room at one point and asked to say a few words to them. While one tries to keep a reserve throughout the professional career and you're observing, you're analyzing, you're commenting on, you're not participating in politics of the country, I felt that that night, that time, when that country was going to disappear, when that state was disappearing and our embassy was disappearing, I could speak a little more personally and I tried to, saying to them that I thought they had very, very much to be proud of that evening, that they had made history and they were the ones who had made this moment. It wasn't anybody in the United States who had done it. It wasn't really even anybody in Bonn who had done it. They had facilitated certain things, but it was these people that had gone out into the streets, they had taken the risks. While they had been rejected at the ballot box, pushed aside as not being people who had the power and the money, maybe even people who had some crazy ideas at times, they were the ones who had in fact brought democracy to their part of Germany, and that was what history would show and they should be very proud of that moment.

Q: Does your book cover the period up until October third, October second of '90, or did it stop earlier?

GREENWALD: It covers it. It covers it in two different ways, though. Basically it's a day-by-day journal until the wall falls. By odd coincidence I was scheduled to go on home leave immediately after the wall fell, that weekend after, and we did go back on an abbreviated home leave which partly was taken up with consultations in Washington. I was never so popular in Washington as I was when I showed up in the State Department on the Monday morning after the wall had just fallen, because I was basically the first person who was back in Washington who had been in Berlin at that time. So it was easy to see anybody you wanted to see, because everyone wanted to know what went on. I gave them all the wrong answers, because, of course, I didn't think it was going to happen as it did. I thought it was open to question whether the end result would be unification, and I thought if that was the end result, it would take a good deal longer than it took. I didn't see that tremendous change of opinion that happened almost overnight, in the blink of an eye, within a couple of weeks. But we got back to Berlin in early December. At that point, from the Washington trip onwards, the book becomes not a day-to-day account but a couple of chapters with a more coherent and traditional narrative approach as opposed to a daily diary.

Q: But it does take it up until ...

GREENWALD: It takes it up to the third. In fact, I was sidetracking myself. After that emotional experience at the party of the sort of alternative politicians on the night of the second of October, we wandered out just before midnight and tried to make our way to the Brandenburg Gate and to the Reichstag, but it was impossible to move really. The streets were packed. You never felt in any danger. It wasn't like a football crowd that had gone crazy, because everyone was in a very happy and peaceful and happily sober mood for the most part, but you simply couldn't get to the Brandenburg Gate. You were trapped in the middle of Bundeninlinden, so when that moment came, somewhat symbolically, as I put it in my book, we were still east of the Brandenburg Gate. But the next day, which was a holiday, the third, the first day of unification was a holiday, and we took it by driving out to a little town called Sarensdorf south of Berlin, which is where my wife's parents had built a little summer place, a summer dacha. They had bought the land about 1930 and had built this place in the early '30s. My wife's father was a soldier who died in the Second World War. He had been a Social Democrat and had spent some time in jail as an intellectual opponent of the regime but was a soldier in the war and died in the last days of the war. My mother-in-law, with Gobby as a six-month-old child after the war, lived for part of that immediate post-war period in this little town of Sarensdorf on this small property in this little house. Then each summer until, I believe it was, 1952 the family would go there and spend the summer. It was very important to them, because they raised their own food on that small property, and at that point, the post-war period, that was vital for a family in Berlin. But in 1952 the GDR passed a law which said that people living in West Berlin could no longer use those properties unless they decided to live in the GDR and become citizens of the GDR in effect. So my wife's mother had to give that up. We had visited it once or twice during the couple of years that we were in the embassy just for old time's sake, for Gobby to see it again. She chatted with the family that was using it, a nice couple that had been there at that point for 30-odd years and were using it as their summer place. During the summer of 1990 when unification was on its way and all sorts of people were beginning to explore claims for return of property, Gobby wrote a letter to the mayor of the little town and said, "What's the status of this property? My mother lost use of it in 1952." She discovered that she had never lost title to it, that, as sometimes happens and sometimes didn't, there was really no true unified practice. Instead of the title being vested in the state and then the state giving it to somebody else for use, title remained in her mother's name. The town of Sarensdorf had been keeping an account book and charging rent to the family that had been using it for all of those years, a couple of marks a year rent applied against repair costs, taxes and whatever. It always came out minus, but it wasn't a very big minus. The mayor basically said, "Gee, we had wondered where you had been for all of these years, Mrs. Shreetzel. Welcome back. It's yours again." So unlike a lot of people who went through many years of claims process, sometimes successfully, sometimes not, to get property back, Gobby's mother got it back immediately, not that Gobby wanted to use it, because we had no use for it at that time certainly, so she immediately told the family that was there that they could continue using it and paying the same rent. But we thought we'd go out there and spend the day walking in the woods behind and around that house. We spent hours picking mushrooms. To Gobby's delight, she found that the same mushrooms that her grandmother had taught her to identify in the woods were still there, and we came back with many pounds of them. But the next day it was back to work and back to normalcy, and that was when we discovered that there had been a change in the way in which the U.S. would organize itself in Germany, so it was clear that we had to make arrangements to leave as quickly as possible.

Q: Before we go on to your next assignment and continue, is there anything else that you want to say about your time in East Berlin? You've covered, I think, a lot of ground.

GREENWALD: Well, it's all been done episodically and there are a hundred different things that could be said and could be added, but I think I have been using up enough tape on this for the moment, so we should probably move on to something else.

Q: You say you went to a new assignment in Washington. Do you want to describe that a little bit?

GREENWALD: Sure. This was a period in which, as it turned out, of course, the U.S. was moving toward war, the Gulf War, and when I was casting about for something to do, hopefully something that would allow us to stay in Europe or at least Gobby to stay in Europe and us not to be too far separated for a while, I was asked if I would be willing to consider something which was somewhat out of the normal line of Foreign Service work. The project as a whole, I think, is still under some classification, but the general outline was that there was a team that was stationed in Frankfurt to be a response if necessary, a ready response, to a terrorist incident. There was concern that, of course, there could very well be such an incident in connection with either the potential for or the actuality of hostilities in the Middle East. The kind of incident we were concerned about was some type of hostage-taking situation particularly if an embassy was seized or many hostages were taken, the kinds of things that had happened all too frequently during the '80s. This was a multi-agency team or inter-agency team that had some intelligence people on it, it had some military people on it, and it was headed by a State Department person. The State Department person who headed it was needed for another assignment and had been already away from that planned assignment for too long, and they were looking for a replacement, and there I was as a possibility. It seemed intriguing. What frankly was most attractive to me was that it would allow me to be still in Germany, and since this was a team, it was basically a waiting for an event that hadn't happened. Until it happened, I would be able to commute on weekends to Berlin. Happily the event never happened, and we remained a contingency rather than an actuality. I was able to, in fact, commute virtually every weekend from December until well into May to Berlin. The second aspect was that since we were a contingency, basically a waiting contingency, I had a lot of free time on my hands and I started to write that book that you kindly referred to, and I got fairly far along in it before I left Frankfurt. But the commuting was a rather interesting thing, which I just mentioned in passing, but, you know, one of the elements of the special Berlin situation for 40-odd years had been something called the Berlin Duty Train. In fact, there's even a movie that romanticizes it. It was made back in the '50s. But the Duty Train was a military train that had the right by four-power agreement - or actually in this case, a series of bilateral agreements between the Soviet forces in their zone of Germany, East Germany, and the military forces of the United States, Britain and France, each of which had their own military train, the purpose of which was to have secure guarantee communications for personnel and for provisions from the three Western Allied military zones of occupation in Western Germany and Berlin where all four powers were represented. That train crossed the zone, as it was called, a long time and crossed the GDR, as it was later called, twice every day. It was under Soviet control from the moment it crossed the inter-German frontier. You traveled with a special flag order which had an American flag on it and had English and Russian describing the purpose of the trip, and so on and so forth. The GDR had no control over that train. It was extra-territorial subject only to Soviet control. I had traveled on that train a number of times, and I knew it as a train, but since it was extra-territorial and a sign of four-power occupation of Germany, it ended on the third of October of 1990. You couldn't have an extra-territorial military occupation train on the soil of unified Germany. But the train had evolved over the years to simply being a mode of transportation for the military, which we Foreign Service types had sort of hopped onto. We were traveling at times from western Germany to Berlin. And the military came throughout with an alternative. It established a duty bus. The duty bus left the Frankfurt train station at the same time in the evening as the train had left. It was a bit slower, but it would leave about ten o'clock at night and get to Berlin at about five in the morning. But the military is a conservative organization and it wasn't enough for them to establish a bus, but they had to treat it as if it was a train so they had to have a commander for the train. The train itself had a real commander. It was actually a job. You had a captain who was in charge of the train and who rode it back and forth and who dealt with the Soviets at the borders, and if there was ever an incident like the kind that was in the Adolf Menjou movie or there was a spy aboard or that type of thing, you would have to deal with it. Well, the military didn't establish a billet for captain to run the bus, but they would ask the senior person traveling on the bus to assume the responsibility of being the bus commander. Since I had reached that age, or rank in the Foreign Service at least, where I was normally the senior person almost every time I rode to Berlin or back, I was made the commander of the bus and given a briefing by the military in Frankfurt on what to do if there was an incident and where the nearest Soviet barracks was and so forth. At first I tried to explain that things had changed and it was really not likely that there would be an incident. In any event, we shouldn't be calling the Soviets anymore; we should be contacting the local German authorities. But after a while I gave up and just rode with the tide and accepted that responsibility, fortunately never having an incident occur and never having to....

Q: On the train or bus that left at ten o'clock at night and got to Berlin at five o'clock in the morning, as bus commander you weren't obliged to stay awake, were you?

GREENWALD: Well, at least one had to assume the responsibility to wake up first.

Q: Okay, and probably to sit in the front row or something like that?

GREENWALD: I was going to just go on to say that because this particular mission in Munich was controlled out of the State Department by the Office of the Special Representative for Counterterrorism, I evolved rather naturally into my next assignment. This was to go into the Office of Counterterrorism, because after a few months I knew those people and they knew me and they offered me a position as the head of the office within that larger office which dealt essentially with diplomatic strategy. There were two main elements within the office. One was the part of the office that dealt with operational matters, that is, liaison to those elements in the U.S. government that operationally deal with terrorism issues and special forces and so forth. There were a couple of military people assigned to the office, a Navy Seal, an Army Special Forces person, and those were the experts for what you might call the hard side of counterterrorism. The other side of the office was traditional diplomatic. You had a policy issue of terrorism in the world, and you needed to find ways to coordinate international response to it. We had a great opportunity at the point when I came into the office, because you had a remarkable change in Eastern Europe and you had a remarkable change already underway, which quickly became even more extensive in the Soviet Union. One major element of the work that I was involved with for two years was to try to draw the former Eastern Block into a consensus on an international approach to terrorism. There was a lot of interesting work in that respect. I made one trip to Eastern Europe and visited Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria very shortly after I came to the office and very shortly after the political changes in those countries, where we sought to explain what our counterterrorism policy was and basically to get them to sign up to a common approach and to cooperation. Even more interestingly, the next year I led my own little team in September of 1992 to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. They had reestablished their independence less than a year ago, and again we did the same thing, talked to them about counterterrorism as we saw it, what we saw the main elements of the international approach were, and get them to sign up to it and also to see where we could help them in a practical way with training. Part of our delegation involved experts on police and military counterterrorism methods and procedures. The job of those people was to see where we could possibly provide training. My job was to see whether we could reach a consensus on the political approach. Not because of me, of course, but because of the times, we made enormous strides in those two years in building a much broader and more effective counterterrorism consensus than had existed during the Cold War. The other main element was less successful, and that dealt with the Middle East. My first work with the Counterterrorism Office other than this special Frankfurt business actually happened just a month before I went back to Washington. But after I had already accepted the position, the head of the office, Ambassador Busby, was leading consultations in Bonn, and I went over from Frankfurt to be part of his delegation and to get a feel for what they were doing. He came to Bonn from Damascus, where he had just had very extensive and quite important discussions with the Syrian government about terrorism. Terrorism was something that for many, many years we and Syria had seen very differently, and we had and still have Syria on the list of terrorism-sponsoring nations. This was a major blockage between not only any normal relationship between the United States and Syria but any successful incorporation of Syria in the Middle East Peace Process, and there had been some signs that the Syrians were rethinking their approach to terrorism. They were willing to talk about it. They wanted to persuade us that they were no longer sponsoring terrorists and terrorist organizations. We were far from persuaded but we wanted to talk about it, and Ambassador Busby had had the first lengthy meetings in Damascus. He promised me that one of the things I would be most involved with was the follow-on to that which should lead to further discussions in Damascus in the near future. In fact, the first two weeks that I was in Washington, even before Gobby could join me, I spent working until quite late each evening writing up a strategy paper for the follow-on, how we would pursue the next round of talks, what we would want to get out of them, what kind of benchmarks we could establish for reasonable progress toward, as we would see it, a Syrian divorce from the sponsorship of terrorism. Unfortunately that never came to pass. There was never a second set of meetings. The dialogue broke down. It's been resumed in different ways at different times since then, but during those two years that I was in Washington working on it from 1991 to 1993, the follow-on with Syria always remained in limbo. There was another major Middle Eastern activity, which was the effort to deal with the Lockerbie bombing. When I came to the office, the effort to establish responsibility for that was reaching its culmination in the Justice Department and the FBI investigation, which was being conducted in great secrecy. There was compartmentalization within the office, and at that point I had nothing to do with it. After I had been in the office about four months, in the early fall of 1991, the Justice Department released its findings, its conclusions that that bombing had been carried out by Libyan government agents who were also responsible for a similar bombing that brought down an Air France plane in northern Africa a short time before that. That bombing, by the way, resulted in the death of the wife of our ambassador to Chad, Bob Pugh, who was a good friend. Both of them had visited us on their way out to Chad in Berlin not long before that tragedy. The question was how would the United States respond. During that period before I became involved in it, the decision was reached that we would not respond militarily, we would not do what we had done after the bombing of the discotheque in Berlin a few years earlier when President Reagan had ordered a bombing raid on Libya. That was an event in effect of hot blood, and this was already quite some time after the bombing, and it was felt that the world wouldn't support that kind of reaction, that we needed to have a diplomatic approach, diplomatic strategy for dealing with it. Then it was turned over to the Office of Counterterrorism in the State Department to come up with that diplomatic strategy, and at that point I was brought in as part of my responsibilities as an office director, and we spent a very large part of the two years that I was in that office working on that problem. It was one in which we worked very closely with the British and French, the British who had also suffered in the Lockerbie bombing. The plane had fallen on the town of Lockerbie, and a number of citizens of that town had died as well as British citizens who had been on the plane. The French were deeply involved because of the Air France bombing. The first task was for the three of us to come to an agreement among ourselves as to how we would proceed and what we would want to do, and then we had to sell it to others. The basic approach that was decided upon was to go to the Security Council of the United Nations and get the Security Council to support our demand that Libya turn over for trial in the United States or in Scotland the named agents that we felt were directly responsible for the Lockerbie bombing and for Libya to equally cooperate with a French judicial procedure for the Air France bombing. We essentially succeeded in the Security Council with a series of resolutions, first Chapter 6, which is the non-binding, hortatory resolutions under the charter, and then move into Chapter 7 when Chapter 6 didn't work, Chapter 7 meaning mandatory binding resolutions that all members of the United Nations are required to adhere to and implement under the charter which is binding international law. Those Chapter 7 resolutions required all states to cut off civil aviation contacts with Libya, which meant that the Libyan-Arab airlines could no longer fly anywhere outside of the boundaries of Libya, and there were a number of other restrictions. All of those restrictions were to continue until Libya proved that it had cut off all contacts with terrorists and support of terrorism and turned over the individuals for trial in the United States or the U.K. and satisfy the French judicial authorities. That was a major success at the time. It had put Libya in a box and isolated it. The Libyans went to some considerable lengths to demonstrate that they were not supporting terrorism, that they were cutting their ties to terrorist groups that we had pointed out they did have ties to, from the IRA through Middle Eastern groups. It had an effect, in other words, on Libya's involvement in the terrorist scene and it made Libya and still makes Libya very cautious about its activities for fear that there could be severe retribution if it had its hand caught in the cookie jar again, but it didn't lead to the turnover of the individuals for trial in Scotland or in the United States and, in fact, this is still very much an open point. [Ed. note: The individuals were later turned over and tried in the U.K.] It's only periodically in the news, but now five and six years after the events in the Security Council, the task we're still facing is to maintain pressure, increase pressure in the international community on Libya to meet those conditions, lest gradually the sanctions erode. So it's still very much an open question whether our strategy will in fact prove ultimately to be successful or not, but during those two years that I was involved in it, we achieved the goals we set ourselves but not the ultimate goals that were set. So I felt some sense of accomplishment, but it was an incomplete sense, because clearly we were still in the middle of a situation which you couldn't judge in 1993 when I left that office.

Q: Were you able to finish your book on Berlin during this period?

GREENWALD: Yes, I was. I was well into it by the time I left Germany, and I wrote as much as I could evenings, weekends and so forth in that first year back in Washington, and I finished it by the summer of 1992 and turned it over to a publisher, Penn State University Press. They took about a year to actually bring it out, which I think is normal for the book-producing business, and it was published in the spring, June of 1993, just before I left Washington.

Q: Is there anything else that you want to cover on the period in Washington, or should we go on to your next assignment?

GREENWALD: I might say there is one other area that is worth touching upon, and it was a major activity, and that was the return of U.S. hostages from Lebanon. When I came to the Office of Counterterrorism in 1991, we still had - I can't recall the exact number - at least a half dozen American citizens who had been held for various lengths of time, quite substantial lengths of time in Lebanon. During those two years, happily all of them were freed and also the prominent British hostage, Terry Waite. There was a lot of activity that went on in terms of working for the release of those hostages. There was a related question that still hasn't been resolved of a missing Israeli pilot, a man named Ron Arad, who many believed and still believe might have survived his crash in Lebanon and might have been held prisoner. There was a belief that Iran had a great deal to do with the situation as Iran had a great deal to do with the timing of the release of our hostages. There is in the press these days a fair amount of talk about the Swiss channel for dealing with Iran. In fact, Switzerland is the representative of U.S. interests in Tehran. We used that channel to communicate on hostage matters from 1991 to 1993 quite extensively. There was the question after all of the U.S. hostages were released as to what now, what did this mean. One of the major blockages toward any kind of normalization of U.S.-Iranian relations was the hostage problem. We had said that many, many times, and we had said that the release of hostages would be regarded obviously very favorably. So there was at least the possibility that some of the kinds of things which now seem to be happening in U.S.-Iranian relations might happen in 1992 or early 1993 when the hostages were freed. One of the questions for us in the Counterterrorism Office was what should our position be. Should we take an extremely hard line? Should we say, well, there are all sorts of indications that Iran still uses methods of terrorism in dealing with its own dissidents, its own Iranian political opponents abroad, it still has ties to the Hezbollah in southern Lebanon and so forth, and should we say that until all of those elements of Iranian involvement with terrorism are removed, the position within the bureaucratic spectrum of the Counterterrorism Office is do nothing, make no movements toward Iran, accept no gestures from Iran until you have it all? My own argument, which I think frankly would have been accepted as the Counterterrorism Office's argument if it ever reached that point, was that we should be more innovative in approaching Iran and say this was a major step forward, let's engage them on this subject and try to do with them what we were trying to do with Syria. I was disappointed and a little bit surprised - I suppose I shouldn't have been in retrospect - how little interest there was at that time in the State Department frankly in doing anything in Iran, and in particular in the Near Eastern and South Asian Bureau. I suppose I shouldn't have been, because just as the ethos in the European Bureau with regard to Berlin issues was built over the years with the relationship to West Berlin and going back to the Berlin air lift and all of those heroic times, so there was a lack of interest in exploring what might be non-stereotypical in East Berlin. I think the ethos that I encountered in the Near East/South Asian Bureau with regard to Iran was still formed completely by that awful searing experience of the hostage taking plus the political realism of having seen what happened in those tragic comic escapades of cakes being taken to Tehran and the Iran Contra scandal in the middle '80s. So there was a feeling that this wasn't a government that had much to recommend it and that there was an enormous possibility of being burned if one took any initiatives. For that combination of reasons, nobody really wanted to try to do anything new or different.

Q: I suppose there were two other related factors to what you've just said, Jon, one that the new Secretary of State in 1993, Warren Christopher, had had a very personal involvement with the embassy takeover and, of course, the release of the hostages just as he was leaving office in 1981. But the other factor was there had really been not much change in Iran yet or at least it wasn't apparent to people other than maybe facilitating and helping release of the Beirut hostages and a lot of other things pretty much stayed the same. Then with the election Khatami as president, things did begin to change.

GREENWALD: Yes, well, certainly the Khatami election is a larger sign of something new and different than anything that was around in 1992-1993. There was at that time the belief that Rafsanjani was different from what had been before him, certainly not as much as Khatami seems to be, but he was different from the first generation. [end of Tape 5, Side B]

Q: Okay, this is the sixth tape of an interview with Jon Greenwald. Jon, I think you were just finishing talking about the role of Secretary Christopher vis-à-vis Iran when he came to office in early '93.

GREENWALD: Yes, I think your point about Secretary Christopher's strong personal feelings that were very much influenced by his dealings with the efforts to resolve the hostage crisis at the end of the Carter Administration is real and true. This immobility, this reluctance to move goes back into the latter stage of the Bush Administration and the stewardship also of Secretary Baker. I think there was a feeling that there wasn't any political benefit but there was enormous political risk in trying to do something in what was already an election year period, which wasn't unlike the reaction that I had seen from him in the early stages of revolution in the GDR. Just as things were becoming most interesting right after the first demonstrations had broken out in the streets of East Berlin, there was a delegation from the Policy Planning Bureau under Francis Fukuyama, the end-of-history man, the highest ranking delegation that basically we had ever sent to the GDR. Certainly at that point in time it was a significant delegation. He very much wanted to talk to the political leadership, at least the second rank of political leadership, because he was working within the Policy Planning Bureau on developing policy alternatives to what was obviously a more flexible, fast-moving situation. Instructions came on the morning that we were to take him over to East Berlin directly from the Secretary. We were not to talk to anybody in East Berlin, because there had been riots and police action a few nights before, and I think his concern was it would politically look bad to talk to the government at the same time as there was some police action against dissidents. My argument would have been this was precisely the time one needed to talk to them to find out what was going to happen and deliver messages and take the pulse of the situation. The nervousness about some type of politically embarrassing incident happening was predominant, and I may do him wrong in feeling that that was a driving concern with regard to Iran at a time which was much closer to an election. At the same time I should also say I have great admiration for the way he conducted the Two-Plus-Four talks and everything around German unification. He was very perceptive and frankly had a far better feel for the flow of history than those of us in East Berlin, than I did, so I don't want to make this appear as an attack upon him, but I do think that particular cautiousness was not just one of Warren Christopher's personal reaction. It was one that really went more widely throughout U.S. political circles. There was much to be risked in dealing with Iran and not much to be gained; therefore, let's just stay away from it. Maybe an early opportunity was lost in 1992-93.

Q: But certainly nobody was really pushing us in the direction of looking for opportunities, no other country, or the Iranian-American community was probably not doing that.

GREENWALD: No, I'm sure there wasn't countervailing domestic pressure to go ahead and do things, and we didn't have the kinds of sharp disagreements about policy toward Iran that we've had over the last year, which have been at least one of the factors influencing our willingness to explore new possibilities, the desire to avoid having differences over the approach to Iran erode the fundamental U.S.-Western European relationship.

Q: Okay, so in the summer of 1993 you went back overseas to another assignment?

GREENWALD: I did. I went somewhat unenthusiastically and not unwillingly to Brussels. I had wanted very badly to go back to Eastern Europe. I had spent much of my career dealing with East-West matters either in Eastern Europe itself or dealing with Eastern Europe. I'd seen and been on the spot for the very dramatic changes in 1989-1990, and I badly wanted to be part of the next phase, to see how it went, to see whether the new democratic governments in the region sank real roots down and where the next stage of history was going to lead them. I would have loved to be allowed to study Russian for a year and go off to the Soviet Union, which was no longer the Soviet Union by that time but already Russia, or go to anywhere in the former Soviet Union. But at that stage in my career there wasn't much practical possibility of that, because there were already plenty of other people who had credentials for that who had served one or more tours and had been ahead of me in line. But I was hoping to go to Eastern Europe. I bid on a number of positions in Warsaw, for example, and Budapest, and those weren't happening, they weren't coming through, but I was holding out and hoped that eventually they would. It was rather late in the bidding process, the assignment process. Some time in April I got a call from Personnel, and they said, "We have an idea. Wouldn't you like to go to Brussels and be in charge of the Political Section at the U.S. mission to the European Community?" I said, "Well, can I think about it over the weekend and come back to you on Monday?" They said, "Sure," and on Monday I came back to them and said no. They said okay. About ten more days went by, and another call came. Again it was Personnel on the line, and they said, "We have an idea. Wouldn't you like to go to Brussels and be in charge of the Political Section at the U.S. mission to the European Community? But before you answer, remember we can make other suggestions." The penny dropped, and I realized that the other suggestions were likely to have much less to do with Eastern Europe or Europe than Brussels, so I said, "Yes, all right." The reason for my reluctance was ignorance. I had worked on Europe for really all of my career essentially, but I had had essentially nothing to do with the European Community. I touched on it once or twice. I had some part to play in the CSCE business. I had even been to Brussels once at the time I was working on CSCE to meet with some people at the Commission, and I had gone from the Counterterrorism Office to hold what were regular semiannual consultations with the European Community on counterterrorism matters. But it always had seemed to me a place which was 90 percent economic, which wasn't my field, with a little touch of the political but basically an economic place with a lot to do with trade, things I wasn't terribly interested in and didn't think were terribly important. So I went not really expecting it to be a very exciting assignment, and I discovered gradually in stages how wrong I was. I got to Brussels in September of 1993 having done a certain amount of background preparation. I had spent some time at FSI to brush up French and bring it up to a more respectable level, and I had gone into the office in the European Bureau that backstopped the mission in Brussels and I read months of back telegrams and that sort of thing. But I didn't know a great deal about the European Community when I got there or a great deal about frankly what was going on between the United States and the European Community. I arrived one day before my new ambassador, Stewart Eizenstadt, and all I knew basically to tell him was where the men's room was in the mission when he hit the ground running. I quickly learned that he was really a unique public servant. I've met a number of remarkable people in my career, but I don't think I met anybody who combines the degree of intellectual capacity with ability to work endless hours and dedication to getting results and sheer decency that is combined in the Eizenstadt package. Not long after I got to Brussels, David Aaron, who was then our ambassador to the OECD in Paris, was up visiting, and he told me that he had met Eizenstadt back in the very early days of the Carter campaign in 1976 and had been aboard the campaign airplane when somebody said, "Do you see that young fellow sitting up in the front of the plane? That's Stu Eizenstadt, a nice fellow, knows everything, never sleeps." That's all still true. He made it an exciting place to work, and he insured that, if it wasn't so already, there would be a heavy political dosage in the work. Of course, he came into a situation which had already evolved far beyond that which I had thought I understood to be the case in Brussels. The European Community had already reached a point where its ambitions and to an extent its capacities were to be a political player, not just an economic player, on a world level. This corresponded with a change in the nature of international relations which was rather fundamental, but at the end of the Cold War the major coin of international power had changed from the old-fashioned straight political/military to what you might call political/economic. I went to Brussels thinking that the balance of the U.S. interests was on the other side of town, the side of town where the mission to NATO was. I left convinced that the great balance of U.S. interest was on the side of town where coincidentally I had been working. I recognized that there's always a feeling, a tendency to see things from "where you stand is where you sit," but I think with an effort to be dispassionate in analysis, there is something to that. Most of the types of problems that we face these days in Europe and beyond Europe in the world are problems that require the application of political strength, political cohesion, economic and financial strength, not traditional military strength, and the only potential ally that we have to be an effective partner in dealing with those problems is the European Union, because only it has that combination of shared Western values and capacity or potential capacity to exercise great political, economic and financial strength, which isn't to say there isn't a role for NATO and there isn't a role for military strength. There clearly is, but the fundamental question in Europe, to take the most immediate example, is not their capacity to withstand an advance of the Red Army. The Red Army doesn't exist. There is, for example, not likely to be such a threat in the near or medium term to a Poland or to an Albania, but there is every possibility of a threat to the stability of countries in Eastern Europe if they don't build truly deep root systems for their democratic structures and if they don't develop a truly efficient and effective market economy. No one threatened Albania from the outside. It collapsed last year because it couldn't answer either of those questions: Did it have a working civil society or a working economy? The European Union has the capacity to serve as a magnet, a beacon, for the nature of development that's necessary, and it has the ability to provide a great deal of help for countries in Eastern Europe in making that transition. Once a country is truly qualified to become a member of the European Union, that is, once it has a sufficient civil society and a sufficiently efficient economy to pass the membership test, then it's going to be a secure country basically, or it will become secure. Whether it's a member of NATO or not is, I would argue, irrelevant. I might argue that Ireland is not a member of NATO, it's not a member of the Western European Union, but if it was invaded by little green men from Mars, because it would be seen as a member of The Western Club, it would get help, and that's the case for all of the countries in Eastern Europe. The question is can they build those ties that make for the membership in the Western club, not whether they're formally protected by NATO or not. And you can extend that to other parts of the world. One example is the southern mideastern Mediterranean. NATO has a Mediterranean initiative, because everyone recognizes that there's a great zone of instability in North Africa not to mention the traditional Arab-Israel area, and that NATO Mediterranean initiative is to convene the foreign and defense ministers from the countries of the region periodically in Brussels and chat. It really doesn't go beyond that. The European Union has a Mediterranean initiative that involves an effort to construct over 20 years a giant free-trade zone that would have a political cooperation component roughly based on CSCE; and to prepare the ground for such an undertaking, to help the countries make the changes in their economies that would be necessary to survive in a free-trade zone of that magnitude, they've allocated over the next five years alone something like nine billion dollars of assistance. If you divide nine billion by I think it's 12 countries that are eligible for that assistance and then do it over five years, it doesn't come out to all that much money per country per year. It's only a few drops in the bucket of what's necessary, but still it's an enormous commitment of resources to try to deal with the long-term causes of instability and insecurity in the region. NATO remains the ultimate guarantor of the fire wall if the fire breaks out, but the way to deal with the question of whether a fire breaks out or not seems to me something that the European Union has more tools with which to work than NATO. You can continue on around the world with something like KEDO, the Korean Economic Development Organization, which is the international body set up basically to safeguard the North Korean nuclear program. If North Korea's nuclear program ever went, was ever weaponized, then clearly you'd need the traditional military strength that could keep it in check. But the financial and political support of the European Union was essential to get KETO off the ground, to finance it, to produce the wherewithal to peacefully divert that nuclear program, and on through the kinds of new global issues that we talk about increasingly these days, population, environment, transnational crime and so forth. So I became a convert as I saw the issues and I saw the way in which Stu approached them and began to get some changes in Washington policies, and a convert to the belief that the real name of the game in Europe today is whether or not the European Union makes that quantum jump forward in advancing the integration process and making a true economic and financial union and a true political union not long after that. That will determine the nature of Europe and the nature of U.S. relations with Europe and as well our ability to deal with the kinds of issues that we're going to be facing increasingly around the world. So it became intellectually for me, I think it's fair to say, the most interesting and most stimulating experience that I've had. My own world view was changed recognizing the importance of different elements, economics and trade among other things, finance, as the power factor in the world, different elements than I'd been trained to think of and had thought of for 25 years. I had developed throughout the CSCE experience a substantial respect for what you might call the soft side of security, that security was more than just how much military force have you got and how much does the other fellow have. There was a great deal of importance to for short term, say, the human rights side of security. But those four years in Brussels opened my eyes largely. They never should have been closed certainly, but they did open my eyes to another area of security which with the end of the Cold War had become, I think, the most important. So it was intellectually stimulating and important. We did a lot of good work. In particular, Stu sought to establish some type of new contractual relationship between the United States and the European Union for a couple of reasons. There was a strong feeling in Europe in the first couple of years that we were there that the United States might turn away from Europe. At the time that we arrived in the fall of 1993, the Uruguay round of trade negotiations was coming to a climax, and partly because it was inherited wisdom in the U.S., partly because it was a good negotiating tactic on the part of our government, there was a great deal of talk about the future in Asia and Europe as *passi¿½*. Then came the 1994 election, and the results seemed to confirm a tendency of the United States to look inward and not be concerned with the outer world, certainly not to be concerned as much with Europe. There was a large percentage of the incoming Congressional class that had no discernible interest in Europe. So European leader after European leader began to make statements, speeches, proposals for some kind of rejuvenation of the trans-Atlantic relationship. This really was across the board. There was as much interest in some kind of rejuvenation being expressed in France as there was in the U.K. or Germany. Stu sought to use that as a way in which not only something that the U.S. would have to respond to in general but the way in which the response would ratify a new relationship to the European Union and change the balance of the way in which the United States dealt with Europe from the overwhelmingly NATO version to a more balanced role between NATO and the European Union. The explorations that we made went down a couple of dead ends before we finally hit upon the negotiation that became known as the New Trans-Atlantic Agenda: a very large, substantial document that was signed at a Summit with European Union leaders in Madrid in December of 1995. In order to avoid the pitfall of the grand document which makes the headline and then disappears a few months later because it has nothing except rhetoric in it, it had an awful lot of specific items. There were over a hundred specific proposals. They went from purely political traditional foreign policy ones through cooperation in developing new disease control mechanisms through various trade proposals to proposals for establishing, as we call it, the new trans-Atlantic bridges. These were new people-to-people contacts that would go beyond the traditional types of exchanges which governments were increasingly less willing to finance than they were at the time of the Cold War. This was a major effort on the part of the mission and involved a great deal of negotiating, much of it done by us unlike some of the other negotiations I mentioned which were done largely out of Washington. A great deal was done, in this case primarily because of Stu's drive in and through Brussels. We can only claim partial success. I don't think we made a total breakthrough in the U.S.-European relations or in the consciousness of what you might call the foreign policy elite. There's still an enormous amount of skepticism about the European Union's capacity to be effective, a fair amount of that justified. But I think we did make a substantial movement forward and at least created some of the preconditions necessary for a change in the kinds of U.S. approaches to Europe I've been talking about. At the same time as all of this was happening and the intellectual excitement, the professional excitement of dealing with a major negotiation and making an effort to change policy, I'd also say that it was in some ways the least enjoyable foreign assignment I've ever had. That's because, well, everything that happens at the European Union is terribly important, big issues, but it's all done in a rather dull sort of way, it's done by good diplomats, bureaucrats, Eurocrats, people in nice suits and ties dressing just like you and me in committee rooms, and it's not the flesh-and-blood, pulsing life of a foreign society. That is one of the reasons why many people are attracted to the Foreign Service in the first place. Unlike what you could do in Budapest, you couldn't walk into a pub in Brussels and sit down and say, "What do you think of the way the European Union football team played last night," and get into a discussion. It's not a country. It's not in that sense a real concept. It's an intellectual construct, and you couldn't call up the country's best and most controversial novelist and invite him to lunch and ask him what did that book really mean, what are its implications for politics. There isn't the best European Union novelist; there's not even the worst European Union novelist. And Brussels itself is a very pleasant, easy place to live, but it's such a polyglot international civil servant community that again we felt much less involved in it, much less drawn to it than any other city we've lived in in Europe. So there's a strange contradiction between the policy satisfactions or even the policy dissatisfactions which were intellectually stimulating and the loss of that romantic side, which at least for me is a strong element of what makes the Foreign Service or makes international life attractive.

Q: I assume that most of your negotiating, your interactions, your dealings were with the staff, the international civil servants of the European Commission and with the diplomats representing members states of the European Union assigned to Brussels just like you were. Is that right?

GREENWALD: Yes, the Commission, it is often said, is the executive branch or the executive arm of the European Union. It's the motor for European policies. It sees itself as the inheritor and the executor of the Monnet-Schuman dream of a Europe which is somehow a political and economic whole. The member states believe in that in greater or lesser degrees. They each have their own concept, the British most famously of the concept of Europe as a free-trade zone but please leave our foreign policy alone and our defense policy, and the Benelux countries which are more inclined toward the Commission type of view because they're small and recognize if they're to play a continuing part in the world, it has to be in and through this larger entity, and the others strung out somewhere in the middle. So any question that comes up in Brussels involving European Union policy is always a fascinatingly complex one where you have to look at the positions being taken and ask why are they taking these positions. Undoubtedly there's an element of institutional competence which always come into play with the Commission trying to advance its power versus the member states who are represented in the council, the European parliament which is growing almost by leaps and bounds in its power and its responsibility so that one had the feeling sometimes that one was watching the 17th century struggle in England between king and parliament with the parliament using the power of the purse to advance its responsibilities into areas that just a few years it had had no say in at all. Every issue that has to be decided, if it's of importance, has domestic political ramifications, which is a truism that, of course, we know from the United States and the famous quotation of Tip O'Neill's that all politics is local. But in the European Union all politics being local means all politics has at least 15 locales. One of the things one learns quickly is that there is almost nothing that matters that can be resolved in one place in the European Union.

Q: Or at one time.

GREENWALD: One place or one time. You've got to go to all of the different power centers, which means in Brussels you've got to touch base with the Commission, the Council and increasingly Parliament, but all of our embassies have to touch base with all of their contacts in their capitals. It's sometimes felt that there's a zero sum game, that as the European Union becomes important or more important in Europe, our embassies in the member state capitals become less important. To an extent that's true but to a much lesser extent than might immediately seem to be the case, because it's only the nature of the issue that our embassy is dealing with that country and its changes becomes less and less what can we do in this special relationship with London or how can we build a special relationship to do something uniquely bilaterally with Bonn than what position is London going to take on the European issue. How is it going to use its influence to make a decision about a European policy or how is Bonn going to use its influence. The work in many ways increases for the bilateral embassy, but it's a matter of in effect becoming a lobbyist for the position that you hope will be represented by Bonn or London or Paris or Rome in the European councils which increasingly are important.

Q: Then there's also a question of effectiveness. You may be able to persuade through the embassy in Rome the Italian government that it should take a certain position, but sometimes it doesn't actually take that or doesn't speak up at the right time. Jon, I'd be interested maybe in delving a little bit into one or the other of two areas. One is the whole question of enlargement of the European Union. I assume in the mid-90s while you were there that was a topic. And the second - choose one or the other or both - would be the whole question of the crises that were cropping up in various parts of the world where the United States was involved, the European Union had an interest in some cases, the Balkans, Rwanda, I don't know what else. Where these things that preoccupied you or got you involved, or was this kind of marginal to your responsibilities?

GREENWALD: No, they were the bread and butter of what we were doing, in both sets of issues, enlargement and the sort of ad hoc crises. Enlargement, of course, is the fundamental question. It's whether the European Union can do to and for Eastern Europe what it did for itself, go back to the reason for the Monnet concept, which was to make war impossible between Germany and France, and that was achieved brilliantly. It's inconceivable that there could be a war in Western Europe, because everything is so tied together that you'd be fighting yourself. Whether that kind of coalescence of enlightened self-interest can be developed and extended to Eastern Europe is the big question of enlargement. Everyone agrees with that strategic concept on both sides of the Atlantic. All of the devils are waiting to pounce out of the details. Early on in my time in Brussels, Secretary Christopher made a speech in Budapest in which he strongly criticized the European Union for, as he put it, moving too slowly and for using Eastern Europe as an area from which to draw resources rather than an area in which to put resources. He used as his citation for that fact that in the past year the Eastern Europeans had bought more goods from Western Europe than the EU was selling or sending into Eastern Europe. We were quickly demarched on that at a number of levels in Brussels, because they felt that there were several things wrong with it. First, there was the economic fallacy that they pointed out, and I think persuasively, that if you have economies which were as run-down as those in Eastern Europe which have to retool, which have to get new machinery and new wherewithal to compete, it's only natural that there would be a period in which they make substantial purchases in the West before they can produce the goods that could be sold and bought in the West, they could sell goods which were of quality that would be of interest to Russia or the Third World or, if they didn't make enough, that could be of interest in the Western markets, and they had to retool to do it. The more important point they made was that, while we could argue about the pace of enlargement - and they had their arguments about why they had to go more slowly than we would like, some of them, I think, quite good arguments - at the higher policy levels we tended to see the European Union as something like NATO, a club of like-minded. You let somebody in when you decided it was politically opportune to let somebody in, which basically is the NATO case. The European Union is different. It doesn't do anybody any good if you let them in before they're able to stand on their own feet. They'll hurt themselves and they'll hurt the larger entity, so they were arguing, "We're really much more like a government than we are like a like-minded club, and these states aren't ready. To some extent, we're not ready. We have to do certain things. You're right, we've been slow about that. But they're not going to be ready for quite a few years, because they have to make enormous changes in the very root structure of their societies." But regardless of that argument about how fast or how slow one could go, one shouldn't use megaphone diplomacy in dealing with each other. They should not go into the heart of Eastern Europe and make a statement that will sound good in the ears of your immediate hosts but which takes a dispute into the newspaper headlines. We need a new type of relationship where we talk quietly and in confidence to each other and not the megaphone approach. That's been one of the issues that's continually haunted us on enlargement. It's come up periodically. It's come up very recently also with regard to Turkey, where there are differences that we have about what the approach to Turkey or the relationship to Turkey should be in the European Union. It's a very complicated question, but we tended to deal with that all too often in a public way rather than a private way. That's been one theme, the question of megaphone diplomacy versus quiet diplomacy. The other is this really more fundamental issue of how fast can you go, are they dragging their feet, because it's already been almost a decade. Nobody thinks that there will really be members in Eastern Europe or the European Union before 2002, 2003, maybe 2005. Is that irresponsible, or is it really necessary because it's the complexity of the situation? I think there's a little bit of truth in both, that there's still very fundamental issues that the European Union has to resolve internally before it can take the Eastern Europeans in. Even if the Eastern Europeans were ready today, the European Union isn't ready for them. But to give them the benefit of doubt, I think that all those kinds of decisions would become easier to take if they get through the number-one priority which they have, and that's economic and monetary union. Almost all of their psychic energy, ability to make political compromises, to force through unpopular measures is being directed toward making EMU a success. They think that's the most important thing on their agenda, the step which will most dramatically, most effectively advance the integration process, and which, if it fails, will most dramatically negatively unravel a great deal which has been achieved over the last 40 years. If they get through that successfully, then they'll be ready and able to jump the hurdles that remain before them on enlargement, which they're not yet ready to jump. Since it's going to take a number of years for the Eastern Europeans to complete their own transformation, I think we can afford to give them the benefit of the doubt on that. The ad hoc crises continually raised the question of what leadership is. From our point of view, leadership has generally been us making up our mind as to what needs to be done and then telling the Europeans what that strategy is and asking for support. From the European point of view, that style has increasingly, as they would see it, evolved into a situation where we are saying to them we will lead and have the prestige of leadership, we will contribute our political prestige to that common cause, and you please write the check. The Europeans are feeling annoyed that to some extent it has to be that way, because they aren't yet able to reach those policy decisions which we've reached for themselves, because their differences among themselves are still substantial and their mechanisms, procedures and mindsets for resolving them all too often go toward lower common denominators. There is also a belief that in many instances they are more able than we're prepared to give them credit for to play a political role. Since both sides agree that the Europeans have a substantial number of checks which they can and need to write, there should be a political payoff for that, that there needs to be a different kind of approach toward shared political leadership. That's been very much the case in the Middle East, very much the case in the Balkans. Of course, it's a particularly difficult one because of the painful history of Bosnia. There you have I would say a cartoon view in the United States that it's a little bit like the Second World War or the First World War all over again. The Europeans got into a mess and couldn't handle it, and we had to jump in and save them. The European view, of course, is that, yes, they got into a mess, they couldn't handle it, but we didn't handle it either, and we stood on the sidelines while they tried to deal with it, and we then got in and provided the absolutely indispensable additional element to resolve the matter, but we couldn't have done it alone either, and now they're providing both a lot of troops and an awful lot of money to try to shore up the situation and rebuild. All of that means that there should be some kind of shared leadership, whereas what they tend to get is the Richard Holbrookian style of leadership, which is accepted at times of crisis but rubs raw quickly when it isn't a time of crisis. That kind of dispute was constant throughout the years that I was there, and I think probably still is. Our role is constantly to mediate; again to explain to Washington attitudes which were sometimes irritated and explain why the irritation; explain ways around it; explain that if we wanted to get that check, we would need to be somewhat more diplomatic in the way we asked for it; and, of course, the traditional role of explaining to the Europeans why it was that Washington was coming at them for this or for that. There was a great deal of suspicion that we had to deal with. You can multiply the examples, but to take just one: the U.S. came up with a rather nice idea which was called the Southeast Europe Cooperation Initiative, SECI. It was basically developed by Richard Shifter at the NSC. It is a modest proposal for encouraging economic cooperation within the Balkans and in the immediate surrounding area of the Balkans, to try to deal with the animosities that had been exacerbated by Bosnia and to encourage cooperation instead of hostility within the region. We had no financial resource to put into this idea. We had the idea, and we were willing to provide political dynamism. Now when we went to the Europeans and said we have this nice idea and we don't have any money for it but we have political dynamism, of course that sent all of the warning signals up that we were really going to ask them to provide the money and write some more checks, and we had to work hard to keep Washington aware of that sensitivity and to persuade the Europeans that in fact this was an idea that was meant to work without anybody putting any financial resources. It was really meant to encourage cooperation on the ground, but it would have been an easier idea to sell if we had made a little more progress in that more fundamental approach, which is the goal of the New Trans-Atlantic Agenda, which is ultimately to encourage Washington to rethink its concept of what partnership with Europe is all about. So I think we made a start in moving things along in that direction. The next few years will be crucial. That will be determined substantially by what happens with EMU, whether it is made a success. Will it lead, as I think it probably will if it's a success, to a great increase in European self-confidence and ability to make substantial movement toward greater integration and, therefore, a more efficient common foreign policy as well as economic policy. Can the United States make the adjustments that will have to be made on our side to deal with a different kind of Europe, dealing with a Europe which is much more our equal.

Q: Maybe that's a good point to stop, Jon. You've covered over several sessions about 30 years of your involvement with Europe and the United States. This is obviously a story that doesn't quite have a closure and an ending at this point, but the Europe of 1998 is very different than the Europe of 1969 or whenever it was you first went to Berlin. I've enjoyed very much these conversations.

GREENWALD: Well, thank you. It's been a pleasure and an honor to have them with you.

End of interview