

AMBASSADOR WILLIAM R. CRAWFORD, JR.

Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy

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Q: Mr. Ambassador, what inspired you to go into the Foreign Service?

CRAWFORD: Family influences. I had a somewhat unusual childhood. Both parents were teachers. My father was a professor at the University of Pennsylvania, my mother a teacher of French in the public high school system in Philadelphia. My father's field was sociology, but what they shared was a love of languages and travel, so that throughout my youth, any time that my father could get a fellowship for foreign travel, foreign study, foreign teaching, he would take the whole family along. Thus, when I was five years old, we spent a year in Europe, when my father had a Guggenheim Fellowship, primarily in France. Then later in 1940-41, he was an exchange professor at the University of Chile, and my brother and I went along on both of those trips. From 1943 to '45, he was drafted into government service during the war as our first ever cultural attaché. He was stationed at the American Embassy in Rio, and I went along for two years of that, from 1943 to '45.

By the time I got out of secondary school, I had lived quite a lot in Europe and in Latin America and had a pretty good backing in French, Spanish, and Portuguese. I also had had a chance to see something of Foreign Service work, and I admired what I saw. I remember in Chile in 1940-41, getting to know Cecil Lyon and his wife. Sheldon Mills, I think, was in Rio. I was very much impressed by these people.

With that kind of family background and the impression made on me by people in the Foreign Service, and certainly an ever-growing interest in intercultural relations, somewhere mixed in all of that a sense of helping to resolve tensions and conflicts, by the time I got to college, I was really on a possible dual track. One was medicine, completely afield from the Foreign Service, and the other was international relations.

Q: Where did you go to college?

CRAWFORD: I went to Harvard as an undergraduate. In exposing myself to both tracks in my first year of college, it was quickly clear that although much interested in medicine, I didn't have much background for the hard sciences and mathematics and so on necessary to be a doctor. More and more, international relations was the thing that naturally came most easily and that I became most interested in. By my junior year in college, that was what I wanted to do.

Over the years I had talked to people in the Foreign Service, going back to that experience in Chile and later in Brazil, and they had said, "It's a great career, but there are two things you won't like about it. The first is that you'll have to spend ten years of apprenticeship doing things that you really won't like-economic work, administration, consular work, and so on, where clearly your ultimate interest is going to be in the political side of things. The other thing that you won't like is when you get in the Foreign Service and get to be senior in it, you won't like the political winds that blow at the very highest levels."

In response to the first comment, I said, "Is there any way around that ten-year apprenticeship?"

They said, "Well, yes, if you become a specialist in a part of the world where the languages and climate are so difficult that others avoid it, you can, indeed, circumvent the apprenticeship."

During my three years at Harvard, 1945-48, I thought for a while of being a Russian specialist and took an intensive summer of Russian. The Russian language and I just did not mesh at all. I found it difficult, not personally interesting, and got an abysmally low grade in the course. On the other hand, I had had an anthropology course my first year at Harvard with the famous professor, Carlton Coon. Anthropology 1 at Harvard was really devoted to Carlton Coon's experiences in North Africa and the Middle East, where he had been involved for an entire career as an anthropologist, but also in North Africa, working for OSS during the war. He was a fascinating man whose son became a close colleague of mine in the Foreign Service. Professor Coon had gotten many of his students over the years interested not so much in anthropology as in careers in the Middle East.

Just before graduating from Harvard, I decided to slow myself down. At that time right after the war, you could accelerate, and I was about to graduate after only two years. I thought, "If I'm going to be representing the United States overseas, I ought to know a lot more about it." So I spent two summers hitchhiking my way around the country, working from job to job, hitting as many of the 48 states and as many different kinds of manual labor as I could in two summers, which was a wonderful experience. I think it did teach me something about the country that I hoped some day to represent.

On graduating from college, the draft was breathing down everybody's necks. At that point the CIA had sought me out and interviewed me. I had agreed to go in, thinking of this as an interim job for the Foreign Service, which then had a long waiting list. But because I had lived in a lot of different places, the whole question of security clearance was quite slow. Meanwhile, the Navy had opened a program of direct USN commissions for college graduates willing to commit themselves to flight training and four years' service. I had to reply to that before the clearance from CIA came.

So, the first thing after graduating from college was a year in the Navy. Thank heavens it was only a year, because it would have been a terrible waste of time to spend four years. Fortuitously, the Navy ran short of money for flight training at that point and the program I was in had generated some hostility from people who had gone to the Naval Academy. They were not particularly happy to have these 30 or 40 officers given USN commissions. Not USNR, but USN. So when they ran short of money, the first program to go was this, and they gave me the choice of getting out entirely and going into the Naval Reserve, or being rerouted into naval intelligence.

I was interviewed by naval intelligence, but it turned out that the apprenticeship there would have been even worse, and I would have spent the first 15 or 20 years sitting in foreign ports under various cover, photographing ships going in and out.

Seeing that I was going to be able to get out of the Navy, I wrote to Carlton Coon saying, "You got me bitten with the Middle East bug, where could I go to really get a good master's degree in Middle East studies?"

With his usual marvelous immodesty, he said, "Since Harvard has been so short-sighted as to dispense with my services (I later learned it was because he had had a rather sharp argument with the president of Harvard, in which he'd called the latter a son of a bitch). I am now at the University of Pennsylvania, and I think we could put together a very good program for you because there are a lot of good people in the field, even though there is no formal program for Middle Eastern studies."

Amazing as it may seem now, in view of the proliferation of Near East studies programs in American universities, in 1948-49, there were really only two of any worth in the country. One was at Princeton, but that was almost entirely centered on one professor, Philip Hitti, and without much depth in the department. Penn did have a number of first-rate people in different parts of the university-Carlton Coon, Ted Speiser, Franz Rosenthal-and, in fact, was being used as the Department of State's in-service training school for would-be Middle East specialists.

So I applied to Penn, got in with the agreement that I could get a master's in one year. Of the six of us going through the program that year, there were three civilians, of whom I was one, and three Foreign Service officers. That furthered my knowledge of people in the Foreign Service and my interest in it. I still, at that point, had not taken the Foreign Service exam.

We are by now in the summer of 1950, and I had my master's degree, got married, and took the Foreign Service exams all at the same time. My wife and I left for Paris in September 1950; I to study at the Institut des Langues Orientales Vivantes, which was the French Government's in-service training school for Arabic language specialists, with particular focus on North Africa. So I went to spend a full year of post-M.A. studies at the Institut des Langues Orientales.

That year was cut short by a letter from Washington saying I'd passed the Foreign Service written exams and needed to be back in Washington to take the orals by the spring. At that point, they did not have examination panels. So my wife and I took what little money we had—we were on a very short budget—and we hitchhiked through North Africa to all the places that Carlton Coon had talked about in those initial anthropology lectures at Harvard, through Algeria and Morocco, at one time sleeping in the servants' quarters of one of the grand old palaces in Fez; every step along the way confirming my interest in a career in the Middle East.

I got back, passed the oral exam in the spring of 1951, and was commissioned in June. I remember at FSI we had lectures on all the different geographic bureaus of the Department. The then-Director of Near Eastern Affairs was G. Lewis Jones, and he came and talked about what would confront us if we spent a career in the Middle East. At the end of the lecture, I went up and said, "Mr. Jones, I'm very much interested in specializing in Middle Eastern affairs, and I'd like to go to Jeddah as my first post."

He looked at me as if I was out of my mind, and he said, "To Jeddah? Why?" Jeddah was known then as the worst post in the Foreign Service, bar none.

I said, "Well, it seems to me it's a very small post, there are only three career officers, and as the junior one I would be able to learn a little bit about all the functions of the embassy." I said I also felt that I would be seeing Arab society and Arab culture without a lot of the European veneer acquired in places like Beirut and Cairo. Privately, I felt my volunteering for Jeddah would also show seriousness of intent in a Middle East career.

The next day I was called over for an interview in NE [Near Eastern Affairs], which I guess convinced him that I was not totally out of my mind. A couple of days later, I was formally assigned to go to Jeddah at the end of the A100 course, thus receiving my assignment a good six weeks before anybody else in the class.

In those days, it was very hard to get people to go to Jeddah. It was, indeed, an awful post. It all worked out, and my first boss in the Foreign Service was Raymond Hare. There could have been no better master within the Foreign Service for a young officer interested in spending a career in the area. I did some administration, some consular work, but basically I was head of my own one-man political section at my first post.

Q: This proved the original theory that if you went to a very difficult area, with a difficult language, that you could bypass the ten-year training period.

CRAWFORD: Basically, yes.

Q: I'm going to skip over some of your very interesting time, because we'll come back to dealing with Arab and Yemeni affairs when you were in Aden.

From 1959 to 1964, you were the Director of Arab-Israeli Affairs.

CRAWFORD: Not through that entire period. In 1959, I came out of an assignment in Aden and Yemen to work on Arabian Peninsula affairs, and then on Israel-Lebanon affairs. Then in 1961-62, when a new desk for the Arab-Israeli Affairs Directorate was created, I was the first officer assigned to that. So I was Director of Arab-Israeli Affairs from 1962 to 1964.

Q: What were your responsibilities at the time? Let's start in 1959, when you were dealing with Saudi Arabia or Arabian Peninsula affairs. What did you do as the director?

CRAWFORD: I wasn't in that job very long, because Hermann Eilts came in. I took over from David Newsom, who went on to other things, and Hermann Eilts came in as Director of Arabian Peninsula Affairs maybe in early 1960. So I was, in effect, an interim director, and that was for just a few months.

Most of our concerns at that time had to do with the whole question of what the military relationship of the United States with Saudi Arabia was going to be, to what extent would we be a provider of military training and ultimately of weapons, and relationships at Dhahran airfield. King Saud had given us base rights during the Second World War, what he regarded as a clasp-of-the-hand alliance with the United States in wartime. That kind of question.

Q: I'm familiar somewhat with this, because I was in Dhahran from 1958 to 1960. What was our interest in Saudi Arabia? We're talking about the 1959-60 period. What was American interest in the area?

CRAWFORD: I think we'd have to say primarily oil. As you know, ARAMCO was the biggest American corporation outside the United States. The whole question of the oil company's relationship with the Saudi Government, what percentage of ownership. ARAMCO, by and large and commendably, was way out ahead of the other British and French oil companies in the area. It was the first to move to a 50-50 arrangement. That paved the way, ultimately, for nationalization on friendly, equitable terms many years later. But I think our primary interest was still oil in the period of 1959 to '61, but the evolving military relationship and training was coming more to the fore.

Q: When we talk about your role as director, that's essentially what most people refer to as the desk officer, isn't it?

CRAWFORD: You won't believe it, but at that point, there was only one officer involved for the entire Arabian Peninsula: the desk officer, whose title was Director of Arabian Peninsula Affairs.

Q: What was your relationship with ARAMCO?

CRAWFORD: Very good, because of the associations formed during the two years that I'd been in Jeddah, particularly with the government relations side of ARAMCO. They were people who could just as easily have gone into the Foreign Service. They were superb Arabists and really knew Saudi Arabia. From them, we in the Foreign Service learned a great deal. We formed close relationships that tended to last over the 30-year span of our respective careers. I say that with a slight smile, because I think ARAMCO, with that degree of expertise, was in some ways only mildly tolerant of the junior Foreign Service officers who felt that they, too, might know something about the country. Also, a company that large did not really want interference in its relationship with the Saudi Government, and tended to be fairly close to the chest about that relationship.

Q: We were pretty much marching in the same direction with ARAMCO, but ARAMCO was much bigger and knew what it was doing. I have to say this was my relationship when I was the economic officer in Dhahran. They were mildly tolerant of this junior economic officer and would give me little scraps of information. Did you feel that it was a good or bad influence on American policy?

CRAWFORD: A good influence. It was a progressive company. It was clear even then that ARAMCO was the motor of progress and development in Saudi Arabia. Young Saudis were being trained by ARAMCO in so many different fields, not just petroleum geology.

Q: What about our military relations? How did we see Saudi Arabia at that time from a strategic military point of view?

CRAWFORD: There was an underlying awareness of the strategic importance of Saudi Arabia, the oil, the Gulf, and so on, but it wasn't much talked about. It wasn't thrust that much upon our awareness. We didn't do much theorizing. There was a sense that this country, Saudi Arabia, with the enormous oil reserves and so on, was going to be increasingly important in our foreign policy concerns. That was certainly there, but not an awareness that within 30 years, by the late 1970's, Saudi Arabia would be recognized as being one of the first half-dozen countries in the world for our foreign policy interests. That's quite a change over 30 years.

Q: Yes, it is. Turning next to Israel, what were your responsibilities?

CRAWFORD: I think I became desk officer or number two for Israel-Lebanon affairs sometime in 1960. I spent a year at that before becoming Director of the newly established section for Arab-Israeli Affairs.

Let me preface my answer by saying that it had always been my intent, long before actually getting in the Foreign Service, to be a specialist on the Middle East as a whole, and not simply on the Arab side of the question. I took it as a given by the time I got into the Foreign Service, which was roughly coincident with the creation of the state of Israel. By then it was clear that a key concern of the United States, forced on us in the State Department whether we liked it or not, by American attitudes toward the creation of the state of Israel. The public attitude was that that state was there to stay, and our job as diplomats was to help Israel, as best we could, get accepted into the Middle Eastern body politic. I felt that I would be ill-serving the Foreign Service, myself, and the country if I were a specialist just on one side of the line, so I sought out the involvement with Israeli affairs to get exposure on that side, so that later what I might have to say about Arab-Israeli matters could not be discounted, as so often had happened, as advice from somebody who only knew one side. So I asked for the assignment to Israeli affairs, which led to the Directorship of Arab-Israeli Affairs.

In the later job, our main concerns were multiple and complex, embracing a very deep relationship with the state of Israel, enormous amounts of aid, military intelligence relationships, but particularly the desk was set up to deal with the problems between Israel and its neighbors. That involved a lot of things to do with U.N., because Israel was surrounded by various U.N. peacekeeping forces. It involved, above all, the question of the Palestinian Arab refugees, equitable division of the Jordan River, and increasingly toward the end of my time, the whole question of nuclear proliferation, which became a very, very important issue, with Israel's move into and across the atomic threshold, which we discovered under Kennedy's administration in 1963.

President Kennedy had come into office and made a lot of declarations about, "If elected President, I will..." and what would follow would be the kind of thing we hear in presidential campaigns, i.e., summon all Middle Eastern leaders to the White House and make peace. That kind of thing was most unlikely to happen and not really a very productive approach to the reality of the problems between Israel and the Arab states.

In that case, when Kennedy came in, Armin Meyer, who was then principal deputy assistant secretary in NEA, and who had been Director of Near Eastern Affairs, managed to deflect or divert White House interest in doing something helpful about the Middle East, to doing something about the core of the problem between Israel and the Arab states, and that was the unresolved Palestinian Arab refugee problem-then as now. The consequence of those recommendations from the Department of State was that Kennedy said, "All right, I'll give it a try."

That produced the whole two-year effort spearheaded by Joseph E. Johnson, who at that time was president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: a highly complicated effort, in which Joseph Johnson was the clear leader. I was the officer in the Department of State designed to be the anchor man of the effort and bring the State Department along in the whole thing.

Ultimately, the product was a very sophisticated one. It was accepted by the Arab states, not to Joe Johnson's surprise, but I think to Israel's surprise. Israel had felt that for sure, one of the other Arab states would torpedo it. It was a very good lesson in American domestic politics to me about the strength of the Israeli lobby. The plan would not have really hurt Israel. We were convinced that we had safeguarded its security concerns. But confronted with the fact of Arab acceptance, Israel panicked, obviously fearing that it would be exposed as the intransigent party. So Israel had to put maximum pressure on President Kennedy through the Jewish lobby and Jewish interests in the United States to back off of US support for the plan. Since it had received only lukewarm support from Dean Rusk, our Secretary of State, and Kennedy could see what appeared to him mounting political risk of continuing US support, Kennedy blinked and the whole effort was dissolved, unfortunately.

Q: In broad terms, what was the plan? What were the risks that Israel saw to it?

CRAWFORD: It was a very subtle plan. What we were trying to do was to implement U.N. Resolution 194, which calls for giving refugees the choice of returning to Israel or taking compensation for properties lost at the time that Israel was established. The Arab states had always taken, as the core of their position, that 194 resolution had to be implemented. We said, "Okay, we'll implement it, but necessarily over a period of several years because it's impossible to interrogate more than a million refugees all at once." The plan anticipated that over a period of years the refugees would be asked about their choices, to prioritize their choices. If a refugee indicated as first choice returning to Israel, then the refugee would be shown what that would mean; i.e., that the village or the farm in which he grew up was now a kibbutz or a factory. This exposed them to the realities of change in Israel, and the refugee would be asked to give other priorities, such as what their compensation would be in the event they chose immigration to Australia, Canada, whatever. Our intent was controlled, carefully screened implementation of Resolution 194, designed to make sure that in no given year would the process get out of control and result in Israel's being swamped.

Ultimately, we felt, from surveys within the refugee camps, that not more than perhaps 80,000 refugees might have opted to go back over a ten-year period. In other words, no serious threat to Israel's security entailed in the whole thing. There were lots of opportunities to press the "abort" button as you went along if the whole process got suddenly out of control and there was any real danger to Israel. Israel could at any point say, "This is just a danger to us." It was a very carefully controlled, genuine implementation of the spirit and letter of Resolution 194.

But even with that, and the realization that we would have paid most of the bills of compensation and resettlement and the limited repatriation, Israel really took fright, and Kennedy backed off. So eyeball to eyeball with the Jewish lobby, Kennedy ducked.

Q: Was the pressure from the Jewish lobby over your head, or were you involved in it, too, when things of that nature happened?

CRAWFORD: You couldn't not be involved in it. It was bruising and a very real thing.

Q: How did this impact on you in your operation?

CRAWFORD: Lots of different ways. When I first went to work on Israeli affairs, suddenly there was at my right hand an American citizen, an Eastern European Jew, a very attractive young man and his wife. He had been, as a small boy, in one of the dreadful camps in Europe, and made his way to the United States. There was no question in our minds that he was working for Israeli intelligence, theoretically no connection with the Israeli Embassy. So it was a wonderful triangulation of somebody in the Department of State working on Israeli affairs, because you'd have dealings with the Israeli Embassy, you had dealings with this young man.

Q: How would he come to you?

CRAWFORD: He just became a friend. I don't even remember exactly how. His name was Philip Katz, and he's now a professor at the Hebrew University in Beersheba in Israel, which was always his intent. It was for Israel a very effective way of triangulating State Department attitudes on evolving issues. However, he was of use to me, too. He taught me a great deal about the American Jewish community. He was Director of the Israel Affairs section of B'nai B'rith. Together, they were extraordinarily bright, a likeable couple. He also introduced me to many leaders of the American Jewish community. Dealing with them was almost like dealing with a foreign government.

There is to this day something called the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations, which is the umbrella group of all key Jewish organized groups in this country. They would meet regularly with the Department of State to make clear their wishes about US-Middle Eastern policy, which was, in almost every instance, a direct reflection of Israel's wishes. I would be there taking the notes when they went to see the Secretary of State. They faithfully and consistently, during that period, backed exactly what the Israeli Government wanted. If it was known that we in the desk were opposing the sale-I remember this one vividly-of, say, 100 very sophisticated new tanks or particular missile to Israel, the word would come. They'd just say, "We know, Crawford, that you're opposing this. We respect your point of view as a conscientious one, but we have ours, and we know we're going to win." And they would; they would win.

Back to that particular tank issue, Israel got the tanks and we didn't even know that Kennedy diverted them out of American stocks assigned to NATO in Germany. Suddenly our attaché in Tel Aviv discovered some of those 100 tanks in Israel and reported. We said, "Where did these come from?" We did a lot of detective work, and it turned out that Kennedy had issued a presidential directive unbeknownst to the Department of State.

This is interesting. I ended up with a duodenal ulcer. It went away fairly quickly after I stopped working on Israel affairs, but doctors at the time said the principal cause of ulcers is frustration. It was so direct. Here I felt I was seriously working through the Johnson plan for Israel's acceptance in the area, and then, as has been true over the whole span of Israel's existence, Israel is usually the main obstacle to trying to solve its own problem. It was the terrible frustration of trying to do the job conscientiously to be helpful and having Israel be the principal resisting player.

Q: Two things come up. There's always been the feeling within the State Department-I've never dealt with the issue, except in a very modest way-the word in the corridor is that anything that comes in from our posts abroad or anything that is circulated in the Department immediately is leaked to the Israeli Embassy. Was this your impression, too?

CRAWFORD: Pretty well. I would say that's certainly 98% true. It was really rather annoying, but perfectly clear that when the Israeli ambassador made a demarche or we to the Israelis, that they already knew exactly in advance what our position was.

This especially came to the fore in the whole question of Israel's nuclear energy program, which was clandestine. In the first months of the Kennedy Administration, our air attaché^{1/2} in Tel Aviv reported that he made a puzzling discovery; a large, new plant behind barbed wire in a place called Dimona, near the city of Beersheba in the Negev. On asking the Israelis what this was and why it was behind barbed wire, they told him it was a textile plant. Eventually, of course, as the result of more intelligence and more questioning, it turned out the "textile plant" was a reactor developed in secret.

The full story seems to have been that President de Gaulle wanted to speed France's movement into nuclear weapons, and he calculated rightly that if he could get American nuclear weapon designs through Israeli involvement, he could speed up his own program by several years. That seems to have been, as far as we could find out then and now, exactly what was done. Jewish scientists in the United States, working for Israel, and Israelis scientists themselves working in these installations, got hold of the designs.

Q: When you say Jewish scientists in the United States working for Israel, these were actually Jewish scientists in the United States working in American installations, passing this information.

CRAWFORD: Yes, and also visiting Israeli scientists. To many of them, this is not an accusation; it's just a fact. They did not see passage of classified material to Israel as being in any sense disloyal; it was all a consistent single loyalty to them. They felt that there was an identity of interest between the United States and Israel, and did not see that there was anything wrong in "theoretically" talking about weapons design with Israeli colleagues. Jewish American scientists would say to us, "My goodness, it's so refreshing to spend a year on a scholarship over there (at the Technion, etc.), sit around at night, discussion is free." Anyway, there seems no doubt, in retrospect, that de Gaulle got his weapons designs. In exchange, the French had engineering expertise and money that the Israelis lacked, so there seems to have been a quid pro quo which resulted in the construction at Dimona.

Anyway, suddenly we woke up to the fact that Israel had a weapons capability and, therefore, we were into a nuclear proliferation question. Kennedy took a very strong position on this. He said, "How can we be credible in the rest of the world if a state apparently as closely allied with the United States, as totally dependent on the United States as Israel, develops a weapons capability?" This is making a very short story out of a very long story, but Kennedy insisted with Ben Gurion, ultimately successfully, that we be allowed to inspect the plant and monitor its development. Furthermore, he insisted that we be authorized by the Israelis to pass the results of our monitoring to President Nasser in Egypt, to try to keep Egypt out of the proliferation game. This was the arrangement which persisted for some years.

The point of this is more that we examined the whole question of whether we could stem the flow or prevent further American classified military, particularly nuclear from moving to Israel. There was a standing committee of which George Ball, the Under Secretary, was chairman at that point, designed to protect US national secrets. It was concluded that there was, in fact, no practical way of stopping this leakage. Given the number of really prominent physicists who were Jewish in this country, there was no possible way of blocking the flow of this kind of information.

Q: Your position as the desk officer, you were watching this. The decisions were made at a higher level.

CRAWFORD: They were presidential, essentially. In this relationship, really the only key player in the United States was sometimes the Secretary of State, but almost always it's presidential. That is because the President wants it that way. It makes it rather exciting to be the desk officer, or if you will, the Director of Israeli Affairs, because it involves such direct association with the White House.

Q: If you were the Chilean desk officer or something.

CRAWFORD: Early in the Kennedy administration, McGeorge Bundy called up late at night to say, "Golda Meir's coming tomorrow. What's she going to talk about?" Ultimately, of course, the White House located all the carefully prepared briefing papers which I explained had gone over days before, but it just shows the instant sensitivity of any American politician to the whole question of the relationship with Israel.

Q: Your chief at that time was Phillips Talbot.

CRAWFORD: Very distinguished. I believe he'd been head of the Asia Foundation. A very distinguished political appointment made by the Kennedy Administration to be Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Phillips Talbot. Really a wonderful, thoughtful human being, a specialist particularly on South Asian questions, for whom the Near East had not been a primary concern in his own career in the quasi-academic foundation world.

I can remember frequently being the next to last person in NEA. The Israel desk had more work to do than other sections. The issues were more pressing, went closer to the heart of American political concerns. Anyway, the two of us would often be the last people in NEA at night. I'd go in with this or that, arguing for example that we had to take issue with the Israelis on some Jerusalem or boundary fracas, whatever it was, and he'd look up at me sympathetically, tired, and say, "Bill, do I really have to go to the mat on this one?" Meaning, wisely, that Phil had just had so much political capital with the administration. I was always calling on him to use some of it.

Q: I'd like to ask you about the role of Dean Rusk. In other interviews that we have done, Dean Rusk often comes across as a Secretary of State, when anything moved out of Asia, his attention and his interest went down considerably. Did you find that he played much of a role, or was this just not his area?

CRAWFORD: He monitored how the whole issue of Dr. Joseph E. Johnson was progressing step to step. Johnson, with me at his side, would come in periodically and report to Rusk. He'd ask intelligent questions on how the whole effort was coming along. He knew it was dear to the hearts of the White House. I don't think it was of great personal interest to him. Ultimately, he may have had a lot to do with giving Kennedy a reason to back off it. Because when Mr. Johnson's final plan to resolve the Arab refugee problem was put together in one voluminous report, I took it up to Secretary Rusk, and he wrote in green ink on the cover, before sending it over to Kennedy, "This may have no more than a 15% chance of success, but perhaps it's worth a try." That copy with his notation on it never resurfaced. Not until much later was Dr. Johnson even aware that that was the Secretary's comment in transmitting it to the President.

It was, as you can see, a very careful, guarded comment. To a President already at that time increasingly under the gun from Israeli interests in the United States to back off of this whole effort, you have good justification for scuttling the plan if your Secretary of State tells you it may have no more than a 15% chance of success. So Rusk's statement was that of a very cautious man not personally committed to or perhaps terribly interested in Johnson's plan. Certainly Rusk was well aware of the mounting domestic storm against the whole thing.

Let me add that I personally liked Secretary Rusk very much. I've seen something of him in later years. He's a person of clearly great integrity and very substantial intellect, a fine human being. I admired him then and I admire him now. He was certainly not a crusader for this plan: detached.

Q: There have often been the accusations, actually more from outside than from within the Foreign Service, that there are Arabists. These are officers who have learned Arabic, serve in Arab posts, and are opposed to Israel because they see things from the side of the Arabs. At the same time, there are officers within the Department who have concentrated on Israeli affairs, who see things in terms of Israel to the expense of the Arabs. Did you find within the Foreign Service, in that crucial position, that you were up against these two buffeting forces, or is this an oversimplification?

CRAWFORD: There were not pro-Israeli buffeting forces within the Foreign Service. There were certainly, on the Arab side, individuals with very, very strong convictions about the wrongness of many Israeli policies. The contestants were not really within the Foreign Service, but between American domestic politics; i.e., the Israeli lobby, and these elements within the Foreign Service. Arabists-yes, primarily, who felt that there were a lot of things wrong with US policy vis-a-vis Israel over the years. I did somewhat get caught in the middle with them as well as with the Jewish lobby. To a very few of my colleagues even the idea of equitable resolutions of the Jordan waters problem and the Arab refugee problem, went further toward the whole idea of accepting the existence of the state of Israel than they wanted to go. Just two or three held views that were that pronounced. It certainly was not then and is not now the majority.

The majority of our Middle Eastern specialists accepted, as I did, that a key tenet of our policy was support of the state of Israel, that Israel was there to stay, and it was our job to try to help get it accepted in the area, which does not mean subservience to Israeli views and how that ought to be done. In fact, often, as in my case, it involves an awful lot of crunch with Israel and people advocating its interests in this country, as my experience and my ulcer proved.

I think among people working on this problem, there is a strongly held feeling that in many ways Israel is an arrogant state that pulls American policy in directions that are not necessarily in American interests. In other words, Israel has an accepted influence on the formulation of our foreign policy toward the Middle East. But we often differ sharply on policies which ultimately might be in its own best interest. It has often fought the United States' view. That's perfectly fair. It's a sovereign state. But the crunch has been there. My reflection over 30 years is that Israel has almost always opposed the most sincere efforts of the United States to try to be helpful in getting it accepted in the area. The ultimate opponent has usually been Israel itself, acting directly and in no small measure through its supporters in this country. It causes bitter feelings in the Department of State. There were one or two colleagues who felt that my involvement in these efforts at compromise, piecemeal solutions was, in a way, almost treacherous.

Q: Were you operating as if it were a given that we were supporting Israel because we support Israel, really, rather than saying Israel is of strategic importance? Did you see a strategic and economic importance to Israel?

CRAWFORD: Very little. It had primarily a political and emotional importance. I don't think I'm seriously convinced that Israel has a strategic importance to the United States. Israel is going to pursue its own interests, and I don't think we should count on it in the overall strategic equation with the Soviet Union. It will go its own way. You could say that Israel is a strategic asset if it happens to see its interests as coinciding with ours, but history shows that it doesn't necessarily do that.

Let me say that I felt so strongly about this whole issue, I was the one who recommended it and it was subsequently implemented, that anyone intending to serve in the Middle East should ultimately serve on both sides of the line, should have experience in the embassy in Tel Aviv, as well as experience in the Arab states. That was a policy that we started there at that time, and it has since pursued. Before that, it was traditional that you could not hope to have an officer who had served effectively in Israel and him or her serve effectively in a subsequent assignment in an Arab state. I said, "That's unrealistic. Our policy is to get Israel accepted in the area. The Arab states must accept the fact that we're going to have officers who can expect, in the course of their service, to serve on both sides of the line." That was implemented and has been a fact ever since.

Q: I'm going to skip rather abruptly over a period of 1963 to 1967, when you were political counselor in Morocco, mainly because I want to concentrate on this other area where you spent so much time.

From 1968 to 1972, you were the DCM, the deputy chief of mission, in Cyprus. The ambassador, to begin with, was Taylor Belcher until 1969, and then David Popper from 1969 to 1973. As DCM, responsibilities depend on who is the ambassador. What were your responsibilities, both under Belcher and Popper? Were they different or was it standard DCM-ships?

CRAWFORD: No, they were somewhat different. I agreed to go to Cyprus initially because I felt that the level of deputy chief of mission is at the stage at which Foreign Service officers should be learning management in the broadest sense. The embassy in Nicosia is itself a small post. But it is the hub of American activities in Cyprus conducted by five different agencies, which at that time had over 1,000 employees in Cyprus, and really it falls to the deputy chief of mission to coordinate the work of all of these several agencies through their respective chiefs. So it's a very good place to learn management, as well, of course, as a fascinating political problem.

On the political program, I could have had no better instructor than Toby Belcher, who at that point was approaching his ninth year on the island. First he had been consul general in the days before Cyprus independence for four or five years, then went back as ambassador for an equal period. So he was a voice of great experience. He really ushered me into the whole political problem.

David Popper was quite different. He did not have previous Cyprus experience or, indeed, Foreign Service experience. His career had been primarily as a civil servant in the Bureau of International Organization Affairs. Very distinguished, but he did not know a great deal at that point, though an extremely intelligent man, about routine Foreign Service operations.

Q: As a political ambassador for somebody who knows the Foreign Service and how one deals abroad.

CRAWFORD: Ambassador Popper had seen a great deal of the Foreign Service in his 25 or 30 years in IO [International Organization Affairs] so it was not like being deputy to a political appointee. But it was different from a normal ambassador-DCM relationship in the sense that Ambassador Popper was away from the post much of the time. Cyprus was fairly tranquil, and he was pulled out to head up international narcotic negotiations with some 70 different countries, successfully so. In his early time there, he was really off post a great deal, leaving me as chargi½. It was at a very interesting period.

Q: Could you describe how you saw the situation at the time? We are speaking of 1968 through 1972.

CRAWFORD: By the time I got there, the second period of maximum tension, almost war, 1967 threat of a Turkish invasion, had passed. We were in an apparent lull as between Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus. But the fascinating development of the years I was first in Cyprus was the do-or-die tension between the junta in Athens and Archbishop Makarios. It was this Greek-to-Greek thing that needed closest watching at that point.

Q: You are speaking of what is often referred to as the colonels, Papadopoulos and Patakos and Ioannidis in Athens, who had seized power in April 1967, and their opposition to Archbishop Makarios, who was president at the time.

CRAWFORD: Elected president of Cyprus, as well as being head of the Cyprus church, very much in the ancient Greek tradition. An extremely canny politician and leader. At the time of his death, he was the longest surviving head of government and head of state in the commonwealth. It shows something about his sagacity. There again, it's a very complicated story, which is a subject of a book or several books all in its own right. Suffice it to say that an intense enmity had developed between the junta in Athens and Archbishop Makarios, with the junta fairly blaming Makarios for having aided a young man, a mainland Greek, who subsequently tried to assassinate the prime minister of Greece. Makarios had given him safe haven, the use of the Cyprus diplomatic pouch, and a fake passport to enable him to get back into Greece after a year of clandestine planning in Cyprus, where he subsequently tried to murder the prime minister of Greece.

Q: Threw a bomb on the road to Cape Sunion. His name was Panagoulis.

CRAWFORD: Yes. He was the man who had been given safe haven in Cyprus and subsequently tried to murder the prime minister. Well, in Greek terms, you don't forget that kind of thing, so the Greeks, with their very substantial assets in Cyprus, decided that Makarios had to go. They made several attempts on his life, cut the fuel lines in his helicopter, etc. Put in fictional terms, nobody would believe it, but the die was cast, and the colonels were determined to get rid of him. Watching these attempts build up was an absolutely fascinating detective story. The writing of it made me the 1970 or 1971 runner-up for the director general's reporting award.

Q: What was our role on Cyprus in this ongoing detective story?

CRAWFORD: It was a very complicated picture. Our relations were with the legitimate government of Cyprus and with Archbishop Makarios. Makarios presented himself to the world as a neutralist in the Cold War. At the same time, he depended heavily on substantial political support from the large Communist Party in Cyprus, which on a percentage of population basis is the largest Communist Party in any Western European state. At the same time, he quietly cooperated in many respects with the United States, in an anti-Communist sense. He was well aware that we had certain facilities in the British sovereign base areas in Cyprus, and he did not raise any objections or make a political issue of those. He had countenanced our cooperative, quiet relationship, in an anti-Communist sense, with his Minister of Interior, in various anti-Communist programs.

The issue becomes complicated in that ultimately it was that Minister of Interior, disaffected from Makarios for various reasons, who was the primary instrument that the junta used in its effort to unseat Makarios. So our role got a little fractured at that point. Let me just say that in a general sense, the Central Intelligence Agency felt that the officers of the junta in Greece were proven friends of the United States.

Q: I speak with a certain amount of anguish, because I was consul general on the country team from 1970 to 1974 in Athens, and I know this positive attitude toward a bunch of thugs.
(Laughs)

CRAWFORD: Then I'm preaching to the converted.

Q: But we're speaking for the record here.

CRAWFORD: At one point, when I went up to Athens with what I considered proof positive of the way the mainland Greeks were playing around in Cyprus and that they were going to pull the whole house of cards down if they continued their foolishness, I was told by our chief of station in Athens, Jim Potts, that that was just absolutely impossible. He couldn't agree with me: these people were friends with whom we'd worked for 30 years, and they would never conduct anything so foolish, and furthermore, we had absolute assurances that they weren't up to any of the kinds of things we were reporting from Nicosia. Well, this had been totally contradicted by a really dramatic conversation I had had, as chargé with the Greek ambassador, whose name was Panayotakos. He, although a career diplomat, was very close to the junta. About 7:00 or 7:30 one night, Panayotakos telephoned to ask me to come to his office.

I was ushered into his office. He was a fat man and was wearing a dark brown turtleneck jersey. There was no light except a hooded lamp on his desk, one of those things with the metal shade faced down toward the desk and not onto his face or illuminating any of the rest of the room. He said, "Mr. Crawford, I'm calling you in as the representative of a country with which Greece is allied. I want you to know of some important developments." (We were aware pretty well of what was going on, and Panayotakos was, in fact, just confirming information we had from many other sources.) He said, "We have today told Archbishop Makarios that he must leave Cyprus."

I said, "Mr. Ambassador, what if he chooses not to heed your advice?"

He said, "Then the people of Cyprus will know their duty." So I reported this.

Q: When was this, do you remember?

CRAWFORD: This would have been just before I left, probably the spring of 1972. So it was that kind of thing that I took up to our embassy in Athens.

Q: Makarios did not leave.

CRAWFORD: Makarios did not leave. He did not choose to heed their threats. But it was a direct antecedent to the events of two years later.

Q: The CIA station chief, whom I can understand, saw only his particular positive relationship, you might call it, with the intelligence agencies of the Greek. But how about our ambassador, Henry Tasca?

CRAWFORD: I had worked with Tasca in Morocco, and Tasca said, "You've got some pretty convincing information there, but why don't you talk it over with the chief of station who is the man in this embassy really closest to these people? Check it out with him."

The chief of station said, "I hear what you're saying, Mr. Crawford, but it's not plausible, credible, believable, or a fact. We have known these people for 30 years." I was bringing specific information that a particular colonel, Angelides, had come down to Cyprus to deliver the message to those Greek Cypriots who were regarded as totally subservient to mainland Greek wishes, to pull them together in an anti-Makarios effort. I said this was what Angelides was doing on that trip to Cyprus. He said, "It couldn't be. It's not credible. He's a fine man. I've asked him about this and he tells me there's no truth to it." (Laughs)

Q: I think Greece is probably one of the prime examples of what happens when a foreign intelligence service can almost co-opt ours because of cooperation and all. Israel may well be the other.

CRAWFORD: It was interesting that two years later, of course, when the Greeks made the last of their several unsuccessful efforts to kill Makarios, in July of 1974, once again the evidence in Cyprus was overwhelming that this was just about to happen. It was convincing enough to Washington to cable instructions out to Tasca saying, "Approach the Greeks and tell them this just won't wash. The information has now become conclusive." The agency was concurrently tasked, I believe, to go to a longstanding asset who was very close to General Ioannidis, who by that time had replaced Papadopoulos as prime minister.

Q: There had been a generals' coup over the colonels.

CRAWFORD: Ioannidis was actually in charge. We triggered this asset to try to find out what was up. He came back and said, "No, there's nothing to it, I can assure you." Of course, this was believed, because he, in turn, had worked so long and faithfully for the United States. But nobody ever considered the possibility that he might still be loyal to his boss and reporting to him, Ioannidis, the whole time he was also working for the United States. So Ioannidis succeeded in throwing the US off track in 1974.

Q: What were our relations with the Turks on the island? The time you were there, there was not the division, although they were separate communities. Cyprus was a mixed government and mixed community.

CRAWFORD: Not entirely. Starting in the early 1960's, the island had been, in fact, divided in quite a different way, in a pepper and salt configuration, in which the Turkish Cypriots, feeling exposed and dreadfully insecure in face of sharp hostility by the majority, 80% of the population that is Greek, had pulled into self-defended enclaves. Turks could still move out into Greek areas, but Greeks were not allowed into these tightly defended little Turkish enclaves in the northern sector of Nicosia and these several little secure enclaves dotted the country. The Turkish Cypriot leadership did not venture out of their own enclaves. But we had good personal relations with them and official relations at that point. There was no question of two governments. There was a nominal Turkish Cypriot vice president of Cyprus, but by 1968 he had really faded out of the picture even in the Turkish community. The de facto leader was Rauf Denktaş. Over the years, we became very close personal friends, as did, indeed, his closest equivalent on the Greek Cypriot side, Glafkos Clerides.

This is important to subsequent developments, because, yes, we had a Turkish language officer in the embassy, we had a Greek language officer, but at the top, the ambassador and I had good relations with the Turkish Cypriot leadership, as with the leaders of the government who were all Greek. This served the US very well after 1974.

Q: What were both the instructions and the official policy of the United States towards Cyprus at the time you were there as DCM?

CRAWFORD: "Do everything possible to try to support the efforts of the United Nations," which had a dual presence in Cyprus-peacekeeping and peacemaking. Two different organizations. Peacekeeping was under the United Nations forces in Cyprus. The peacemaking presence was a special representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations. We felt the special representative should be out in front in the efforts to resolve the various constitutional issues between the two communities. So we were supporting his efforts: in Cyprus and as appropriate with Greece and Turkey.

The U.N. seemed to be doing a good job of that, slowly but surely trying to mend the constitutional fences. That was all swept aside, ultimately, by this Greek versus Greek feud which did, indeed, pull the whole house of cards down. So pre-1974 our policy was to stand behind and be as helpful as possible to the U.N. efforts to try to achieve a more stable relationship between the two communities.

Q: Having moved from Israeli affairs to another lobby which has the potential for being almost as difficult, and from time to time it crops up, the Greek American lobby, did you find this much of a problem on Greek affairs?

CRAWFORD: Not the first time I was in Cyprus, not from 1968 to 1972. The American Greek community had not at that point been aroused.

Q: It took the July 1974 Turkish invasion to do it.

CRAWFORD: Yes.

Q: We'll come back to that. During this period, it did not particularly invite your attention?

CRAWFORD: Nor was it trying to exercise much influence on Cyprus events. It was not in evidence as it was intensely later. We'll come to that in 1974 and afterwards.

Q: We'll be coming back to Cyprus in some detail. Let's talk about your assignment to the Yemen Arab Republic as ambassador. You might treat, at the same time, a little bit of changes you saw when you had been in Aden before, dealing with that area as a junior officer. How did you get the assignment of going to the Yemen Arab Republic?

CRAWFORD: In a rather amusing and perhaps unique way. The summer of 1971, still in Cyprus as deputy chief of mission, I got a telegram from the Department asking for my views about being assigned as ambassador to Mauritania. A dual telegram went to David Popper, who was off on the narcotics negotiation.

The cable had come from the then-Under Secretary for Management, Ambassador [William] Macomber. I think I talked by telephone with David Popper, who asked me how I felt about it. In any case, I cabled my response to Macomber's request for my views. I knew something about Mauritania from the years in Morocco. I said Mauritania would present problems because there was no schooling. Our daughter was then eight, too young to go to boarding school. The family would have had to live apart. I said I was honored to be considered, but I felt I might make a greater contribution in other assignments which had been mentioned to me even though they did not carry ambassadorial rank. At that point, one thing that was in the offing was to go as deputy chief of mission to Tel Aviv, which I would have been very much interested in as part of this career pattern of staying involved with both sides. I mentioned a number of these things, but then very respectfully at the end, I said, "Of course, if this is where the path of duty lies, I will willingly go." My response had nothing to do with Mauritania being a physically difficult post. I had, after all, volunteered for Jeddah as my first Foreign Service post.

I got back a very angry telegram from the Department, signed by the Under Secretary, saying, "Because of your refusal to serve at a hardship post, you are hereby forever removed from the list of those who will be considered eligible to serve as chief of mission." I hadn't even realized I was on such a list. Still, that was rather crushing to be told that you'd never, ever, get a chief of mission assignment.

Subsequently, Ambassador Popper went back to Washington on consultation. Part of what he did when he was back was to find out what on earth had happened. He knew he had a DCM whose morale was badly bruised. He did find out. Evidently, Under Secretary Macomber had gotten White House approval to put forward the names of three relatively junior Foreign Service officers for the first time at the FSO-2 rank, with the understanding that the White House would sympathetically review their nominations as chiefs of mission. Wholly unbeknownst to me, of course, the first two had come up in regard to different posts in Africa, and each had said, in effect, "It's lovely to be considered as ambassador, but we're doing other things now that we're very much interested in." Both had turned them down. So I was the third in this unsuccessful Macomber venture to show him empathy with younger officers.

The sense that Ambassador Popper came away with was that the Under Secretary felt his policy had gotten egg over its face and he was very angry indeed. So I spent the year of 1971 to the summer of 1972 in a crestfallen state.

On July 4, 1972, about 4:00 a.m. in the morning, I got a telephone call from Bonn. It was the North Yemeni ambassador in Bonn, who said, "Bill, it's happened."

I said, "Mohammed, it's 4:00 in the morning here. What on earth has happened?"

He said, "Your Secretary of State is in Sanaa. Relations have been renewed. Now you must make yourself the first ambassador."

Well, at that point I have to go back in history. I had been in and out of Yemen from 1957 to 1959. The job of independent consul in Aden carried with it responsibility for representing on a day-to-day basis US interests in Northern Yemen, as well, where our ambassador in Jeddah was accredited as minister. The Jeddah ambassador would go down to this dreadfully benighted place (or so it was generally regarded) up in the mountain vastness of the Arabian Peninsula and be differential to the Imam of Yemen and so on, but seldom more than once in a tour in Jeddah. Reporting coverage was really left up to the Aden consul, who was nominally the second or third secretary of a non-existent legation in Yemen.

In the period of 1957 to 1959, the Russians and Chinese both-this is shortening this enormously-for different and competing reasons had gotten substantially involved in Yemen. The Russians had shown an interest in the 1920's for genuine strategic reasons because of the country's position controlling the Bab-al-Mandeb southern entrance to the Red Sea. This was part of the Russian historic push south toward fresh-water ports. The Chinese, on the other hand, wanted to block the Russian push southward by their own thrust east to west. They also saw Yemen as a jumping-off point into Black Muslim Africa, in which they were intensely interested.

Suddenly, from our reporting out of Aden, Washington began to concern itself with what the Russians and Chinese might be up to in this funny country that nobody knew anything about. In the course of an assignment that was over two years in Aden, our efforts were really divided between the Aden post and coverage of Yemen. Again making a long story short, as my Aden assignment was coming to an end, I was able to make all the physical preparations for opening a legation in Yemen. When I left, the job split into two, a legation in Ta'iz, North Yemen, and a consul in Aden. In those two years, it had become obvious to me that this archaic government in Northern Yemen couldn't last for long. This was a theocratic, despotic, just dreadful medieval kind of regime which forbade foreigners from entering the country, forbade its own students from leaving the country for further education, etc. Jails were overflowing; the overflow prisoners shuffled the streets with a ball and a chain, a huge cannon ball attached by a manacle to the ankle.

But I had gotten to know several of the young men who wanted educations and who were prepared to be ostracized politically and even go into exile for the sake of college study. It seemed to me that they were the hope of the future in Yemen. It seemed obvious that when something happened to the then-Imam (Ahmad), Saudi Arabia would intervene through the tribes, and Egypt would intervene to protect its interests. And as it turned out there were several years of civil war when the Imam finally died in 1962. But I felt it would be these young men seeking an education, believing in the future of their country, who probably, in fact, would be that future after the anticipated conflict following the Imam's death had sorted itself out.

So I helped a number of them get scholarships to the United States, and one in particular became, over the years, my closest Arab friend. He, in fact, had already gone into exile in Aden and had to support a family. In 1957 he had come into the consulate in Aden to give Arabic conversation lessons. He was threadbare. He came from a very distinguished opposition family in Northern Yemen, the Nu'man clan of intellectuals. Through him, I got really into the Yemeni scene. We had become, as I say, close friends.

Following the 1962-67 civil war, my friend, Muhammad Ahmad Nu'man, as one of the young republicans, had moved up very quickly in the post-revolutionary, post-civil war government, to be political advisor to the president, ambassador to France, then ambassador in Bonn.

So, as I say, Muhammad was calling the early morning of July 4, 1972, to say that Secretary of State Rogers was visiting Northern Yemen to put the concluding stamp on a previously worked-out arrangement, whereby Yemen would be the first Arab country to re-recognize the United States after the Arab-Israeli War of 1967 and the break of relations, in exchange for which we would be as helpful as we could in encouraging international economic aid to this desperately poor country, and we would assign an ambassador to be resident, for the first time, in Northern Yemen.

So back to the 4:00 a.m. telephone call from Bonn to Nicosia. I said, "But Muhammad, it doesn't work that way. Foreign countries don't choose their American ambassadors."

He said, "Well, how does it work?" I described what I knew of the usual selection process. He said, "You'll be hearing from us."

The press that day did indeed report that Secretary Rogers had been in Yemen, that relations were to be resumed, and the United States would assign a resident ambassador for the first time to Northern Yemen. The Secretary's party was on its way out of Yemen on his plane up to Athens. My wise ambassador, David Popper, who had worked very closely with Joe Sisco, who was Under Secretary, for many years, said, "Bill, I think you ought to call Joe Sisco in Athens tonight." It was still the night of the Fourth of July.

I was able to get through to Sisco in Athens later that evening and told him about the early morning call from Bonn.

Sisco asked if I would be interested in the Yemen job.

I said, "I'd love to, but you may or may not be aware that there's rather a veto outstanding on my being considered for this level of position."

He said, "If I were you, I wouldn't worry about that. In fact, this is music to my ears. The Secretary is really taken by Yemen and he wants a dynamic young officer to go there. I'll be in touch with you."

I learned that what subsequently happened was that the Yemeni ambassador to the U.N. came to call on Sisco in the wake of the Secretary's Yemen visit and reportedly said, "We're delighted by the Secretary's visit to Yemen and the resumption of relations after this long break, and the fact that you're going to be assigning a career ambassador to be resident. We realize that in your system, you do not welcome comments by foreign countries on the possible candidates, but. . ."

The Under Secretary interrupted: "Mr. Ambassador, I wish you'd just stop right there and let me tell you who we have under consideration." And a month later I was assigned to Yemen, sworn in by none other than Under Secretary Macomber.

Q: Was the title of the country North Yemen?

CRAWFORD: Yemen Arab Republic.

Q: Could you describe what was the situation there when you came? We're talking about 1972. Not only what the situation was there, but could you describe the relationship between the United States and the two Yemens, the one in Aden, the other in Northern Sanaa. You were going to Sanaa.

CRAWFORD: Right. Yemenis traditionally think of themselves as a single country historically, going all the way back to the Sabeian era (Queen of Sheba). They have a very strong sense of historical background, are convinced that at one time their nation extended from what is now the southern part of the Saudi Red Sea coastline, the Asir, which is clearly Yemeni in culture, through what is currently Northern Yemen, the Yemen Arab Republic, and the People's Democratic Republic of South Yemen, PDRY, the capital of which is Aden. Culturally, the Hadhramaut in the eastern PDRY also seems to have been part of that nation.

Currently, in fact, this historic entity has been split up. Aden and its hinterland was the traditional British colony of Aden and the Aden protectorates and is a woebegone place, really all dependent on Aden, which the British used as a coaling station on the way to India. The British played their cards wrong and turned over independence to a Maoist Communist Party when they were finally forced out of Aden, instead of turning it over to a truly center-of-the-road nationalist party, with a disastrous result. It had a population upon independence in the '60s of about 1.5 million, but that population is down now to about 900,000. In other words, the Yemenis in the PDRY voted with their feet and have fled the country. It is totally dependent on the Soviet Union, which has taken over all the British bases, refinery, and excellent port facilities. It is the only completely controlled Soviet satellite in the Middle East. The Soviets have close relations with the Syrians, and so on, but nowhere else in the area a client state like the PDRY.

Northern Yemen is a mountain country immediately to the north of PDRY, with a population of about 7.5 million, maybe 8.5 million, half the population of the Arabian Peninsula. Yemen exports people and has throughout history. Thus, there are fairly large Yemeni communities in the United States.

Q: In Lackawanna, New York.

CRAWFORD: In the steel mills, the Detroit automobile industry. Northern Yemen is a scenic mountain country, with the most intensive system of agriculture anywhere between there and Japan, and just a wonderful country to be in. The people have a sense of humor and they're open and friendly, religiously tolerant. They have to be because they're divided between Sunni and Shi'a just about equally.

The same former language instructor out of Aden, later to be the ambassador to France and Germany, suddenly become the foreign minister, presiding the day that I present my credentials to the new and democratically elected president of Northern Yemen after the years of civil war. The foreign minister scheduled it so it would be on the tenth anniversary of American recognition of the republic.

Really one of the most remarkable, warm things that could happen to any Foreign Service officer, there was a Cabinet of, say, 12, and seven or eight were ministers who had gone to the United States under scholarships that I had managed to get them when consul in Aden way back in 1977 to 1979. It was really a very special, loving relationship and happy.

I was fortunate, too, because I had extraordinary backing from Secretary of State Rogers, who had had what many people referred to as a "mystical experience," in his visit to Yemen on that July Fourth, to resume this relationship. I won't belabor the story, but through various mechanical failures of airplanes and so on, all the best arrangements collapsed and he had to fly into Sanaa to a tiny airport after dusk had fallen. He had a very tight schedule on this Middle Eastern trip. Everybody knew that if he didn't make it to Sanaa that night, he'd have to do so the next morning. He flew in, tribesmen having drawn up jeeps all along the otherwise unlit landing strip to shine their headlights on it, with all the lighted flares. He just loved it. The Yemenis were very sophisticated, and, as he reported to me, impressed him by not asking anything of him except to welcome the resumption of relations and with the assignment of a first resident ambassador. They said, "You, the United States, have great influence in all those world groups, the World Bank, the IMF, the U.N. Development Program. We just hope that you will put in a good word with them about our needs as one of the five poorest countries in the world."

Rogers was so taken by that, the one country that hadn't asked anything of him in terms of money, that he said, "I really want to help those people. I want to establish an effective American presence and AID aid program. Call on me any time you want."

Q: So it was much more of a personal relationship there, both on your part and the part of Secretary of State, than is usual in countries.

CRAWFORD: Yes, a very special, warm, and loving thing.

Q: Did we have any strategic interests there?

CRAWFORD: We felt we did, very definitely, because by then the Russian-dominated Aden, or the PDRY, was busy trying to subvert Northern Yemen. The Russians were playing on both sides. The Russians were arming both. Over the years, going all the way back to the 1950's, of which we spoke earlier, we had a growing awareness that this country was half the population of the Arabian Peninsula, and that if it turned sour and became like its southern neighbor, the PDRY, Communist controlled and Russian dominated, that you'd have a real danger to the peninsula's oil assets, and particularly with the metastasis of those million-and-a-half Yemenis working in the oil fields. There was a very strong sense of American strategic interest.

I was, indeed, strongly backed by Rogers, and the people in Washington knew that he wanted an effective American presence, so very quickly we had an aid program going, a Peace Corps presence, and had committed in the first year about \$30 million of assistance to various programs. It was a very exciting, rewarding time.

Two years later, again on July Fourth, oddly enough, I was summoned back to Washington to be interviewed by Secretary of State Kissinger, to go to Syria as ambassador, along with Dick Murphy, and Dick Parker. The three of us were interviewed separately by Dr. Kissinger. But in my file that went up to him, the Assistant Secretary of NEA, then Roy Atherton, put in a note which he was kind enough to inform me of. Apparently it was along the lines of: "You asked to see him, but we'd really rather not pull Crawford out of Yemen because we've just got things going there." So that was the way it would have worked, except for the events in Cyprus. I went off on summer vacation hiking in Norway. In the end it was only for a few days. When Ambassador Rodger Davies was killed in Nicosia, Kissinger summoned me back urgently, and within what was then a record time in US history confirmed by the Senate, briefed by President Ford and Secretary Kissinger, and on my way back, not to Yemen but Cyprus.

Q: Back to Yemen. What sort of things would you do as an ambassador? I'm thinking of somebody who is reading this transcript and wants to know what did you do.

CRAWFORD: Traveled all over the country. Ambassadors should never get stuck in the capital. I resisted the efforts of the Department of State to send me a Chrysler Imperial, which would have been operable on only 11 miles of road in the capital. Instead, I managed to get a Range Rover out of them, so that I was able to get all over the entire country, called on tribal leaders and villagers, went to see irrigation projects, water drilling projects, saw the Peace Corps volunteers in their villages, took them in hand on weekends, those that were stationed in Sanaa, went out on tours all over the surrounding areas looking for archeological remains.

I had a wonderful relationship with the government. As I say, my best friend there had become the foreign minister, and he'd call at five minutes to 1:00 and say, "Where are the corn flakes?" He had a terrible ulcer, so he'd drop in in five minutes, driving my wife up the wall, for literally Wheaties or Corn Flakes for lunch, which was the only thing his stomach would take. We would talk about anything and everything going on in the country. It was still a very fragmented country and a lot of problems remaining from the civil war. But he was passionately devoted to its development and new-fangled techniques as satellite photography for economic development projects and so on. It was a very special relationship.

He was, unfortunately, murdered in the streets of Beirut shortly before I left, two or three months, because he was on his way to Baghdad, carrying proof of an Iraqi attempt to overthrow his own government. He was commissioned by his president to confront the Iraqis with the proof, and they knew he had the proof in hand, and they had a small Palestinian group in Iraq gun him down in the streets of Beirut.

But it was just a wonderful time, building an effective and by and large, unselfish, American presence in a country that had an awful lot to do with the Russians and Chinese, and still liked the Chinese very much. They'd gotten very fed up with the Russians, and wanted the American presence back as a counterpoise.

Q: How did you deal with the Chinese? During that period, we were just beginning to develop relations with the Chinese.

CRAWFORD: Correct, cool. We had effectively no social dealings. We'd bow politely, even shake hands, as I recall, when we met. They were doing some very good things in that country.

Q: They were building a port, weren't they?

CRAWFORD: Principally a road. They saw that the one thing that would get them the most credit was the major road system tying together the three cities of Hodeida, Sanaa, and Ta'iz. They did a wonderful engineering job. What impressed the Yemenis was that the Chinese were not just managers. The Chinese engineers would get down and do manual labor right along with their approximately 10,000 Yemeni workers. It was a pretty effective job, and they ran good health clinics. The Yemenis liked them.

Q: How about the Soviets?

CRAWFORD: They did not like the Soviets. The Soviets, the North Yemenis felt, with justice, had really plighted their troth to the PDRY. The Yemenis saw that the Russian effort in Northern Yemen was basically aimed at extending northward their zone of control in Aden, or, at best, a sort of tongue-in-cheek effort to keep North Yemen from subverting the Russian-controlled regime in the south, which they could have done if they'd wanted to given their population preponderance. It was a very exciting, building time.

Q: Was Egypt playing a role there at that time?

CRAWFORD: Egypt had gotten really burned. In 1962 Egypt had gone in with an expeditionary force of 50,000 Egyptians at its maximum, to help its side in the civil war, a war which Egypt really lost against the Saudi-backed tribes. Egyptians used to call Yemen their Vietnam. The parallel was far from exact, but they pulled out in 1967 when they lost that war with the Israelis. But that was really a pretext to call home the troops. They had lost the war. They had never managed to extend their control outside the main cities, even with the air force, sophisticated equipment, and the use of poison gas.

Q: Very much the shades of what happened to the Soviets in Afghanistan.

CRAWFORD: Yes. Against tribesmen who were mobile and know their terrain, and who love warfare. The Yemenis were very much like the Afghans in that respect. It's a way of life for the tribes.

Q: Now we come to the events that caused your sudden assignment as ambassador to Cyprus. For somebody who is not too conversant with this, you might just give somewhat of a summary of what brought about the assignment.

CRAWFORD: I touched on this earlier. I think two things. First of all, there had been the cataclysmic events in the summer of 1974 in Cyprus, in which the junta had made its final desperate effort to unseat Makarios, had very nearly killed him, but he escaped with his life. I remember I was in the Department, having just talked to Secretary Kissinger about going to Syria. He said, "Particularly at the wish of NEA, your own bureau, you will be going back to Yemen. You're free to go on your summer vacation."

The day I was leaving the Department happened to be the day that the Greeks moved against Makarios. A couple of senior US officials remembered my Cyprus experience and called to ask my thoughts on the Makarios course of events.

The then-Assistant Secretary for IO [International Organization Affairs] was one call, and the other was from the National Security Council. My first response was to ask if Makarios had escaped alive. They told me the newest reports indicated he might have.

I said, "He's a cat with nine lives, and if he has escaped he will be back, because he's beloved by the Greeks and a master politician. Who have the Greeks put in his place?"

"Somebody called Nicos Sampson."

I said, "You mean that paranoid killer?" If anything more were needed, that would discredit the Greek effort, and I explained that he was a discredited paranoid killer.

Q: Could you give some background? It's an important factor that they put this man in there.

CRAWFORD: The junta had, I believe, gone to a couple of other "respectable" Cypriot political leaders, who had turned them down and said, "We're all loyal Greeks, but we don't approve of your apparently impending action against our president, and we're not going to be a party to this."

Nicos Sampson had been a newspaper photographer and later newspaper editor/owner in the 1960's, just a plain despicable man whose claim to fame in history was that he carried in his newspaper during the period of the fight against the British pictures of a British woman and child blown up or shot in the back, lying bleeding to death on a Nicosia street. The common story was that it was Sampson who had shot them in the back and then stepped up to photograph them and give it more publicity. This was the view that the Cypriots had of him-cheap, unintelligent, ambitious, a killer, a thug. Most sensible Cypriots and foreigners refused, even before this, to have anything to do with him. In Cyprus, as deputy chief of mission from the 1968 to 1972 period, I had refused his invitation to come to his house, he was such a despicable person. The British obviously felt that way and so did many Greek Cypriots. I pointed out to my interlocutors on the telephone that the fact that Sampson was the only man the junta had found to play their game means their effort was discredited from the start and I doubted Sampson would last.

They said, "Who will take his place?"

I said, "In the absence of the Archbishop, probably Glafkos Clerides, the Speaker of the House, a fine man who is in the constitutional position to step in as acting president. The next thing that's going to happen is that Turkey is going to invade, and nothing that we do will stop them. We stopped them twice before, and this time they're going to view this as such a serious disruption of the status quo, that under their treaty rights they will almost certainly invade Cyprus. We won't be able to stop them."

Question: "How much of Cyprus do they want to take? All of Cyprus?"

I said, "No. They'll go for the northern third, which is enough to establish strategic control over the island. Finally, one gratuitous comment, and that is look for the early fall of the junta, because Greeks cannot, in their pride, stomach a government which has so seriously misbehaved and jeopardized Greece's reputation around the world. So look for the early fall of the government in Athens. Is there anything that I could usefully do in this evolving situation?"

"We'll check with the Secretary." The answer came back the following day, as a matter of fact, "Thank you very much. We've got it under control. The Secretary thanks you, but you're free to go on your vacation."

I did. I went off to hike in Norway sometime in August, and had hardly started when the Norwegian police found me on top of a fiord and flew me back into the capital, where I was told by our ambassador that I was to return to Washington instantly at the Secretary's request. Our ambassador told me of Ambassador Davies' assassination in Nicosia and speculated that this was the reason for the preemptory summons. On my wilderness hike, of course, I had heard nothing of what had happened in Cyprus after checking out of the Department.

Q: This is Rodger Davies, who was shot on August 19, 1974.

CRAWFORD: And it was August 19 that the Norwegian police tracked me down. I flew back. I think the fact that Kissinger had seen me just a few weeks before in relation to Syria was relevant, as well as my four years previous experience in Cyprus.

Q: It was such a fast-breaking situation, I assume, that the idea was to get somebody in place right away.

CRAWFORD: Yes. President Ford and the Secretary prevailed on Congress to treat Senate confirmation as an emergency. From start to finish, from notification to the Senate to confirmation, took about two hours. I was sworn in, and I was off in just a few days, arriving in Cyprus as I recall on August 27. By that time the civilian airports in Cyprus were closed off because of the fighting. The only way to get into Cyprus was to fly into the British sovereign base area. So I flew to England, and the RAF took me into the British sovereign bases. I came, so to speak, by the back door.

Dean Brown had been out there for a few days holding the fort after Rodger's death. I believe I arrived exactly ten days after Rodger was killed.

Q: What was the situation when you were there? What did you find that you had to do-instructions from Washington? What was the situation you had to deal with?

CRAWFORD: It's curious that there really were not any instructions from Washington. In the case of my assignment in Yemen, you could say there were. Secretary of State Rogers had said, "I want to help these people and establish an effective American presence." I certainly never received any instructions from Dr. Kissinger, except to go out there and get there in a hurry. So I think it really was more than anything how I came to conceive of what I should be doing. Nobody ever told me. I suspect that's true more often than not.

Q: In the interviews I've been doing, in a fast-breaking situation, the person in the field essentially writes his or her own instructions, unless there's some doubt about their competence. So with all the modern communication and technology, when the chips are down, the reliance is in the person in the field.

CRAWFORD: On the plane crossing the Atlantic, I decided that the first thing I had to do was get back into effective communication with the leaders on both sides.

Q: You are speaking about Turkish and Greek leaders, or were there more leaders than that? What about Makarios?

CRAWFORD: Makarios was in London, and the acting president of Cyprus was Clerides. In a sense, the first policy thing I did, although I in no way thought of it as making policy, which produced immediate grumbles from Dr. Kissinger, was in my brief remarks on being sworn in by the Deputy Secretary. I spoke of an island whose very independence and unity were threatened unless remedial measures were taken soon to prevent a permanent division of the island, to get the communities back into negotiation, to terminate the foreign military presence, etc. Word came down through Arthur Hartman, the Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, that the Secretary had rather blown up about his new ambassador in Cyprus making policy before he even arrived on the island. I said, "It's simply a statement of fact. The island is now divided, and unless somebody does something, it's going to stay divided. I wasn't trying to make policy, Arthur."

He said, "Well, the Secretary is angry."

So I said, "By the way, Arthur, I'm going to stop and call on Makarios in London." Arthur looked troubled. I guess he realized more than I did at that point the extent to which the Secretary-this does not give credence to those who think the United States was involved in the effort to overthrow Makarios; we absolutely were not-but it was perfectly true that the Secretary of State did not like Archbishop Makarios, and vice versa.

Q: This is almost endemic. There would be a long line of those. I'm told he was a very difficult man.

CRAWFORD: The Secretary of State or the Archbishop?

Q: (Laughs) I think both, but particularly Makarios.

CRAWFORD: I actually rather liked him. He was very cagey. There was no pious virtue about him despite his chosen profession. He had tremendous sagacity as a politician: very wily and very tough. But you had to admire that. He was shrewd. As Dr. Kissinger once venomously said to him in my presence, "Your Beatitude, we don't have any problem with you, except you're too big for your island." (Laughs)

So when I repeated that I intended to call on the Archbishop, he said, "The Secretary would not like that."

I said, "I'm sorry, I've already been asked by the Archbishop's entourage to make sure that I stop in on my way out. Although he is not currently the president of Cyprus, he will again be. Clerides is only the acting president. I really have no choice." So I did call on Makarios. I'm very glad I did, because it helped pull back on the suspicion, which Makarios really had, that the United States had not only supported the junta, but also its effort to remove him. So it helped to get me off on a better foot. At least I didn't have Makarios and his supporters against me.

Q: The Secretary of State, again through an intermediary, basically says, "Don't see him," and you say, "I have to see him."

CRAWFORD: Because I knew the situation on Cyprus, that Makarios would return.

Q: But I'm really talking about here in the Department of State. When you were told it wouldn't be a good idea, you said, "It really is a good idea," and then there was no further opposition? Or did you go directly against instructions?

CRAWFORD: It was not a direct instruction. Arthur shrugged and said, "I'll tell the Secretary that the horse is out of the barn door, you've already been asked by the Archbishop's entourage to make sure that you call. It would then be a clear insult not to do so." I emphasized that from my point of view, not to mention my safety, it really had to be done. And I'm glad I did, because that was a calculation.

We had just had an ambassador who got killed by ultra-Greek nationalists and who were still very, very angry over the failure of the attempted coup. Makarios already felt that we were responsible for what had happened. When I got to Cyprus, it was the ultra-nationalists, the EOKA types advocating union between Cyprus and mainland Greece, and EOKA-B, the second EOKA movement (the first having been back in the 1960's under General Grivas) who were certain to be implacably hostile. It was they who had killed Davies. If in addition to this group, other Makarios' supporters, who constituted the overwhelming majority of the Greek Cypriots and truly adored him as a leader-if they were against me, I would just be zero in effectiveness. Not only a question of physical survival. I wanted to make sure that the word got sent back from Makarios in London to his supporters on the island that I was okay and fair and could perhaps be helpful.

Then arriving in Cyprus, fortunately I had a very close, friendly relationship with the acting president, Glafkos Clerides from previous service. Fortunately also, the same was true in his own-by-then sector of Cyprus, of Rauf Denktash, the Turkish Cypriot leader. The first thing I did was to insist on and gradually gain freedom of movement. Remember by then, Northern Cyprus, one-third, or a little less, was controlled by the Turkish mainland Army. They gave lip service to the idea that Rauf Denktash was the leader of Turkish Cyprus, but in fact, he was entirely dependent on the mainland Turks and very much restricted in his own movements by them. The Turkish military who wanted none of the messiness that might have gone with an independent local leader.

So I went to the Turkish ambassador. There were two or three telephone lines across the line. The first full afternoon I was there, within 18 hours of my arrival, I got on one of those lines. Ambassador Asaf Inhan had been the Turkish ambassador when I left two years before. After greetings, I told him that within 48 hours I proposed to come across the line.

He said, "Bill, I'm glad you're back, but I think that would be most inconvenient and probably not possible."

I said, "First of all, in conducting its military operation, Turkey has announced that it is not trying to destroy the unity of Cyprus, nor the independence of Cyprus. As far as I'm concerned, I am the American ambassador to Cyprus in all of its parts, and I must have freedom of movement. There's an additional reason beyond policy. I have a lot of American citizens in the north whose welfare, under American law, is my responsibility. They have just been through a war and many of them are in trouble. I must be free to visit them." So he sighed.

I called him later again to say that we would be arriving at the checkpoint two days hence at 4:00 in the afternoon. I knew he had to check it out with the controlling Turkish mainland military.

The next message from the Turkish ambassador was that I had to have a visa.

I said, "A visa to go to all parts of a single country to which I am accredited?" So I got them to drop that.

When we got to the checkpoint as we had said we would two days later, there was an escort. I said, "I don't have to be escorted. I know my way."

The Turkish military said, "Call it an interpreter." So I had a jeep full of "interpreters" with machine guns at 16 checkpoints from there out to the northern coast. The Turks were still very much on a wartime footing, shoved guns in your face and so on.

I did establish the principle of freedom of movement, albeit very limited at first. I was able to drive out to the northern coastal city of Kyrenia, called on my American citizens there, which is where most of them happened to be, and bit by bit to extend that every weekend, to expand the area along the coast the military would allow me to visit.

I was able to convince the leadership on both sides that my freedom of movement was in their interest. To the Greek Cypriot government, which is the only one we recognized, and is still, I was able to say, "Surely, for the sake of the ultimate reunification of the island, it is useful for you to have me insist on this principle of freedom of movement in all parts of the island. Furthermore, I can perhaps see things going on of which you're unaware that may be of interest." Remembering that we were accused by Greeks of having caused the attempt on Makarios and subsequent Turkish invasion, they swallowed and said, "All right, we trust you. We understand why you're doing it, and we'll try to explain to people why you're going to cross that line. We'll try to explain so you don't get shot when you come back."

To the Turkish Cypriots, I offered the chance, and ultimately gave them, some voice to the outside world other than the Turkish mainland military with which Rauf Denktash was very restive. He had very early in his career been in exile from Cyprus in Turkey, where he was kept pretty well under lock and key and had written a book against mainland Turkish policies over the years in northern Cyprus. So while there was a semblance of Turkish unity, the reality was that Denktash welcomed contact with the outside world and the American ambassador, because it gave him a little more elbow room. At first, after the invasion, he had no freedom of movement outside his own "capital" of Nicosia. When I insisted on it, as happened on a couple of occasions, he was able to say, "Your insistence has enabled me to say that, of course, I must escort you." So it got him and the community moving in areas that the Turkish mainland military had not allowed him.

Then the rest of the diplomatic corps, the British, French, and Germans in Nicosia, who had in truth been cowering on the Greek side for fear of incurring the government's anger, not knowing how to deal with the situation, followed suit. It became the established way for all missions to deal with the confused situation in which there were two declared administrations, only one of which was recognized.

It was not very pleasant living. There were no dependents. Early on, we had to make changes in the embassy staff, because people were pretty demoralized. They'd seen their ambassador killed, gone through a war, and had a very rough time. We removed some, brought back others who had previous Cyprus experience.

Q: Who was your DCM?

CRAWFORD: Frederick Z. Brown, who had been with consul general in Da Nang. He was wonderful, not familiar with Cyprus, but it didn't matter. I had that familiarity and we had a Turkish language officer who knew Cyprus, and a couple of others whose experience went way back. We had no dependents, and I flew in with two American bodyguards who stayed with me the whole first year. They lived in the Residence. Because Rodger Davies had been killed by shooting through a window, I was never allowed near an open window. The windows were blocked off with sheets of steel, so it was very hard to tell when it was daytime or nighttime. I got out very little. When I did, it was always accompanied by two extra cars of Cypriot police, all armed fore and aft. In the car there was so much bulletproofing, I couldn't see out of my own window. And a great deal of hostility. The Greek Cypriots, by and large, people I had known socially in the earlier period, few of them came forward to offer anything. Those who did knew they were risking their lives or, at minimum, violent criticism. I was enormously grateful to the brave few who did.

Q: What did they feel towards the United States?

CRAWFORD: That we had caused the whole thing that had happened to them, the loss of their island, the Turkish invasion, the near-killing of their beloved president. They felt, to a large extent, that Dr. Kissinger personally was the cause of it, because he was the personification to them of the maligned US influence. They felt that in his previous position in the National Security Council, he had unique authority to control the actions of CIA as well as the overt side of the US foreign policy. They were convinced that we regarded Makarios as a dangerous Communist, and therefore supported the junta against democracy in Greece and against Makarios.

Q: How about the ones that supported the junta in Cyprus? How did they feel towards the United States?

CRAWFORD: They had killed Rodger Davies because they felt they had been betrayed. They had been assured by the junta representatives from mainland Greece that this whole thing had been approved by the United States, and they felt that it couldn't be motherland Greece that had made this ghastly mistake; it must have been the manipulations of the United States which had caused the whole thing to go awry, and had intentionally created a situation which would permit Turkey to invade.

Q: It's interesting. I had just left Greece, but before that, everything that happened in Greece, whether inclement weather to anything that was detrimental to the Greeks, was considered to be a machination on the part of the United States. There was this wonderful self-delusion that "We never do anything wrong; it's always somebody else." I suppose 50 years before, it was the British. Now it was the United States.

CRAWFORD: Absolutely.

Q: It's the exact play in Greece with the Greeks.

CRAWFORD: It was not the Greek ambassador that was killed; it was the American ambassador.

Q: Yes. I always found this incredible. In many ways, I've often felt that as we divide the world up, Greece should be put in the Middle East, where at least the thought processes are more, you might say, Middle Eastern than European.

Did you have any dealings with Sampson? Was he still running things?

CRAWFORD: Sampson had indeed gotten discredited in just a few days and had been run out of town. He wasn't even in Cyprus at that point. I had no dealings with him whatsoever. Clerides was acting president by the time I got there, an old and good friend.

Q: Did he remain a good friend? Were you able to deal with him?

CRAWFORD: Oh, yes, very close.

Q: What did the Greeks want from you?

CRAWFORD: Massive amounts of American aid, pressure to remove Turkish troops from their island, get Turkey to pull out. In short, an instant solution; our insistence with Turkey that all the Greek Cypriot refugees, of whom there were about 100,000 or one in every five Greek Cypriots who had been displaced from their home, that they return to their homes in the Turkish-occupied area, the Turkish troops removed, and the status quo be resumed, which was clearly impossible.

I sound throughout this as if I blame the junta. In a specific sense, yes. But in fact, there was a very long history of Greek Cypriot maltreatment of the Turks, so this has antecedents going way, way back.

After arrival, I set about trying to help the whole process of U.N.-sponsored negotiations between the two, to help the special representative of the United Nations, who is now, by the way, the Secretary General of the United Nations, Perez de Cuellar. In reality, the United States had more authority than the Secretary General's special representative, because we had more influence with Greek and Turkey and with the two communities in Cyprus.

Over the four years that I was there, we tried in countless different ways to nibble away at the intractable situation, intractable because Turkey had achieved, in 1974, what it had long wanted, and that was to move Cyprus out of a waffley area of Greek-Turkish influence and irrevocably into a zone of Turkish military hegemony. They just never liked the idea that this island thirty miles off their shores might suddenly become hostile and cut them off to the south. The Turkish ambassador expressed it to me in just those terms. He said, "Turkey is an imperial power and a continental power. That we are unnaturally prevented from breathing to the north and the east by the presence of the Soviet Union makes it all the more important that we be able to breathe to the south and to the west. 1974 solved the southern dimension. It remains to solve the western dimension."

Q: This is an unclassified interview. How effective did you find the CIA when you were there this second time? Were they helpful?

CRAWFORD: By that time (fall 1974) I think they were a bit embarrassed. They had been closely identified with the junta and therefore with its mistakes, even though, as I used to try to persuade my Cypriot friends, American errors were errors of omission, not commission. They had been too prone to believe the colonels when they told them that nothing was going to happen. So by the time I was ambassador there, I got nothing but absolute collaboration, cooperation, and support from Agency representatives. In fact, I was in a position to pretty well insist on the kind of representation I wanted and, in fact, on the officers who would represent the Agency at that time, and did so insist.

Q: How about the desk? Maybe it was slightly before your time, but Henry Kissinger had forced out the desk officer, Tom Boyatt. Was that during your time?

CRAWFORD: No, that was when I was in Yemen. Partly because, I gather, Boyatt had been calling signals about what Greece was up to and presenting the arguments very forcefully. I don't know whether Kissinger forced him out or not, because he certainly went on to have a successful career.

Q: He was moved, all of a sudden, rather rapidly over to the Senior Seminar. I joined him.

Did you find, as time went on, that you were getting good, solid support from the Department of State?

CRAWFORD: Absolutely, all the way up to Secretary Kissinger, about whom Cyprus stories are legion. I'd like to think that I got along with him quite well. I could deal with him, with humor, and he seriously wanted a Cyprus solution, no question about that. He felt the whole Cyprus thing threatened to be a real blot on his reputation in history, and he really did want it resolved if it possibly could be in his time as Secretary. So he gave me every possible support.

The enmity between Makarios and Kissinger was very real. Though Makarios dealt fairly with me, he kept letting his newspapers blame and continue to blame Kissinger for everything that happened. I reported all this. Kissinger finally, quite rightly, could accept this no longer, saying, on the one hand, to the Archbishop/president of Cyprus, who had by that time returned, "You ask for our help in solving this. You ask for aid. On the other hand, you are against us in every one of your controlled newspapers. You can't have it both ways." So after the worst of these, I was recalled. This was maybe in the middle of 1975, 1976, really at my own suggestion. It was the only way we could show Makarios we were serious about not accepting continued insults. So I was recalled very quickly and sat in Washington for two or three weeks.

Then I said, "We've made the point. I think we should find some way of getting me back to Cyprus." The then Under Secretary, Philip Habib, asked if I had any ideas.

I suggested that I draft a strong letter from the Secretary to the Archbishop, and that to the letter be added an oral message from the Secretary that I would be charged with carrying back, to say, "You can't have it both ways. If there's any more of this violence and insults to the United States and criticism of the American role, we will terminate that role and let the Cyprus situation stew in its own juices." I went back; the dual messages worked, the inspired insults stopped; and I picked up my job again.

Q: What were we doing outside of showing our good intentions?

CRAWFORD: By that time, we had established full freedom of movement. For another, we had a massive aid program. This, of course, gets into the whole business of the friends of Greece in Congress and out of Congress.

Here I digress a bit. The day I was approved by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, I went down with Secretary Kissinger, who was giving classified testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. This would have been sometime before I left, the 26th or something like that, of August 1974. I went with Secretary Kissinger, who told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee how we saw the situation, what he intended to do, and he introduced me and asked for the committee's earliest possible approval.

After the Secretary had spoken, Senator [Jacob] Javits of New York spoke. A truly remarkable man, I might say. I am paraphrasing somewhat, but he said something like this: "Mr. Secretary, everything that you've said to us this morning sounds appropriate to the circumstances and we think you're on the right course. We support you. But just a word of advice. Rightly or wrongly, I am regarded by some as the leader of what is known as the Jewish lobby in Congress with which you have occasionally taken issue over policy. Whether that is or is not correct, let me just talk to you for a minute about some realities of American politics. Jewish influence in the United States is concentrated in a few key cities-New York, Los Angeles, Chicago. Greek influence in this country is everywhere. There isn't a sheriff, a small town mayor, a state governor, highway commissioner, who hasn't to some extent become indebted to Greek American support, financial support and votes, whether Republican or Democratic. Greeks in the United States have an organization which links them, called AHEPA, the society for the preservation of Hellenic culture. It has never been a political organization; it's essentially cultural to preserve the sense of Hellenism and so on. Greek Americans have never exercised national political influence. Their interest is in the liquor licenses, the highway contracts, restaurant licenses, and so on, to protect their own local position. They've never before exercised this essentially tremendous weight on a national level."

"But the Cyprus issue has galvanized them as they have never been galvanized before, and they have a structure through which to bring political influence to bear on the national level. If from time to time, Dr. Kissinger, you have had reason in your mind to take issue with the Jewish lobby, just wait til the Greek lobby hits you." (Laughs)

Indeed, it hit him. When the Greeks got behind Carter's campaign, as an alternative to Ford-Kissinger, as you recall, leaders of the Greek community in this country passed the word to the leaders of Greek Cyprus that, "When our man Carter gets in, we will make sure that anybody who has had anything to do with Cyprus during this disastrous period is eliminated." They specifically said there would be a clean sweep of our ambassadors in Athens, Ankara, and Cyprus. The Secretary of State, of course, would be changed. They said that first. And the Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, Arthur Hartman. "We will promise you there will be a complete change of characters." Indeed, within weeks of Carter coming in, they got the change in Athens, got the change in Ankara. Arthur Hartman went off with dignity to be ambassador to France, but they got him out. They did fulfill their promise on that. A couple of other semi-subordinate officials, the Director for Southern European Affairs and so on, were moved. I was, in effect, told by my Greek Cypriot friends that the "Greek lobby" had assured the Cypriot leadership: "Crawford's next."

Then an interesting, wonderful thing happened, which was reported back to me by the Greek Cypriots, particularly the Greek Cypriot foreign minister, an old friend. He reported these conversations with the constant flow of American Greek principals to the island. So the foreign minister said, "Bill, they've told us that they're going to get rid of you. What would you like to do?" I replied that, "If there's something useful I can do here, I'd like to do it, to help put this island back together again."

So the Greek Cypriots went back to their Greek American friends and said, "If you insist on this, as condition for aid to Cyprus, if you think it's got to be done, fine. But we think that Crawford knows the island, is fair, and we'd just as soon have him stay," including, by the way, Archbishop Makarios.

When I got back, for instance, with that angry message from Kissinger, that was just before Carter came in, Makarios spoke to me. He had this benign, lovely look, with his big tall hat. He said, "Mr. Ambassador, isn't it true that under your system, ambassadors submit their resignations when a new President comes in?"

I said, "Yes, your Beatitude, it is."

He said, "Wouldn't that be in your case, also, as a career officer, that you would submit your resignation?"

I said, "Yes, your Beatitude."

He said, "What are your wishes?" Meaning he was angry at Kissinger, furious, too, at my bearing this angry message: seething.

I said, "Your Beatitude, if the time has come when I can no longer serve the cause of peace in Cyprus, I'll be happy to go. If there's still something to be of use based on my knowledge of the island and experience here, I would prefer to stay." He just smiled very faintly, having made the point that he could remove Kissinger's envoy at will. And I stayed for another three years.

Q: You are using the term "beatitude" reminds me again of another one of the interviews. It may have been Douglas Dillon or George Ball. He found himself pushed to the corner by Makarios, found himself saying, "Jesus Christ, your Beatitude, you can't do that," or something.

CRAWFORD: That was probably George Ball. He undertook a mediatory mission to Cyprus in the 1960's. There's a resonance to that later on, too, on one of Makarios' visits to Washington after all of these events. I think he was coming in from London. I was called to be back for the visit. I went up to talk to the Secretary before Makarios' arrival, and Dr. Kissinger said, "Bill, what do I call him?"

I said, "Your Beatitude."

So we went downstairs to the front entrance. Dripping with cynicism and dislike, Dr. Kissinger greeted the Archbishop when the limousine pulled up at the door. "Your Beatitude, I'm so glad to welcome you to Washington, your Beatitude." We went upstairs, and Makarios was sitting there resting his hands on his scepter symbol of office and his lovely hat and all the rest, and that's when Kissinger just started right off saying, "Your Beatitude, I want you to know that we have great respect for you, your Beatitude. It is only, your Beatitude, that we feel you're too big for your island. Of course, if you chose, you could, I suppose, be president or prime minister of Greece whenever it suited you. I suppose the one thing that would unify all those Greek politicians, your Beatitude, would be the prospect that you would come in to be president of Greece or prime minister. Now, on the other hand, if, your Beatitude, you were General Secretary of the Soviet Union, that would give us real problems to have such an adversary, your Beatitude." The meeting got nowhere, obviously.

Then as we were going down the elevator, all crushed in there with the Archbishop and his bodyguard, Secretary Kissinger and his bodyguard, me, into an elevator that ordinarily holds five, the Secretary said to the Archbishop, "Your Beatitude, when I'm with you, I really quite feel that I like you."

The Archbishop looked at him benignly and said, "Dr. Kissinger, it lasts for just about five minutes after we've parted, doesn't it?"

Q: Makarios died rather shortly thereafter, in 1977.

CRAWFORD: Yes. Then you get to other things. The Carter Administration did come in. Carter, in fulfillment of his campaign promises, appointed Clark Clifford as special emissary. We had been chipping away at various aspects of the aid problem. Aid was not a problem. In fact, it was a problem unusually in the reverse; we had more aid money voted by the Greek lobby in Congress than we could ethically utilize. I did not endear myself to the leaders of the Greek lobby, John Brademas and Paul Sarbanes, by reporting exactly that, that this was unconscionable, when there was so much poverty in the world, to be spending this amount of money in Cyprus. But they had that kind of political authority and it went through. Despite the best efforts of Kissinger and my own efforts, we really hadn't gotten anywhere against the intransigent realities on the ground, and still haven't, by the way.

President Carter appointed Clark Clifford to be his special emissary to try to resolve it. Clifford is a brilliant negotiator, a very wise man. I think, as the result of the first major mission to Athens, Ankara, and Cyprus, he was really starting to make a dent, basically saying to Makarios, "You can never get everything back. You've got to do some giving in constitutional terms, not ceding land to Turkey or anything like that, but you've got to be more flexible in negotiations than you ever have been in the past, and realize that Turkish Cypriots, for example, are going to have to have a zone which they can call their own. With our help, perhaps, you can get a federal umbrella over the whole thing so eventually you can reunite it. You can probably get the percentage area of Cyprus that the Turkish Cypriots control down from the present 38 to something under 30, but you're going to have to give. Otherwise, we can't be helpful." That's not by any means exact, but that's roughly the kind of realism that he was advocating to Makarios.

It was tough negotiating between two strong men, but we all felt that Clifford was starting to get somewhere and that Makarios was starting to move. Then he had first one, then a second heart attack, and died. He was followed by a leader, Kyprianou, without anything like the stature to carry off that kind of thing. It takes a strong man to be able to cut his losses, and Kyprianou was not that.

Q: On April 12, 1976, I notice that 2,000 to 3,000 Cypriots tried to storm the embassy. What was behind this?

CRAWFORD: They did several times. There were two main attacks. One was when I was back on consultation, and Fred Brown was charged. Another was when I was there, and I have forgotten the date. They were still very, very angry with the United States. After all, there were 100,000 refugees in and around Nicosia, who fled from the Turkish zone of occupation. They were dislocated, homeless people, though we were rapidly housing them with this most generous per capita aid program anywhere in the world, including Israel at that point. They were a lot of bitter, desperately angry people. Students could be very easily whipped up, and that's what happened. They were students whipped up by professional agitators. They had already burned down a chunk of the American embassy at the time that they killed Rodger Davies. They burned down a little bit more when Fred Brown was in charge. They tried a third time, and that was the last.

By then, we were better organized with tear gas in place, more levels of local defense. Kissinger at that point had given his warning to Makarios, "If anything more happens to our embassy, we're going to pull out." The previous violence had certainly been condoned, indeed if not instigated, by Makarios. So the warnings had taken some hold. The students were still agitated and tried again to burn the embassy, but by that time, we not only had a great deal of cooperation from the U.N. forces, with the Canadian chief of staff for the U.N. forces in quietly positioned-not quite in U.N. terms "legal," but de facto active Canadian-American friendship-had stationed his troops in side streets, ready to move a couple of personnel carriers, ready to move in if something really got out of hand. Furthermore, the mainland Greeks by then had seen that it was not in their interest. They controlled the Greek Cypriot Army and national guard, and it was not in their interest to let things out of control.

Q: By this time, of course, the colonels were long gone.

CRAWFORD: It was a totally different situation.

Q: There was Karamanlis and a democratic Greek government.

CRAWFORD: Our ambassador in Athens went to Karamanlis and said, "We have disturbing reports about what might happen tonight." I believe I'm right in this. Jack Kubisch had talked to the Greek government, and they had sent instructions to the Greek general commanding the Cyprus forces, "Don't let anything get out of hand." So there were pretty nervous-making waves of student attacks on the embassy to try to burn it down, but it was controlled, and they ran out of zip before we ran out of tear gas.

Q: Looking back on this, what would you say was the effect of your time as chief of mission at a very difficult time? What would you call your accomplishments?

CRAWFORD: First of all, we were able to establish freedom of movement in a situation in which the US was excluded from dealing with one-third of the island and its leadership. The aid money, though it was excessive, was spent as wisely as could possibly have been the case. A lot was done for displaced persons, but, at our insistence, for basic economic development and improvement on both sides of the line. We got Greek Cypriot approval, believe it or not, for spending money on depressed Turkish communities, as well, because Turkish Cypriots had been displaced in the whole process of population transfer. So we spent money in proportion to the population ratio, 80-20, on the Turkish side, with Greek Cypriot approval. The aid money was spent fairly and effectively on doing a lot of good things that needed doing, more than probably needed doing in some cases.

We established a role for the United States as the effective communicator and purveyor of ideas which might lead toward a solution of the problem, any aspect of the problem or its entirety. We made it clear that our role would be more behind the scenes, that it was our preference and certainly in the interest of the parties to keep the U.N. peacemaking presence out in front. Everybody came to see that that was a logical way of approaching it, because we were so neurotically identified in different ways by our two allies, that we couldn't play the neutral role. Witness the Greek influence in the American political process by that time.

We were able, on arrival, to establish effective working relationships with leaders on both sides, despite grievances and hatreds and all the rest, largely buffered by the friendships that we'd carried over from previous experience. Over time, the extent of animosity began to ebb, and more and more of a genuine friendship began to be restored to replace this real hatred which had existed certainly from 1974. It was palpable. Several attempts were reported to have been made on my life, and there was no question about it, it was a very unpleasant atmosphere. We were regarded as the betrayer of Greek Cyprus. By 1978, that was no longer true. We were looked to as the power de facto, and the only power that could really do anything in a final sense to develop a solution. So it was a very different atmosphere when I left.

Q: This may be more in an editorial note than a question, but sometimes it's said by those who don't understand the trade of diplomacy that with modern communications, you really don't need someone in the field; you can practically do everything by telegram, it's just a matter of communication. I would think that what you've just said here shows the idiocy of doing away with someone who is there and who is intimately concerned.

CRAWFORD: Yes, I think that's absolutely true. Immodestly or modestly, whichever, I think I was the right choice to go back in, because I had a documented record of friendship with both communities, an impartiality, and was able to build on that. I had had four years of recent experience on the island, and many friendships, and built on those. If it had been somebody else who didn't have that kind of relationship, it would have been a far harder task.

Q: You could hit the ground running.

CRAWFORD: Talking to our military attaché about a month after I arrived, he said, "If you don't mind my saying so, Mr. Ambassador, I thought you were out of your mind when, within 24 hours after arrival, you started wanting to cross the line, wanting to talk to the Turkish Cypriot leadership. I just couldn't understand what you were up to, but now I see it. It worked. You established working relationships within a few days at all levels, on both sides."

Q: Your last job was as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Near East, South Asia, and North Africa, NEA. This was from 1978 to 1979. What was this job about?

CRAWFORD: I was principal deputy of four in NEA, the alter ego, supposedly, to Harold Saunders, who was not a career diplomat, but a civil servant during several administrations in the White House and Department of State, dealing with the Middle East. He had been in the White House, actually, way back in 1962-1963 when I was working with Dr. Joseph Johnson on the Palestine refugee problem. When I was due to come out of Cyprus, having thwarted all the efforts of the Greek lobby to get rid of me, due to come out in perfectly natural course of events-in fact, even more, four full years the second time-Saunders asked me to come back as his principal deputy.

It was not a very happy experience. Some of the blame I must take on myself. I had been an unusually independent field officer, running my own show as chief of mission in Yemen and Cyprus for six years. I'm sure that I did not fit easily back into a large and structured bureaucracy. I was restive with that, and it probably showed. Much of that time I was, in fact, running NEA, with all of its problems, from the Polisario in Morocco and Algeria in the west, and east to nuclear proliferation in India and Pakistan, a sweeping highly troubled area of the world: 28 countries and 45 posts, annual US expenditures of six billion dollars. The Assistant Secretary, Harold Saunders, was heavily involved in the Camp David process, so everything else, including running NEA, was mine.

The hours were horrendous. It was about 13 to 14 hours a day, Monday through Friday, ten hours on Saturday, five to six on Sunday, not including the telephone calls in the middle of the night. After the tense years in Cyprus, I think the unremitting pace began to take its toll. A not so good scene culminated in my being assigned as chief escort officer to the Senate Majority Leader, Robert Byrd of West Virginia, on a trip that he made out to the Middle East in November-December of 1978 at the behest of President Carter. The President, I believe, did not expect Byrd to accomplish anything in the Middle East, but wanted to cater to his massive ego. I was told that Carter viewed Byrd's support as essential to a lot of legislative matters pending in Congress. Apparently Byrd had been indispensable to getting the Panama Canal Treaty through.

Things might have limped along except for that disastrous trip. Senator Byrd is one of the most difficult personalities I've ever run into. The principal Senate physician, an admiral, was also on this trip. It started off badly between the Senator and me when Byrd commanded, "Of course, you will stay in my hotel at every stop."

In any case, quite uneasy in the face of Byrd's command, I told him I felt I could be of greater service to him if I stayed with our ambassadors at the various posts in order to get playback from them as to how the mission was going and handle NEA business as well. We did a lot of interesting things. It was the last official mission to see the Shah of Iran, and produced a conversation I shall never forget. We saw the Shah on the first of December, I think, and he was out by the tenth of January.

We had just been inspected in NEA. NEA as a whole, and I, personally, had come off in the inspection report, then still in draft, as the hardest working, most efficiently managed, thanks in no small measure, etc., etc., crisis area in the Department of State. In all, a superb report. I mentioned this to Newsom who evidently knew nothing of the inspection and seemed disconcerted. Naively, I did not at first link this to the Byrd trip.

Consequently, Newsom called in the chief inspector, who was scheduled to be sent to Taiwan to the position equivalent to ambassador there. The result of their conversation was that the inspection report was changed to reflect the seventh floor's dissatisfaction. (I assume to guard against a grievance proceeding in which I might have used the inspection report as a defense.)

I was somewhat in demand. The Assistant Secretary for I.O. (U.N. Affairs) asked if I would come to New York as number two at USUN. I told Newsom of the offer.

He called back a couple of days later and said, "My principals in this affair say that you are never again to hold a policy position in the US Government." He mentioned a specific, though minor, chief of mission opening as an alternative. Knowing that post in question was tentatively scheduled to go to a close friend, I told Newsom I thought this was poor way of dealing with senior personnel and indicated I would be leaving the service to accept a job that had been offered outside government.

Q: You feel this was Byrd?

CRAWFORD: Yes, I soon learned for certain that it was. Newsom told a mutual friend, not thinking it would get back to me. I remain appalled at Newsom's role in this. He was patently dishonest and his failure to tell the truth gave me no chance to argue my case or air my suspicions and those of the Senate physician about the reasons for Byrd's venom. I wrote Newsom a letter when I retired. I said in essence, "Sorry about the way you chose to deal with this, David. It would not have been mine."

Q: Was there any particular reason why one couldn't say, "Look, Byrd hates your guts"?

CRAWFORD: No. David was afraid, which characterized his career and reputation with many. Byrd had too much power, and Byrd had gone to the White House, you see, after our return. The White House had passed the word to State. David is an ultra cautious person, and it was not in his nature to just say, "Look, we've got a real problem here. How should we both deal with it?" But he didn't do that. In fact, he hid the whole thing inside a major reformation of structure of NEA at the time in which Deputy for South Asia, Jack Miklos, was also moved out of NEA. Newsom mandated a new deputy assistant secretary position, all in the guise of making the Bureau more responsive to our burgeoning concerns in South Asia, to which NEA was considered to be insufficiently responsive, etc. Anyway, a nice gloss was put on it, but it was wholly dishonest. I was bemused later to see an article in the Foreign Service Journal, in which Newsom wrote about the importance of integrity and courage in a Foreign Service career.

Q: Have you found much of this in dealing in Washington, particularly, a lack of candor?

CRAWFORD: Yes. This was one of the things that led to my dissatisfaction on coming back to Washington. I instituted a new system of personnel assignments in NEA which I think had a good effect on morale, because it was honest with people. I was making many of the recommendations coming out of NEA as to ambassadorial appointments in the area, because I was interested in making the most out of human talent. I saw too many cases in which I would know perfectly well from the seventh floor that Ambassador X was really not to be seriously considered again for another post, but when Ambassador X would come back, they would say, "Your name is on the list for this and this," rather than: "You've had two posts and we'll give you time. You can have a couple of years in holding positions, but you would be wise to start looking outside the service." Generally, until they came into my office, they were dealt with dishonestly by the powers that be. I would say, "Frank (or whoever it happened to be), I don't think they're being candid with you, because I know that while they've put your name on that list, they're not going to back you." I didn't want to do that to colleagues and friends of long standing.

Q: You realize you are at the mercy of the system, and you might as well explain how the system is working.

CRAWFORD: When I decided to retire, there was a short ceremony in NEA. I said-and I meant it-to all the dedicated officers assembled, who knew pretty well what had happened, "I would do it all over again. This has been the most exciting, rewarding career I could have possibly wanted."

Q: Thank you.

End of interview