Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

THOMAS W. WILSON

Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy

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[Note: This interview was not edited by Mr. Wilson prior to his death]

Q: Today is the 30th of October 1996. This is an interview with Thomas W. Wilson at his home in Georgetown. If we could start at the beginning, could you state when and where you were born.

WILSON: In Baltimore on September 1912.

Q: Could you tell me a bit about your family, your father and your mother?

WILSON: My father was a self made American businessman, a guy who left the farm in his teens in Delaware, and worked his way to California and came back. He fell in love with the automobile and spent his life being a dealer and distributor and supervisor of automobile dealerships including during the New Deal. He was the national director for automobile dealers. They set up internal ground rules.

Q: The regulations and self governing rules for the association. Where did you live?

WILSON: I lived in Baltimore until I was 16 and went away to school. I came back and worked on the Baltimore Evening Sun which has just gone out of business until with great good luck landed a job on the Paris Herald.

Q: I want to move back just a bit. Tell me a bit about your mother. Where was she?

WILSON: My mother was I think probably a potentially good poet. She was very busy raising three children and taking care of a husband and running a house and so forth and didn't have time for much for anything else. It was an absolutely letter perfect romance with my father that lasted for over 40 years. I had a sister a year younger and a brother two years younger. It was a very close family until I thought I had to get out of Baltimore. I thought it was too small a place for me. Before that happened I went to Mercersburg Academy in Pennsylvania, an absolutely wonderful school.

Q: And what year did you graduate from Mercersburg?

WILSON: Thirty one. 1931.

Q: It was right in the middle of the depression. Where did you go to college?

WILSON: I went to Princeton.

Q: Princeton. So you were right in the Baltimore loop. If you were from Baltimore, you had to go to Princeton.

WILSON: That's how I got there. I really wasn't anxious to go to college at all. I had some scholarships from various places. My father who very infrequently tried to guide me, finally said, "Well if you don't really care where you go, why don't you go to Princeton." Because he had observed that big shots in Baltimore tended to be Princeton men, and he thought that was a good thing to do. I was not very fond of the idea, but that's where I went.

Q: What types of courses, what was your major at Princeton?

WILSON: Well there were several. I thought I was going to major in English until I found out that Princeton had only two courses. I think there were two majors that you had to have. One was the 18th century novel and its relation to the classics, and the other was 19th century novel and its relation to the classics. I stopped in and gave the dean a piece of my mind about the fact that every backwater college in the country had courses in playwriting and essay writing and so forth. He said they had a course in essays, just one semester and it was limited to 15 seniors who had demonstrated unusual capacity in that particular field. So I looked around, and I thought that psychology was interesting, so I went into that. It turned out the whole faculty were behaviorists. I thought that behaviorism fell out a little while after that, but I understand it's back again. In any event, because it was behaviorist, we spent a lot of time doing lab work. Mind you I was an objectionable fellow.

Q: I'm gathering this.

WILSON: I thought it was pretty silly to put some powder on a certain segment of your skin to see if you had a violent reaction or no reaction at all because this experiment had been done at least 100,000 times, and the outcome was highly predictable: 75% had no reaction and 25% had a violent reaction. I had the violent reaction; very unpleasant. So I didn't think that was much for me. I shifted to economics. I don't know why. It may be an exaggeration to say we were directed to learn ten reasons why there could be no bank failure in the United States. We were on that subject...

Q: A depression tends to focus the mind.

WILSON: That was when the banks closed, with my father's check for my next semester in the bank. Besides which my father went bankrupt for the second time in the same depression, and I thought it was time for me to get out and help run the family, which I did. By this time it was the middle of my junior year, and so I went to work for the Baltimore Evening Sun.

Q: Can you talk a little bit about the Evening Sun in those days?

WILSON: The Baltimore Sun was a good daily newspaper. It was more than a newspaper, it was a Baltimore institution. They were in the good position of having persuaded the merchants in Baltimore that you can't do business if you don't advertise in the Sun papers. So they did, and the Sun papers did very well. I started as a police reporter in the western district of Baltimore and worked at that for a couple of years until I did the classic act of writing a series of pieces exposing the numbers racket which was such a success that I was brought inside to the re write desk and sort of became the out of town reporter for the Sun. Everybody else was probably married and had children, so they sent me out to cover the floods and airplane accidents and murder cases. I enjoyed it immensely.

Q: Did you enjoy having to write in a hurry and being concise?

WILSON: Well, I was forced to. I still remember the time I called in late in the afternoon. One of our re write men was a lot older than the rest of us, and he was very good at what he did. He was an old hand. When I called in late with a story, the exact nature of which I forget, I think it was an automobile accident. He said, "Dictate it!" I had never dictated anything in my life. I did dictate that not very important story, and from then on, did. I found it very useful because in later years I did a lot of dictation, and found I could do it almost as cleanly as I could write.

Q: As a police reporter, what was your impression of the Baltimore police system in the '30s?

WILSON: Yes the early '30s. I thought it was a good organization. I didn't have any trouble with them; you sort of learned to talk their language to get along with them. The press and the police worked together very closely. They expected reporters to be looking over their shoulders all the time and we were. I was great fun. You would tear around in an automobile with a press sign in your car, horn blowing all the time getting to a fire or something like that. You could violate the traffic rules and park wherever you wanted to. You knew the cops. One of the cops it turned out knew me when one night my father was out of town and I got a pair of Annie Oakleys for a concert.

Q: You might explain what an Annie Oakley is.

WILSON: It is the free tickets that the newspapers get from the theater owners.

Q: They are called Annie Oakleys because holes are punched in them. It looks like somebody has been shooting at these tickets. That is where the name originated.

WILSON: I never knew that. It was a piano concert, so I took my mother, who took these things seriously. These were the days when people still got dressed to go to the theater. She had on an evening dress and I a jacket. We walked in to the theater and there was a very large cop standing at the door of the theater. As I walked by with my mother looking very elegant, he said, "Hey Wilson, What are you gonna do, move the piano on the stage?" So we got along with the cops all right.

Q: I'm trying to catch the flavor of the times. Baltimore was very much a Southern city. On reporting and dealing with the black community, can you comment on that on reflection?

WILSON: I don't think we were even aware of it. There were very many African Americans in Baltimore. The Western police district which was one of my bailiwicks was very largely black. There was an Afro American newspaper called the Afro American. In fact I was getting to be quite buddies with the Afro American reporter in that district. I do remember that he took me to a theater on Pennsylvania avenue in Baltimore, an annual musical performance put on by the members of the AfrAmerican staff. It was a first rate show. I was the only white man in the theater. I don't remember this in Baltimore, but your question reminds me that things were not quite so comfortable on the eastern shore of Maryland. I do remember when there was a particularly bad situation. There had been a murder and there was a mob scene that led to the lynching of a suspect. Mencken wrote an editorial on the front page of the Sun suggesting that the eastern shore be given back to the Indians, but also suggesting that it probably wouldn't work because the Indians were too smart to take it. The result of which the next couple of circulation trucks to reach the eastern shore which was then by ferry from Annapolis over, got thrown in the river and the farmers of the eastern shore boycotted the Baltimore market where they usually sold their produce and sent it all to Philadelphia. That much I do remember. I don't remember any particular urban fallout in Baltimore.

Q: The eastern shore right up unto the present has always had what in present terms we would call a white red neck atmosphere. I mean this much more a Mississippi type of feeling. They have always had a very difficult time with race relations there. Sort of masters and slaves. Did you have any dealings with H. L. Mencken? When one thinks of the Sun in that era one always thinks of H. L. Mencken.

WILSON: No, I really didn't have much to do with him. He didn't come into the office much when I was there. There was a brief period when he substituted as managing editor of the evening paper. For some reason or another, nobody was available so he stepped in and ran it for a little while. He seemed to be a very quiet and indeed quite pleasant old fellow. I was in my '20s; he was an old fellow to me. I really didn't have anything to do with him.

Q: You say you left the Evening Sun and you went where then?

WILSON: The Paris Herald.

Q: First I'd like to get the dates. When did you go to the Paris Herald?

WILSON: In 1937.

Q: In 1937. And you were with the Paris Herald from when to when?

WILSON: 1937 1938. Then I was hired by the INS, the International News Service in Paris in their bureau. So I was in Paris for two and a half or three years.

Q: How did you get this Paris Herald job. This must have been like going to heaven in a way wasn't it?

WILSON: It was unbelievable. I had been on a story that had a lot to do with a guy, I guess he was the public affairs vice president of the American Express Company in Baltimore. We got to be fairly friendly. He asked me what I wanted to do next, and I told him I wanted to leave Baltimore. I was thinking of a classmate of mine working on a newspaper in Texas and I was thinking of writing him to see if he would like to swap jobs. Texas sounded like a more lively place than Baltimore did. He said he was public relations director of the American Express company in Paris for several years and got to be fairly good friends with Hills, who was publisher of the Paris paper. He happened to know there was a vacancy there. They have had several Baltimore Sun people, and they have always turned out very well. Would you like me to write him and see if he would like to hear from you? I said, "Yes I would." Sometime later I was down at a murder story near Stillville, Maryland and I got a call from my office saying we've got a telegram from Larry Hills offering you a job. "Keep it. I'll be right there." In any event that's what I did. It was just as lucky and as silly as that.

Q: May I add for the record that the Paris Herald in those days and for many years on was the pre eminent American newspaper in Europe. It was a top job. It was associated with the New York Herald which was a close rival to the New York Times in those days.

WILSON: The Paris Herald was the European edition of the New York Herald. There also was a Paris Tribune which was a European edition of the Chicago Tribune. The Chicago Tribune folded and the Herald bought some part of it, so the old Paris Herald became the Paris Herald Tribune. Then somewhere along the line the New York Herald bought the... Was there a New York Tribune? I'm not sure. Yes! There was the New York Herald Tribune. So these two things worked together. Anyhow it was the Paris Herald Tribune which was the European edition of the New York Herald Tribune. That's what it was when I went there.

Q: I might say that the New York Herald Tribune had some of the top writers in many fields. I particularly think of the sports writers, but others were extremely... I mean it was a classy paper. Could you tell me about, I mean here you are a boy from Baltimore and you are in the big city of lights. What was your impression of Paris in the late 1930's?

WILSON: I roomed with Jim Lardner who was one of Ring Lardner's four sons.

Q: Ring Lardner being a pre eminent writer and columnist of that era.

WILSON: Yes. Jim Lardner and Walter Kerr. There were two Walter Kerrs. This was the one who was head of the Paris Bureau and then head of the European Bureau and head of the Washington Bureau. Not the theater Walter Kerr. The three of us lived together. It was a night job. We went to work at 6:00 to 8:00 for the so called day side of the paper, and then went out to dinner for an hour and a half or two hours and then came back because of the time difference, the US. news was just beginning to come in around 10:00 there so then we worked until 2:00 maybe a little less than that because you could be out at a nightclub if you want at 2:00 and things were still going on in Paris nightclubs. Then you sleep eight hours and get up and have the whole day free. It doesn't work that way now, but it was a great time.

Q: What did the job consist of?

WILSON: It was mainly re writing. You'd get little one or two sentence or paragraph items from New York. For the follow story, you kept the story in the files and you expanded a one or two sentence lead in to a new lead on an old story.

Q: I can speak as a retired Foreign Service Officer, I was Consul General in Naples, I read it every day. Then it was the Paris Times Herald. It was an amalgamate but essentially it is the same paper. This is where you got your news and it served beautifully.

WILSON: It was very good. I don't know why the New York Times tried to put out a European edition after WW II; it didn't work. It was just a shrunk down New York Times. This was a paper by itself.

Q: Yes it really is unique. It was very influential. How about the French? Were you getting involved with the French while you were there or were they a difficult people to crack?

WILSON: No. I'm afraid that Americans are not much better than other people when they live in other countries. They tend to hang around with their own. The staff of the Paris Herald Tribune at that time was roughly divided into two groups. One were leftovers from WWI and the other were people who had been there a year or less. I fell in with some expatriate American news people who had been there long enough to have had a lot of French friends and French relations. Actually I got married over there.

Q: How did you meet your wife?

WILSON: She was the assistant society editor. Her family had lived there since before WWI. He was a newspaper man with the New York Sun and William Byrd. He had run a little publishing firm called The Three Mountain Press on rue St. Louis, and had known nearly all the expatriate American writers between the wars. I'm still astonished at the interest in that group.

Q: Oh yes. Gertrude Stein, Ernest Hemmingway, Scott Fitzgerald, Zelda Fitzgerald and others. These names still resonate.

WILSON: I've gotten letters from colleges asking me for... They get me mixed up with my father in law or just when I was there. But I remember them asking me for any manuscripts, papers, restaurant menus, theater tickets, laundry lists. And at some point they just put in parentheses yes really, we mean it. Laundry lists!

Q: Obviously Gertrude Stein was still there, but most of the others had left by that time hadn't they?

WILSON: Most of the others had left by that time, yes. I don't think there were any members of that group still there.

Q: Except for Gertrude Stein. She was there throughout WWII wasn't she?

WILSON: She stayed in France, yes.

Q: Did the aura of these writers make you all sort of potential Hemmingways. Were you all sitting down working on your novels and going to the Deux Magots waiting to come out with the great American novel?

WILSON: Not that I know of.

Q: You didn't have a great American novel you were working on?

WILSON: No, No. I was going to work my way around the world in newspaper jobs. To China. I never got there.

Q: What about the great political waves going on in France. As Americans were you observing the rise of the United Front and the almost fascist right in French politics. I mean this was all getting very close to WWII. Or were you all sort of focused on what was happening back home?

WILSON: I think when I left the sit down strikes were on in Detroit, but so was the Spanish Civil War, and that's what I sort of grew up on politically. As a matter of fact, I had notions that I could volunteer in the Abraham Lincoln brigade, part of the International Brigade. As a matter of fact, Jim Lardner did and was killed. We were absolutely obsessed with the rise of fascism and the Spanish Civil War and the nonsense in Italy.

Q: You are talking about Mussolini and his thing and the rise of Hitler.

WILSON: Yes the rise of Hitler. That's what we talked about. That was the overwhelming political interest at that time.

Q: What was your impression of the French body politic? Did you have a feeling that this was a country that was going to sort of be the bastion of democracy?

WILSON: France was? I'm really getting into very fuzzy memory. I think Leon Blum was still in when I got there in 1937. But the failure indeed refusal of the French and British before you get to the Americans to do anything for the Spanish was our dominant scandal of the times as far as I was concerned. And certainly some of the people I spent time, I didn't go to the Deux Magots. I went to the Dome. I walked home after the paper and there was always somebody sitting there in the Dome Cafe and you would sit around there and have a few beers and pretty soon the sun's coming up. There goes the day.

Q: You left there when? No you had sat a certain point moved over to the International News Service.

WILSON: Do you remember when the Duke of Windsor was coming to the United States for a trip and there was a big story in the American press. The Duke of Windsor was a great pal of a Frenchman who was supposed to be the originator of a system of industrial production that increases the speed...

Q: We can fill this in later but I know what you mean. It was a time management system.

WILSON: That's right and some Baltimore labor leader made a particularly nasty speech about the Duke of Windsor coming over. Because of his friendship with this dirty guy who was speeding up production on the industrial line, and he canceled his trip. That is to say the Duke of Windsor canceled his trip because of this lack of welcome. It so happened that the INS guy, poor fellow, had been around the Crillon Hotel all day waiting to find out whether the Duke was going to the United States tomorrow or not. And unfortunately the bar was on the same floor and he got drunk up in the course of the day. I wrote the story in the office. He canceled his trip at 11:00 at night which as I say was a big story in the U.S. I wrote the story for the Paris Herald. Unfortunately the INS guy had gotten crocked and missed the story entirely. As a result, the head of the INS Bureau fired him and hired me. So I was with the INS for several years.

Q: What type of work were you doing for the INS?

WILSON: The INS was strictly office writing. Lots of mailboard stuff. Background stories and feature stories. Otherwise just compiling news. We had a very able French journalist who covered Parliament for us. Otherwise we just read the news.

Q: You say Parliament, you mean Chamber of Deputies.

WILSON: Chamber of Deputies, yes.

Q: Were you ever used to try to make contact with the Duchess of Windsor? Being a Baltimore lady, Wallis Warfield?

WILSON: No.

Q: You left there. When did you leave France then?

WILSON: Let's say I'm trying to figure out. I had gotten married in 1938. I thought the war was going to start then. It didn't.

Q: We had already had the Sudeten crisis and the Anschluss with Austria by this time.

WILSON: The Anschluss was the first one wasn't it?

Q: Yes. Then the Munich crisis in '38 I believe.

WILSON: Yes that's right. It was plain to me that there was going to be a war. My wife became pregnant and we would have stayed but it didn't seem to be a good time to be there with a newly born infant. So we took a freighter from Holland and came home. To my vast surprise, I found myself working for the Wall Street Journal in Washington.

Q: Today is the 15th of November 1996. You worked for the Wall Street Journal from 1939 until when?

WILSON: I said 1939 but I think it was late 1938 that I started there. I worked for the Journal about two years.

Q: So that gets us into 1941 or rather 1940. Then where did you go?

WILSON: Well, by this time the war had started. September 1, 1939 as I recall, and I did a careful calculation about the role of journalists and journalism in the upcoming war. I figured very carefully and it seemed to me that journalists would do little except carry communications back from some communication center and put it on the wire. Of course I couldn't have been more wrong. I believe as it turned out that casualties among journalists were just about the same as among infantrymen. But anyhow that's the way I figured it so that when I was offered a job with the National Defense Advisory Commission, NDAC. That was the first of the agencies that became the War Production Board. I thought I might as well join the government now one way or another because we were going to be in it sooner or later and that was a better place to be than with a newspaper. The National Defense Advisory Commission actually was established before the war started to help get the economy of this country in shape for going to war. It was an extraordinary organization. They brought some very good people to Washington: William Knudsen president of General Motors, Ed Stettinius, from U.S. Steel, William L. Bath who ran the big subsidiary of the Swedish company that made ball bearings, and a lot of other people. So that's what I moved in to first on the information side. Those were the days when I remember the information officer thought his job was to get out as much information as possible and get it right.

Q: How long were you with the National Defense Council?

WILSON: I was in it until after we were in the war, 1942 I guess. Then I went abroad with the group that ran defensive buying.

Q: It wasn't the War Production Board?

WILSON: I was with the War Production Board. That was one of the outgrowths of the National Defense Advisory Commission. But the War Production Board got into difficulties with the Army. By that time I was working for the planning division of the War Production Board. The Planning division of the War Production Board was the place where the civilian government reviewed what the Army said they wanted, and this led to certain difficulties. The planning commission was considered by the military to be the people who were trying to keep them from getting everything they wanted to have. In a great battle between the Army and the War Production Board, it was decided that the price of peace was to get rid of the planning division, so everybody in the planning division got fired or told to go look for another job. Everybody in the rest of Washington wanted to hire us so I was offered a job to go out to the Middle East for the Board of Economic Warfare.

Q: Where did you go in the Middle East?

WILSON: Cairo.

Q: Cairo?

WILSON: I don't know whether you liked this kind of sidelight. This is a good example of how a lot of jobs were given and careers were made in the war. I found that much later there was a meeting in the Board of Economic Warfare where the point was made that while we had close relationships with the British ministry of economic warfare, we had nobody in certain parts of the world where they had active agencies. There was a discussion as to whether we the Americans should do anything about that. The decision was made let's send a couple of people out and see what happens. As a result of that, when I walked into their office they said do you want to go to China, Cairo or London? London didn't seem like China. I'll go to Cairo.

Then it turned out to work very well. The British had a very capable fellow running their office. He had quite a staff. He wanted to get along with us, so we decided to form a combined agency.

Q: You were in Cairo from when to when?

WILSON: I was in Cairo from early 1942 until the end of the war. 1945.

Q: So you formed a combined agency. Was this with the British and Americans together? What were your tasks?

WILSON: Yes, together. Well the Board of Economic Warfare needed information to carry out several functions. One was to buy materials we wanted to keep the enemy from getting, chrome from Turkey, that sort of thing. The other was for Navy functions. What kind of trade routes did they want to break up because they would particularly hurt the enemy. The third role was eventually we were going to have to occupy those countries and so wanted to know something about the state of their economy. My function was to collect information about what the Germans were doing out there about the shape of the Balkans and eventually the time when we had to enter Greece.

Q: What sort of information were you getting about let's say Greece?

WILSON: Well, that really was the central political point of this problem. The British as you know had a strong role in Greece for a long time. We'd had none so to speak. They knew what they were doing in both the Middle East where we were living and the Balkans we were looking at. Beyond which they had developed over many years quite effective information or intelligence collection if you want to call it that. We had none. Joining the British in WWII was an immediate partnership. I was alone, but when we decided to join and make an agency I became the Deputy Chief of the agency. My British colleague was the chief. I automatically received the whole flow of British reports from both the Middle East and the Balkans from British collection services. This got to be terribly embarrassing after a while because gradually the Americans started trying to build up an intelligence collection agency. In no time at all there were four of them in Cairo, the Army, Navy, Air Force, and something called the combined collection agency to put together what those three guys got. On top of that there was always us. That would make five. None of them had any resources or any experience in the area. It was very embarrassing for me because I had no resources but a lot of information. So that got to be pretty awkward for awhile.

Q: Were you able to share your information with the American agencies that were out there.

WILSON: Of course I sent everything I learned back to Washington. But the American military presence out there was another of the freakish things that happened in war time. Our Board of Economic Warfare was originally established under the leadership of a colonel in the Army. He was a perfectly good fellow; there was nothing wrong with him except that he was just over his head. His agency suddenly blew up into a large world wide institution, and they had to get rid of him. The way you got rid of a colonel in the war was to make him a general which is what the Army did, and then they had to find a place for him to be, and since there was no American military in the Middle East, they sent him out there. I've not got the story quite right. He went out as a colonel and when he got there he discovered his British colleague was a general. He went to meetings and generals speak more than colonels do at meetings, so he had to be raised from a colonel to a general. After he became a general, he obviously needed a staff, a chief 1, a chief 2, a chief 3, and a chief 4. If you got that many people you needed a transportation unit. If you got a transportation unit the cars needed to be repaired from time to time so you've got to have some mechanics. We actually built an American command in the Middle East out of nothing except for the fact that they had to get rid of a colonel, in a job he couldn't do in Washington.

Q: It is an insight into the practicalities of how things work. What role did the United States have in planning what to do with let's say the Balkans after the war?

WILSON: By that time we had some active jobs. For one thing we had been collecting what information we could about the state of transportation in Greece for example and Yugoslavia for postwar purposes. Then suddenly, I'm not sure I can date this, but when the Soviets reached the point when they could invade Europe through Romania, and the Allies decided to be aware of what they could do to support the Russian drive and the Germans to supply their troops to the East or central part of Europe which we knew quite a bit about, we didn't know much about what was going on in the east. So the state of the railroad system became important from a military point of view. It turned out that our military had been planning for that. Sure because I had been running that in the Middle East I became one Sunday afternoon, chief of the Balkan section of the Mediterranean forces from Italy. We ran the bombing campaign to the east, but then in a very big major way against the petroleum resources in Romania. By this time, and this time I guess is 1944, it became clear we really knew the tightest supply for the Germans was in oil and oil resources. Among petroleum resources a special lubricating oil was their worst shortage, and their greatest supply of lubricating oil was coming from a, I'm trying to think of the name of the company.

Q: Texaco, Sohio, Secony?

WILSON: Anyway you're on the right track... Standard Oil. A processing plant in Romania that was a large producer of the type of lubricating oil that the Germans were in very short supply of, and a shortage that could lead and did lead to have an actual impact on German military forces. So this became a high priority for us. It is a very long story and very complicated but eventually we destroyed that plant. But there was a campaign that really, it was a major military campaign that involved the strategic air force. Not individual raids or bombing individual cities but really a strategic strength of the enemy's fighting force. So we'd done that. By this time our office in Washington had begun to help plan for occupation forces. And we had provided great information about the state of things in Greece for purposes of military occupation. I think I said by this time I had a staff of three or four people. We picked up a lot of British types in the area, and we had a sizable team of people ready to go in with the military when Greece became available.

Q: This was towards the end of 1944 so when the Germans pulled out and left, the British went in and got caught up in the civil war there. Had you moved to Korcyra by this time which was sort of the headquarters. A nice place isn't it?

WILSON: Well I lived in a tent and worked in a temple or a palace. A huge palace for the king of Naples. I was on the fifth floor.

Q: When we went in to Greece, what were the concerns you and your group had about going into Greece? This was strictly a British operation wasn't it, going into Greece?

WILSON: Yes. Our agency was called the Combined Economic Warfare Agency/ Middle East. Probably the most obscure agency of WWII. We were able to send a team of four or five people. I could say that most of them were British but not all of them; there were Americans in there. Individuals who had lived there, knew the languages, and had some experience in that kind of work. But I guess the actual occupation forces were entirely British.

Q: I think so. With your group, what was your group looking for in Greece when they went in?

WILSON: Well I think by this time we were people who were able to participate in problems of food and re establishing basic services and I guess just advising the military on problems of governance. But this was getting pretty late as far as I was concerned, and I really can't tell you what.

Q: Well Greece was taken over by the British and they got involved in the civil war between the Royalists and the communists, but what about Yugoslavia? Did you get involved at all in anything early Yugoslavia as the Yugoslav army more or less freed itself?

WILSON: This I don't know. As you know we had done a good deal to help the Tito forces. We had originally tried to help Mihailovich. We, in this case I mean the allies. The U.S.. and British had twice equipped Mihailovich to strike the only really useful resource that Yugoslavia had. There is a big copper mine. Both times he said thanks very much and saved the equipment we gave him to fight Tito after the war. So, late in the war we took to helping Tito too. I remember a young lieutenant came to ask my advice. He told me he'd been offered a job, an assignment into Yugoslavia while the fighting was still going on. I said how's your languages? He said he didn't have any. I asked him a few other questions that had to do with the usual sort of qualifications a guy should have. He was to jump out of an airplane and work with Tito. I advised him not to go. He, of course, promptly went. He had an absolutely wonderful career. Came out with all kinds of honors and was pushed into a high position with the U.S. intelligence agency. The British did most of that work. Force 333 and force 666. When I was at Korcyra I often went over working on targets for the next day. One of these British forces had a bar there. Being in a combined agency if I pulled the right card out of my wallet, I could prove that I was either American or British. So I could attend this force 266 bar. They were really the most remarkable kind of people. To me they all looked alike; they all looked middle aged; they all wore horn rimmed glasses as though they were working in the city in London. It was impossible to tell which one had just come in, and which one was just going out in a submarine or an airplane or a power boat or something. They were real characters out of books.

Q: Did you start moving over into the postwar planning at all, or did you keep doing this until the end of the war?

WILSON: I guess the answer is I kept doing it until the end of the war. I think I was successful in shutting up the agency because the job had been finished, and got back to Washington.

Q: One of the most remarkable things anybody can do. When did you get back to Washington?

WILSON: It must have been probably early 1945, or the middle of 1945. You were talking about the government and asked me if I got into the postwar things. I don't know if I was out of the government or not. I had hardly quit one job when I was asked to join the U.S. mission to the Allied Reparations Commission meeting in Moscow. That was in July or August 1945. Was the war over in June?

Q: The war was over in April in Europe and August in Japan. What was this group called?

WILSON: I think I was still working for the War Production Board, I'm sorrthe Economic Warfare Agency.

Q: You went to Moscow in July of 1945. What was your impression of Moscow at that time, and then what were you doing?

WILSON: Well, one has to remember that the Soviets had done a great deal toward winning the war, they were our allies. We were co victors and we, I mean most Americans, had high hopes that we would get along for the rest of our life. Nothing much happened in Moscow in the reparations commission because I believe the agreement to work on reparations came up at the Yalta Conference. I believe that even there Stalin announced that $200,000,000 worth of reparations would be a good number. The British had no ideas and we had no ideas, but Roosevelt, who didn't particularly like numbers anyhow, was very fond of Isadore Lubin who was head of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and was then one of his anonymous assistants. Lubin was very good at reducing very complex economic information into simple little graphs that Roosevelt thought he could understand, so he made him head of the U.S. delegation to Moscow. I was sent over in advance because my agency during the war had also worked on strategic bombing in Europe selecting targets. I had been familiar with that work in the course of the war and knew the people in it. I went over to try to lay on a flow of information from the military in Europe or us in Europe to our mission in Moscow so we could get as much information as we could get a hold of on the state of the German economy. We'd been dropping bombs on it for years and we didn't know what was left of it. This was on the assumption of course that the reparations that the Germans could pay would bear some relationship to their capacity to pay them. It was a false assumption. Nobody seemed to pay much attention to that. Anyhow the Russians kept insisting on $200,000,000. As far as I know we never found out where they got that figure. The discussions in Moscow were totally held up by the Americans and British saying what is the basis of your $200,000,000 figure? They'd keep saying we're working on it; we've got a study underway. There was a summit meeting in Germany, the Potsdam Conference, we had expect that reparations would be the last step in that conference. It turned out Stalin still wanted to talk about it first. I had to take a plane from Moscow to Potsdam with a lot of our office supplies and so forth. Now I'm not sure what decision was made at Potsdam except to, I think they bucked the reparations problem to the conference of foreign ministers, and that really didn't do anything. I don't know what ever was done about reparations.

Q: I think in a way the Soviets just took their reparations. Even if it was bolted down they took it. I think for us we went at things sort of piecemeal.

WILSON: The one thing that I can recall about the reparations commission was that our instructions began with a paragraph which said, and I think I can nearly quote it, "The United States will accept no reparations under any circumstances. No reparations of any kind under any circumstances." We were to argue to whatever the Germans could afford going to our allies who had been badly damaged and needed them, but to take nothing. I do recall the story that I understood at the time was that President Roosevelt had always been a serious student of the Versailles treaty. He had felt that the reparations load put on Germany did have something to do with the conditions that eventually led to Hitler and Nazism there. He was determined that we do nothing to repeat that kind of mistake. That's why we said we would take no reparations at all under any circumstances. As I say I don't know what if anything was eventually done.

Q: Well I think there were some reparations for war damage to some individuals. We were still doing that in the 60's but that was not government to government. Well that sort of cut your raison d'ï¿½tre. What happened to your job and your agency?

WILSON: You mean when we finished the reparations thing? The war was over; my jobs were finished. I resigned from the government for the first time.

Q: Did you go back to newspaper work?

WILSON: No I never did. I always thought I would, but I never got around to it. What I did then is probably getting much more personal than you are interested in. A couple of my colleagues in the War Production Board and I had thought about what we'd do after the war. We decided that the time had come when it was going to be important for the U.S. to start exporting technology as well as manufactured goods and that this would be an interesting business to get into and to start. Both interesting but we liked to think it would be helpful. We started something modestly called the Worldwide Development Corporation. It was in effect kind of premature privately based point four program. But since you had to, we tried to combine economic planning, technological training, and normal commodity trading in one organization. It had some success but not in the Middle East to which I had returned for that purpose.

Q: Well we want to pick this up when you got involved with the Marshall Plan. When and how did that come about?

WILSON: By this time for reasons that are not particularly relevant, I was vice president of an educational film company in New York when I got a telephone call from Alfred Friendly who became managing editor of the Washington Post. He had been a friend of mine as a correspondent. He said he had made an appointment the next day for me in New York with Thomas K. Finletter who was going to London as head of the Marshall Plan delegation mission to the United Kingdom about my going with him as his information officer. I said I'm sorry I can't do that. I've been away for two and a half years and have just come back from Russia. I have to find a place to live; my family is rearranged, reconnected for the first time in years. Al said do me a favor, I made an appointment for you. At least go see him and tell him why you can't do it. So I went to see him at the appointed time. Tom Finletter, I don't know if he had been coached by Friendly by now or not. It turned out he told me about what he was going to do and told me how important it was to get the right information out, that this was a prime concern of the Congress and so forth and so on. I just wanted to ask your advice about how to do this if you were in that spot. I absolutely fell flat on my face. I told him. He ended up by saying I'm taking the Queen Elizabeth. Do you suppose you could fly over and be there before I get there. I'd love to have you with me. What did I say? Yes! So I sold the house and packed up the family and went to London and met Tom when he got off the Queen Elizabeth.

Q Well how long wee you involved with the Marshall Plan?

WILSON: About four years. I took a year's leave of absence from my company and when that year was up, Averill Harriman, who was running it in Europe who I met in the War Production Board and in Moscow in the Reparations Commission asked me to come to Paris. So I told the company I couldn't get back and moved to Paris.

Q: Let's talk first about Finletter who was later Secretary of the Air Force. How was he to work for during this time in London?

WILSON: I thought he was wonderful to work for. He had what I tend to think of as a high level New York lawyer's mind - like a trap. He was very fast. He's been dead for quite a while now. He was a guy who decided what his priority was. He'd focus everything in his head and in his actions and his timing and scheduling and so forth on that. Everything else would get brushed to the side. On that point, he was terrific. But he also was a great delegator; he would occasionally want to know what I was doing, but that was about all. I had an easy job in a way. The British were running an adult economic information program under Stafford Cripps who was running the Treasury at that time. He had a small group of very able people. They were trying to educate the British on the economic problems of the UK after the war. Their economy was absolutely dependent on the Marshall Plan, and they knew it. They didn't want to deny it; they actually wanted people to understand it because it involved some serious shifts in British attitudes toward their role in the world which some of their people didn't like at all. Some of their publishers didn't like at all, so educating the British public about the Marshall Plan and its place within the context of the British postwar problem was something they very much wanted to do. So that all I had to do was suggest to them what I thought would be a good idea, and they did it. I did very little directly in the way of information activity. I remember the Congress seemed to be more interested in the idea of whether people over there knew where they were getting this all and were properly appreciative than anything else. This was the subject that a long string of American visitors and delegates most wanted to know about. When I would be visited by traveling Congressmen and they wanted to know about whether the British really appreciated the help the American people were giving them, I took an editorial out of my desk and handed it to them. This editorial was very bitter that they were sick and tired of hearing about the Marshall Plan and what wonderful people the Americans were for giving it to them for nothing. They said we get this in the press, on the radio, in the newsreels, the next thing you know we will be getting it from the pulpit. It was from the Daily Worker, and that's it. That beats the Congress every time.

Q: Did you have any battles with the British press or the BBC or anything at that time?

WILSON: Really almost none. The Beaverbrook press...

Q: Lord Beaverbrook. He was the big media baron I guess you would call him.

WILSON: They were old imperialists and they thought that it was a disgrace for the British Empire to accept handouts from their friends. But most of the working people knew better; the working people in the press knew better. No, we had no problems, practically no problems at all with the British press people. The British did depend on the Marshall Plan; so did everybody else. The facts were pretty clear. We were asking nothing. We had a good product as they would say in the commercial world.

Q: You went out there when? Was this about '46 or so? When did you go out to London?

WILSON: '47. The Speech was '47 at Harvard.

Q: George Marshall made a commencement speech at Harvard in June of '47 I think.

WILSON: That's right so this was early '48 when the act was passed and the money and things had begun to flow. But then it was '49 when I went to Paris.

Q: You were in Paris until when?

WILSON: '49 until '51 or '52.

Q: Could you talk a bit about Averell Harriman. I mean he was a major figure in American diplomacy for many years. During the time you dealt with him in Paris, what was your impression and how did he operate?

WILSON: Well I did know Harriman very well and worked with him several times. I don't know anybody who worked with him, if they could work with him, who didn't love him. He was a man who was absolutely totally committed to what he was doing. He worked like a dog. He expected you to also, but he didn't expect you to do anything he didn't do himself. He was really a wonderfully effective person. Everybody felt they had to respect him. I'm not talking about the non Americans with which we had to deal. I think quite apart from the fact that sure he was a very welcome man - he was an ambassador, and he was running in this case the Marshall Plan. He was running a program that the Europeans were absolutely dependent on. But I think he was, now that we begin to talk about it, very persuasive in private. He was never a very good speaker. If you are talking about diplomacy, I'm talking about private diplomacy. He always knew what he was talking about. I think he was probably more responsible than any other individual in forcing the Europeans to take the Marshall Plan in a way that I think became ultimately its most important impact. That is to say, I don't know if he's responsible for this but we, the United States Government, refused to deal with the French and the Italians and the rest of them, nation by nation, which they all wanted. They thought they could get more from us I guess. He insisted that it be a European plan, that they put together their requirements subject to our review and approval, but that they do it themselves; but that they not do what all of them tried to start doing which was to face their terrible economic problems on a national basis. All of them wanted to deal with their problems by cutting imports and exports. They wanted to nationalize their currencies, and in any event, I think he had more to do with it than anybody else, insisting on a daily, practical day to day basis that this was a European recovery program. They had to present their combined requirements. We would allocate against it. They would then have to re divide it among themselves. They could not do it by nationalist priorities

Q: Germany at this time of course was not in it. I mean was Germany in it too?

WILSON: Yes, from the beginning.

Q: Your job again was making sure the European public was aware. Looking at it sort of country by country, we've already looked at England, what about France? Did you find any difficulty getting the message out to the French?

WILSON: Well the Marshall Plan information program in Europe, I believe, probably engaged in the most open, active, large scale propaganda warfare that we've ever had. The Russians were out to ruin the Marshall Plan. You remember they refused to...

Q Yes they made Czechoslovakia withdraw from the Marshall Plan aid and all that.

WILSON: The first ships arrived in Europe in Le Harve with Marshall Plan goods. The dock workers refused to unload them. They had to be unloaded by the French Army. The mine workers not only went on strike but they flooded the coal mines in France and Belgium. Some of the European governments, as I said before, had Communists in them as part of their coalition cabinets. This being a quite understandable reward for having conducted active anti fascist, anti German activity during the occupation. The only people who really fought were the Communists in some of those countries, and they were sometimes taken in to those cabinets and had people in the governments. While they weren't at the top nonetheless, you're in a - I'm thinking of France in the early days - country that is short of paper for example. It turns out there's a Communist in control of paper allocations, and you can believe me the Communist press gets plenty of paper, while the anti communist press doesn't. The same sort of thing could be said about film stocks and that sort of thing. What's more they had money. They could afford publishing when some other people couldn't. If you've ever walked down a street where the walls only on one side are covered with posters, and they are all the same posters and they are all the same source, they carry a sense of power.

Q: Oh yes I've seen it. The workers with the sickle and hammer. You really feel like they are the movement of the future.

WILSON: Exactly! The Communists had a monopoly on the walls of Paris. So this was a real fight. So we did everything. We put the story in every media. We ran traveling exhibits in trucks and in trains and on barges down the canals of Europe. We had access to the non communist press completely. We could get our stuff in the British newsreels but the newsreels ran, I can't think of the neighborhood of Paris, it was almost completely communist. It didn't run in those theaters because if it did they'd get bricks through the screen. I remember every now and then getting a call from a French mayor from some town saying the local communists tried to bust up your exhibit this afternoon. We've got them arrested. Do you want to charger them? We never did; that's not the point. I remember we published a paper for French unionists. It used to get thrown off the train sometimes as the train went over the river somewhere. So it was a good fight.

Q: How did you find the French bureaucracy at that time? Was it difficult to, I mean the ones with whom you would have contact. Were the ones who were not Communist sympathetic to the Communists or not?

WILSON: No. They were trying to get France back on its feet, back in business so they could tell us they didn't like us. They were very active allies.

Q: By this time it was quite clear to everyone who was involved that the Soviet Union was the enemy and these were their surrogate warriors in a way. Was there any doubt in anyone's mind what the battle was about?

WILSON: No. Well of course there was. There were always left wing French intellectuals to worry about, but they were also hard to deal with. In due course even the French got into it. They didn't like us. We gave all of these things to the program in France, but they didn't have much choice, and they put up with it when it was easy to do so. We would rather have their name on it than ours anyhow. You know sometimes we'd want to do some things they just didn't know how to do. That was embarrassing. The French were also curious about things. This was probably about half way through the Marshall Plan and emphasis was starting to shift, I think Paul Hoffman had a thing about productivity; that was the key to manufacturing and industrial success. I remember we sent a group of journalists over once to the U.S. to visit some high productivity plants in the U.S. They came back and all wrote the same set of columns. I'm sure this is not true, they all had the same title, at least a number had the same title, "Quest que c'est la productivitee?" They were intrigued. They hadn't thought of productivity. It was a strange idea to them. So it had a kind of intellectual level to it.

Q: Did you find there was any sort of approach you could make to the left wing intellectuals or did you almost write them off as somebody you couldn't make any impression on? I'm not talking about the hard line Communists; I mean the...

WILSON: Well, some of our most active help came from the Socialists. They knew the Communists. They knew you couldn't work with them. By this time there was an anti communist free trade union.

Q: Yes. There were two trade unions. One was dominated by the Communists and the other was not. I forget the name. We had a representative, I don't know if you knew him, Irving Brown. Did you work with Irving Brown at all?

WILSON: Yes. I don't think I did personally but I remember the French had something called the Quai Liberte. They were anti Communist. This is when I thought about the walls. And they did some wonderful things. There would be these huge Communist posters up. They would invent a little piece to go across it to paste over it. I remember the French, no doubt with some encouragement from us, were about to extend their military service from 12 months to 18 months. Of course the Communists took a battle against this. They had posters all over the place "Down with the 18 months." The Quai Liberte people made a little banner kind of thing that would go across these things and it said, " We want 36 months like they have in Russia." This killed it. They just couldn't get anywhere with it. Who was the famous head of the French Communist Party for many years?

Q: Maurice Thorez?

WILSON: Thorez. Of course. Thorez became very ill, or apparently very ill. The Russians sent a special plane to Cairo to pick him up and take him to a hospital presumably on the theory that he couldn't get competent treatment in France. You also know how any time any communist would get put in jail they would slap the posters all over the place "Liberee whatever the guy's name was." So as soon as the Russians took Thorez to Russia, they plastered France with things saying "Liberee Thorez." So they had some real competition. The French were active too.

Q: You finished up in 1953?

WILSON: '52.

Q: '52. How did you feel about it when you left? Sort of you had done your bit and as far as you were concerned people in France and all pretty well knew what we were doing?

WILSON: Yes. I'd like to think a job well done. I thought like most of us, there would be a United states of Europe within a decade. That was 40 years ago and they haven't made it yet. I'm not sure they are ever going to make it. Yes, thoroughly convinced that it had been a very wise policy and a very effective program, and it was on the right course.

Now I think the Marshall Plan was actually kind of deceptive for many Americans. Because when we went over there the continent was a mess, and we fixed it in a few years. It didn't really occur to us we didn't do it. All we really did was provide the one thing that was missing from their point of view. The industrial revolution had started there. They knew how to build factories and bridges, things like that. They had just been bombed out, and they needed steel etc. etc. which you could only get from one place in the world, and it took dollars to buy it. We provided them with the dollars, that's all. That they didn't have and couldn't get anywhere else. They made the recovery plans. We provided them with the money to buy the stuff they needed, and so it worked perfectly. But it gave some of us I'm afraid, the notion that we know how to fix a country if they're in trouble. I think a good deal of our foreign aid program probably was driven by that myth. That's not quite the same thing as going to a country that has no experience and in some cases effectively no government that knows how to work. I think we had that illusion that we knew how to do things and in Asia, Africa, Latin America, the same thing doesn't apply. But I think we also failed to understand the significance of forcing them to decide what it was they wanted and what they needed. I think when it came around to running the, what did they call that in the Kennedy administration?

Q: The Alliance for Progress.

WILSON: The Alliance for Progress, we stuck to a country to country basis. I think it was because our people probably liked to do it that way. We were used to running those countries.

Q: Well then you returned to private life after that, is that right?

WILSON: Yes. I came back briefly with Averell Harriman shortly after he came back. The Korean War broke out by then. Harriman was called back to put together - we had complicated economic assistance programs to various countries. We had the military assistance, and the point four technical assistance was a third category. Congress wanted all those put together. It was a call back for Averell Harriman. He was the only guy who could knock their heads together, and he did. He had a small staff, about half a dozen people. It was a coordinating function. But I don't remember what came out of that. Well one thing that came out of that was Eisenhower came in and Harriman went out; everybody else went out. That's when I left.

Q: And you stayed in private life after that?

WILSON: Yes. At least until the Kennedy administration.

Q: What was your involvement with the Kennedy administration?

WILSON: During WWII I had known a guy named Harlan Cleveland. We were never in the same outfits, but we always knew what the other one was doing and had some degree of collaboration. Anyhow he was Assistant Secretary for IO, International Organizations including the UN. He asked me to come back with him into the State Department.

Q: You were in the State Department from when to when?

WILSON: '61 to '68. But four years in Washington working with the UN. When Cleveland was made ambassador to NATO, he asked me to come with him as political advisor. I was head of the political section of the U.S. mission to NATO.

Q: When you were with Harlan Cleveland, what was your job with IO?

WILSON: I was really sort of a general factotum. As you know in government, special assistants can be anything. I guess I was a special assistant to Harlan for four years.

Q: What was his method of operating would you say?

WILSON: I think his method of operating was extremely interesting. His theory was that more and more pieces of foreign policy were becoming multi national, more issues multi lateral; therefore, IO, since it has to represent the U.S. on issues and in institutions involving several branches of the State Department and maybe the federal government, the IO is a good place to coordinate U.S. policy. He just happened to be strong enough to make that work. It would be hard to believe from the present State Department, but it did in fact work I thought quite well.

Q: Can you think of any major issues where he had to lock horns within the State Department or the government?

WILSON: Well I'm sure there were. I'm just trying to recall. It probably involved arguments every day with everybody more or less. But we were working for a President who thought the UN was a good idea, and the U.S. had a role in it. The White House guy on this was Arthur Schlessinger, and he believed in it. The Secretary of State had been the first guy to deal with the United Nations, Dean Rusk. Our man there was Adlai Stevenson. That was a situation that wouldn't work unless those three guys wanted to make it work. They all wanted to make it work, and it worked very well. And I guess everybody else knew that. That would damp down the bureaucratic problems by itself.

Q: Well now you went to NATO when? From about 1964 or 1965 until about 1968? What was the status of NATO at that time? This was a very difficult time wasn't it? Wasn't this about the time when de Gaulle decided to pull France out?

WILSON: We moved from Paris to Brussels during that period, in '67 I think it was.

Q: Was that expected? Were you all waiting for de Gaulle to do that?

WILSON: Yes, I think so, in the sense that we knew de Gaulle didn't like it. The first thing he pulled out of the military you know, so the military, of course, had to move. I think he wanted to keep the political headquarters in Paris, because I think he just thought he would have more influence on it. But we decided that if he didn't want to be in the military end of it, we'd take the political out too. Most people think of NATO as a military organization with a bunch of six feet two inch Texas generals in line. It's a standing diplomatic conference. One that has been going on for 35 years now.

Q: Well how did you find the move to Belgium? Did the organization you were with adjust quickly or was there a period of discouragement?

WILSON: It was fantastically easy. The Belgians did a marvelous job. I thought we'd sink Brussels. It turned out that they took us very well. There was literally no problem. First of all, NATO is a very complicated organization. You've got the missions of 16 countries actually living together in a common office building. You eat together. And NATO works at all kinds of levels. The diplomatic mission of the ambassadors have a formal meeting once a week. There are no records, no rules. Everything is by consensus, and it's very formal. Except that they also meet several times a week informally at lunch at somebody's house. Meetings can be called at any time day or night. Then there's a senior political committee made up of sort of number two people. I wasn't number two, but I was the American on the senior political committee, and these are people who can be pretty much trusted to stay in line, but to be a little bit more informal and find out a little more about why the other guy is being so silly. There are subgroups and you meet in all sorts of formations under very different rules. But, there's some way to get it done at NATO somehow or other. I'm not making very clear sense of this. It worked because everybody wanted to make it work; that's the one thing. Maybe the other thing that hit me between the eyes was the extent to which the U.S. is the leader, whether you want to be or not. I sat for about three years behind the U.S. name card around the conference table. I didn't particularly want to be the leader. In fact, I wished that some of our allies would show a bit more leadership than they sometimes do. I finally got it through my head that there was absolutely no chance whatsoever of getting NATO to do anything until the U.S. position was known. I could not trap my colleagues, even though I got to know some of them quite well, into any initiative. What happened most of the time is that something starts with a U.S. initiative, breaks down into a four party consensus, and then that's accepted by the rest of them.

Q: Were the French still playing an active role on the political side when you were there?

WILSON: At this point the French were making sure they weren't going to do anything American that they could get into trouble with de Gaulle about.

Q: So they were sort of a write off?

WILSON: Yes. They would go along as long as they weren't getting into any trouble with the Quai d'Orsai, but they wouldn't even try to get clear to go along if they weren't so sure about it, but they contributed nothing at all.

Q: Were you there when the Soviets and their block invaded Czechoslovakia in the summer of '68? In august of '68. How did that hit NATO? What was the feeling and what were the expectations when the news came out?

WILSON: I will claim that the U.S. delegation was not surprised, and it's because there had been some very good information about what was going on and because it seemed to be overwhelmingly clear that the Czechs had gone out of control. The Soviets could not live with what the Czechs could not go without at this point. The Russians had no alternative but to invade. And I will say that we were the only people in NATO who thought it would happen.

Q: Did you expect that this might lead to a larger war?

WILSON: No.

Q: Well, you left there shortly after that then.

WILSON: When was Nixon elected?

Q: '68.

WILSON: I resigned. Not that, I am a Democrat, but this didn't have anything to do with it. Any of the times I worked for the government it had nothing to do with it. But I thought it was time to get off the merry go round. Cleveland resigned, of course. The new Secretary of State, William Rogers, asked some of us to stay until spring, because they were having the 20th anniversary of the Treaty of Washington, which was the basis of NATO, you know, meeting in Washington at that time. I resigned, but Harlan asked me to stay until June to let Rogers get ready for that meeting. I came over here and worked with Rogers getting ready for the 20th anniversary of the Treaty of Washington celebration or meeting.

Rogers then asked me to stay with him in the Department which I did for about six months or so until the end of the year.

Q: And then you left. I think we might quit at this point.

End of interview